Archive for November, 2013

I have heard many theories of the primacy of Jews in global finance and how the western central banks are controlled by Rothschilds and other Jews.  I just have a difficult time with these issues because on the one hand, one cannot deny that there are big banks like Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers which were founded by Jews while the remaining banks like Chase Manhattan and Wells Fargo others founded by WASP elite.  But more generally when it comes to rich individuals, I saw today an inaccurate article that claimed that 48% of the US billionaires are Jewish while a more accurate article finds that the right number is 24%, or 105/442.  I haven’t checked through the first article fully but did note that it lists Jamie Dimon, who actually follows Greek Orthodox Christianity as a Jew.

There is no doubt that Jewish people have been successful in business and finance but at the same time, I will maintain that there is a significant exaggeration about their actual proportion in finance and in wealth that is not accidental.  The claim that there is overrepresentation in Jews among the wealthy a subtle issue.  The difference between the false figure of 48% and the correct figure of 24% is a giant psychological jump.  The latter figure is a substantial fraction but is not one that suggests a monopoly of wealth and power while the former is getting close to the breaking point which can lead to a cascade of reinforcement for the idea that politics in America might be totally in the hands of a Jewish elite.  It is not.  It is true that the Zionist lobby exercises a great deal of power in the US for which there is evidence but if we assume that money drives politics (which I don’t believe generally although I do believe that a substantial part of US politics is driven by money) then we might consider the inaccurate figure of 48% to be alarming for the American state.

The Taki’s Magazine article was interesting enough that — and I believe these figures are accurate — that we can get a glimpse of the Jewish billionaire distribution around the world:

US 105/442 = 24%
Israel 16/16 = 100%
Russia 12/99 = 12%
Canada 6/29 = 21%
Brazil 6/45 = 13%
UK 5/37 = 14%
Ukraine 3/10 = 30%
Monaco 3/3 = 100%
Australia 3/22 = 14%
Spain 2/20 = 10%
France 2/24 = 8%
Germany 1/58 = 2%
Hong Kong 1/39 = 3%

A similar type of claim is made often that Jews dominate the US media.  There may be some truth to this but the same type of problem occur when people start claiming that clear non-Jews in positions of power in media are Jews perhaps because of unconscious bias.  The Christian Rupert Murdoch is one such case but there are probably others in this note on Zionist dominance of US media.

The reason that this note is worthwhile in the first place is because truth matters all the time.  False claims about Jewish dominance of finance or media are not acceptable to me and should not be to anyone else either.  The antisemitic literature suffers from attempting to pile together the entire financial elite to Jewish people which is just nonsense.  In fact relatively subtle geopolitical phenomena, such as WASP elite taking their revenge for having their hands be forced by 9/11 in many ways is not possible to understand if the blanket claims of the antisemitic literature are taken seriously.  I suspect that literature exists to protect the WASP elite from public scrutiny.



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Although I only have metaphysical experiences to go on this issue, I am fairly certain that actual Zionist power in America is greatly reduced. American state was locked in a recent metaphysical experience.
  • Olaf Aalop It would seem
  • Zulf Ahmed I trust my experiences. Note that this is from yesterday AFTER the deal with Iran. So this does not explain the weakening of Zionist power before the deal. My basic picture of WASP elite versus Zionist elite applies because Brzezinski, the representative of WASP elite was firmly against an Iran war.
  • Leisa Irwin Enlightenment is changing the paradigm! I feel the same thing.
  • Zulf Ahmed In my specific metaphysical experience I saw various floors in a wild but very concrete landscape. As I was passing by, Netanyahu began chasing me but I passed him. He came close and threatened to kill me. Then I came by Noam Chomsky in a room and he clawed me. Then I saw a man claiming to be Germany. Then I came across a large box with a number of men who put locks on the box and said American state locked. Then I followed someone, maybe Germany who said something about jumping to Andromeda. We jumped but hit a giant spoon, which broke from the impact. Then I jumped with a humanoid dressed in an astronaut’s costume in some strange hole which seemed like some ocean creature filled with prickly thorns which broke off as we went deeper. Soon the entire landscape had vanished.


    Two segments of dreams last night. First, during some travels I was trying to stay at some Chinese hotel where I had stayed before for seven months but left indignantly when they would not give me a discount. Second, in a different travel with another man who may have been a musician, I was lost in a gigantic campus that for some reason I was convinced was Princeton with many beautiful Gothic buildings. We walked for miles without reaching any destination and finally my attention turned to some ants on the side of the path where I was afraid of the sting of a large black ant moving in my direction from the crowd of smaller ants. The large black ant turned into a transparent hemispherical disk with some content difficult to decipher. I woke up from these dreams at this point.

The metaphysical experiences of the past hour ( Friday 1:17 AM November 29 ) includes passing a man who greeted me in a friendly manner dressed casually in a white t-shirt with some colorful marking and khaki grey pants and then I saw in a boardroom full of people who seemed surprised when a giant wooden board from one side of the wall come down on them. I don’t know who these people were but I suspect it is a symbolic event having nothing to do with the material world.

Of 3:29 AM:  A spectacled suited man sitting in a sofa jeered in the latest episode of my metaphysical experiences while I heard ‘Political Prisoner’ and had a blade slash my right eye. I am not too worried, though.

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Anglo-Americans built up Russia and Germany to take control of Western Europe by 1945.  And although they gave birth to Israel, they are reacting in slow motion to the Zionist operation of 9/11 with a deal with Iran.  This deal marks the beginning of the post-1945 world order in earnest as the Anglo-American elites’ hands were forced by the Zionist Reichstag fire of 9/11 for an equilibrium that was favorable for the imperial plans of Greater Israel.  Anglo-Americans will, in my opinion, attempt a version of the previously successful strategy with Russia and Germany in this case with Iran and Israel for hegemony in the region.  They also will ‘punish’ the Zionists for 9/11; they already have, simply with the Iran deal.  This analysis builds from some key perspectives of geopolitical power.  Both Engdahl’s Full Spectrum Dominance and Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard support the claim that Anglo-Americans seek global hegemony.  With 9/11, Zionists, who have sought hegemony of the Middle East armed with a literal interpretation of the Old Testament, had been pushing to make Iran the central pole of conflict which to some extent the United States has used as an excuse for expanding ‘missile defense’ close to the Russian border in former Soviet Republics.  The deal with Iran rebalances the field and removes some of the political progress made by Zionists since they did 9/11.

To be clear, I am predicting that Anglo-Americans will build up Iran countering Israel as a method of eventual hegemony of the Middle East without distractions.

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The game of global elite is and has always been about geopolitical power.  There is little question that Zionists seek geopolitical power.  All empires do.  But the antisemitic literature very often suggest that the only party seeking geopolitical power are ‘the Jews’.  There are many problems with this claim, the least of which is the assumption that ‘the Jews’ exist as a unified bloc.  That is the position of the Zionists within the ideology that claims the ‘the Jews’ are a race-nation.  Most American Jews are liberals and do not necessarily subscribe to Zionist ideology.  But leaving aside the issue of the success of the Zionist ideology in indoctrinating people who are Jewish by birth, there are severe problems with the antisemitic literature that claims something like, ‘the Jews rule the world’ or ‘Jewish World Order’ or other equivalent claims.

The true geopolitical power for the past few centuries have been the Anglo-American WASP elite.  Preparata argues in his book that Angl0-Americans built up Germany to pull it down and conquer Western Europe.  But Sutton has argued in a series of three books that Wall Street supported the Bolksheviks whose leaders were Jewish but whose backers were WASP, Wall Street financing of Hitler’s Germany.  The Rockefeller-founded Council on Foreign Relations was planning postwar American global hegemony before the Second World War began in the 1930s.  It was the Anglo-American WASP elite who were the primary orchestrators in my view of that war which was a Holocaust of 60 million.  The antisemitic literature will claim that it was due to the Jews.  This is a complex topic and there is evidence that ‘Judea declared war on Germany’ but behind the loudness of the Zionists the real power was the Anglo-American WASP elite.

Pentagon has had plans for world domination that is clear and explicit from 1945 which more recently has embraced the doctrine of Full Spectrum Dominance of the globe continuing the strategy begun postwar of fabricating the Cold War during the Truman administration.  People can find obscure references to how some Jewish person had made some pronouncement for conquering the world but the obvious is missed, that the instrument of world domination in the current period has been the American state, its military, its intelligence agencies.  While one can tabulate the influence within the American state of the Zionists, for example found in the video alleging that Zionists did 9/11 (which I believe is true) this influence is relatively recent and the power had been retained by the Anglo-American WASP elite.



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The United States, Israel
and the Palestinians

Fateful Triangle may be the most ambitious book ever attempted on the conflict between Zionism and the Palestinians viewed as centrally involving the United States. It is a dogged expose of human corruption, greed, and intellectual dishonesty. It is also a great and important book, which must be read by anyone concerned with public affairs. The facts are there to be recognized for Chomsky, although no one else has ever recognized them so systematically. His mainly Israeli and U.S. sources are staggeringly complete, and he is capable of registering contradictions, distinctions, and lapses which occur between them. There is something profoundly moving about a mind of such noble ideals repeatedly stirred on behalf of human suffering and injustice. One thinks here of Voltaire, of Benda, or Russell, although more than any one of them, Chomsky commands what he calls  reality‚ facts over a breathtaking range. Fateful Triangle can be read as a protracted war between fact and a series of myths‚ Israeli democracy, Israeli purity of arms, the benign occupation, no racism against Arabs in Israel, Palestinian terrorism, peace for Galilee. Having rehearsed the ‚official narrative, he then blows it away with vast amounts of counter-evidence. Chomsky’s major claim is that Israel and the United States‚ especially the latter‚ are rejectionists opposed to peace, whereas the Arabs, including the PLO, have for years been trying to accommodate themselves to the reality of Israel. Chomsky supports his case by comparing the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict‚ so profoundly inhuman, cynical, and deliberately cruel to the Palestinian people with its systematically rewritten record as kept by those whom Chomsky calls the supporters of Israel.  It is Chomsky’s contention that the liberal intelligentsia (Irving Howe, Arthur Goldberg, Alan Dershowitz, Michael Walzer, Amos Oz, Jane Fonda, Tom Hayden, Shlomo Avineri, Martin Peretz) and even segments of the organized Left are more culpable, more given to lying, than conservatives are. Nor is Chomsky especially gentle to the PLO, whose ‚Äúself-destructiveness‚Äù and ‚Äúsuicidal character‚Äù he criticizes. The Arab regimes, he says, are not ‚Äúdecent,‚Äù and, he might have added, not popular either. In the new edition, Chomsky includes invaluable material on the Oslo and Wye accords‚Äîan unnecessary line of Arab capitulation by which Israel has achieved all of its tactical and strategic objectives at the expense of every proclaimed principle of Arab and Palestinian nationalism and struggle. For the first time in the twentieth century, an anti-colonial liberation movement has not only discarded its own considerable achievements but has made an agreement to cooperate with a military occupation before that occupation has ended. Witnessing such a sorry state of affairs is by no means a monotonous, monochromatic activity. It involves what Foucault once called ‚Äúa relentless erudition,‚Äù scouring alternative sources, exhuming buried documents, reviving forgotten (or abandoned) histories. It involves a sense of the dramatic and of the insurgent, making a great deal of one‚Äôs rare opportunities to speak. There is something profoundly unsettling about an intellectual such as Chomsky who has neither an office to protect nor territory to consolidate and guard. There is no dodging the inescapable reality that such representations by intellectuals will neither make them friends in high places nor win them official honors. It is a lonely condition, yes, but it is always a better one than a gregarious tolerance for the way things are.

For some time, I’ve been compelled to arrange speaking engagements long in advance. Sometimes a title is requested for a talk scheduled several years ahead. There is, I’ve found, one title that always works: ‘The current crisis in the Middle East.’ One can’t predict exactly what the crisis will be far down the road, but that there will be one is a fairly safe prediction. That will continue to be the case as long as basic problems of the region are not addressed. Furthermore, the crises will be serious in what President Eisenhower called ‘the most strategically important area in the world.‚’  In the early post-War years, the United States in effect extended the Monroe Doctrine to the Middle East, barring any interference apart from Britain, assumed to be a loyal dependency and quickly punished when it occasionally got out of hand (as in 1956). The strategic importance of the region lies primarily in its immense petroleum reserves and the global power accorded by control over them; and, crucially, from the huge profits that flow to the Anglo-American rulers, which have been of critical importance for their economies. It has been necessary to ensure that this enormous wealth flows primarily to the West, not to the people of the region. That is one fundamental problem that will continue to cause unrest and disorder. Another is the Israel-Arab conflict with its many ramifications, which have been closely related to the major U.S. strategic goal of dominating the region’s resources and wealth.

For many years, it was claimed the core problem was Soviet subversion and expansionism, the reflexive justification for virtually all policies since the Bolshevik takeover in Russia in 1917. That pretext having vanished, it is now quietly conceded by the White House (March 1990) that in past years, the ‘threats to our interests… in the Middle East could not be laid at the Kremlin’s door’; the doctrinal system has yet to adjust fully to the new requirements. ‘In the future, we expect that nonSoviet threats to [our interests will command even greater attention,‚’ the White House continued in its annual plea to Congress for a huge military budget. In reality, the ‘threats to our interests.. in the Middle East as elsewhere, had always been indigenous nationalism, a fact stressed in internal documents and sometimes publicly.1 A ‚Äúworst case‚Äù prediction for the crisis a few years ahead would be a war between the U.S. and Iran; unlikely, but not impossible. Israel is pressing very hard for such a confrontation, recognizing Iran to be the most serious military threat that it faces. So far, the U.S. is playing a somewhat different game in its relations to Iran; accordingly, a potential war, and the necessity for it, is not a major topic in the media and journals of opinion here.2 The U.S. is, of course, concerned over Iranian power. That is one reason why the U.S. turned to active support for Iraq in the late stages of the Iraq-Iran war, with a decisive effect on the outcome, and why Washington continued its active courtship of Saddam Hussein until he interfered with U.S. plans for the region in August 1990. U.S. concerns over Iranian power were also reflected in the decision to support Saddam‚Äôs murderous assault against the Shiite population of southern Iraq in March 1991, immediately after the fighting stopped. A narrow reason was fear that Iran, a Shiite state, might exert influence over Iraqi Shiites. A more general reason was the threat to ‚Äústability‚Äù that a successful popular revolution might pose: to translate into English, the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Preface  17  threat that it might inspire democratizing tendencies that would undermine the array of dictatorships that the U.S. relies on to control the people of the region. Recall that Washington‚Äôs support for its former friend was more than tacit; the U.S. military command even denied rebelling Iraqi officers access to captured Iraqi equipment as the slaughter of the Shiite population proceeded under Stormin‚Äô Norman‚Äôs steely gaze. Similar concerns arose as Saddam turned to crushing the Kurdish rebellion in the North. In Israel, commentators from the Chief of Staff to political analysts and Knesset members, across a very broad political spectrum, openly advocated support for Saddam‚Äôs atrocities, on the grounds that an independent Kurdistan might create a Syria-Kurd-Iran territorial link that would be a serious threat to Israel. When U.S. records are released in the distant future, we might discover that the White House harbored similar thoughts, which delayed even token gestures to block the crushing of Kurdish resistance until Washington was compelled to act by a public that had been aroused by media coverage of the suffering of the Kurds, recognizably Aryan and portrayed quite differently from the southern Shiites, who suffered a far worse fate but were only dirty Arabs. In passing, we may note that the character of U.S.-U.K. concern for the Kurds is readily determined not only by the timing of the support, and the earlier cynical treatment of Iraqi Kurds, but also by the reaction to Turkey‚Äôs massive atrocities against its Kurdish population right through the Gulf crisis. These were scarcely reported here in the mainstream, in virtue of the need to support the President, who had lauded his Turkish colleague as ‚Äúa protector of peace‚Äù joining those who ‚Äústand up for civilized values around the world‚Äù against Saddam Hussein. But Europe was less disciplined. We therefore read, in the London Financial Times, that ‚ÄúTurkey‚Äôs western allies were rarely Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Preface  18  comfortable explaining to their public why they condoned Ankara‚Äôs heavy-handed repression of its own Kurdish minority while the west offered support to the Kurds in Iraq,‚Äù not a serious PR problem here. ‚ÄúDiplomats now say that, more than any other issue, the sight of Kurds fighting Kurds [in Fall 1992] has served to change the way that western public opinion views the Kurdish cause.‚Äù In short, we can breathe a sigh of relief: cynicism triumphs, and the Western powers can continue to condone the harsh repression of Kurds by the ‚Äúprotector of peace,‚Äù while shedding crocodile tears over their treatment by the (current) enemy.3 Israel‚Äôs reasons for trying to stir up a U.S. confrontation with Iran, and ‚ÄúIslamic fundamentalism‚Äù generally, are easy to understand. The Israeli military recognizes that, apart from resort to nuclear weapons, there is little it can do to confront Iranian power, and is concerned that after the (anticipated) collapse of the U.S.-run ‚Äúpeace process,‚Äù a SyriaIran axis may be a significant threat. The U.S., in contrast, appears to be seeking a long-term accommodation with ‚Äúmoderate‚Äù (that is, proU.S.) elements in Iran and a return to something like the arrangements that prevailed under the Shah. How these tendencies may evolve is unclear. The propaganda campaign about ‚ÄúIslamic fundamentalism‚Äù has its farcical elements‚Äîeven putting aside the fact that U.S. culture compares with Iran in its religious fundamentalism. The most extreme Islamic fundamentalist state in the world is the loyal U.S. ally Saudi Arabia‚Äîor, to be more precise, the family dictatorship that serves as the ‚ÄúArab facade‚Äù behind which the U.S. effectively controls the Arabian peninsula, to borrow the terms of British colonial rule. The West has no problems with Islamic fundamentalism there. Probably one of the most fanatic Islamic fundamentalist groups in the world in recent years was led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the terrorist extremist who had been a CIA favorite and prime recipient of the $3.3 billion in (official) U.S. aid given Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Preface  19  to the Afghan rebels (with roughly the same amount reported from Saudi Arabia), the man who shelled Kabul with thousands killed, driving hundreds of thousands of people out of the city (including all Western embassies), in an effort to shoot his way into power; not quite the same as Pol Pot emptying Phnom Penh, since the U.S. client was far more bloody in that particular operation. Similarly, it is not at all concealed in Israel that its invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was undertaken in part to destroy the secular nationalism of the PLO, becoming a real nuisance with its persistent call for a peaceful diplomatic settlement, which was undermining the U.S.-Israeli strategy of gradual integration of the occupied territories within Israel. One result was the creation of Hizbollah, an Iranian-backed fundamentalist group that drove Israel out of most of Lebanon. For similar reasons, Israel supported fundamentalist elements as a rival to the accommodationist PLO in the occupied territories. The results are similar to Lebanon, as Hamas attacks against the Israeli military become increasingly difficult to contain. The examples illustrate the typical brilliance of intelligence operations when they have to deal with populations, not simply various gangsters. The basic reasoning goes back to the early days of Zionism: Palestinian moderates pose the most dangerous threat to the goal of avoiding any political settlement until facts are established to which it will have to conform. In brief, Islamic fundamentalism is an enemy only when it is ‚Äúout of control.‚Äù In that case, it falls into the category of ‚Äúradical nationalism‚Äù or ‚Äúultranationalism,‚Äù more generally, of independence whether religious or secular, right or left, military or civilian; priests who preach the ‚Äúpreferential option for the poor‚Äù in Central America, to mention a recent case. The historically unique U.S.-Israel alliance has been based on the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
20  Preface  perception that Israel is a ‚Äústrategic asset,‚Äù fulfilling U.S. goals in the region in tacit alliance with the Arab facade in the Gulf and other regional protectors of the family dictatorships, and performing services elsewhere. Those who see Israel‚Äôs future as an efficient Sparta, at permanent war with its enemies and surviving at the whim of the U.S., naturally want that relationship to continue‚Äîincluding, it seems, much of the organized American Jewish community, a fact that has long outraged Israeli doves. The doctrine is explained by General (ret.) Shlomo Gazit, former head of Israeli military intelligence and a senior official of the military administration of the occupied territories. After the collapse of the USSR, he writes, Israel‚Äôs main task has not changed at all, and it remains of crucial importance. Its location at the center of the Arab Muslim Middle East predestines Israel to be a devoted guardian of stability in all the countries surrounding it. Its [role] is to protect the existing regimes: to prevent or halt the processes of radicalization and to block the expansion of fundamentalist religious zealotry.4 To which we may add: performing dirty work that the U.S. is unable to undertake itself because of popular opposition or other costs. The conception has its grim logic. What is remarkable is that advocacy of it should be identified as ‚Äúsupport for Israel.‚Äù With some translation, Gazit‚Äôs analysis seems plausible. We have to understand ‚Äústability‚Äù to mean maintenance of specific forms of domination and control, and easy access to resources and profits. And the phrase ‚Äúfundamentalist religious zealotry,‚Äù as noted, is a code word for a particular form of ‚Äúradical nationalism‚Äù that threatens ‚Äústability.‚Äù Despite shifting alliances in a highly volatile region, Israel‚Äôs role as a Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Preface  21  U.S. strategic asset seems stable in the foreseeable future. Its advanced economy, like that of its patron, relies very heavily on the creativity and funding of the enormous state sector. The two countries are linked in joint research and development projects, mostly military and spin-offs, and Israel provides basing and storage facilities for the vast U.S. system of intervention forces targeting the oil-producing regions. Though effectively an extension of the U.S. military and economic interests, Israel is not entirely under control‚Äîclient states commonly pursue their own paths, to the chagrin of the masters. Contradictions abound, at least contrary strains, as they do in U.S. policy as well. The Israeli Air Force is very visibly carrying out maneuvers in Eastern Turkey aimed at Iran, using advanced U.S. 15-E jets that can attack Iran and return without refueling. At the same time. headlines in the Israeli press report, ‚ÄúIsrael and Iran have been conducting direct trade relations‚Äîfrom 1994.‚Äù Unlike the U.S., Israel does not officially list Iran as an enemy state, and there are no official barriers to trade, which is small but growing.5 Israel‚Äôs development and deployment of weapons of mass destruction continues under U.S. aegis, as it has since the Kennedy years. The wellinformed military analyst Uzi Mahanaimi reports that ‚ÄúIsraeli assault aircraft have been equipped to carry chemical and biological weapons manufactured at a top secret institute near Tel Aviv, military sources revealed yesterday‚Äù. Crews flying U.S. F-16 jets are trained to ‚Äúfit an active chemical or biological weapon within minutes of receiving the command to attack.‚Äù The weapons are manufactured at a biological research institute in Nes Ziona, near Tel Aviv, which ‚Äúattracted unwanted scrutiny‚Äù when Dutch authorities confirmed that it was the intended destination of an El Al airliner that crashed in Amsterdam, killing many people on the ground, and found to have been carrying nerve gas components. ‚ÄúThere is hardly a single known or unknown Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Preface  22  form of chemical or biological weapon‚Ķwhich is not manufactured at the institute,‚Äù according to a biologist who held a senior post in Israeli intelligence. Nes Ziona does not work on defensive and protective devices, but only biological weapons for attack, according to the British Foreign Report. The devices have already been used, the report continues, in the attempt by Mossad agents to kill Khaled Mishal in Jordan, which backfired.6 Once again, Israel is following in the footsteps of its patron. After World War II, the U.S. took over the hideous biological warfare operations of Japanese fascists, including the personnel, and protected them from war crimes prosecution‚Äîridiculing Russian war crimes trials of these Class A war criminals as Communist-style show trials. The U.S. takeover of the programs was denied until it was exposed in the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars in 1980. The achievements of the Japanese Mengeles became the core of U.S. biological warfare capabilities‚Äîone reason, along with nuclear bombs, why the U.S. official stand from 1950 was that it is ‚Äúfallacious‚Äù to divide weapons ‚Äúinto moral and immoral types,‚Äù and that the concept of ‚Äúweapons of mass destruction‚Äù does ‚Äúnot appear to have any significance.‚Äù The Joint Chiefs of Staff included biological warfare in war plans by 1949. Shortly after, the plans included a first-use option, along with nuclear weapons, a position formalized by the National Security Council in 1956 and in force until the 1972 treaty banning biological warfare. Recently released Chinese and U.S. archives raise questions about the actual use of these weapons in North Korea and China, previously assumed (by me as well) to have been Communist propaganda; China appears to have downplayed their use, so as not to provide information to the enemy. 7 The international framework in which these developments are proceeding is fraught with danger and uncertainty. The U.S. has been isolated for years in its policies on Israel and the Palestinians, and only Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky

Preface  23  since its Gulf War victory has it been able to institute the program it had demanded in opposition to a very broad international consensus. The U.S. is now quite isolated in its policies towards Iran, which most of the world wants to reintegrate into the international system. In the case of Iraq, the U.S. and U.K. have lost much of the limited support they had in the past, and must now pursue military action in increasingly brazen violation of the UN Security Council and regional opinion. Secretary of Defense William Cohen ‚Äúwon no public support‚Äù when he ‚Äúvisited Saudi Arabia and five other friendly Persian Gulf countries‚Äù to explain the U.S. policy of punitive raids against Iraq in March 1999. A senior Saudi official stated: ‚ÄúWe object to any nation taking matters into its own hands, and using bombing as an instrument of diplomacy.‚Äù Saudi Arabia has consistently refused to allow U.S. combat planes based there to join in operations against Iraq.8 The U.S. hope is that the region‚Äôs governments are sufficiently despotic so as to be able to suppress the growing popular opposition to the savage devastation of the civilian society of a neighboring Arab country‚Äîopposition that is growing elsewhere as well. Concerns over these developments must surely have become serious as the U.S. and its British client were seeking to prepare the ground for bombing of Iraq in late 1997. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was sent to Saudi Arabia, but treated with noticeable coolness. In sharp contrast, former Iranian president Rafsanjani, ‚Äústill a pivotal figure in Tehran, was given an audience by the ailing King Fahd in Saudi Arabia,‚Äù and as his 10-day trip ended on March 2, Foreign Minister Prince Saud described it as ‚Äúone more step in the right direction towards improving relations.‚Äù He also reiterated that ‚Äúthe greatest destabilising element in the Middle East and the cause of all other problems in the region‚Äù is Israel‚Äôs policy towards the Palestinians and U.S. support for it. These policies might activate popular forces that Saudi Arabia greatly fears, as Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Preface  24  well as undermining its legitimacy as ‚Äúguardian‚Äù of Islamic holy places, including the Dome of the Rock in East Jerusalem, now effectively annexed by U.S./Israeli ‚Äúgreater Jerusalem‚Äù programs. Shortly before, the Arab states had boycotted a U.S.-sponsored economic summit in Qatar that was intended to advance the ‚ÄúNew Middle East‚Äù project of Clinton and Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres. Instead, they attended an Islamic conference in Teheran in December 1997, joined even by Iraq.9 The increasingly prominent Turkish-Israel alliance is not welcome to other countries of the region, and there are signs that they may be considering Iranian initiatives to develop a regional system that would be more independent of U.S. control, including the Gulf oil producers, Egypt, and Syria. That is not a prospect that U.S. planners can lightly tolerate, particularly with the reasonable likelihood that not too far in the future the current oil glut will decline and the Middle East share in global oil production will substantially increase. It is against the background of such possible developments in the region that U.S. planning with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be assessed. Israel‚Äôs internal economy and social structure are coming to resemble that of its patron and paymaster, with growing inequality and the collapse of social support systems, along with a sense of social solidarity generally One grave internal problem is the cost‚Äîeconomic, social, and cultural‚Äîof sustaining a large and growing ultra-religious (‚ÄúHaredi‚Äù) population, which draws heavily on educational and welfare programs but contributes little to the economy. In a 1997 study, economists from the Hebrew University and Boston University found that Israel‚Äôs workforce participation for men is well below that of Western Europe and the U.S., and declining as ‚Äúultra-Orthodox non-participation‚Ķis permanent and increasing at a geometric rate.‚Äù If the tendencies persist, they will ‚Äúmake Israel‚Äôs welfare system insolvent and bankrupt Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Preface  25  municipalities with large ultra-Orthodox populations.‚Äù Refusal to work among the Orthodox is a specific Israeli phenomenon, not the case elsewhere or historically in anything like the manner of contemporary Israel. With the religious population doubling every 17 years, ‚Äúeconomic bankruptcy is imminent,‚Äù the economists conclude, though the ultraOrthodox Rabbi who chairs the Knesset finance committee feels that all is under control because ‚Äúthis country is living with miracles.‚Äù10 Conflicts between the secular and religious populations are becoming more intense, exacerbated by class and ethnic correlations. Population growth is increasing among Palestinians and ultra-religious Jews, declining among secular and privileged sectors, as in Europe. Many Israelis find the looming ‚Äúcivil war‚Äù more ominous even than the dangerous international conflicts that are likely to persist. As in the U.S., the Israeli political system is converging in a narrow center-right spectrum with little differentiation, and the traditional parties (Likud, Labor) are virtually collapsing. Their current leaders, Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, have ‚Äútwo identical maps,‚Äù political commentator Yosef Harif observes: ‚Äúfrom a political point of view there is no difference today between Netanyahu and Barak‚Äù‚Äînot that matters were very different before, apart from the differences of style that trace to the differing constituencies of the political blocs. Netanyahu‚Äôs plan is ‚ÄúAllon Plus,‚Äù an amplification of the traditional Labor Party Allon Plan that grants Israel effective control over desirable regions and resources of the occupied territories. Barak‚Äôs ‚Äúalternative‚Äù is what he calls ‚Äúthe expanded Allon Plan,‚Äù which amounts to about the same thing. Barak demands that ‚Äúwe must not uproot settlements‚Äù or ‚Äúabandon the Jewish settlement in Hebron,‚Äù and it is ‚Äúforbidden for us to agree to a Palestinian state.‚Äù ‚ÄúOne listens to the ideas of Barak and hears the voice of Netanyahu,‚Äù the reporter observes, paraphrasing the Biblical passage. Considering their records, commentator Avi Shavit, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Preface  26  speaking for the left, asks ‚Äúwhy do we hate Benjamin Netanyahu so much,‚Äù particularly since he ‚Äúbears responsibility for less bloodshed and less harm to human rights than the two patrons of peace who occupied the prime minister‚Äôs chair before him,‚Äù Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, the former ‚Äúanointed as Messiah‚Äù in delusional fantasies of the left, Shavit comments.11 With regard to the Palestinians, the U.S. and Israel continue to implement the extreme rejectionist program they have maintained since the early 1970s, in international isolation until the Gulf war gave the U.S. free rein to institute its version of the ‚Äúpeace process‚Äù: keeping unilateral control, rejecting Palestinian rights, and moving to implement a variant of South Africa‚Äôs homeland policies, though without many of the advantages that South Africa conferred on the Bantustans. The steps are reviewed in the text that follows and the chapters that update the story from 1983 to the present. At the time of writing (March 1999), the most recent stage in the ‚Äúpeace process‚Äù is the Wye Memorandum signed at the White House on October 23, 1998, and approved by the Israeli Cabinet on November 11. In agreeing, the Cabinet declared that ‚ÄúThe Government will continue to pursue its policy of strengthening and developing the communities in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, on the basis of a multi-annual plan,‚Äù including ‚Äúsecurity roads‚Äù for Jews throughout the territories and preservation of Israel‚Äôs ‚Äúnational interests‚Äù: ‚Äúsecurity areas, the areas around Jerusalem, the areas of Jewish settlement, infrastructure interests, water sources, military and security locations, the areas around north-south and west-east transportation arteries, and historic sites of the Jewish people.‚Äù Immediately following the accord, settlers established more than 12 new settlements throughout the West Bank, heeding the call of Israel‚Äôs Foreign Minister, Ariel Sharon, to ‚Äúgrab‚Äù as much West Bank land as possible. By January 1999, the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Preface  27  ‚Äúland grab‚Äù was accelerating, including isolated settlements that would be the first candidates for eventual evacuation under any settlement that is not a complete caricature. Standard practices are being followed, among them, razing Palestinian houses in the search for ‚ÄúJewish archaeological remains‚Äù and establishing ‚Äúnature reserves,‚Äù later to be converted to Jewish housing. Of particular significance is new post-Wye development in the Givat Ze‚Äôev Bloc northwest of Jerusalem, in pursuance of the Bush-Clinton‚Äî Rabin-Peres programs of cutting off what will be left to the Palestinians from the region around Jerusalem (let alone Jerusalem itself, the center of their cultural, social, and economic existence) and from the territory to the south.12 The UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling on Israel to observe the Fourth Geneva Convention, which bans settlement in the occupied territories. The resolution was passed 115 to 2, the usual two.13 The Wye agreement changes territorial arrangements in trivial ways‚Äî which are not easy to determine, since it is the first redeployment accord without a map indicating areas to be transferred to Palestinian administration.14 But it is presumably a step towards something like the 50-50 split of the territories that was Rabin‚Äôs goal in the Oslo negotiations, at least if Israel is sensible enough to abandon useless lands where the population may rot in peace in scattered and isolated enclaves. The most significant and innovative aspect of the Memorandum is its barely concealed call for state terror to achieve the goals of the U.S.-Israel program. That breaks new ground for international agreements. The Memorandum emphasizes that the Palestinian security forces, which have a shocking record of torture and terror, must act to ensure the security of Israelis. The CIA will supervise them as they carry out arrests, hold mock trials, collect arms, and Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Preface  28  ‚Äúcriminalize‚Äù incitement against the agreements. They must operate on the principle of ‚Äúzero tolerance for terror‚Äù (against Israelis), a concept that is broadly construed, as anyone familiar with the record of the CIA will understand. The Memorandum does contain a sentence stating that ‚Äúwithout derogating from the above, the Palestinian Police will‚Ķimplement this Memorandum with due regard to internationally accepted norms of human rights and rule of law.‚Äù There is no reciprocity: the security of Palestinians is not an issue, and even the meaningless and shameful comment just quoted does not apply to Israel, despite its brutal record of terror, torture, and violation of elementary legal and human rights obligations, too well-documented to review. Included are hundreds of killings of Palestinians since Oslo, most of them ‚Äúunlawful‚Äù according to Amnesty International (AI), and exceeding killings of Israelis by a considerable margin (though less than before, when the ratio was extreme). AI reports further that ‚Äúthere continues to be almost total impunity for unlawful killings of Palestinians,‚Äù not to speak of house demolitions, expulsion from Jerusalem and elsewhere, imprisonment without trial, systematic torture of prisoners, etc.‚Äîall well-documented by major human rights organizations, including Israeli organizations, but of no concern to the framers of the latest stage of the rejectionist program. No less striking is the praise of the Clinton-Gore Administration for the harsh and illegal measures employed by the Palestinian security forces to suppress opposition to the accords and ensure security for Israelis.15 Amnesty International published an assessment of the human rights situation since Oslo as the Wye Memorandum was signed.16 AI estimates 1600 Palestinians routinely arrested by Israeli military forces every year, half ‚Äúsystematically tortured.‚Äù AI notes once again, as other major human rights organizations regularly have, that Israel is alone in Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Preface  29  having ‚Äúeffectively legalized the use of torture‚Äù (with Supreme Court approval), determining that in pursuit of Israel‚Äôs perceived security needs ‚Äúall international rules of conduct could be broken.‚Äù AI reports similar practices on the part of the Palestinian Authority, including execution of two Palestinians for ‚Äúincitement against the peace process.‚Äù The State Security Courts that conduct such abuses have been endorsed by the U.S. State Department as demonstrating Arafat‚Äôs ‚Äúcommitment to the security concerns of Israel,‚Äù with the support of Vice-President Al Gore. Clinton‚Äôs achievement in bringing the two parties together to agree on the Wye Memorandum was hailed with the usual awe. He proved himself to be the ‚ÄúIndispensable Man,‚Äù the New York Times headline read, praising him for the ‚ÄúCrucial Salvage Mission.‚Äù Clinton is ‚Äústaking out the moral high ground‚Äù by insisting on the terms of the Wye Memorandum. He ‚Äúpreached accommodation to immutable realities‚Äù‚Äî ‚Äúimmutable‚Äù because they are demanded by U.S. power. He crowned his moral achievement with ‚Äúan uplifting, optimistically American speech,‚Äù while ‚Äútethering the vaunted U.S. idealism, which some Israelis and some Palestinians believe to be diplomatic naivet√©, is the promise of a fat new American purse.‚Äù Nevertheless, the idealism and moral high ground cast a radiant glow over the proceedings.17 Particular cases illustrate the reality of U.S. policy. When some atrocity occurs, Palestinians are placed under harsh curfew, no matter who is responsible. A striking illustration was the massacre of 29 Arabs praying in a Mosque by the right-wing American religious settler Baruch Goldstein in February 1994, followed by severe curfew of Palestinians and killing of many more Palestinians. Visitors to the Kiryat Arba suburb where Goldstein settled can walk to the shrine established for him, where they can worship in praise of the ‚Äúmartyr‚Äù who died ‚Äúclean of hands and pure of heart,‚Äù as the words on the gravestone read. In one of the innumerable other curfews, in September 1998, a day-old infant Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Preface  30  died in Hebron and another, three months old, died in her mother‚Äôs arms, both on their way to the hospital, when Israeli soldiers refused to let them pass through security barriers that had been set up to ensure that Jewish settlers could observe ritually prescribed seven days of mourning without disturbance. The soldiers made ‚Äúa mistake in judgment‚Äù the military spokesperson stated, ending the matter18 A few days later, Osama Barham, who now holds the record for imprisonment without charge by Israeli military authorities, reached the end of five years of administrative detention, then extended by the military without any court decision. A secular journalist, Barham is suspected of membership in Islamic Jihad, without evidence‚Äîor concern from the overseers. Barham can consider himself lucky by comparison to those sent to the Israel-run torture chamber Al-Khiam in Lebanon, administered by the mercenary army Israel established in the ‚Äúsecurity zone‚Äù it occupies in violation of a unanimous UN Security Council resolution of March 1978 ordering it to withdraw immediately and unconditionally; U.S. tolerance renders the decision moot. The first news in nine months from Al-Khiam was brought by Hassan, released after 12 years of regular torture, he reports, confirming ample evidence since 1982. Hassan may have been lucky too, as compared with the 71 Lebanese prisoners held in Israeli jails as hostages for future negotiations after having been kidnapped in Lebanon, with the authorization of Israel‚Äôs courts.19 Israeli military operations in Lebanon continue, while its occupying forces come under more successful attack by the increasingly sophisticated Hizbollah resistance (called ‚Äúterror‚Äù in the U.S., sometimes in Israel). Israeli military operations are not confined to the ‚Äúsecurity zone.‚Äù In February 1999, three Israeli officers from an elite command unit operating north of the zone were killed in a Hizbollah ambush. Israel warned that it would attack Lebanese civilian targets in Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Preface  31  retaliation, as, in fact, it has regularly done in the past. Since the end of Israel‚Äôs invasion of Lebanon in 1982. some 25,000 Lebanese and Palestinians have been killed, according to Lebanese officials and international relief agencies, along with 900 Israeli soldiers.20 The achievement of imposing its rejectionist program in near international isolation is impressive enough. But U.S. power won an ideological victory that is in some ways even more dramatic. By now, its rejectionist ‚Äúpeace process‚Äù is adopted as the framework of a just settlement worldwide, even among those who only a few years ago were calling for recognition of Palestinian rights and Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories (in accord with UN 242 of November 1967, as interpreted throughout the world, including the U.S. until 1971). So far, U.S. and Israeli leaders have been unwilling to move as far towards accommodating Palestinian rights as South African advocates of Apartheid did towards Blacks 35 years ago. Their solution was ‚ÄúBlack states,‚Äù to which the unwanted populations could be confined, to serve as a cheap labor force when needed. Presumably, the U.S. and Israel will sooner or later realize that they can gain by adopting a more progressive stand of the South African variety. If so, they will agree to call the Palestinian enclaves a ‚Äústate‚Äù and perhaps even allow them a degree of industrial development (as South Africa did), so that U.S.- and Israeli-owned manufacturers, joining with rich Palestinians, can exploit cheap and easily exploitable labor, subdued by repression. Calls for a Palestinian state are being heard, though it is instructive to look at them closely At the extreme pro-Palestinian end of mainstream discourse, Anthony Lewis, joining in the standard denunciations of Netanyahu, contrasted him with ‚Äúthe unsentimental old soldier‚Äù Yitzhak Rabin, who, with his ‚Äúsheer intellectual honesty,‚Äù was willing to sign the Oslo agreements. But unlike Rabin, Netanyahu ‚Äúopposes any solution that would give the Palestinians a viable state‚Äîtiny, disarmed, poor, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Preface  32  dominated by Israel, but their own.‚Äù That is ‚Äúthe heart of the matter,‚Äù the crucial distinction between the saintly Rabin and the bad Netanyahu. And because of Netanyahu‚Äôs recalcitrance, ‚ÄúOslo is dying.‚Äù21 In fact, Rabin, and his successor Shimon Peres while in office, forcefully rejected any idea of a Palestinian state, while the Netanyahu government has been more ambivalent on the matter (see below). But no doubt Rabin would sooner or later have come to grant the Palestinians a state that is ‚Äútiny, disarmed, poor, dominated by Israel, but their own.‚Äù There is no more reason to doubt that Netanyahu would also agree to that, as his Minister of Information has already stated. Similarly all but the most extreme fanatics in the Arab and Islamic world would probably be willing to grant the Jews a state that is ‚Äútiny disarmed, poor, dominated by Palestine, but their own.‚Äù And they might even take ‚Äúthe heart of the matter‚Äù to be the unwillingness of some ultra-extremist to adopt this forthcoming stand. A thought experiment suggests itself. One might ask what the reaction would be to a presentation of ‚Äúthe heart of the matter‚Äù in the terms just stated. The answer tells us a good deal about the ideological victory of U.S. power. Recently Hillary Clinton indicated her interest in running for the Senate in New York. In an article headlined ‚ÄúNew York‚Äôs Palestinian State,‚Äù James Dao of the New York Times asked whether she had made a ‚Äúmonumental political gaffe‚Äù in advocating a Palestinian state. What she had said to a group of young Israelis and Arabs a year earlier is that ‚ÄúI think that the territory that the Palestinians currently inhabit, and whatever additional territory they will obtain through the peace negotiations,‚Äù should ‚Äúevolve into a functioning modern state‚Äù‚Äîa state that would, surely, be ‚Äútiny disarmed, poor, dominated by Israel.‚Äù White House aides had immediately ‚Äúdisowned comments by Hillary Rodham Clinton about the need for a Palestinian state and insisted that Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Preface  33  she was speaking only for herself,‚Äù and she came under considerable attack. But when announcing her candidacy, she received some support as well. A political science professor was quoted as saying that ‚Äúsupporting a Palestinian state used to be the peacenik position, an extreme left-wing position.‚Äù But perhaps now no more. Perhaps adopting the stand of South African racists 35 years ago can no longer be condemned so easily as ‚Äúthe peacenik position, an extreme left-wing position.‚Äù22 Struggles for freedom and rights are never over, and this one is not either. All of the contesting parties in the region face very serious and possibly lethal threats. It cannot be said that the dominant outside power has helped to smooth the way towards a meaningful solution of their problems, or even towards reduction of the dangers. But that story has not come to an end either, and there are many options open to concerned people who hope to seek and pursue a far more constructive and honorable course.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Preface  34  Notes‚ÄîPreface 1.  2.  3. 4. 5. 6.  7.  8. 9. 10. 11. 12  Sections of this Preface are based on ‚ÄúNo Longer Safe,‚Äù Z Magazine, August 1993. See my Deterring Democracy (Verso, 1991; updated edition, Hill & Wang, 1992), chapter 1, and sources cited. See David Hoffman, ‚ÄúMaking Iran Public Enemy No. 1,‚Äù Washington Post Weekly, Mar. 22-28, 1993, reporting from Jerusalem on Israel‚Äôs efforts and those of two of its US. propaganda agencies, the AntiDefamation League and the American Jewish Committee. Also Israel Shahak, ‚ÄúHow Israel‚Äôs strategy favours Iraq over Iran,‚Äù Middle East International, Mar. 19, 1993. John Murray Brown, Financial Times, Mar. 23,1993. Gazit, Yediot Ahronot, April 1992, cited by Israel Shahak, Middle East International, Mar. 19, 1993. Eli Kamir, Ma‚Äôariv, Nov. 12; Dorit Gabai, Ma‚Äôariv, Dec. 21, 1997. Uzi Mahanaimi, Ha‚Äôaretz, Oct. 4; Eli Kamir. Ma‚Äôariv, Feb. 5, 1998. Gordon Cramb, ‚ÄúAir crash shakes faith in Dutch politics,‚Äù FT, Feb. 21, 1999. Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare (Bloomington: Indiana, 1998). For misleading articles on the topic, see Ralph Blumenthal, New York Times, Mar. 7, 1999, Judith Miller and Blumenthal, NYT, Mar. 4; see also my ZNet Commentary, ‚ÄúOn Staying Informed and Intellectual Self-Defense,‚Äù ZNet, Mar. 8, 1999 Douglas Jehl, ‚ÄúSaudis Admit Restricting U.S. Warplanes in Iraq,‚Äù NYT, Mar. 22, 1999. David Gardner, FT. Feb. 28; Robin Allen, FT. Mar. 3 1998. Avi Machlis, FT. Mar. 17,1999. Harif, Ma‚Äôariv, Dec. 3; Shavit, Ha‚Äôaretz, Dec. 26, 1997. Report on Israeli Settlements 9.1, January-February 1999, Foundation for Middle East Peace. For excellent analysis of the agreements, see Norman Finkelstein, ‚ÄúSecurity Occupation: The Real Meaning of the Wye River Memorandum,‚Äù New Left Review (November/December 1998),  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Preface  13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.  35  revised February 1999; Nasser Aruri, ‚ÄúThe Wye Memorandum: Netanyahu‚Äôs Oslo and Unreciprocal Reciprocity,‚Äù J. of Palestine Studies 28.2 (Winter 1999); documents appear here as well. David Sharrock, Guardian Weekly, Jan. 17, 1999. Reuters, Boston Globe, Feb. 10, 1999, 50 words. Report on Israeli Settlements, November-December 1998. Human Rights Watch, Palestinian Self-Rule Areas: Human Rights Under the Palestinian Authority (1988), cited by Finkelstein, op cit. AI, Five Years after the Oslo Agreement (September 1998). See Graham Usher Middle East International, Oct. 16, 1998; Finkelstein, op cit. Deborah Sontag, ‚ÄúIndispensable Man,‚Äù NYT, Dec. 14, 1998. Gidon Levi, ‚ÄúThe Dead Children of Hebron,‚Äù Musaf Ha‚Äôaretz, Sept. 4, 1998. Gidon Levi, ‚ÄúLetters from the Israeli Prison,‚Äù Musaf Ha‚Äôaretz, Sept. 11, 1998; David Sharrock, Guardian, May 25, 1997. Aliza Marcus, Boston Globe, Mar. 1,1999. Lewis, ‚ÄúSolving the Insoluble,‚Äù NYT, Apr. 13, 1998. Dao, NYT, Feb. 28, 1999; Agence France-Presse, NYT, May 7; James Bennet, ‚ÄúAides Disavow Mrs. Clinton on Mideast,‚Äù NYT, May 8,1998.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
1. Fanning the Flames  I  n the war of words that has been waged since Israel invaded Lebanon on June 6, 1982, critics of Israeli actions have frequently been accused of hypocrisy.1 While the reasons advanced are spurious,* the charge itself has some merit. It is surely hypocritical to condemn Israel for establishing settlements in the occupied territories while we pay for establishing and expanding them. Or to condemn Israel  *  Through the summer of 1982, the media were flooded with letters of a  strikingly similar format, typically asking of critics: Where were you when‚Ķ?,‚Äù where the gap is filled by the writer‚Äôs favorite Palestinian atrocity, often invented. Another typical format was the accusation that it is hypocritical to criticize Israeli atrocities unless one goes on to condemn the Russians in Afghanistan, the Syrians for the terrible massacre in Hama, etc. No similar requirements were imposed when the PLO was bitterly condemned for terrorist atrocities. In fact, it has been a common pretense that the media and others had not condemned PLO atrocities or even that the media have been ‚Äúpro-PLO‚Äù (e.g., Leon Wieseltier: ‚ÄúThere is a scandal, and it is the moral and political prestige of the PLO [in media] coverage of the Middle East‚Äù). Entering still further into the world of fantasy, we even find the charge (Robert Tucker) that ‚Äúnumerous public figures in the West, even a number of Western governments‚Äù (all unnamed) have ‚Äúencouraged the PLO in its maximalist course‚Äù of ‚Äúwinnertake-all,‚Äù i.e., destruction of Israel. When the intellectual history of this period is someday written, it will scarcely be believable.
Fanning the Flames  37  for attacking civilian targets with cluster and phosphorus bombs ‚Äúto get the maximum kill per hit,‚Äù2 when we provide them gratis or at bargain rates, knowing that they will be used for just this purpose.3 Or to criticize Israel‚Äôs ‚Äúindiscriminate‚Äù bombardment of heavily-settled civilian areas or its other military adventures,4 while we not only provide the means in abundance but welcome Israel‚Äôs assistance in testing the latest weaponry under live battlefield conditions‚Äîto be sure, against a vastly outmatched enemy, including completely undefended targets, always the safest way to carry out experiments of this sort. In general, it is pure hypocrisy to criticize the exercise of Israeli power while welcoming Israel‚Äôs contributions towards realizing the U.S. aim of eliminating possible threats, largely indigenous, to American domination of the Middle East region. Clearly, as long as the United States provides the wherewithal, Israel will use it for its purposes. These purposes are clear enough today, and have been clear to those who chose to understand for many years: to integrate the bulk of the occupied territories within Israel in some fashion while finding a way to reduce the Arab population; to disperse the scattered refugees and crush any manifestation of Palestinian nationalism or Palestinian culture;5 to gain control over southern Lebanon. Since these goals have long been obvious and have been shared in fundamental respects by the two major political groupings in Israel, there is little basis for condemning Israel when it exploits the position of regional power afforded it by the phenomenal quantities of U.S. aid in exactly the ways that would be anticipated by any person whose head is not buried in the sand. Complaints and accusations are indeed hypocritical as long as material assistance is provided in an unending and ever-expanding flow, along with diplomatic and ideological support, the latter, by shaping the facts of history in a convenient form. Even if the occasional tempered criticisms from Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
38  Fanning the Flames  Washington or in editorial commentary are seriously intended, there is little reason for any Israeli government to pay any attention to them. The historical practice over many years has trained Israeli leaders to assume that U.S. ‚Äúopinion makers‚Äù and political elites will stand behind them whatever they do, and that even if direct reporting is accurate, as it generally is, its import will gradually be lost as the custodians of history carry out their tasks. The basic point seems simple enough, and is well-understood outside the United States, including Israel. A dissident Israeli journalist observes that ‚ÄúAll this delusion of imperial power would stop if the United States turned off the tap‚Ķin anger at some excessive lunacy.‚Äù6 The London Economist comments: Holding up the supply of shiny new weapons is America‚Äôs traditional slap on Israel‚Äôs wrist. But an embargo is ineffective unless it is certain to last‚Ķ Much more effective would be the belief in Israel that this time an American president will stick with his policy, including if need be a lasting embargo on arms and a rethink of the extent of America‚Äôs aid.7 The point, as noted, seems simple enough. Some years ago it was in fact as simple as it seems. It would then have been possible to influence Israel to join in the international consensus‚Äîwhich has long included the major Arab states, the population of the occupied territories, and the mainstream of the PLO‚Äîin support of a two-state political settlement that would include recognized borders, security guarantees, and reasonable prospects for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The precondition, of course, was for the U.S. itself to join this consensus and cease its support for the adamant rejectionism of the Labor Party and then Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Fanning the Flames  39  Menachem Begin‚Äôs Likud coalition. Though this picture of recent history is remote from the standard version here, it is familiar abroad, and has the additional merit of accuracy.8 What seemed simple several years ago, however, has become considerably more complex today. By now it is not at all clear what the effect would be if U.S. policy were to shift towards the international consensus, abandoning the commitment to a Greater Israel that will dominate the region in the interests of American power‚Äîa commitment that is expressed in deeds, whatever the accompanying words may be‚Äî and terminating its immense material, diplomatic and ideological contributions towards ensuring that the quite reasonable international consensus will not be realized. The question is of no small significance. I will return to the background, the issues, and the current prospects. What follows is not intended as a comprehensive review or analysis of the network of relations among the United States, Israel and the Palestinians. Rather, its more modest aims are to bring out certain elements of the ‚Äúspecial relationship‚Äù between the United States and Israel, and of their relationships to the original inhabitants of the land, which I think have been insufficiently appreciated or addressed and often seriously misrepresented, with the consequence that we have pursued policies that are both disgraceful and extremely dangerous, increasingly so. These remarks will be critical of Israel‚Äôs policies: its consistent rejection of any political settlement that accommodates the national rights of the indigenous population; its repression and state terrorism over many years; its propaganda efforts, which have been remarkably successful‚Äîmuch to Israel‚Äôs detriment in my view‚Äîin the United States. But this presentation may be misleading, in two respects. In the first place, this is not an attempt at a general history; the focus is on what I think is and has been wrong and what should be changed, not on Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Fanning the Flames  40  what I think has been right.* Secondly, the focus on Israeli actions and initiatives may obscure the fact that my real concern is the policies that have been pursued by the U.S. government and our responsibility in shaping or tolerating these policies. To a remarkable extent, articulate opinion and attitudes in the U.S. have been dominated by people who describe themselves as ‚Äúsupporters of Israel,‚Äù a term that I will also adopt, though with much reluctance, since I think they should more properly be called ‚Äúsupporters of the moral degeneration and ultimate destruction of Israel,‚Äù and not Israel alone. Given this ideological climate and the concrete U.S. actions that it has helped to engender, it is natural enough that Israeli policies have evolved in their predictable way. Perpetuation of these tendencies within the U.S. and in U.S.-Israel relations portends a rather gloomy future, in my view, for reasons that I hope will become clearer as we proceed. If so, a large measure of responsibility lies right here, as in the recent past. The essential features of the U.S. contribution towards the creation of a Greater Israel were revealed in a stark and brutal form in the September 1982 massacre of Palestinians in Beirut, which finally did elicit widespread outrage, temporarily at least. I will return to the events and their background later. For now, it suffices to observe that the *  One of the things that is right is the Hebrew-language press, or at least,  significant segments of it. I have relied extensively on the work of thoughtful and courageous Israeli journalists who have set‚Äîand met‚Äîquite unusual standards in exposing unpleasant facts about their own government and society. There is nothing comparable elsewhere, in my experience. See also TNCW, p. 450 (see note 5); Robert Friedman, ‚ÄúThe West Bank‚Äôs brave reporters,‚Äù Middle East International, March 4, 1983. I am indebted to several Israeli friends, primary among them Israel Shahak, for having provided me with a great deal of material from these sources, as well as much insightful comment. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
41  Fanning the Flames  Israeli invasion of Lebanon was supported by the U.S. and by editorial comment generally, though qualms were raised when it seemed to be going too far (perhaps threatening U.S. interests) or to involve too many civilian casualties. All of this is reminiscent of the U.S. attack on South Vietnam in 1962, then most of Indochina a few years later, to mention an event that did not take place according to standard U.S. journalism and scholarship, just as official Party history recognizes no such event as the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Israeli occupation of West Beirut on September 15 also elicited no official U.S. criticism, though the Sabra and Shatila massacres that followed aroused angry condemnation. The condemnation was directed in the first place at the Christian Phalange, which was accused of the actual massacre, and in the second place at the Government of Israel, for failing in its responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the camps. A flood of letters and articles in the press contrasted Begin‚Äôs reliance on force and violence, his deception, his high-handed rejection (at first) of an official inquiry, and his efforts to evade responsibility, with the stand of the opposition Labor Party both now and when it had held power. The ‚Äúbeautiful Israel‚Äù of earlier years was disappearing, because of Begin and Sharon. Col. Eli Geva, who had been dismissed from the IDF* after refusing to lead his troops against West Beirut, was quoted as saying: The feeling is that the house is on fire. I am referring to a country which is in a type of deterioration, or landslide, and everyone who believes in this country, has to contribute to stopping the landslide.9  *  Israel Defense Forces; the army of the State of Israel.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Fanning the Flames  42  Many agreed, specifically, many long-time supporters of Israel (in the special sense of the term mentioned earlier), who dated the deterioration from the invasion of West Beirut, or of Lebanon, or perhaps somewhat earlier, though surely after Begin took power. Within Israel, the Beirut massacre evoked much anguish and an unprecedented wave of protest against the government, including an immense popular demonstration, backed, for the first time, by the opposition Labor Party. There was, however, little evidence of any significant loss of support for Begin and his governing Likud coalition. The strong and often passionate support for the military operation in Lebanon on the part of the majority of the population also appears to have been unaffected by the massacre, though opposition grew in the following months as the costs began to mount. The response in the U.S. was interesting. After initial sharp condemnation, the general reaction, across quite a broad spectrum, was that the events and the reaction to them highlighted the uniquely high moral standards of Israel. A New York Times editorial commented that Israel‚Äôs anguish ‚Äúis only appropriate for a society in which moral sensitivity is a principle of political life.‚Äù Even in journals that are often regarded as taking a critical stance towards Israel, similar sentiments were voiced. Time, for example, commenting on protests within the IDF, wrote that it ‚Äúhas from the start been animated by the same righteous anger and high moral purpose that has guided Israel through its tumultuous history.‚Äù10 When the Report of the Israeli Commission of Inquiry into the massacres appeared a few months later, commentary was rhapsodic: Israel had sought and attained ‚Äúsalvation‚Äù; its achievement was ‚Äúsublime‚Äù (see chapter 6, section 6.8). No state in history merits such accolades; such comments would be dismissed with contempt with reference to any other state (apart from one‚Äôs own, in patriotic speeches or the more dismal segments of Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Fanning the Flames  43  scholarship). But with reference to Israel such references are so commonplace as to pass without notice, quite across the board in American journalism and scholarship, with rare exceptions. In contrast, the Palestinians and their organizations, and the Arabs more generally, have been portrayed in terms of violence, terrorism, irrationality, and uncompromising refusal to come to terms with the existence of Israel or to accept the norms of decent behavior. The contrast is clear enough in journalism and scholarship, and it is also familiar in standard media fare, where the Arab terrorist is routinely contrasted with the heroic Israeli. It would, for example, be inconceivable for a TV drama to portray an Israeli or Jewish character in the manner of the standard Arab villain, despite the ample record of Israeli terrorism over many years, effectively concealed in the United States. Colonel Geva‚Äôs comment, cited above, may well be accurate, but the question of timing is of some significance, as is the stance‚Äîboth current and historical‚Äîof the Labor Party that dominated the pre-state Zionist movement and ruled from the establishment of the state to 1977. This is a question that will be addressed below. The record shows quite clearly, I believe, that it is a serious error to attribute the deterioration to Begin‚Äôs Likud coalition. The house was on fire long before, and supporters of Israel have been fanning the flames, a fact long deplored by many true Israeli doves. Those who have watched the ‚Äúlandslide‚Äù in silence, or have helped it along, or have successfully concealed it by often vulgar apologetics, or have blamed the Palestinians when they are persecuted or killed in alleged ‚Äúretaliations,‚Äù have laid the groundwork for the current conflagration, and for the atrocities in Beirut that finally evoked some temporary protest. The reasons for this judgment will appear as we proceed. It would be salutary, then, to abandon hypocrisy. Either we provide the support for the establishment of a Greater Israel with all that it Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Fanning the Flames  44  entails and refrain from condemning the grim consequences of this decision, or we withdraw the means and the license for the pursuit of these programs and act to ensure that the valid demands of Israelis and Palestinians be satisfied. This can, perhaps, still be accomplished, though the possibilities recede with each passing year as the Greater Israel that we are creating becomes more firmly implanted, and as its military power‚Äînow estimated to be surpassed only by the U.S., the USSR and China11‚Äîcontinues to grow. A point of no return may soon be reached, with consequences that may be appalling for Israel and the Palestinians, for the region, and perhaps for the entire world.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Fanning the Flames  45  Notes‚ÄîChapter 1 Fanning the Flames 1. 2.  3.  4.  5.  Leon Wieseltier, New Republic, Sept. 23, 1981; Robert W. Tucker, ‚ÄúLebanon: The Case for the War,‚Äù Commentary, October 1982. Richard Ben Cramer, Philadelphia Inquirer, June 30, 1982. Reprinted in The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon (Claremont Research and Publications, New York, 1982), a useful collection of press clippings for June/July 1982. On the extensive scale of Israeli use of cluster bombs in heavily populated areas, see Warren Richey, Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 2, 1982, reporting the findings of munitions experts from the multinational peacekeeping force. Doctors in Beirut reported that other anti-personnel weapons, such as phosphorus bombs, were no less devastating in their impact upon civilians, though the major effect was from the massive air, sea and artillery bombardment itself. It could not be known, of course, that an American marine (Cpl. David L. Reagan) would also be killed by a cluster bomb of the type supplied to Israel by the U.S.; J. Michael Kennedy, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 2; Time, Oct. 11, 1982. On August 5, 1982, New York Times correspondent Thomas Friedman reported ‚Äúindiscriminate‚Äù shelling of West Beirut by Israeli planes, gunboats and artillery. The editors deleted the word ‚Äúindiscriminate‚Äù as inconsistent with the approved image of our Israeli ally. Washington Post editors, in contrast, felt that it was permissible to report ‚Äúindiscriminate‚Äù Israeli bombardment on the same day. See Alexander Cockburn, Village Voice, Sept. 21, 1982, for discussion and details, including Friedman‚Äôs protest to the editors for their lack of ‚Äúcourage – guts,‚Äù for being ‚Äúafraid to tell our readers and those who might complain to you that the Israelis are capable of indiscriminately shelling an entire city.‚Äù The solicitude of Times editors for Israel during this period‚Äîas before‚Äîhas been remarkable, as we shall have occasion to observe below. Amos Perlmutter describes ‚Äúthe destruction of Palestinian nationalism in any form‚Äù as one of ‚ÄúBegin‚Äôs most extreme and cherished ambitions‚Äù  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Fanning the Flames  6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.  46  (Foreign Affairs, Fall 1982). The same was true of his predecessors, who typically denied that it existed and sought to destroy its manifestations. On the measures taken under the occupation to prevent even cultural expression, see my Towards a New Cold War (henceforth, TNCW; Pantheon, New York, 1982, pp. 277-8). Haim Baram of Haolam Haze; cited in the Manchester Guardian Weekly, Sept. 12, 1982. Economist, Sept. 11, 1982. For ample though only partial evidence, see TNCW, chapters 9-12. We return to this matter, and other questions touched on here. UPI, Boston Globe, Sept. 26, 1982. Editorial, New York Times, Nov. 6, 1982; Time, Oct. 11, 1982. The estimate is that of the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies; Time, Oct. 11, 1982. Israelis tend to rank their power one notch higher, describing themselves as the third most powerful military force in the world. See, for example, Dov Yirmiah, Yoman Hamilchama Sheli (My War Diary; privately printed, Tel Aviv, 1983, to be published in English translation by South End Press), an important record of the Lebanon war to which we return.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
2. The Origins of the “Special Relationship”
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  48  1. Levels of Support: Diplomatic, Material, Ideological  T  he relationship between the United States and Israel has been a curious one in world affairs and in American culture. Its unique character is symbolized by recent votes at the United Nations. For example, on June 26, 1982 the United States stood alone in vetoing a UN Security Council resolution calling for simultaneous withdrawal of Israeli and Palestinian armed forces from Beirut, on the grounds that this plan ‚Äúwas a transparent attempt to preserve the P.L.O. as a viable political force,‚Äù evidently an intolerable prospect for the U.S. government.1 A few hours later, the U.S. and Israel voted against a General Assembly resolution calling for an end to hostilities in Lebanon and on the Israel-Lebanon border, passed with two ‚Äúnays‚Äù and no abstentions. Earlier, the U.S. had vetoed an otherwise unanimous Security Council resolution condemning Israel for ignoring the earlier demand for withdrawal of Israeli troops.2 The pattern has, in fact, been a persistent one. More concretely, the special relationship is expressed in the level of U.S. military and economic aid to Israel over many years. Its exact scale is unknown, since much is concealed in various ways. Prior to 1967, before the ‚Äúspecial relationship‚Äù had matured, Israel received the highest per capita aid from the U.S. of any country. Commenting on the fact, Harvard Middle East specialist Nadav Safran also notes that this amounts to a substantial part of the unprecedented capital transfer to Israel from abroad that constitutes virtually the whole of Israel‚Äôs investment‚Äîone reason why Israel‚Äôs economic progress offers no meaningful model for underdeveloped countries.3 It is possible that recent aid amounts to something like $1000 per year for each citizen of Israel when all factors are taken into account. Even the public figures Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  49  are astounding.* For fiscal years 1978 through 1982, Israel received 48% of all U.S. military aid and 35% of U.S. economic aid, worldwide. For FY 1983, the Reagan administration requested almost $2.5 billion for Israel out of a total aid budget of $8.1 billion, including $500 million in outright grants and $1.2 billion in low-interest loans.4 In addition, there is a regular pattern of forgiving loans, offering weapons at special discount prices, and a variety of other devices, not to mention the taxdeductible ‚Äúcharitable‚Äù contributions (in effect, an imposed tax), used in ways to which we return.5 Not content with this level of assistance from the American taxpayer, one of the Senate‚Äôs most prominent liberal Democrats, Alan Cranston of California, ‚Äúproposed an amendment to the foreign aid bill to establish the principle that American economic assistance to Israel would not be less than the amount of debt Israel repays to the United States,‚Äù a commitment to cover ‚Äúall Israeli debts and future debts,‚Äù as Senator Charles Percy commented.6 This was before the Lebanon war. The actual vote on foreign aid came after the invasion of Lebanon, after the destruction of much of southern Lebanon, the merciless siege and bombardment of Beirut, the September massacres, and Israel‚Äôs rapid expansion of settlement in the occupied territories in response to Reagan‚Äôs plea to suspend settlement in accord with his peace proposals, which Israel rejected. In the light of these events, the only issue arising in Congress was whether to ‚Äúpunish‚Äù Israel by accepting the President‚Äôs proposal for a substantial increase in *  The General Accounting Office (GAO) has informed Congress that the actual  level of U.S. aid may be as much as 60% higher than the publicly available figures. This is the preliminary result of a detailed study of U.S. aid to Israel by the GAO. ‚ÄúA major issue could develop next year [1983] over how much of the GAO study may be made public.‚Äù James McCartney. Philadelphia Inquirer, August 25, 1982. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  50  the already phenomenal level of aid‚Äîwhat is called taking ‚Äúa get-tough approach with Israel‚Äù7‚Äîor to take a softer line by adding even more to the increases that the President requested, as the Senate and most liberals demanded. Fortunately, the press was sufficiently disciplined so that the comic aspects of this characteristic performance were suppressed. The consequences of this message of approval to Israel for its recent actions on the part of the President and Congress are not at all comic, needless to say. It should be noted that in theory there are restrictions on the use of American aid (e.g., cluster bombs can be used only in self-defense; development funds cannot be spent beyond Israel‚Äôs recognized‚Äîi.e., pre-June 1967‚Äîborders). But care has been taken to ensure that these restrictions will not be invoked, though the illegal use of weapons occasionally elicits a reprimand or temporary cut-off of shipments when the consequences receive too much publicity. As for the ban on use of U.S. funds for the settlement and development programs that the U.S. has officially regarded as illegal and as a barrier to peace (i.e., beyond the pre-June 1967 borders), this has never been enforced, and the aid program is designed so that it cannot be enforced: ‚Äúin contrast to most other aid relationships, the projects we fund in Israel are not specified,‚Äù Ian Lustick observes, and no official of the State Department or the aid program has ‚Äúever been assigned to supervise the use of our funds by the Israeli government.‚Äù For comparison, one may consider the U.S. aid program to Egypt (the largest recipient of non-military U.S. aid since Camp David), which is run by an office of 125 people who supervise it in meticulous detail. Many knowledgeable Egyptians have been highly critical of the aid program, alleging that it reflects American rather than Egyptian priorities, financing U.S. imports which must be brought on American ships and U.S. consultants, when trained personnel are available in Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  51  Egypt for a fraction of the cost. They also note the emphasis on the private sector, ‚Äúpay[ing] Mid-west farmers for wheat which could be grown at half the price in Egypt‚Äù (according to a former AID director), and in general the infiltration of Egyptian society to the extent that some perceive a threat to Egyptian national security.8 These examples illustrate the diplomatic and material support that the U.S. provides for Israel.9 A concomitant, at the ideological level, is the persistence of considerable illusion about the nature of Israeli society and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since 1967, discussion of these issues has been difficult or impossible in the United States as a result of a remarkably effective campaign of vilification, abuse, and sometimes outright lying directed against those who dared to question received doctrine.* This fact has regularly been deplored by Israeli doves, who have been subjected to similar treatment here. They observe that their own position within Israel suffers because of lack of support within the U.S., where, as General (Res.) Mattityahu Peled observed, the ‚Äústate of near hysteria‚Äù and the ‚Äúblindly chauvinistic and narrow-minded‚Äù support for the most reactionary policies within Israel poses ‚Äúthe danger of prodding Israel once more toward a posture of calloused intransigence.‚Äù10 The well-known Israeli journalist and Zionist historian *  Israeli intelligence apparently contributes to these efforts. According to a CIA  study, one of its functions is to acquire ‚Äúdata for use in silencing anti-Israel factions in the West,‚Äù along with ‚Äúsabotage, paramilitary and psychological warfare projects, such as character assassination and black propaganda.‚Äù ‚ÄúWithin Jewish communities in almost every country of the world, there are Zionists and other sympathizers, who render strong support to the Israeli intelligence effort. Such contacts are carefully nurtured and serve as channels for information, deception material, propaganda and other purposes.‚Äù ‚ÄúThey also attempt to penetrate anti-Zionist elements in order to neutralize the opposition.‚Äù Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
52  The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  Simha Flapan describes ‚Äúthe prejudice of American Jewry‚Äù as now ‚Äúthe major obstacle to an American-Palestinian and Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, without which there is little chance to move forward in the difficult and involved peace process.‚Äù11 In concentrating on the role of American Jewry, these Israeli writers focus much too narrowly, I believe. To cite one last example, an article in the American Jewish press quotes a staff writer for Ha‚Äôaretz (essentially, the Israeli New York Times) who says that ‚Äúyou American Jews, you liberals, you lovers of democracy are supporting its destruction here by not speaking out against the government‚Äôs actions,‚Äù referring to the wave of repression in the occupied territories under the ‚Äúcivilian administration‚Äù of Professor Menachem Milson and General Ariel Sharon introduced in November 1981 (see chapter 5, sections 5-8). He goes on to explain the plans of Begin and Sharon: to drive a large number of Arabs out of the West Bank, specifically, the leaders and those with a potential for leadership, ‚Äúby every illegal means.‚Äù How? You activate terrorists to plant bombs in the cars of their elected mayors, you arm the settlers and a few Arab quislings to run rampages through Arab towns, pogroms against property, not against people. A few Arabs have been killed by settlers. The murderers are known, but the police are virtually helpless. They have their orders. What‚Äôs your excuse for not speaking out against these violations of Israeli law and Jewish morality? The settlers, he adds, are ‚ÄúReligious Jews who follow a higher law and do whatever their rabbis tell them. At least one of the Gush Emunim rabbis has written that it is a mitzvah [religious duty] to destroy Amalek [meaning, the non-Jewish inhabitants], including women and Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  53  children.‚Äù12 The Ha‚Äôaretz journalist adds that his journal has ‚Äúa file of horror stories reported to us by soldiers returning from occupation duty in the West Bank. We can refer to them in general terms‚Äîwe can rail against the occupation that destroys the moral fibre and self-respect of our youth‚Äîbut we can‚Äôt print the details because military censorship covers actions by soldiers on active duty.‚Äù13 One can imagine what the file contains, given what has been printed in the Israeli press. It should be noted, in this connection, that many crucial issues that are freely discussed in the Hebrew press in Israel and much that is documented there are virtually excluded from the American press, so that the people who are expected to pay the bills are kept largely in the dark about what they are financing or about the debates within Israel concerning these matters. Many examples will be given below. The dangers posed to Israel by its American supporters have consistently been realized, leading to much suffering in the region and repeated threat of a larger, perhaps global war.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
54  The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  2. Causal Factors 2.1 Domestic Pressure Groups and their Interests he ‚Äúspecial relationship‚Äù is often attributed to domestic political pressures, in particular, the effectiveness of the American Jewish community in political life and in influencing opinion.14 While there is some truth to this, it is far from the whole story, in two major respects: first, it underestimates the scope of the ‚Äúsupport for Israel,‚Äù and second, it overestimates the role of political pressure groups in decision-making. Let us consider these factors in turn.15 In the first place, what Seth Tillman calls the ‚ÄúIsraeli lobby‚Äù (see note 14) is far broader than the American Jewish community, embracing the major segments of liberal opinion, the leadership of the labor unions,*  T  *  Leon Hadar writes: ‚ÄúAlong with the organized American-Jewish community, the  labour movement has been a major source of support for Israel‚Äù; true with regard to the labor union bureaucracy, whatever the membership may think. Hadar quotes ILGWU president Sol Chaikin who condemns Reagan for his willingness ‚Äúto ‚Äòsell‚Äô both Israel and the Solidarity movement in Poland‚Ķto appease his big business friends.‚Äù Victor Gotbaum discusses the problems posed for Israel‚Äôs supporters by the Begin government and its ‚Äúantagonizing‚Äù foreign policy decisions: ‚ÄúWe couldn‚Äôt justify [the Golan annexation], so we preferred to remain silent‚Äù; many labor leaders find themselves ‚Äúdivorcing their love for Israel from their relations with Begin‚Äù (Gotbaum). Such rhetoric has not been heard since the peak days of American Stalinism and Trotskyite ‚Äúcritical support.‚Äù It is, however, rather common among Western intellectuals with regard to Israel. See TNCW, chap. 10, for some examples. More will appear Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  55  religious fundamentalists,16 ‚Äúconservatives‚Äù of the type who support a powerful state apparatus geared to state-induced production of high technology waste (i.e., military production) at home and military threats and adventurism abroad, and‚Äîcutting across these categories‚Äîfervent cold warriors of all stripes. These connections are appreciated in Israel, not only by the right wing. Thus Yitzhak Rabin, reputedly a dove and soon to become the Labor Prime Minister, argued against moves towards political settlement after the 1973 war. Israel should try to ‚Äúgain time,‚Äù he urged, in the hope that ‚Äúwe will later find ourselves in a better situation: the U.S. may adopt more aggressive positions vis-a-vis the USSR‚Ķ‚Äù17 Many American Zionist leaders recognize these factors. In December 1980, several of them argued in the American Jewish press that ‚Äúthere is far greater potential commonality of interests among Jews and the Moral Majority than there is among Jews and the National Council of Churches‚Äù (Jewish Week). Jacques Torczyner, former President of the Zionist Organization of America and an executive of the World Zionist Organization, wrote that ‚ÄúWe have, first of all, to come to a conclusion that the right-wing reactionaries are the natural allies of Zionism and not the liberals‚Äù18‚Äîhe is wrong about the latter, mistakenly assuming that they do not join in the cold war consensus whereas in fact they have consistently promoted and helped to maintain it. It should furthermore be noted that the American left and pacifist groups, apart from fringe elements, have quite generally been extremely supportive of Israel (contrary to many baseless allegations), some passionately so, and have turned a blind eye to practices that they would be quick to denounce elsewhere. Again, examples will, appear below. There is an interesting expression of views akin to Rabin‚Äôs in a recent below. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  56  study of ‚Äúthe real anti-Semitism in America‚Äù by Nathan and Ruth Perlmutter, respectively, the National Director of the Anti-Defamation League of B‚Äônai Brith and his wife, also an active Zionist leader. In the United States, the Anti-Defamation League is regarded as a civil libertarian organization, at one time, a deserved reputation. Now, it specializes in trying to prevent critical discussion of policies of Israel by such techniques as maligning critics, including Israelis who do not pass its test of loyalty, distributing alleged ‚Äúinformation‚Äù that is often circulated in unsigned pamphlets, and so on.19 In Israel, it is casually described as ‚Äúone of the main pillars‚Äù of Israeli propaganda in the United States. Seth Tillman refers to it as part of ‚Äúthe Israeli lobby.‚Äù We return to some of its public performances (see chapter 5, section 7.1). The well-known Israeli military historian Meir Pail, formerly head of the Officers Training School of the IDF and an Israeli dove, might well have had the League in mind when he described the ways in which ‚ÄúGolda Meir and the Labor Party destroyed pluralism and debate within the old Zionist framework,‚Äù mimicking ‚ÄúJoseph Stalin‚Äôs tendency towards communist parties all over the world,‚Äù whose interests were to be ‚Äúsubjugated‚Ķto the power interests of the Soviet Union‚Äù; ‚ÄúAnd the Israeli regime‚Äôs tendency has been similar‚Äù as it has ‚Äúdestroyed the very process of dissent and inquiry,‚Äù beginning (he says) with the Golda Meir labor government.20 The League has proven a more than willing instrument. The Perlmutters cite studies showing that whereas anti-Semitism ‚Äúwas once virulent‚Äù in the U.S., today there is little support for discrimination against Jews; there may be dislike of Jews, anti-Jewish attitudes, etc., but then much the same is true with regard to ethnic and religious groups quite generally. What then is ‚Äúthe real anti-semitism,‚Äù which is still rampant, in fact perhaps more dangerous than before? The real anti-Semitism, it turns out, lies in the actions of ‚Äúpeacemakers of Vietnam vintage, transmuters of swords into plowshares, championing Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  57  the terrorist PLO‚Ķ‚Äù* The Perlmutters fear that ‚Äúnowadays war is getting a bad name and peace too favorable a press‚Ķ‚Äù They are concerned by ‚Äúthe defamations by the Left of the promptings for our warring in Vietnam and latterly‚Ķtheir sniping at American defense budgets‚Ķ‚Äù ‚ÄúBeyond oil it is the very ideology of the liberals in which peace, even if it is pockmarked by injustice, is preferable to the prospect of confrontation that today imperils Jews.‚Äù Similarly, Jewish interests are threatened ‚Äúby this decade‚Äôs Leftists, here and abroad, as they demonstrate against and scold the United States for its involvement in Nicaragua and El Salvador.‚Äù Jewish interests are threatened because the Central American dictators have been friends of Israel‚Äîfriendship which has been and is being reciprocated with much enthusiasm, though the Perlmutters do not discuss these facts, which help explain why victims of Somoza and the Salvadoran and Guatemalan generals are not friends of Israel, not because of anti-Semitism, but for quite understandable reasons; peasants being massacred with Israeli arms or tortured by military forces who boast of their Israeli training and support are not likely to be friends of Israel. According to the Perlmutters, such groups as the National Council of Churches also threaten Jewish interests by calling on Israel ‚Äúto include the PLO in its Middle East peace negotiations.‚Äù ‚ÄúApologists for the Left‚Äîlike those for the Right‚Äîhave frequently rationalized anti-Semitism or indifference to Jewish interests as being merely a transitory phase,‚Äù but Jews should know better. Throughout, the argument is that Israel‚Äôs interests‚Äîunderstood *  It is a common claim, perhaps believed by its proponents, that there are many  ‚Äúchampions of the PLO‚Äù in the U.S., even that the press is ‚Äúpro-PLO‚Äù (see first*). When examples are given, it regularly turns out that these ‚Äúchampions‚Äù are critics (often harsh critics) of the PLO who, however, believe that Palestinians have the same human and national rights as Jews. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  58  implicitly as the interests of a rejectionist Greater Israel that denies Palestinian rights‚Äîare the ‚ÄúJewish interests,‚Äù so that anyone who recognizes Palestinian rights or in other ways advocates policies that threaten ‚ÄúIsrael‚Äôs interests‚Äù as the authors conceive them is, to paraphrase Stalinist rhetoric of earlier years, ‚Äúobjectively‚Äù anti-Semitic. Those who are ‚Äúinnocent of bigotry‚Äù are now placing Jews in ‚Äúgreater jeopardy‚Äù than traditional anti-Semites, with their advocacy of peace, criticism of U.S. interventionism, opposition to bloodthirsty tyrants and torturers, etc. This is the ‚Äúreal anti-Semitism,‚Äù and it is exceedingly dangerous. So the Anti-Defamation League has its work cut out for it.21 It might be noted that the resort to charges of ‚Äúanti-Semitism‚Äù (or in the case of Jews, ‚ÄúJewish self-hatred‚Äù) to silence critics of Israel has been quite a general and often effective device. Even Abba Eban, the highly-regarded Israeli diplomat of the Labor Party (considered a leading dove), is capable of writing that ‚ÄúOne of the chief tasks of any dialogue with the Gentile world is to prove that the distinction between antiSemitism and anti-Zionism [generally understood as criticism of policies of the Israeli state] is not a distinction at all,‚Äù and that Jewish critics (I.F. Stone and I are specifically mentioned) have a ‚Äúbasic complex‚Ķof guilt about Jewish survival.‚Äù Similarly Irving Howe, typically without argument, simply attributes Israel‚Äôs dangerous international isolation to ‚Äúskillful manipulation of oil‚Äù22 and that ‚Äúsour apothegm: In the warmest of hearts there‚Äôs a cold spot for the Jews‚Äù‚Äîso that it is quite unnecessary to consider the impact of the policies of the Labor government that he supported, for example, the brutality of the occupation,* already fully apparent and sharply condemned in Israel *  It might be noted that to people concerned with the facts, ‚Äúskillful manipulation  of oil‚Äù also seems too easy an excuse (while the ‚Äúsour apothegm‚Äù hardly merits comment). See, for example, the discussion by Zionist historian Jon Kimche of Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
59  The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  when he wrote.23 The Perlmutters deride those who voice ‚Äúcriticism of Israel while fantasizing countercharges of anti-Semitism,‚Äù but their comment is surely disingenuous. The tactic is standard. Christopher Sykes, in his excellent study of the pre-state period, traces the origins of this device (‚Äúa new phase in Zionist propaganda‚Äù) to a ‚Äúviolent counterattack‚Äù by David Ben-Gurion against a British court that had implicated Zionist leaders in arms-trafficking in 1943: ‚Äúhenceforth to be anti-Zionist was to be anti-Semitic.‚Äù24 It is, however, primarily in the post-1967 period that the tactic has been honed to a high art, increasingly so, as the policies defended became less and less defensible. Within the Jewish community, the unity in ‚Äúsupport for Israel‚Äù that has been demanded, and generally achieved, is remarkable‚Äîas noted, to the chagrin of Israeli doves who plausibly argue that this kind of ‚Äúsupport‚Äù has seriously weakened their efforts to modify harsh and ultimately self-destructive government policies. There is even a lively debate within the American Jewish community as to whether it is legitimate to criticize Israel‚Äôs policies at all, and perhaps even more amazing, the existence of such a debate is not recognized to be the amazing phenomenon it surely is. The position that criticism is illegitimate is defended, for example, by Elie Wiesel, who says: I support Israel‚Äîperiod. I identify with Israel‚Äîperiod. I never attack, never criticize Israel when I am not in Israel. As for Israel‚Äôs policies in the occupied territories, Wiesel is unable to how the Labor government‚Äôs apparent duplicity and rejection of possible peaceful settlement alienated friendly African countries well before the use of the ‚Äúoil weapon.‚Äù Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
60  The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  offer a comment: What to do and how to do it, I really don‚Äôt know because I lack the elements of information and knowledge‚Ķ You must be in a position of power to possess all the information‚Ķ I don‚Äôt have that information, so I don‚Äôt know‚Ķ25 A similar stance of state-worship would be difficult to find, apart from the annals of Stalinism and fascism. Wiesel is regarded in the United States as a critic of fascism, and much revered as a secular saint. The reason generally offered in defense of the doctrine that Israel may not be criticized outside its borders is that only those who face the dangers and problems have a right to express such criticism, not those who observe in safety from afar. By similar logic, it is illegitimate for Americans to criticize the PLO, or the Arab states, or the USSR. This argument actually extends a bit more broadly: it is legitimate‚Äîin fact, a duty‚Äîto provide Israel with massive subsidies and to praise it to the skies while vilifying its adversaries, particularly those it has conquered, but it is illegitimate to voice any critical comment concerning the use of the bounty we provide.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  61  2.2 U.S. Strategic Interests Returning to the main theme, reference to Jewish influence over politics and opinion seriously underestimates the scope of the so-called ‚Äúsupport for Israel.‚Äù Turning to the second point, the argument much overestimates the pluralism of American politics and ideology. No pressure group will dominate access to public opinion or maintain consistent influence over policy-making unless its aims are close to those of elite elements with real power. These elements are not uniform in interests or (in the case of shared interests) in tactical judgments; and on some issues, such as this one, they have often been divided. Nevertheless, a closer look will illustrate the correctness of the assessment that the evolution of America‚Äôs relationship to Israel ‚Äúhas been determined primarily by the changing role that Israel occupied in the context of America‚Äôs changing conceptions of its political-strategic interests in the Middle East.‚Äù26 Let us consider some of the relevant historical background, in an attempt to clarify this issue. Despite the remarkable level of U.S. support for Israel, it would be an error to assume that Israel represents the major U.S. interest in the Middle East. Rather, the major interest lies in the energy reserves of the region, primarily in the Arabian peninsula. A State Department analysis of 1945 described Saudi Arabia as ‚Äú‚Ķa stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history.‚Äù27 The U.S. was committed to win and keep this prize. Since World War II, it has been virtually an axiom of U.S. foreign policy that these energy reserves should remain under U.S. control. A more recent variant of the same theme is that the flow of petrodollars should be largely funneled to the U.S. through military purchases, construction projects, bank deposits, investment in Treasury securities, etc. It has been necessary to Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  62  defend this primary interest against various threats.  2.2.1 Threats to U.S. Control of Middle East Oil At the rhetorical level, the threat from which the Middle East must be ‚Äúdefended‚Äù is generally pictured to be the USSR. While it is true that the U.S. would not tolerate Soviet moves that threatened to provide the USSR with a significant role in Middle East oil production or distribution, this has rarely been a realistic concern‚Äîwhich is not to say that ideologists have not come to believe the fantasies they conjure up to serve other needs.28 In fact, the USSR has been hesitant to intrude on what is recognized to be American turf. The pattern was set early on in the Cold War, when the U.S. organized its first major postwar counterinsurgency campaign, in Greece in 1947. Entering Greece after the Nazis had withdrawn, Britain had imposed the rule of royalist elements and former Nazi collaborators, suppressing the anti-Nazi resistance‚Äîin Athens, under Churchill‚Äôs order to British forces ‚Äúto act as if you were in a conquered city where a local rebellion is in progress.‚Äù29 The repression and corruption of the Britishimposed regime revived the resistance. Severely weakened by the war, Britain was unable to cope with the problem and the U.S. took over the task of destroying the Communist-led peasant and worker-based nationalist movement that had fought the Nazis, while maintaining in power its own favorites, such as King Paul and Queen Frederika, whose background was in the fascist youth movements, and Minister of the Interior Mavromichalis, described by U.S. intelligence as a former Nazi collaborator and given responsibility for internal security. Some Senators found all of this difficult to reconcile with Truman Doctrine rhetoric about supporting ‚Äúfree peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,‚Äù under which the counterClassics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  63  insurgency campaign was mounted. To them, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge explained that ‚Äúthis fascist government through which we have to work is incidental.‚Äù30 The counterinsurgency effort was no small enterprise: in the war that ensued, 160,000 Greeks were killed and 800,000 became refugees. The American Mission set itself the task of eliminating those to whom Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh referred as ‚Äúsubversive social forces,‚Äù rooted in the insidious ‚Äúnew growth of class-consciousness and proletarianism‚Äù‚Äî‚Äúan alien and subversive influence,‚Äù as American charg√© Karl Rankin described them, to which ‚Äúno leniency‚Äù should be shown until ‚Äúthe state has successfully reasserted its dominance‚Äù and the ‚Äúbandit uprising has been quelled‚Äù (the Ambassador‚Äôs phrase, standard usage in U.S. documents as in Soviet documents concerning Afghanistan). It was the American Mission and its fascist clients (and, of course, the wealthy and, later, American corporations, who were the real beneficiaries) who represented the ‚Äúnative‚Äù element in Greece, as distinct from the ‚Äúalien‚Äù influence of Greek peasants and workers subverted by class- consciousness. The dedicated savagery with which the U.S. Mission set about the task of liquidating the class enemy was a bit too much even for the British, who are not known for their gentlemanly decorum in such procedures; they were also not too happy about being displaced from yet another outpost of British influence and power. With the enthusiastic approval and direct participation of the U.S. Mission, tens of thousands were exiled, tens of thousands more were sent to prison islands where many were tortured or executed (or if lucky, only ‚Äúre-educated‚Äù), the unions were broken, and even mild anti-Communist socialists were suppressed, while the U.S. shamelessly manipulated the electoral process to ensure that the right men won. The social and economic consequences were grim. A decade later, ‚Äúbetween 1959 and 1963, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  64  almost a third of the Greek labor force emigrated in search of satisfactory employment.‚Äù31 The fascist coup of 1967, again with apparent U.S. backing, had its roots in the same events. A major motivation for this counterinsurgency campaign was concern over Middle East oil. In his March 12, 1947 speech announcing the Truman Doctrine, the President observed that ‚ÄúIt is necessary only to glance at a map‚Äù to see that if Greece should fall to the rebels ‚Äúconfusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.‚Äù A February 1948 CIA study warned that in the event of a rebel victory, the U.S. would face ‚Äúthe possible loss of the petroleum resources of the Middle East (comprising 40 per cent of world reserves).‚Äù32 A Russian threat was fabricated to justify U.S. intervention, but without factual basis; Stalin was trying to rein in the Greek guerrillas, knowing that the U.S. would not tolerate the loss of this Middle East outpost, as Greece was regarded, and not at all pleased at the prospect of a possible Balkan Communist confederation under Titoist influence. Again, it does not follow from the fact that the threat was fabricated that it was not believed in some planning circles; in public as in personal life, it is easy to come to believe what it is convenient to believe. The exaggeration of the Russian threat should be understood as an early example of the functioning of the Cold War system by which each superpower exploits the threat of the great enemy (its ‚ÄúGreat Satan,‚Äù to borrow Ayatollah Khomeini‚Äôs term) to mobilize support for actions it intends to undertake in its own domains. The success of the Greek counterinsurgency campaign, both at the military and ideological level, left its stamp on future U.S. policymaking. Since that time there has been recurrent talk about Russia‚Äôs attempts to gain control of Middle East oil, the Soviet drive to the Gulf, etc. But no serious case has been made that the USSR would risk nuclear war‚Äîfor that would be the likely consequence‚Äîby pursuing any Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  65  such objective. A more realistic threat to U.S. dominance of the region has been posed by Europe.* In the 1940s, the U.S. succeeded in displacing France, and to a large extent Britain, in part by design, in part simply as a reflection of the power balance.33 One consequence of the CIA-backed coup that restored the Shah in Iran in 1953 was to transfer 40% of Iranian oil from British to American hands, a fact that led the New York Times editors to express concern that some misguided British circles might believe that ‚ÄúAmerican ‚Äòimperialism‚Äô‚Ķhas once again elbowed Britain from a historic stronghold.‚Äù At the same time, the editors exulted that ‚Äúunderdeveloped countries with rich resources now have an object lesson in the heavy cost that must be paid by one of their number which goes berserk with fanatical nationalism.‚Äù34 The costs of the object lesson were indeed heavy, as events were to show, and are still being paid; and many others have been compelled to learn the same lesson since. Concern over European involvement in the region persisted. The U.S. strongly opposed the attempt by Britain and France to reassert their influence in the area with the 1956 Suez invasion (in conjunction with Israel); the U.S. was instrumental in expelling all three powers from Egyptian territory, though Soviet threats may also have played their part. Henry Kissinger, in his 1973 ‚ÄúYear of Europe‚Äù address, warned of the dangers of a Europe-dominated trading bloc including the Middle East and North Africa from which the U.S. might be excluded. Later, he confided in a private meeting that one basic element in his post-1973 *  And more recently, Japan, which in 1982 replaced the U.S. as Saudi Arabia‚Äôs  number one trading partner and is also first or second as supplier for most other Gulf oil producers. Still, the Middle East is ‚Äúthe only U.S. foreign market that has experienced any significant growth in the past few years.‚Äù William 0. Beeman, Christian Science Monitor, March 30, 1983. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  66  diplomacy was ‚Äúto ensure that the Europeans and Japanese did not get involved in the diplomacy‚Äù concerning the Middle East.35 Subsequent U.S. opposition to the ‚ÄúEuro-Arab dialogue‚Äù stems from the same concerns. Today, competition among the state capitalist societies (including now some lesser powers such as South Korea) for a share in the wealth generated by oil production is a matter of growing significance.  2.2.2 The Indigenous Threat: Israel as a Strategic Asset A third threat from which the region must be ‚Äúdefended‚Äù is the indigenous one: the threat of radical nationalism. It is in this context that the U.S.-Israel ‚Äúspecial relationship‚Äù has matured. In the early 1950s, the U.S.-Israel relationship was decidedly uneasy, and it appeared for a time that Washington might cement closer relations with Egyptian President Nasser, who had some CIA support. These prospects appeared sufficiently worrisome so that Israel organized terrorist cells within Egypt to carry out attacks on U.S. installations (also on Egyptian public facilities) in an effort to drive a wedge between Egypt and the U.S.,36 intending that these acts would be attributed to ultranationalist Egyptian fanatics.* From the late 1950s, however, the U.S. government increasingly *  The official in charge of these operations, Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon,  became Secretary-General of the Histadrut (the socialist labor union). According to the respected Israeli journalist Nahum Barnea, Lavon gave orders that were ‚Äúmuch more severe‚Äù than those leading to the terrorist operations in Egypt, including an attempt ‚Äúto poison the water sources in the Gaza Strip and the demilitarized zones‚Äù (Davar, Jan. 26, 1979). He does not indicate whether these alleged orders were executed.36 Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  67  came to accept the Israeli thesis that a powerful Israel is a ‚Äústrategic asset‚Äù for the United States, serving as a barrier against indigenous radical nationalist threats to American interests, which might gain support from the USSR. A recently declassified National Security Council memorandum of 1958 noted that a ‚Äúlogical corollary‚Äù of opposition to radical Arab nationalism ‚Äúwould be to support Israel as the only strong pro-West power left in the Near East.‚Äù37 Meanwhile, Israel concluded a secret pact with Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia. According to David BenGurion‚Äôs biographer, this ‚Äúperiphery pact‚Äù was encouraged by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and was ‚Äúlong-lasting.‚Äù38 Through the 1960s, American intelligence regarded Israel as a barrier to Nasserite pressure on the Gulf oil-producing states, a serious matter at the time, and to Russian influence. This conclusion was reinforced by Israel‚Äôs smashing victory in 1967, when Israel quickly conquered the Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank and the Golan Heights, the last, after violating the cease-fire in an operation ordered by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan without notifying the Prime Minister or Chief of Staff.39 The Israeli thesis that Israel is a ‚Äústrategic asset‚Äù was again confirmed by Israel‚Äôs moves to block Syrian efforts to support Palestinians being massacred by Jordan in September 1970, at a time when the U.S. was unable to intervene directly against what was perceived as a threat to U.S. clients in the Arab world. This contribution led to a substantial increase in U.S. aid. In the 1970s, U.S. analysts argued that Israel and Iran under the Shah served to protect U.S. control over the oil-producing regions of the Gulf. After the fall of the Shah, Israel‚Äôs role as a Middle East Sparta in the service of American power has evoked increasing American support. At the same time, Israel aided the U.S. in penetrating Black Africa with substantial secret CIA subsidies‚Äîsupporting Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, Idi Amin in Uganda, Mobutu in Zaire, Bokassa in the Central Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  68  African Republic, and others at various times40‚Äîas well as in circumventing the ban on aid to Rhodesia and South Africa, * and more recently, in providing military and technological aid, as well as many advisers, for U.S. clients in Central America.41 An increasingly visible alliance between Israel, South Africa, Taiwan and the military dictatorships of the southern cone in South America has also proven an attractive prospect for major segments of American power.42 Now, Israel is surely regarded as a crucial part of the elaborate U.S. base and backup system for the Rapid Deployment Force ringing the Middle East oil producing regions.43 These are highly important matters that deserve much more attention than I can give them here. *  UPI, Boston Globe, May 16, 1982: the item reads, in toto, ‚ÄúAmerican-made  helicopters and spare parts went from Israel to Rhodesia‚Äînow Zimbabwe‚Äî despite a trade embargo during the bitter war against guerrillas, the Commerce Department has disclosed.‚Äù The Labor Party journal quotes the head of South Africa‚Äôs military industry as saying that Israeli ‚Äútechnological assistance permits South Africa to evade the arms embargo imposed upon it because of its racial policies‚Äù (Davar, Dec. 17, 1982). Yediot Ahronot, citing the London Times, reports that ‚ÄúIsraeli technicians are helping South Africa evade the French military embargo‚Äù by transferring and repairing French armaments in Israeli hands (Oct. 29, 1981). Close relations with South Africa were established by the Rabin Labor government in the mid-1970s and remain warm, because, as Minister of Industry and Commerce Gidon Pat recently stated in Pretoria, ‚ÄúIsrael and South Africa are two of the only 30 democracies in the world.‚Äù Similarly, Gad Yaakovi of the Labor Party ‚Äúpraised the economic and ‚Äòother‚Äô [i.e., military] relations with South Africa in a television interview‚Äù in Israel, Yoav Karni reports, adding that if he had said similar things in Britain, Holland or Sweden he would have lost his membership in the Social Democratic party, though his remarks caused no distress in the Israeli Labor Party. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  69  Had it not been for Israel‚Äôs perceived geopolitical role‚Äîprimarily in the Middle East, but elsewhere as well‚Äîit is doubtful that the various pro-Israeli lobbies in the U.S. would have had much influence in policy formation, or that the climate of opinion deplored by Peled and other Israeli doves could have been constructed and maintained. Correspondingly, it will very likely erode if Israel comes to be seen as a threat rather than a support to the primary U.S. interest in the Middle East region, which is to maintain control over its energy reserves and the flow of petrodollars. Support for the concept of Israel as a ‚Äústrategic asset‚Äù has, then, been considerable among those who exercise real power in the U.S., and this position has regularly won out in internal policy debate, assisted, to some extent, by domestic political pressures. But the position has not been unchallenged. There have also been powerful forces in favor of the kind of peaceful political settlement that has long been possible, a matter to which we turn in the next chapter. Michael Klare has suggested that a useful distinction can be drawn between the ‚ÄúPrussians,‚Äù who advocate the threat or use of violence to attain desired policy ends, and the ‚ÄúTraders,‚Äù who share the same goals but believe that peaceful means will be more effective.44 These are tactical assessments, and positions may therefore shift. It is, to first approximation, accurate to say that the ‚ÄúPrussians‚Äù have supported Israel as a ‚Äústrategic asset,‚Äù while the ‚ÄúTraders‚Äù have sought a political accommodation of some sort. The point is implicitly recognized in much pro-Israeli propaganda, for example, a full-page New York Times advertisement signed by many luminaries (including some who are doves in other contexts), which calls for establishment of a pro-Israel political pressure group (NAT PAC) under the heading ‚ÄúFaith in Israel strengthens America.‚Äù To support their case, they write: ‚Äú‚Ķif U.S. interests in the Middle East were threatened, it would take months to Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  70  mount a significant presence there. With Israel as an ally, it would take only a few days.‚Äù Similarly, Joseph Churba, Director of the Center for International Security, complains that ‚Äúthe left in Israel‚Äù lacks appreciation of U.S. and Israeli interests and ‚Äúmany in their ranks, as in the ranks of the American left, are working for the same purpose, i.e., that neither country should function as an international policeman, be it in El Salvador or in Lebanon‚Äù‚Äîthe left in Israel and the U.S., then, are contributing to anti-Semitism, ‚Äúthreatening the interests of Jews,‚Äù according to the doctrine of ‚Äúthe real anti-Semitism‚Äù developed by the Anti-Defamation League, discussed above. Those who understand U.S. and Israeli interests believe, as Churba does, that ‚ÄúWestern power‚Äù should be ‚Äúeffectively used to moderate Soviet and radical adventurism,‚Äù45 and that the U.S. and Israel should function as international policemen in El Salvador, Lebanon and elsewhere. The authentic voice of the ‚ÄúPrussians,‚Äù in both cases. The same distinction is implicit in the argument as to whether Israel‚Äôs ‚ÄúPeace for Galilee‚Äù invasion of Lebanon strengthened the American position in the Middle East and, in general, served U.S. ends. The New Republic argues that this is so; hence the operation was justified. Others believe that American interests in the region have been harmed. Thus Thomas Friedman, after an extensive investigation of opinion in the Arab world, concludes that ‚Äúnot only did respect for many Arab leaders die in Lebanon [because they did not come to the defense of the victims of the Israeli attack, even when a besieged Arab capital was being defended by ‚Äúa popular movement,‚Äù as a Lebanese political scientist explained], but so too much of America‚Äôs respect in the Middle East,‚Äù because of the perception that ‚ÄúAmerica cannot be trusted‚Äù (the director of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development) and that the U.S. supports Israel ‚Äúas an instrument of its own policy.‚Äù A senior Kuwaiti official, echoing widely expressed opinions, stated: ‚ÄúYou have lost where Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  71  it matters most‚Äîon the humanitarian level. Whatever respect there was in the Arab world for the United States as a moral authority has been lost.‚Äù46 Who is right in this debate? Both sides are, in their own terms. Those who deride ‚Äúthe humanitarian level‚Äù and the concept of ‚Äúmoral authority‚Äù can argue, with some plausibility, that Israel‚Äôs military might enhances the capacity of the United States to rule the region by force and violence, and that the invasion of Lebanon contributed to this end, at least in the short term. Those who have a different conception of what the U.S. role should be in world affairs will draw different conclusions from the same evidence.  2.2.3 Subsidiary Services After the Lebanon invasion, Israel moved at once to underscore its status as a ‚Äústrategic asset‚Äù and to reinforce its own position by improving relations with its allies (which, not by accident, are U.S. allies) in Africa and Latin America. Renewing relations established under CIA auspices in the 1960s (see above), Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir visited General Mobutu in Zaire, informing him that apart from direct military and technical support, ‚ÄúIsrael will aid Zaire through its influence over Jewish organizations in the United States, which will help in improving [Zaire‚Äôs] image.‚Äù* This is a rather serious matter, since the *  Mobutu is not the only brutal dictator to whom this idea occurred, or was  suggested. In an interview with the left-wing journal AI-Hamishmar (Mapam), Dec. 29, 1981, Imelda Marcos, acting as an ‚Äúinternational advocate‚Äù for her husband, explained their intention of exploiting improved relations with Israel and the influence of American Jews ‚Äúto improve the tainted image [of the Philippine dictatorship] in the American media, and to combat its unpopularity Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  72  image of this corrupt and brutal dictatorship is not of the highest, and as Mobutu complained, ‚Äúthe main antagonists [of Zaire] in the U.S. are Jewish members of Congress.‚Äù Shamir‚Äôs comforting response was: ‚ÄúJews criticize us too.‚Äù He went on to explain that ‚Äúwith the cooperation of Israeli groups and with the money that American Jews will contribute, it will be possible to aid Zaire,‚Äù militarily and materially and in improving its image. General Mobutu expressed his pleasure that Israeli officers are providing military training (specifically, for his Presidential Guard) along with French and Chinese advisers. In January 1983, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon visited Zaire and an agreement was reached that Israeli military advisers would restructure Zaire‚Äôs armed forces. Sharon ‚Äúdefended Israel‚Äôs new arms and military aid agreement with Zaire today as a step towards increasing Israeli influence in Africa,‚Äù UPI reported. Sharon added that the program (which must be secret) would be ‚Äúa contribution to Israeli exports in arms and equipment‚Äù and that it would lead other African countries to turn to Israel for military aid.47 A few weeks earlier, Sharon had visited Honduras ‚Äúto cement relations with a friendly country which has shown interest in connection with our defense establishment.‚Äù Israeli radio reported that Israel had helped Honduras acquire what is regarded as the strongest air force in Central America, and noted that ‚Äúthe Sharon trip raised the question of whether Israel might act as an American proxy in Honduras.‚Äù ‚ÄúIt has also been reported that Israeli advisers have assisted in training in the American Congress.‚Äù Commenting, journalist Leon Hadar reports the opinion of Israeli officials that other third world dictatorships with a ‚Äúnegative image‚Äù are also interested in using this device to obtain greater political, economic and military aid from the U.S., and that strengthening of Israel‚Äôs role in the Third World is one of the ‚Äúadvantages‚Äù that Israel will gain from strategic cooperation with the U.S. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  73  Honduran pilots.‚Äù48 A ‚Äútop-level military source‚Äù in Honduras stated that the new Israel-Honduras agreement involved sophisticated jet fighters, tanks, Galil assault rifles (standard issue for state terrorists in Central America), training for officers, troops and pilots, and perhaps missiles. Sharon‚Äôs entourage included the head of the Israeli Air Force and the director-general of the Defense Ministry; they ‚Äúwere accorded the full measure of honors usually accorded to a visiting head of state.‚Äù A government functionary stated that Sharon‚Äôs visit was ‚Äúmore positive‚Äù than Reagan‚Äôs shortly before, since Sharon ‚Äúsold us arms‚Äù while ‚ÄúReagan only uttered platitudes, explaining that Congress was preventing him from doing more.‚Äù There is no significant domestic force to prevent Israel from ‚Äúdoing more,‚Äù a fact deplored by Israeli doves. ‚ÄúThe unannounced visit and military accord underline Israel‚Äôs growing role as U.S. arms broker and proxy in crisis-ridden Central America.‚Äù Meanwhile in Guatemala, Chief of Staff Mario Lopez Fuentes, who regards President Rios Montt as insufficiently violent, complained about U.S. meddling concerning human rights; ‚ÄúWhat we want is to be left at liberty,‚Äù he said; ‚ÄúIt would be preferable if the U.S. were to take an attitude similar to that of other allies such as Israel, he indicated.‚Äù49 Israel‚Äôs services in Central America have been considerable, including Nicaragua (under Somoza), Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, and now apparently Costa Rica since it began to draw closer to U.S. policy in the region after the election of Luis Alberto Monge in February 1982. The Israeli contributions to Guatemalan and Honduran military forces are particularly significant: in the former case, because the military regimes placed in power through U.S. intervention were finding it difficult to resist a growing insurrection while congressional human rights restrictions were impeding direct U.S. military aid to these mass murderers; and in the case of Honduras, because of Reagan‚Äôs increasingly visible efforts to foment disorder and strife by supporting the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  74  Somozist National Guard based in Honduras in their forays into Nicaragua, where they torture and destroy in the manner in which they were trained by the United States for many years.50 Before the Falklands war, it had been hoped that Argentine neo-Nazis could be employed for this purpose, as well as for improving the efficiency of state terrorism in El Salvador and Guatemala. A more reliable client-ally may be needed to perform this proxy role, however. Charles Maechling, who led counterinsurgency and internal-defense planning for Presidents Johnson and Kennedy from 1961-66 and is now an associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, described U.S. trainees in Latin America as ‚Äúindistinguishable from the war criminals hanged at Nuremberg after World War II,‚Äù* adding that ‚Äúfor the United States, which led the crusade against the Nazi evil, to support the methods of Heinrich Himmler‚Äôs extermination squads is an outrage.‚Äù51 Apart from being an outrage, it has become difficult, because of congressional legislation. Hence the importance of Israel‚Äôs contributions through the 1970s and increasingly today, in support of those who employ the methods of Himmler‚Äôs extermination squads. The congressional human rights campaign (often misleadingly attributed to the American presidency) was a reflection of the ‚ÄúVietnam syndrome,‚Äù a dread malady that afflicted much of the population in the wake of the Vietnam war, with such terrifying symptoms as insight into *  The extensive direct U.S. involvement in state terrorism in Latin America, as  Maechling notes, began under the Kennedy Administration, when the mission of the Latin American military was shifted from ‚Äúhemispheric defense‚Äù to ‚Äúinternal security,‚Äù i.e., war against their own populations. The effects were catastrophic, throughout Latin America. In terms of its impact, this 1961 decision of the Kennedy liberals was one of the most significant ones of recent history. It is little known here. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  75  the ways in which American power is used in the world and concern over torture, murder, aggression, and oppression. It had been hoped that the disease had been cured, but the popular reaction to Reagan‚Äôs revival of Kennedy-style counterinsurgency showed that the optimism was premature, so Israel‚Äôs contributions are perhaps even more welcome than before. It has, incidentally, been alleged that the U.S. has been opposed to Israel‚Äôs Latin American ventures (e.g., that Carter opposed Israel‚Äôs aid to Somoza), but this is hardly likely. There is little doubt that the U.S. could have prevented any intervention of which it did not approve, and it sometimes did so, though not in Nicaragua, where the Human Rights Administration in fact supported Somoza to the end of his bloody rule, even after the natural allies of the U.S., the Nicaraguan business community, had turned against him. Israel‚Äôs services have extended beyond the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, to Asia as well. Thus on one occasion Israel supplied American jets to Indonesia when its arms were depleted in the course of the massacre of Timorese, and the Human Rights Administration, while doing its best to provide the armaments required to consummate this mission, was still reluctant to do so too openly, perhaps fearing that the press might depart from its complicity in this slaughter.52 Taiwan has been a particularly close ally. The Israeli press speaks of ‚Äúthe Fifth World‚Äù‚ÄîIsrael, South Africa, Taiwan‚Äîa new alliance of technologically advanced states that is engaged in advanced weapons development, including nuclear weapons, missiles, and so on. 53 We return in chapter 7 to these developments, which may by now be causing some alarm in Washington. With Reagan‚Äôs efforts to enflame the Nicaragua-Honduras border and Sharon‚Äôs trip to Honduras, the Israeli connection became so visible as to call forth some official denials, duly reported as fact in the New York Times. Noting that Israel is ‚Äúenlarging its military training missions and Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  76  role as a principal supplier of arms to Central America,‚Äù Leslie GeIb writes that ‚Äúfrom every indication, the Israelis are not there, as are most of the others [Americans, PLO, Cubans, East Germans], as participants in a form of East-West confrontation or to engage in revolutionary or counterrevolutionary intrigue.‚Äù These ‚Äúindications‚Äù turn out to be statements to this effect by Israeli and American officials, none of whom ‚Äúsaid that Israel was in Central America to do Washington‚Äôs bidding or to help out in countries such as Guatemala where the Administration is barred from providing military aid because of civil rights abuses.‚Äù Naturally, one would expect Israeli and American officials to proclaim any such arrangements openly, so their failure to do so suffices to prove that there is nothing to this canard. A State Department official comments that ‚Äúwe‚Äôve indicated we‚Äôre not unhappy they are helping out‚Äù in places like Guatemala and Honduras, ‚Äúbut I wouldn‚Äôt say we and the Israelis have figured out together what to do.‚Äù54 Elaborate ‚Äúfiguring out‚Äù would seem to be superfluous, given the shared perceptions and interests, not to speak of the extremely close relations at all levels, including the military itself, military industry, intelligence, diplomatic, etc. It is striking that Gelb assumes as a matter of course that while Israel might be pursuing its own interests (as it no doubt is, one of these being to render services to U.S. power), this could not be true of, say, Cuba, which surely has no reason to feel threatened and therefore could not be trying to break out of its ‚Äúisolation‚Äù (as Israel is, he reports) by supporting friendly governments. One might have expected Gelb, perhaps, to be sensitive to this issue. He was the director of the Pentagon Papers study, which contained the astonishing revelation that U.S. intelligence, over the 20-year period surveyed, was so completely indoctrinated by Cold War propaganda that it was unable to conceive of the possibility that the North Vietnamese might have been motivated by Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  77  their own perceived interests, instead of simply acting as lackeys of the USSR or China.55  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
78  The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  3. American Liberalism and Ideological Support for Israel s noted, the view of the ‚ÄúPrussians‚Äù has generally won out in internal policy debate. But the story is more complex. American liberalism has led the way in constructing the ‚Äúblindly chauvinistic and narrow-minded‚Äù support for Israeli policy that General Peled deplores. On the same day that the U.S. and Israel stood alone against the world at the United Nations (see chapter 2, section 1), the national conference of the Democratic Party ‚Äúadopted a statement highly sympathetic to Israel‚Äôs recent attacks in Lebanon, qualifying it only with an expression of regret over ‚Äòall loss of life on both sides in Lebanon‚Äô.‚Äù In contrast, the Foreign Ministers of the European Community ‚Äúvigorously condemned the new Israeli invasion of Lebanon‚Äù as a ‚Äúflagrant violation of international law as well as of the most elementary humanitarian principles,‚Äù adding that this ‚Äúunjustifiable action‚Äù posed the risk of ‚Äúleading to a generalized war.‚Äù56 This is by no means an isolated case. In fact, the front page of the New York Times on that day (June 27) encapsulates the U.S.-Israel ‚Äúspecial relationship‚Äù rather neatly. There are three adjacent columns. One is a report by William Farrell from Beirut, describing the effects of Israel‚Äôs latest bombardments: cemeteries jammed, people buried in mass graves, hospitals in desperate need of supplies, garbage heaped everywhere in stinking piles, bodies decomposing under tons of rubble, buildings little more than shattered hulks, morgue refrigerators full, bodies piled on the floors of hospitals, the few doctors desperately trying to treat victims of cluster and phosphorus bombs, Israel blocking Red Cross medical supplies, hospitals bombed, surgery interrupted by Israeli shelling, etc. The  A  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  79  second is a report by Bernard Nossiter from New York, reporting how the U.S. blocked UN action to stop the slaughter on the grounds that the PLO might be preserved as ‚Äúa viable political force.‚Äù The third is a report by Adam Clymer from Philadelphia on the sympathetic support of the Democratic national conference for Israel‚Äôs war in Lebanon. The three front-page reports, side-by-side, capture the nature of the ‚Äúspecial relationship‚Äù with some accuracy‚Äîas does the lack of editorial comment. American liberalism had always been highly sympathetic to Israel, but there was a noticeable positive shift in attitudes in 1967 with the demonstration of Israel‚Äôs military might. Top Israeli military commanders made it clear not long after that Israel had faced no serious military threat and that a quick victory was anticipated with confidence‚Äîthat the alleged threat to Israel‚Äôs existence was ‚Äúa bluff.‚Äù57 But this fact was suppressed here in favor of the image of an Israeli David confronting a brutal Arab Goliath,58 enabling liberal humanitarians to offer their sympathy and support to the major military power of the region as it turned from crushing its enemies to suppressing those who fell under its control, while leading Generals explained that Israel could conquer everything from Khartoum to Baghdad to Algeria within a week, if necessary (Ariel Sharon).59 The rise in Israel‚Äôs stock among liberal intellectuals with this demonstration of its military prowess is a fact of some interest. It is reasonable to attribute it in large part to domestic American concerns, in particular, to the inability of the U.S. to crush indigenous resistance in Indochina. That Israel‚Äôs lightning victory should have been an inspiration to open advocates of the use of violence to attain national goals is not surprising, but there are many illusions about the stance of the liberal intelligentsia on this matter. It is now sometimes forgotten that in 1967 they overwhelmingly supported U.S. intervention (more accurately, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  80  aggression) in Indochina and continued to do so, though many came to oppose this venture for the reasons that impelled business circles to the same judgment: the costs became too high, out of proportion to the benefits that might be gained‚Äîa ‚Äúpragmatic‚Äù rather than principled opposition, quite different from the stance adopted towards depredations of official enemies, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, for example. (In contrast, the central elements of the peace movement opposed aggression in both cases on principled grounds; these facts have been much obscured in the subsequent rewriting of history). Thus the appeal of Israel‚Äôs efficient and successful use of force was, in fact, quite broad. It was only half-jokingly that people spoke of sending Moshe Dayan to Vietnam to show how to do the job right. At the same time, the challenge to authority at home was regarded with much distress. A dread image was conjured up of Vietcong, Maoist fanatics, bearded Cuban revolutionaries, rampaging students, Black Panthers, Arab terrorists and other forces‚Äîperhaps on the Russian leash‚Äîconspiring to shake the foundations of our world of privilege and domination. Israel showed how to treat Third World upstarts properly, winning the allegiance of many frightened advocates of the virtues of knowing one‚Äôs place. For some, the military might that Israel displayed induced open admiration and respect, while others disguised these feelings, appealing to the alleged vulnerability of Israel before the forces it had so decisively crushed, and still others were deluded by the effective ‚Äú‚ÄòDavid and Goliath‚Äô legend‚Äù (see note 58). Individuals have their own reasons, but tendencies of this nature are readily detectable and go a long way towards explaining the outpouring of ‚Äúsupport for Israel‚Äù as it demonstrated its capacity to wield the mailed fist. It is since 1967 that questioning of Israel policies has largely been silenced, with effective use of the moral weapons of anti-Semitism and ‚ÄúJewish self-hatred.‚Äù Topics that were widely discussed and debated in Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  81  Europe or in Israel itself were effectively removed from the agenda here, and a picture was established of Israel, its enemies and victims, and the U.S. role in the region, that bore only a limited resemblance to reality. The situation slowly began to change in the late 1970s, markedly so, after the increasingly visible repression under the Milson-Sharon regime in the occupied territories (only partially reported here) and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, which offered a serious challenge to the talents of propagandists. The immense popularity that Israel won by demonstrating its military efficiency also offered a weapon that could be usefully employed against domestic dissidents. Considerable effort was devoted to showing that the New Left supported Arab terrorism and the destruction of Israel, a task largely accomplished in defiance of the facts (the New Left, as the documentary record clearly shows, quite generally tended to support the position of Israeli doves).60 It is interesting that one of the devices currently used to meet the new challenge is to extend to the press in general the deceptive critique applied to the New Left in earlier years. Now, the insistent complaint is that the media are antagonistic to Israel and subject to the baleful influence of the PLO, motivated by their reflex sympathy for Third World revolutionary struggles against Western power. While this may appear ludicrous given the evident facts, neither the effort (see p 36* and further examples below) nor its not insignificant success in containing deviations towards a minimal degree of even-handedness will come as any surprise to students of twentieth century propaganda systems, just as there was no surprise in the earlier successes of those who were fabricating a picture of New Left support for PLO terrorism and contempt for Israel precisely because it is a democracy advancing towards socialism, one of Irving Howe‚Äôs insights.61 We are, after all, living in the age of Orwell. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  82  One can, perhaps, offer a more sympathetic psychological interpretation. Those who are accustomed to near total dominance of articulate opinion may feel that the world is coming to an end if their control is threatened or weakened ever so slightly, reacting in the manner of an over-indulged child who is chided for the first time. Hence the wailing about the reflex sympathy of the press for the PLO and its immutable hatred of Israel when, say, there is an occasional report of the bombing of hospitals or beating of defenseless prisoners. Or the phenomenon may simply be an expression of a totalitarian mentality: any deviation from the orthodox spectrum of ‚Äúsupport for Israel‚Äù (which includes a variety of permissible ‚Äúcritical support‚Äù) is an intolerable affront, and it is therefore barely an exaggeration to describe slight deviation as if it were near total. As an illustration (there are many), consider a March 1983 newsletter of the American Professors for Peace in the Middle East‚Äîa well-funded organization that is concerned about peace in the Middle East in the same sense in which the Communist Party is concerned about peace in Afghanistan‚Äîsent to its 15 Regional Chairmen and its many Campus Representatives. It warns of an ‚Äúorganized, centrally controlled, information plan‚Äù on the ‚ÄúArab side‚Äù which is not matched by anything representing ‚Äúthe Israeli position.‚Äù Their concern is aroused by ‚Äúa list of speakers who are being toured through the university circuit‚Ķto present the Arab point of view,‚Äù giving presentations that ‚Äúsmack more of propaganda than of education.‚Äù ‚ÄúIn order of frequency and virulence the speakers are: Hatem Hussaini, Edward Said, Noam Chomsky, Fawaz Turki, Stokely Carmichael, James Zogby, Hassan Rahman, Chris Giannou, M.D., Israel Shahak, and Gail Pressberg.‚Äù As any observer of the American scene will be aware, these nefarious figures almost completely dominate discussion of the Middle East in the United States, and ‚Äúthe Israeli point of view‚Äù virtually never obtains a Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  83  hearing, though, the newsletter adds, ‚Äúthere are doubtless many speakers who espouse the Israeli position‚Äù and would speak if only there were an opportunity for them to do so. Even if there were some truth to the paranoid concept of ‚Äúan organized, centrally controlled, information plan,‚Äù or the belief that these speakers are part of it, or that they ‚Äúpresent the Arab point of view,‚Äù * it should be obvious that this would be a phenomenon of marginal significance in the United States and could not begin to compare with the massive pro-Israel propaganda system, of which this organization‚Äîwhich alone surely dwarfs anything on the ‚ÄúArab side‚Äù‚Äîis a tiny element. But the frightened little men of the APPME probably believe all of this. Perhaps they are aware that this ‚Äúinformation plan‚Äù and its agents have virtually no access to the mass media or journals of opinion, but they are right in noting that no way has yet been found to prevent them from responding to invitations at one or another college, a flaw in the American system that still remains to be addressed. As the invasion of Lebanon proceeded, the list of those who were deliberately falsifying the facts to place Israel in a less than favorable light grew quite long, including the European press and much of the American press and television, the International Red Cross and other *  Among them are people who have always been harsh critics of all the Arab  states and the PLO, for example, the third in order of virulence and others as well, but it is true that no one on the list meets the approved standards of servility to the Israeli government propaganda system, so they might be considered ‚Äúpro-Arab‚Äù by someone who takes this to be the criterion for distinguishing ‚Äúeducation‚Äù from ‚Äúpropaganda.‚Äù For the record, virtually every talk I have given on this topic has been arranged by some tiny student or faculty group, as any sane person familiar with the United States would of course know without being told. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
84  The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  relief agencies, American diplomats, and in fact virtually everyone except spokesmen for the Israeli government and selected Americans returning from guided tours. The general tone is conveyed by Eliahu Ben-Elissar, chairman of the Knesset‚Äôs Committee on Foreign Affairs, who received ‚Äúthe most applause‚Äù at the convention of B‚Äônai Brith when he said: ‚ÄúWe have been attacked, criticized, dirtied, besmirched‚Ķ I wouldn‚Äôt want to accuse the whole world of anti-Semitism, but how to explain this violent outburst.‚Äù62 A similar perception, widely shared, was expressed by Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon: Today we are in the arena opposite the entire world. It is the people of Israel, a small and isolated people, against the entire world.63 This ‚Äúhorrible thing that is now taking place around us in the world‚Äù is ‚Äúno doubt‚Äù the result of anti-Semitism, not the Lebanon war or the Beirut massacres a few days before. We return to some details of this intriguing story. The truth of the matter is that Israel has been granted a unique immunity from criticism in mainstream journalism and scholarship, consistent with its unique role as a beneficiary of other forms of American support. We have already seen a number of examples and many more will appear below. Two examples noted earlier in this chapter offer a clear enough indication of this immunity: the Israeli terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities and other public places in Egypt (the Lavon affair), and the attack on the unmistakeably identified U.S. Liberty with rockets, aircraft cannon, napalm, torpedoes and machine guns, clearly premeditated, leaving 34 crewmen dead and 75 wounded in ‚Äúthe Navy‚Äôs bloodiest ‚Äòpeacetime‚Äô international incident of the 20th Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  85  century‚Äù* (see notes 36, 39). In both cases, the general reaction of the press and scholarship has been silence or misrepresentation. Neither has entered history as a deplorable act of terrorism and violence, either at the time or in retrospect. In the case of the bombings in Egypt, the Israeli novelist Amos Oz, writing in the New York Times, refers to the terrorist acts obliquely as ‚Äúcertain adventurist Israeli intelligence operations‚Äù‚Äîthe standard formulation‚Äîin a highly regarded article on the ‚Äúbeautiful Israel‚Äù of pre-Begin days.64 The nature of the attack on the Liberty was also evaded not only by the press fairly generally but by the government and by a U.S. Naval Board of Inquiry, though high-ranking figures had no doubt that the official report was a whitewash; former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, for example, states that the attack ‚Äúcould not possibly have been a case of mistaken identity,‚Äù as officially claimed.65 Can one imagine that any other country could carry out terrorist bombings of U.S. installations or attack a U.S. ship killing or wounding 100 men with complete impunity, without even critical comment for many years? That is about as likely as that across the spectrum of mainstream opinion, some country (other than our own) should be depicted as guided by a ‚Äúhigh moral purpose‚Äù through the years (see chapter 1, citing Time, a journal regarded as critical of Israel), while its *  Richard Smith (see note 39). He notes that the only comparable incident in  recent years was the Japanese attack upon the U.S. gunboat Panay in 1937 in which 3 were killed, and contrasts the ‚Äústrangely callous‚Äù Israeli attitude with the far more forthcoming Japanese reaction, both at the personal and governmental levels. His conclusion is that nations have no friends, only interests; but he overlooks the fact that Japan could not count upon the American intelligentsia to cover up the incident, a privilege that Israel correctly took for granted. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  86  enemies are dehumanized and despised, and history is reconstructed to preserve the desired illusions, a topic to which we turn directly.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  87  Notes‚ÄîChapter 2 The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù 1. 2. 3.  4.  5.  6. 7. 8.  9.  Bernard D. Nossiter, New York Times, June 27, 1982. Boston Globe, June 27; June 9, 1982. Nadav Safran, Israel: the Embattled Ally (Harvard, Cambridge, 1978, pp. 576, 110), a study that bends over backwards to provide an interpretation sympathetic to Israel; see TNCW, chapter 13, for discussion. G. Neal Lendenmann, ‚ÄúThe Struggle in Congress over Aid Levels to Israel,‚Äù American-Arab Affairs, Winter 1982-3 (see chapter 4, note 60); Boston Globe, Sept. 26, 1982. For an attempt to assess the actual level of U.S. aid, see Thomas Stauffer, Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 29, 1981. For the specific details of the official record, see Yosef Priel, Davar, Dec. 10, 1982; Ignacio Klich, South, February 1983. Bernard Weinraub, New York Times, May 26, 1982. ‚ÄúSenate OK‚Äôs foreign aid plan with $2.6b for Israel,‚Äù Washington Post‚Äî Boston Globe, Dec. 18, 1982. Ian S. Lustick, ‚ÄúIsraeli Politics and American Foreign Policy,‚Äù Foreign Affairs, Winter 1982/83; Amanda Mitchison, ‚ÄúGift horses,‚Äù New Statesman, Feb. 4, 1983. ‚ÄúIsrael: Foreign Intelligence and Security Services,‚Äù reprinted in Counterspy, May-June 1982; one of the documents brought by American journalists from Iran, where they were released after the takeover of the American Embassy. Given the circumstances, one cannot be certain of the authenticity of the document, though this tends to be confirmed both by its character and the subsequent discussion concerning it. A former chief of the Israeli Mossad (essentially, the Israeli CIA), Isser Harel, accepted the authenticity of the document but condemned it as ‚ÄúantiSemitic, one-sided and malicious,‚Äù ‚Äúdilletantish,‚Äù reflecting a tendency in the CIA to ‚Äúrewrite history‚Äù at the time the report was written in 1979; Yuval Elizur, Boston Globe, Feb. 5, 1982, citing an interview in Ma‚Äôariv.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù 10. 11.  12. 13. 14.  15. 16.  17.  88  General (Res.) Mattityahu Peled, New Outlook (Tel Aviv), May/June 1975, reporting on a visit to the United States. New Outlook editor Simha Flapan, speaking at an October 1979 conference in Washington; cited by Merle Thorpe, Jr., President, Foundation for Middle East Peace, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, First Session, Dec. 16, 1981 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1982, p. 143). See chapter 4, below. Jessie Lurie, Jewish Post & Opinion, May 28, 1982. On the political influence of what he calls ‚Äúthe Israeli lobby,‚Äù see Seth Tillman, The United States in the Middle East (Indiana, Bloomington, 1982). Tillman was on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with special concern for the Middle East. Leon Hadar, ‚ÄúLabour of Love,‚Äù Jerusalem Post, March 2, 1982. See Stephen Zunes, ‚ÄúStrange Bedfellows,‚Äù Progressive, Nov. 1981. He notes that passionate support for Israel combines readily with fervent anti-Semitism. See also Richard Bernstein, ‚ÄúEvangelicals Strengthening Bonds With Jews,‚Äù New York Times, Feb. 6, 1983, and J. A. James, ‚ÄúFriends in need,‚Äù Jerusalem Post, Jan. 20, 1983, discussing the ‚Äúpotential importance of Evangelical support‚Äù in American politics and the ‚Äúimmense infra-structure‚Äù of media at their command, and also the vast wealth that can be tapped. Davar reports that the Temple Mount Fund, ‚Äúestablished in Israel and the U.S. and financed by Christian extremists,‚Äù intends to donate tens of millions of dollars to Jewish settlements in the West Bank; Jan. 23, 1983 (Israleft News Service). It is a reasonable surmise‚Äînow sometimes voiced in Israel‚Äîthat an Israeli-Evangelical Protestant alliance may become more prominent in Latin America, following the model of Guatemala, where the Rios Montt regime (which has succeeded even in surpassing its predecessors in its murderous barbarity) is supported by Evangelical Protestant movements and advised and supplied by Israel. See note 42. Cited by Amnon Kapeliouk, Israel: lafin des mythes (Albin Michel, Paris, 1975, p. 219). This book by an outstanding Israeli journalist is the best  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  18. 19.  20.  21.  22. 23.  24. 25.  26. 27.  89  account of Israeli government (Labor Party) policies from 1967-1973. Many U.S. publishers were approached for an English edition, but none was willing to undertake it. Cited by Zunes, ‚ÄúStrange Bedfellows.‚Äù See, for example, Pro-Arab Propaganda in America: Vehicles and Voices; a Handbook (Anti-Defamation League of B‚Äônai Brith, 1983); Thomas Mountain, ‚ÄúCampus anti-Zionism,‚Äù Focus (Brandeis University), February 1983 (thanking the League for what passes as ‚Äúfact‚Äù); and many handouts and pamphlets circulated in colleges around the country, typically without identification, which students distributing them often attribute to the League. Benny Landau, Ha‚Äôaretz, July 28, 1981; Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, p.65; Jolanta Benal, Interview with Meir Pail, Win, March 1, 1983. Nathan and Ruth Ann Perlmutter, The Real Anti-Semitism in America (Arbor House, New York, 1982, pp. 72, 111, 116, 136, 133f., 159, 125, 231). The book also contains the kinds of defamation of critics of Israeli policies and distortion of their views that one has come to expect in such circles and that merit no more comment than similar exercises in Communist Party literature. Jon Kimche, There Could Have Been Peace (Dial, 1973. pp. 310-11). Abba Eban, Congress Bi-Weekly, March 30, 1973; speech delivered July 31, 1972; Irving Howe, ‚ÄúThinking the Unthinkable About Israel: A Personal Statement,‚Äù New York magazine, Dec. 24, 1973. Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel: 1917-1948 (Indiana, Bloomington, 1965), p. 247. Interview, Jewish Post & Opinion, Nov. 19, 1982. The interviewer, Dale V. Miller, interprets him, quite accurately and it seems approvingly, as holding that the ‚Äúprovince‚Äù of criticism is ‚Äúthe sole right of the Israelis themselves.‚Äù On Wiesel‚Äôs attitudes concerning the September Beirut massacre, see chapter 6, section 6.4. Safran, Israel, p. 571. Cited by Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power (Harper & Row, New York, 1972, p. 242).  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù 28.  29.  30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.  36.  37.  90  For some discussion of this point, see my chapter ‚ÄúWhat directions for the disarmament movement?,‚Äù in Michael Albert and David Dellinger, eds., Beyond Survival: New Directions for the Disarmament Movement, (South End, Boston, 1983). Cited in Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War (Random House, New York, 1968, p. 188), from Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, 1953, p. 249). For more recent discussion, see Lawrence S. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece (Columbia, New York, 1982). The two volumes of the Kolkos‚Äô (see note 27) remain invaluable for understanding the general wartime and postwar period, though much useful work has appeared since, including much documentation that basically supports their analyses, in my view, though the fact is rarely acknowledged; since they do not adhere to approved orthodoxies, it is considered a violation of scholarly ethics to refer to their contributions. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, pp. 119, 88. Ibid., pp. 1, 149, 154, 296; see the same source for an extensive review and documentation. Ibid., pp. 80, 232. For discussion, see TNCW, chapters 2, 11, and references cited there. New York Times, August 6, 1954; see TNCW, p. 99, for further quotes and comment. Cited in TNCW, p. 457, from MERIP Reports, May 1981; also, J. of Palestine Studies, Spring 1981. The source is a memorandum obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. The man in direct charge of these operations, Avri el-Ad, describes them in his Decline of Honor (Regnery, Chicago, 1976). See Livia Rokach, Israel‚Äôs Sacred Terrorism (AAUG, Belmont, 1981), for excerpts from the diaries of Prime Minister Moshe Sharett concerning these events and how they were viewed at the time, at the highest level. On the ensuing political-military crisis (the ‚ÄúLavon affair‚Äù), see Yoram Peri, Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics (Cambridge, 1983), an important study that undermines many illusions. ‚ÄúIssues Arising Out of the Situation in the Near East,‚Äù declassified  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  38. 39.  40.  41.  91  12/10/81, commenting on NSC 5801/1, Jan. 24, 1958. Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion: A Biography (Delacorte, New York, 1978, pp. 261f.). Ibid., pp. 315-6; Pen, Between Battles and Ballots, p. 80. It has been suggested that the Israeli attack on the U.S. spy ship Liberty was motivated by concern that the U.S. might detect the plans for this attack. See James Ennes, Assault on the Liberty (Random House, New York, 1979). See also Richard K. Smith, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1978, who describes how ‚Äúwith the greatest ease‚Ķthe Israeli pilots [and later torpedo boats] butchered the large, slow-moving, and defenseless Liberty,‚Äù which was clearly and unmistakeably identified, in accordance with ‚Äúa vital part of Israel‚Äôs war plan,‚Äù namely, ‚Äúto keep foreign powers in the dark‚Äù so as to avoid ‚Äúsuperpower pressures for a cease-fire before they could seize the territory which they considered necessary for Israel‚Äôs future security‚Äù‚Äîa rather charitable interpretation, given the facts about the cease-fire and some questions that might be raised about ‚Äúsecurity.‚Äù See TNCW, p. 315 and references cited. See also the CIA study cited in note 9, which states that ‚ÄúThe Israelis also have undertaken widescale covert political, economic and paramilitary action programs‚Äîparticularly in Africa.‚Äù In his report on U.S. labor leaders, Leon Hadar notes that they have been particularly ‚Äúimpressed with Israel‚Äôs success in establishing links with the Third World, especially in Africa, to resist Soviet influence‚Äù‚Äîthe latter phrase being the usual code word for resistance to unwanted forms of nationalism. That American labor bureaucrats should be pleased by support for Mobutu and the like no longer comes as any surprise. See note 15. Yoav Karni, ‚ÄúDr. Shekel and Mr. Apartheid,‚Äù Yediot Ahronot, March 13, 1983. On the extensive Israeli relations, military and other, with South Africa, see TNCW, pp. 293f. and references cited; Israel Shahak, Israel‚Äôs Global Role (AAUG, Belmont, 1982); Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, ‚ÄúSouth Africa and Israel‚Äôs Strategy of Survival,‚Äù New Outlook (Tel Aviv), April/May 1977; Beit-Hallahmi, ‚ÄúIsrael and South Africa 1977-1982: Business As Usual‚ÄîAnd More,‚Äù New Outlook, March 1983, with further  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  42.  43. 44.  92  details on the enthusiasm shown by both Labor and Likud for South Africa though Labor prefers to keep the matter hidden, on the arrangements to use Israel for transshipment of South African goods to Europe and the U.S. to evade boycotts, etc.; Uri Dan, ‚ÄúThe Angolan Battlefield,‚Äù Monitin, January 1982; Carole Collins, National Catholic Reporter, Jan. 22, 1982; and many other sources. See TNCW, pp. 290f. and references cited; Shahak, Israel‚Äôs Global Role; Ignacio Klich, Le Monde diplomatique, October 1982, February 1983; Washington Report on the Hemisphere (Council on Hemispheric Affairs), June 29, 1982; Latin America Weekly Report, Aug. 6, Sept. 24, Dec. 17, 24, 1982; El Pais (Spain), March 8-10, 1983; Steve Goldfield, Jane Hunter and Paul Glickman, In These Times, April 13, 1983; and many other sources. It was reported recently that Kibbutz Beit Alpha (Mapam) has been providing equipment to the Chilean army (Ha‚Äôaretz, Jan. 7, 1983). In particular, Israel is now Guatemala‚Äôs biggest arms supplier (Economist, April 3, 1982), helping the U.S. government evade the congressional ban on arms, and Israeli military advisers are active. The new regime in Guatemala, which has been responsible for horrible massacres, credits its success in obtaining power to its many Israeli advisers; its predecessor, the murderous Lucas Garcia regime, openly expressed its admiration for Israel as a ‚Äúmodel‚Äù (see chapter 5, section 7.2). On the new levels of barbarism achieved by the Rios Montt regime, see Allan Nairn, ‚ÄúThe Guns of Guatemala,‚Äù New Republic, April 11, 1983 (ignoring the Israeli connection, which could hardly be discussed in this journal). See references cited, and an unpublished paper by Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, ‚ÄúIsrael‚Äôs support for Guatemala‚Äôs military regimes,‚Äù with information from the Israeli press. We return to further details. On Israel‚Äôs arms sales as a ‚ÄúU.S. proxy supplier of arms to various ‚Äòhot spots‚Äô in the Third World,‚Äù see SOUTH, April 1982. Arms sales now constitute a third of Israel‚Äôs industrial exports (Dvar Hashavua, Aug. 27, 1982). See Michael Klare, in Leila Meo, ed., U.S. Strategy in the Gulf (AAUG, Belmont, 1981). Michael Klare, Beyond the ‚ÄòVietnam Syndrome‚Äô (Institute for Policy  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù  45.  46. 47. 48. 49.  50.  51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57.  93  Studies, Washington, 1981). Advertisement, New York Times, Oct. 13, 1982; Joseph Churba, letter, New York Times, Nov. 21, 1982. See also Steven J. Rosen, The Strategic Value of Israel, AIPAC Papers on U.S.-Israel Relations, 1982; AIPAC is the officially-registered pro-Israel lobbying organization in Washington. Thomas L. Friedman, ‚ÄúAfter Lebanon: The Arab World in Crisis,‚Äù New York Times, Nov. 22, 1982. Tamar Golan, Ma‚Äôariv, Dec. 1, 1982; Reuter, Boston Globe, Jan. 20, 1983; UPI, New York Times, Jan. 22, 1983. New York Times, Dec. 6, 1982. Susan Morgan, Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 14, 1982; ‚ÄúGuatemala: Rightists on the warpath,‚Äù Latin America Weekly Report, March 4, 1983. For one of many recent examples, see Marlise Simons, New York Times, Dec. 14, 1982, citing American Roman Catholic missionaries who report that ‚Äúthe raiders had lately been torturing and mutilating captured peasants or Sandinist sympathizers, creating the same terror as in the past,‚Äù giving examples. The Somozist National Guard was trained in the U.S. Army School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone. Charles Maechling Jr., ‚ÄúThe Murderous Mind of the Latin Military,‚Äù Los Angeles Times, March 18, 1982. See TNCW, p. 429 and chapter 13, and references cited. Yoav Karni, ‚ÄúThe secret alliance of the ‚ÄòFifth World‚Äô,‚Äù Yediot Ahronot, Nov. 22, 1981. See TNCW, pp. 292-3. Leslie H. Gelb, ‚ÄúIsrael Said to Step Up Latin Role, Offering Arms Seized in Lebanon,‚Äù New York Times, Dec. 17, 1982. See my For Reasons of State (Pantheon, New York, 1973, p. 51), for citation and discussion. Adam Clymer, New York Times, June 27, 1982. Le Monde, June 11, for the full text; Christian Science Monitor, June 11, 1982. For references, see John Cooley, Green March, Black September (Frank Cass, London, 1973, pp. 161-2); my Peace in the Middle East? (Pantheon. New York, p. 140).  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
The Origins of the ‚ÄúSpecial Relationship‚Äù 58.  59. 60.  61.  62. 63.  64.  65.  94  The U.S. press appears to have ignored this important discussion among Israeli military commanders, apart from a report by John Cooley. Christian Science Monitor, July 17, 1972. For some discussion of what he refers to as ‚Äúthe ‚ÄòDavid and Goliath‚Äô legend surrounding the birth of Israel,‚Äù see Simha Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians (Barnes & Noble, New York, 1979, pp. 317f.). Yediot Ahronot. July 26, 1973; see Peace in the Middle East?, p. 142. See my ‚ÄúIsrael and the New Left,‚Äù in Mordecai S. Chertoff, ed., The New Left and the Jews (Pitman, New York, 1971); and Peace in the Middle East?, chapter 5, including a discussion of some of the remarkable contributions of Irving Howe, Seymour Martin Lipset, and others. See chapter 5, below, for further discussion. See the references of the preceding note on this and other examples, all presented without a pretense of evidence or rational argument, a stance always available when the targets are outside the approved consensus. Jewish Post & Opinion, Nov. 5, 1982. Jerusalem Domestic Television Service, Sept. 24, 1982. Reprinted in The Beirut Massacre (Claremont Research and Publications, New York, 1982), from the U.S. government Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Amos Oz, ‚ÄúHas Israel Altered its Visions?‚Äù New York Times Magazine, July 11, 1982. On misrepresentation of these events in scholarship, referring to Safran, Israel, see TNCW, p. 331. For a rare recording of the facts in the press, see the article by staff correspondents of the Christian Science Monitor, June 4, 1982; also Cecilia Blalock, ibid., June 22, 1982 and Philip Geyelin, Washington Post (Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 20, 1982). On the events and the cover-up, see references of note 39; also Anthony Pearson, Conspiracy of Silence (Quartet, New York, 1978) and James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1982).  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
3. Rejectionism and Accommodation
Rejectionism and Accomodation  96  1. A Framework for Discussion  W  hat have been the attitudes and policies of the major participants in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and those concerned with it, during the period since 1967, when the U.S.-Israel relationship became established in something like its present form? To approach this question sensibly, we should begin by clarifying what we take to be the valid claims of those who regard the former Palestine as their home. Attitudes towards this question vary widely. I will simply state certain assumptions that I will adopt as a framework for discussion. The first of these is the principle that Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are human beings with human rights, equal rights; more specifically, they have essentially equal rights within the territory of the former Palestine. Each group has a valid right to national selfdetermination in this territory. Furthermore, I will assume that the State of Israel within its pre-June 1967 borders had, and retains, whatever one regards as the valid rights of any state within the existing international system. One may formulate these principles in various ways, but let us take them to be clear enough to serve at least as a point of departure.  1.1 The Concept of Rejectionism The term ‚Äúrejectionism‚Äù is standardly used in the United States to refer to the position of those who deny the right of existence of the State of Israel, or who deny that Jews have the right of national selfdetermination within the former Palestine; the two positions are not exactly the same because of the question of the status of Israeli Arabs Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  97  and of Jews outside of Israel, but let us put these questions aside temporarily. Unless we adopt the racist assumption that Jews have certain intrinsic rights that Arabs lack, the term ‚Äúrejectionism‚Äù should be extended beyond its standard usage, to include also the position of those who deny the right of national self-determination to Palestinian Arabs, the community that constituted 9/10 of the population at the time of the first World War, when Great Britain committed itself to the establishment of a ‚Äúnational home for the Jewish people‚Äù in Palestine.* I will use the term ‚Äúrejectionism‚Äù in this non-racist sense. By ‚Äúaccommodation,‚Äù I will mean the position that accepts the basic assumptions of the preceding paragraph. Each position can take various forms, as regards the manner in which national rights are realized, boundaries, etc. The doctrine of self-styled ‚Äúsupporters of Israel,‚Äù which has largely dominated discussion here, holds that the PLO and the Arab states have been undeviatingly rejectionist (apart from Egypt since 1977), while the U.S. and Israel have sought a peaceful settlement that will recognize the valid claims of all. A more recent version is that the ‚Äúbeautiful Israel‚Äù of earlier years, which was realizing the dream of democratic socialism and becoming ‚Äúa light unto the nations,‚Äù has been betrayed by Begin and his cohorts, a consequence of the refusal of the Arabs to accept the existence of Israel and the unwavering commitment of the PLO‚Äîa collection of thugs and gangsters‚Äîto the destruction of Israel, the murder of innocents, and the intimidation of all ‚Äúmoderate‚Äù opinion in *  See the next chapter for discussion of the historical backgrounds of the current  conflict. Note that there was a pre-Zionist Jewish community in Palestine, consisting largely of anti-Zionist orthodox Jews whose leadership in later years supported the PLO in its call for a democratic secular state in Palestine. Thus virtually all of the indigenous population was anti-Zionist. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  98  the occupied territories.1 Like virtually all propaganda systems, this one contains elements of truth. But the real world is rather different, as will quickly be discovered if the historical record is rescued from the oblivion to which it has been consigned.  1.2 The International Consensus Since 1967, a broad international consensus has taken shape, including Europe, the USSR and most of the nonaligned nations. This consensus initially advocated a political settlement along approximately the preJune 1967 borders, with security guarantees, recognized borders, and various devices to help assure peace and tranquillity; it envisioned the gradual integration of Israel into the region while it would remain, in essence, a Western European society. This is the way the basic international document, UN Security Council Resolution 242, has been understood throughout most of the world, though its actual wording was left vague so that agreement on it could be achieved. As Jon Kimche comments: ‚ÄúEverybody subscribed to it and no one believed in it, since neither Arabs nor Israelis, Russians or Americans could agree on what the Resolution meant.‚Äù2 This is not quite accurate3, since in fact there was substantial agreement along the lines of the consensus just described.* The official position of the United States, for example, was that only ‚Äúinsubstantial alterations‚Äù of the pre-June 1967 borders would be allowed.4 Note that this consensus was rejectionist, in that it denied the national rights of Palestinian Arabs, referring to them solely in the  *  The resolution was accepted by Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, and in  1972 by Syria, with the condition that Palestinian ‚Äúrights‚Äù must be recognized. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  99  context of a refugee problem. For this reason, the PLO has refused to accept the resolution. This refusal may be a tactical error, but it is easy to understand its motivation. One would hardly have expected the World Zionist Organization, in 1947, to have accepted a UN resolution concerning Palestine that referred to Jewish interests only in terms of a refugee problem, denying any claim to national rights and any status to the Zionist movement or its organizations. The U.S. has refused any direct contacts with the PLO on the grounds of its unwillingness to accept UN 242 and to recognize the existence of the State of Israel, basing this refusal on a ‚ÄúMemorandum of Agreement‚Äù concluded with Israel by Secretary of State Kissinger in September 1975. This policy raises two questions. The narrower one is that the status of the Memorandum is dubious. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kissinger specified that its terms are not ‚Äúbinding commitments‚Äù of the United States and warned against creating such commitments. Furthermore, ‚ÄúCongress specifically dissociated itself from the related memoranda of agreement,‚Äù including this one.5 More broadly, whatever one thinks about the attitude of the PLO towards UN 242, it is quite clear, as we shall see, that it has been far more forthcoming than either Israel or the U.S. with regard to an accommodationist settlement. Nevertheless, the refusal of Israel to recognize the PLO, or to accept Palestinian national rights in any meaningful form, is not invoked as a reason to refuse contacts with Israel. Unless we adopt rejectionist assumptions, then, the argument supporting the American refusal to enter into direct contacts with the PLO has no force. From the mid-1970s, the terms of the international consensus have been modified in one significant respect: the right of the Palestinians to national self-determination has been recognized, and the consensus now includes the concept of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  100  Strip, with perhaps some minor border rectifications. The newer form of the international consensus overcomes the earlier rejectionism and falls under the rubric of ‚Äúaccommodation‚Äù in the sense of this term described above. Within the international consensus, there has been little discussion of whether such a settlement‚Äîhenceforth, a ‚Äútwo-state settlement‚Äù‚Äîreflects higher demands of abstract justice; rather, it has been taken to be a politically realistic solution that would maximize the chances for peace and security for the inhabitants of the former Palestine, for the region, and for the world, and that satisfies the valid claims of the two major parties as well as is possible under existing conditions. One can imagine various subsequent developments through peaceful means and mutual consent towards a form of federation or other arrangements. The existence of this international consensus, and the nature of the rejectionist forces that block its realization, are well-understood outside of the U.S., and are also recognized by knowledgeable observers here. For example, Seth Tillman (see note 5) concludes his recent study of U.S. policies in the Middle East by noting ‚Äúthe emergence of a consensus among moderates in the Arab world, the United States, and Europe‚Äîwith some minority support in Israel as well‚Äîon the approximate terms of a viable and equitable comprehensive settlement in the Middle East,‚Äù namely, along the lines just sketched. He notes that ‚Äúthe essentials of the consensus of moderates are well known, approximating in most respects the official policy of the United States‚Äù since 1967. ‚ÄúOutside of Israel, the United States, a few ‚Äòrejectionist‚Äô Arab states, and certain groups within the PLO, support for a settlement along these lines approaches worldwide unanimity,‚Äù he observes.6 A simpler but quite accurate formulation would be that U.S.-Israeli rejectionism has consistently blocked the achievement of ‚Äúa viable and equitable comprehensive settlement.‚Äù Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  101  I will assume the international consensus, as just sketched, to be reasonable in essence. Let us consider, then, three basic positions as points of reference: the international consensus in its more recent form, and the two varieties of rejectionism. Note that I do not mean to imply that these are the only possible solutions that merit consideration. In fact, in my view, they are not optimal. Furthermore, from 1967 to the October 1973 war, there were realistic alternatives that would have been far preferable for all concerned, I believe. These were rejected at the time, and after the 1973 war the short-term possibilities narrowed to essentially those sketched, within the framework of accommodation.7 Perhaps I should qualify these remarks, saying rather that I will assume the international consensus to have been reasonable in essence during the period under review here. It might be argued that as a result of U.S.-Israeli rejectionism, a peaceful political settlement is no longer possible, that the U.S.-financed program of Israeli settlement in the occupied territories has ‚Äúcreated facts‚Äù that cannot be changed short of war. If persistent U.S. rejectionism brings about this state of affairs, as sooner or later it will if U.S. policy does not change course, the primary objective for Americans concerned with peace and justice will no longer be to try to bring the U.S. in line with the international consensus, now irrelevant, but to block American support for the next step: expulsion of a substantial part of the Arab population on some pretext, and conversion of Israel into a society on the South African model with some form of Bantustans, committed to regional disruption, etc. I will put these questions aside until the final chapter.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  102  2. The Stands of the Major Actors dopting this as the basic framework for discussion, we can turn to consideration of the attitudes and policies of the major actors since 1967, considering in turn the U.S., Israel, the Palestinians under Israeli occupation, and the Arab states and the PLO. I will intersperse this historical account with some comment on the ways in which the history has been interpreted in the U.S., an important matter bearing on the ideological support for Israel discussed earlier, and thus bearing crucially on the development of policy and the prospects for the future.  A  2.1 The United States As far as the U.S. is concerned, there has been internal conflict over the issue throughout the period. At one extreme, the Rogers Plan, announced by Secretary of State William Rogers in December 1969, reflected the international consensus of the time. At the other extreme, Henry Kissinger advocated the rejectionist position: a ‚ÄúGreater Israel‚Äù should refuse any accommodation, and should maintain control over the occupied territories. This position was never explicitly formulated, at least in publicly available documents, but the policies pursued conform to it quite closely and it even emerges with relative clarity from the murky rhetoric of Kissinger‚Äôs memoirs, as we shall see directly. Kissinger succeeded in taking control over Middle East affairs by 1970, and the rejectionist ‚ÄúGreater Israel‚Äù position became U.S. policy in practice. It has remained so in essence ever since, with post-1973 modifications to which we return. Echoes of these conflicting positions remain today. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  103  As noted in the preceding chapter, major sectors of American corporate capitalism, including powerful elements with interests in the Middle East, have supported the international consensus, as have others. But this position has lost out in the internal policy debate in favor of the concept of an Israeli Sparta serving as a ‚Äústrategic asset.‚Äù The persistent policy debate concerns the question of whether the fundamental U.S. interests are better served by this rejectionism, or by a move towards the international consensus, with a peaceful resolution of the conflict. In the latter view, the radical nationalist tendencies that are enflamed by the unsettled Palestinian problem would be reduced by the establishment of a Palestinian mini-state that would be contained within a JordanianIsraeli military alliance (perhaps tacit), surviving at the pleasure of its far more powerful neighbors and subsidized by the most conservative and pro-American forces in the Arab world, in the oil-producing monarchies, which have been pressing for such a settlement for some years. This would, in fact, be the likely outcome of a two-state settlement. The internal policy debate has certainly been influenced, at the congressional level substantially so, by the highly effective pressure groups described above. A number of prominent supporters of Israel, particularly in left-liberal circles, have adduced the fact that oil companies tend to favor the international consensus as support for their own rejectionism.8 This makes about as much sense as the fringe right-wing argument that if Soviet leaders happen to advocate some proposal for their own purposes (say, ratification of Salt II), then we should oppose it. The further claim that Israel is being ‚Äúsold out‚Äù for oil is hardly consistent with the plain facts. The levels of U.S. aid to Israel, apart from all else, tell us just to what extent Israel has been ‚Äúsold out.‚Äù In fact, it is the Palestinians who have consistently been ‚Äúsold out‚Äù in the U.S., with no objection from left-liberal proponents of such arguments, in favor of a militarized Israel Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  104  that will serve the U.S. interest of controlling the petroleum reserves of the Middle East and will provide the subsidiary services noted above. The policy debate in elite circles takes for granted, on all sides, the goal of maintaining U.S. control over Middle East petroleum resources and the flow of petrodollars. The question is a tactical one: how best to realize this goal. U.S. policy, then, has in practice been consistently rejectionist, and still is, despite continuing internal conflict that is barely reflected in public discourse, with its overwhelmingly rejectionist commitments and assumptions.  2.2 Israel Within Israel, the policy debate has been much narrower in scope. There are two major political groupings in Israel, the coalition dominated by the Labor Party (the Labor Alignment, Ma‚Äôarach), and the Likud coalition dominated by Menachem Begin‚Äôs Herut Party. The Labor Party governed with various partners until 1977, the Likud coalition since then.  2.2.1 The Rejectionist Stands of Labor and Likud Contrary to illusions fostered here, the two major political groupings in Israel do not differ in a fundamental way with regard to the occupied territories. Both agree that Israel should effectively control them; both insistently reject any expression of Palestinian national rights west of the Jordan, though the Labor Alignment contains a margin of dissidents. Thus, both groupings have been consistently rejectionist. Furthermore, both have departed from the accommodationist assumptions sketched Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  105  above in another respect as well. The State of Israel, as the courts have determined, is not the state of its citizens. Rather, it is ‚Äúthe sovereign State of the Jewish people,‚Äù where ‚Äúthe Jewish people consists not only of the people residing in Israel but also of the Jews in the Diaspora.‚Äù Thus, ‚Äúthere is no Israeli nation apart from the Jewish people,‚Äù in this sense.9 Almost 1/6 of the citizens of the State of Israel are not Jews. But let us put this matter aside for now. The professed reason for the rejectionism of the two major political groupings is security, but from this fact we learn nothing, since every action of every state is justified in these terms. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Israel faces a serious security problem. As the matter is posed and discussed in the United States, Israel‚Äôs security problem is the paramount issue. This presupposed framework of discussion again reflects the profound racism of the American approach to the topic. Evidently, the indigenous population also has a ‚Äúsecurity problem‚Äù; in fact, the Palestinians have already suffered the catastrophe that Israelis justly fear. The familiar rhetoric concerning the issue only reveals more clearly the underlying racism. Thus it is argued that the Arabs already have 22 states, so the Palestinians have no valid claim to selfdetermination, no claim comparable to that of the European Jews who established the State of Israel in 1948; at a similar moral level, a fanatic anti-Semite could have argued in 1947 that there are, after all, many European states, and Palestinians of the Mosaic persuasion could settle there if they were not satisfied with minority status in an Arab region. Another argument is that there are numerous Palestinians in Jordan, even in the government, so that should be the Palestinian state‚Äîand by similar logic, the problem could be solved by settling Israeli Jews in New York, where there are many Jews, even the Mayor and city officials, not to speak of their role in economic and cultural life. Or it is argued against the Palestinians that the Arab states have not supported their Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  106  nationalist efforts, a stand that contrasts so markedly with the loving attitude that Europeans have shown towards one another during the centuries of state-formation there. Other familiar arguments are at about the same moral and intellectual level. Dropping racist assumptions, there are two security problems to be dealt with. The international consensus in fact provides the most satisfactory, if quite imperfect, response to this dual problem in the contemporary period. In the unlikely event that it is realized, a major security problem will remain‚Äînamely, for the Palestinian state, confronted with one of the world‚Äôs major military powers and dependent on the most conservative elements in the Arab world for survival. Whatever security problems Israel would then face do not compare with those it has been in the process of creating for itself by its commitment to expansionism and confrontation, which guarantees endless turmoil and war, and sooner or later, probable destruction. Though Israel‚Äôs security concerns‚Äîby now, in large part selfgenerated‚Äîare not to be dismissed, they do not provide an impressive basis for U.S.-Israeli rejectionism, even if we were to accept the familiar tacit assumption that the security of the Palestinians is of null import. In fact, there are other motives for Israel‚Äôs rejectionism that appear to be more compelling. The territories provide Israel with a substantial unorganized labor force, similar to the ‚Äúguest workers‚Äù in Europe or migrant workers in the U.S. They now play a significant role in the Israeli economy, performing its ‚Äúdirty work‚Äù at low pay and without rights (it might be noted that child labor among Arabs, particularly those from the occupied territories, has caused something of a scandal in Israel, though without affecting the practice, but not here). The process of proletarianization of Arab labor in the territories, in part through land restrictions, mimics what happened in Israel itself. Shai Feldman of the Center for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv University comments accurately that ‚Äúat Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  107  present, important sectors of Israel‚Äôs economy cannot function without manpower provided by the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,‚Äù including tourism, construction, and to some extent, agriculture.10 The territories are also a controlled market for Israeli goods, with export sales of about $600 million per year according to the military government. These sales are paid for in hard currency, since the territories in turn export about $100 million a year in agricultural products to Jordan and the Gulf states and receive hard currencies from them from various payments and remittances. Income to Israel from West Bank tourism may amount to about $500 million, so that the potential loss to Israel of abandoning the territories may come to over $1 billion per year. Noting these facts, Thomas Stauffer of the Harvard Center of Middle East Studies observed that there is a crucial difference between Israel‚Äôs interest in these territories and in the Sinai, which had little economic value once the oil fields had been returned.11 In addition, there was of course a major gain for Israel in the Sinai settlement, in that the most powerful state in the Arab world was removed from the Arab-Israeli conflict, so that Israel could pursue its programs in the occupied territories and Lebanon without undue concern over any military deterrence. It is, then, extremely misleading to think of the withdrawal from occupied Sinai as providing any sort of precedent for the West Bank; as for the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights, they have been virtually excluded from the discussion of potential political settlement, within Israel or the United States. Furthermore, Israel is now heavily dependent on the West Bank for water, a more significant commodity than oil in the Middle East. Its own water supplies are exploited to the maximum limit, and it is now estimated that about 1/3 of Israel‚Äôs water is from West Bank sources.12 An Israeli technical expert writes that ‚Äúcutting Judea and Samaria [the West Bank, in Israeli parlance] off from the rest of the country‚Äù will lead Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  108  to serious consequences with regard to water management; ‚ÄúThere is no solution in sight for the water deficiency problem from the natural water resources of the area,‚Äù he writes, so that ‚Äúthe eventual solution must be sought in the import of water from external, still unutilized resources, and in brackish and seawater desalination on a large scale‚Äù (which to date, has not proven feasible). The only unexploited source nearby is the Litani river in southern Lebanon, which Israel has long coveted and will sooner or later place under its control, quite probably, if the U.S. supports Israel‚Äôs steps to impose the political arrangements of its choice in southern Lebanon.13 One consequence of the Lebanon war was that Israel‚Äôs national water company took over ‚Äútotal control of the scarce and disputed water resources in the West Bank,‚Äù an important move towards further integration of the territories. Zvi Barel comments that the decision contradicts the Camp David principle that control over water should fall under the autonomy provisions, and that knowledgeable sources attributed the decision to political factors, not technical considerations as was claimed.14 It may be that this step was taken in defiance after the announcement of an unwelcome U.S. ‚Äúpeace plan‚Äù on September 1, 1982, to which we return. It is, incidentally, noteworthy that the U.S. September 1982 peace plan makes special mention of Israel‚Äôs rights to ‚Äúfair safeguards‚Äù with regard to West Bank water, the only exception specifically noted to the ‚Äúreal authority‚Äù that is to be granted the Palestinian inhabitants.15 In the past, there has been considerable conflict over utilization of the waters of the Jordan and its tributaries, and it is likely that this will continue. One potential point of conflict has to do with the Yarmuk River, a tributary of the Jordan. The Israeli press reports that current Jordanian projects will decrease the flow of Yarmuk waters to the Jordan, where they are utilized by the Israeli water system. Chief of Staff Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  109  Rafael Eitan ‚Äútravelled yesterday along the border with Jordan near the Yarmuk, opposite the Jordanian water project. It was not possible to learn his reaction to the Jordanian project.‚Äù16 It is unlikely that Israel will permit such a project within Jordan on any significant scale. While the two major political groupings, Labor and Likud, agree in their overall rejectionism, they do differ in the arrangements they prefer for the occupied territories. The Labor governments pursued what has been called the ‚ÄúAllon Plan,‚Äù proposed by Minister Yigal Allon. Its basic principles were that Israel should maintain control of the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, parts of the Eastern Sinai, and much of the West Bank including the Jordan valley, a considerably expanded area around Jerusalem (Arab East Jerusalem was annexed outright by the Labor government over virtually unanimous international protest, including in this case the U.S.), and various corridors that would break up the Arab West Bank and ensure Israeli control over it. In his study of this period, Israeli journalist Amnon Kapeliouk writes that the Allon Plan was ‚Äúrendered operational‚Äù in 1970, and envisioned the annexation of about 1/3 of the West Bank‚Äîactually about 40%; see chapter 4, section 4.1. The centers of dense Arab settlement, however, would be excluded, with the population remaining under Jordanian control or stateless so as to avoid what is called ‚Äúthe demographic problem,‚Äù that is, the problem of absorbing too many non-Jews within the Jewish State. To the present, this remains essentially the position of the Labor Party, as we shall see. Thus former Prime Minister Rabin, interviewed in the Trilateral Commission journal in January 1983, states that ‚Äúspeaking for myself, I say now that we are ready to give back roughly 65% of the territory of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip where over 80% of the population now resides,‚Äù17 a formulation that is less extreme than most. We return to other expressions of this unchanging commitment. The Allon Plan was designed to enable Israel to maintain the advanClassics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  110  tages of the occupation while avoiding the problem of dealing with the domestic population. It was felt that there would be no major problem of administrative control or support by Western liberal opinion (an important matter for a state that survives largely on gifts and grants from the West) as long as the second-class Arab citizens remained a minority, though such problems might arise if their numbers approached half the population. As Anthony Lewis writes, actual annexation ‚Äúwill change the very nature of the Jewish state, incorporating within it a large, subservient and resentful Arab population‚Äù18‚Äîin contrast to the 15% minority of today, to which the same terms apply. In contrast, Begin‚Äôs Likud coalition has been moving towards extension of Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza and has virtually annexed the Golan Heights, though it was willing to return the Sinai in full to Egypt‚Äîover strong objections from leading segments of the Labor Party‚Äîin the context of the Camp David accords.* Like Labor19, Likud also apparently intends to keep the Gaza Strip. Contrary to what is often assumed, Likud has not called for annexation of the West Bank and does not appear to be aiming for this, at least in the short run. Extension of Israeli sovereignty‚Äîthe actual announced intent‚Äîis a more subtle device, which will allow Israel to take what it wants while confining the Arab population to ever-narrower ghettoes, seeking ways to remove at *  Former Prime Minister Golda Meir ‚Äúassailed Prime Minister Begin‚Äôs government  yesterday, calling his peace plan ‚Äòa concrete, terrible danger‚Äô for Israel,‚Äù and ‚Äúaccused‚Äù Begin of ‚Äúagreeing to concessions she would never stand for‚Äù; ‚ÄúLabor Knesset Member [former Chief of Staff] Mordechai Gur today sharply opposed the continuation of the peace process with Egypt‚Äù on the grounds that Sadat would demand return to the 1967 borders. Many Labor leaders were particularly opposed to the return of the northeast Sinai settlements that they had established.19 See also chapter 4, section 4.2.2, below. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  111  least the leadership and possibly much of the population, apart from those needed as the beasts of burden for Israeli society. Outright annexation would raise the problem of citizenship for the Arabs, while extension of sovereignty, while achieving the purposes of annexation, will not, as long as liberal opinion in the West is willing to tolerate the fraud. The logic of the Likud position does, however, appear to be that the Arab population must somehow be reduced, and it has been alleged that then Defense Minister Ariel Sharon ‚Äúhopes to evict all Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza and drive them into Jordan.‚Äù20 Sharon is not entirely alone in this view, though his position, if correctly reported, is extreme. The idea that the solution to the problem is for the Palestinians to leave‚Äîfar away‚Äîhas deep roots in liberal and socialist Zionism, and has recently been reiterated by American ‚Äúdemocratic socialists‚Äù as well as by Israeli leaders sometimes regarded as doves. We return to various expressions of such ideas, in virtually all shades of Zionist thought, and to current policies in the occupied territories. While the two major political groupings do differ in the ways in which they formulate their rejectionist positions, neither has been explicit about the matter‚Äîwhich is easy enough to understand, given Israel‚Äôs dependence on liberal opinion in the West‚Äîand it is therefore not easy to formulate this difference clearly. Thus as noted, while the policies of the Likud government have regularly been interpreted as leading to annexation by the Labor opposition and others, in fact, Begin calls for the establishment of Israeli ‚Äúsovereignty‚Äù over the currently occupied territories. Under this Israeli sovereignty, those Arabs who remain would have some form of local autonomy. Presumably, they and their descendants would not receive Israeli citizenship under this arrangement, so that the ‚Äúdemographic problem‚Äù would not arise. Or, perhaps, if their numbers are sufficiently restricted they might opt for Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  112  either Israeli or Jordanian citizenship, while Israeli sovereignty remains in force over the entire territory in question. Surely it is intended by both Labor and Likud that the Jewish settlers will retain Israeli citizenship. Under the Labor Alignment plan, the inhabitants would be Jordanian citizens or stateless, but effectively under Israeli control. In essence, then, the two programs are not very different. Their difference lies primarily in style. Labor is, basically, the party of the educated Europe-oriented elite‚Äîmanagers, bureaucrats, intellectuals, etc. Its historical practice has been to ‚Äúbuild facts‚Äù while maintaining a low-keyed rhetoric with conciliatory tones, at least in public. In private, the position has been that ‚Äúit does not matter what the Gentiles say, what matters is what the Jews do‚Äù (Ben-Gurion) and that ‚Äúthe borders [of Israel] are where Jews live, not where there is a line on a map‚Äù (Golda Meir).21 This has been an effective method for obtaining the ends sought without alienating Western opinion‚Äîindeed, while mobilizing Western (particularly American) support. In contrast, the mass base of the Likud coalition is largely the underclass, the lower middle class, and the workforce, the Sephardic population of Arab origin, along with religious-chauvinist elements, including many recent immigrants from the U.S. and the USSR; it also includes industrialists and many professionals. Its leadership is not so attuned to Western styles of discourse and has frequently been willing to flaunt its disregard for the hypocritical Gentile world, often in a manner regarded as openly insulting in the West, including the U.S. For example, in response to Reagan‚Äôs September 1982 call for a settlement freeze, the Likud leadership simply announced plans for 10 new settlements while Begin sent a ‚ÄúDear Ron‚Äù letter with a lesson on ‚Äúsimple historic truth.‚Äù22 Under somewhat similar circumstances in the past, Labor responded not by establishing new settlements but by ‚Äúthickening‚Äù existing ones or by establishing military outposts which Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  113  soon became settlements, meanwhile keeping to conciliatory rhetoric. The more devious Labor approach is much more welcome to the West, and raises fewer problems for ‚Äúsupporters of Israel.‚Äù In the case of the Reagan September 1982 proposals, Labor‚Äôs response was one of qualified interest. In part, the reason was the traditional difference in style; in part, it reflected the fact that Reagan‚Äôs proposals, while vague in essentials, could be interpreted as compatible with Labor‚Äôs ideas in part, though they certainly were not consistent with the Likud demand for total ‚Äúsovereignty.‚Äù Furthermore, Labor‚Äôs show of statesmanlike interest might, it was hoped, strengthen its dismal electoral prospects by discrediting the government. Labor speaks of ‚Äúterritorial compromise‚Äù or ‚Äútrading peace for territory,‚Äù terms that have a pleasant sound to American ears, though the reality they disguise is not very different from Likud‚Äôs ‚Äúsovereignty.‚Äù In fact, the ‚Äúcompromise‚Äù and ‚Äútrade‚Äù are explicitly rejectionist positions. There have already been two ‚Äúterritorial compromises‚Äù in Mandatory Palestine: the 1947 UN General Assembly resolution that recommended partitioning Palestine into a Palestinian and a Jewish State, and the 1949 armistice agreement that divided the Palestinian State, with about half annexed by Israel and the rest annexed by Jordan or administered by Egypt (see chapter 4). A further ‚Äúcompromise,‚Äù in terms of some version of the Allon Plan, simply eliminates the right of Palestinian selfdetermination. It is often alleged that there was, in fact, an earlier ‚Äúterritorial compromise,‚Äù namely, in 1922, when Transjordan was excised from the promised ‚Äúnational home for the Jewish people.‚Äù In fact, in 1922 ‚Äúthe Council of the League of Nations accepted a British proposal that Transjordan should be exempted from all clauses in the mandate providing for‚Ķthe development of a Jewish National Home in Palestine,‚Äù a decision that is difficult to criticize in the light of the fact that ‚Äúthe number Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  114  of Jews living there permanently in 1921 has been reliably estimated at two, or according to some authorities, three persons.‚Äù 23  2.2.2 The Legacy of the Founding Fathers Both political groupings, then, have been consistently rejectionist, willing to grant no national rights to the indigenous Arab population. Israel‚Äôs consistent rejectionism is founded on the attitudes expressed by the long-time leader of the Labor Party, David Ben-Gurion, when he stated that the Palestinian Arab shows no ‚Äúemotional involvement‚Äù in this country: Why should he? He is equally at ease whether in Jordan, Lebanon or a variety of places. They are as much his country as this is. And as little.24 Elsewhere, ‚ÄúBen-Gurion followed Weizmann‚Äôs line when he stated that: ‚Äòthere is no conflict between Jewish and Palestinian nationalism because the Jewish Nation is not in Palestine and the Palestinians are not a nation‚Äô.‚Äù25 Essentially the same view was expressed by Moshe Dayan at a time when he was a principal spokesman for the Labor Party. The cause of the Palestinians (which he professed to understand and appreciate) is ‚Äúhopeless,‚Äù he intimated, so they should establish themselves ‚Äúin one of the Arab countries.‚Äù ‚ÄúI do not think,‚Äù he added, ‚Äúthat a Palestinian should have difficulties in regarding Jordan, Syria or Iraq as his homeland.‚Äù26 Like Ben-Gurion, Dayan was asserting that the Palestinians, including the peasantry, had no particular attachment to their homes, to the land where they had lived and worked for many generations, surely nothing like the attachment to the land of the Jews who had been exiled from it 2000 years ago. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
115  Rejectionism and Accomodation  Similar views were expressed by Prime Minister Golda Meir of the Labor Party, much admired here as a grandmotherly humanitarian figure, in her remark that: It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist.27 Elsewhere, she describes the Palestinian problem as merely an ‚Äúinvention of some Jews with distorted minds.‚Äù28 In accordance with these dominant views concerning the Palestinians, an Israeli court ruled in 1969 that the Palestinians ‚Äúare not a party to the conflict between Israel and the Arab States,‚Äù and Foreign Minister Abba Eban of the Labor Party (a well-known dove) insisted that the Palestinians ‚Äúhave no role to play‚Äù in any peace settlement,29 a position that received no major challenge within the Labor Party when it governed or in opposition. Simha Flapan concludes his study of this question with the observation that ‚ÄúThe Palestinians were never regarded as an integral part of the country for whom long-term plans had to be made, either in the Mandatory period or since the establishment of the state.‚Äù This was the most ‚Äúlasting impact‚Äù of ‚ÄúWeizmann‚Äôs legacy.‚Äù30 This appears to be quite a realistic judgment, as far as the mainstream of the Zionist movement was concerned. We return to further discussion in the next chapter. These positions, which have been consistently maintained, amount to rejectionism in its clearest form, though the matter is rarely seen in this light in the U.S. Both major political groupings in Israel have taken the position that Jordan is a Palestinian state, and that Israel will accept no third state between Israel and Jordan‚Äîthe ‚ÄúJordanian-Palestinian Arab Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  116  State‚Äù in the official words of the Labor Party,31 the ‚ÄúPalestinian State‚Äù in Likud rhetoric. This is not, of course, the position of what might reasonably be called the ‚Äúpeace movement,‚Äù a small but significant minority that adheres to the international consensus. On its actual scale, see chapter 7, section 4.1.1.  2.2.3 The Disguise The consistent rejectionism of both major political groupings in Israel is disguised in the United States by two main devices. First, as already noted, the concept of ‚Äúrejectionism‚Äù is restricted to the denial of Jewish national rights, on the implicit racist assumption that the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine do not have the human rights that we naturally accord to Jews. Second, it is observed‚Äîquite accurately‚Äîthat Israel has always been more than willing to negotiate with the Arab states, while they have not reciprocated this willingness. It requires barely a moment‚Äôs thought to perceive that Israel‚Äôs willingness in this regard is strictly rejectionist, since the Palestinians are excluded. When a framework for negotiations has been proposed that includes the Palestinians, Israel has always refused to participate. Thus Israel‚Äôs apparently forthcoming position with regard to negotiations, much heralded in the U.S., is simply part and parcel of its commitment to the rejection of Palestinian rights, an elementary point that is regularly suppressed in discussion of the issue in the U.S. Like the term ‚Äúterritorial compromise,‚Äù so also the appealing phrase ‚Äúnegotiated settlement‚Äù has become a disguise for outright rejectionism in American discourse. When these simple points are understood, we can interpret properly the pronouncements of Israel‚Äôs American propagandists. For example, the general counsel to the Anti-Defamation League of B‚Äônai Brith (see Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
117  Rejectionism and Accomodation  chapter 2, section 2.1), Arnold Forster, condemns current U.S. government policy because he sees the U.S. as insisting that an IsraelLebanon peace must be part of a more ‚Äúcomprehensive‚Äù settlement: Absurdly, the Israelis are made to appear dreadful simply because they ask of Lebanon open borders, tourism both ways, trade relations, negotiations in their respective capitals32 and regular political contacts‚Äîall the stuff of a healthy, peaceful relationship between countries. Our Government argues that if genuine peace is achieved only between Israel and Lebanon, the pressure would then be off the Jewish state to resolve the West Bank Palestinian problem along the lines of President Reagan‚Äôs fading peace plan. Secretary Shultz‚Äôs clever tactic is therefore to deny Israel the peace with Lebanon it hungers for‚Äîunless Israel simultaneously withdraws from the West Bank.33 This argument will no doubt seem impressive to those who share the assumptions of this well-known civil rights group, specifically, the assumption that Palestinians do not have the same rights as Jews. Dropping these assumptions, we see at once that Israel‚Äôs proposals, which Forster advocates, would simply take another long step towards the extension of Israeli sovereignty over the occupied territories. In short, Forster is simply presenting a brief for a ‚ÄúGreater Israel‚Äù and for the denial of elementary human rights to the Arabs of Palestine. Furthermore, the ‚Äúhealthy, peaceful relationship‚Äù that Israel seeks to impose on Lebanon by force would be one that subordinates Lebanon‚Äîat the very least, southern Lebanon‚Äîto Israeli interests, as a market for Israeli goods, a potential source of cheap labor and water, etc., a fact that is plain when we consider the relations of economic and military power Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  118  and that was well on its way towards realization as Forster wrote (see chapter 6, section 7.1). This ‚Äúhealthy, peaceful relationship,‚Äù then, would be of the sort imposed by many other ‚Äúpeace-loving states‚Äù during the colonial era, for example, the relationship imposed on India by benevolent Britain (after the destruction of native Indian enterprise) or on China at the time of the Opium Wars, to mention two of many classic examples. All of this is so transparent that it might be surprising that the general counsel of an alleged human rights organization would be willing to make such statements publicly‚Äîuntil one recalls that this is the New York Times, with an audience of educated readers for whom the underlying racist assumptions are so firmly implanted that the obvious conclusions will generally not be drawn. As to whether Forster is correct in his belief that the U.S. government is really dropping its rejectionist stance, that is another matter; the increase in aid to Israel, passed by Congress at exactly that time, surely belies this assumption, as already noted.  2.3 The Population of the Occupied Territories The third party to be considered is the population of the occupied territories, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank‚Äîthe latter, called ‚ÄúJudea and Samaria‚Äù by both the Labor government and Likud, though the U.S. press regularly attributes this usage, which is taken to imply a biblicallyendorsed right of possession, to Menachem Begin.* In fact, reference to *  The same error is made by commentators who should know better, for example, Rabbi  Arthur Hertzberg, who describes the terms ‚ÄúJudea‚Äù and ‚ÄúSamaria‚Äù as those that ‚Äúthe Likud and its sympathizers prefer,‚Äù in an interchange that exhausts the usual range of tolerable opinion: Hertzberg (with the assent of Irving Howe) representing the position of ‚ÄúJewish moderates, headed by the Labor Party,‚Äù and Ivan Novick, President of the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  119  biblical rights is common in both political groupings.34 Thus Shimon Peres, the socialist leader of the Labor Party, accepted Begin‚Äôs rationale for retaining the West Bank, writing: ‚ÄúThere is no argument in Israel about our historic rights in the land of Israel. The past is immutable and the Bible is the decisive document in determining the fate of our land.‚Äù This doctrine apparently causes few raised eyebrows in the Socialist International, in which Peres and his Labor Party are honored members.35 Nevertheless, Peres advocates ‚Äúterritorial compromise‚Äù in accordance with the Allon Plan, to free Israel of an unwanted Arab population which ‚Äúwould eventually endanger the Jewish character of Israel‚Ķ36  2.3.1 Attitudes under Occupation The attitudes of the indigenous population are generally ignored in the U.S., on the assumption‚Äîracist in essence‚Äîthat they simply do not count. In the early years of the occupation, the Labor government refused to permit any independent political expression on the part of the population, even rejecting the request of pro-Jordanian ‚Äúnotables‚Äù to form an anti-PLO grouping, a fact revealed in 1974 by the former military commander of the West Bank, General (now President) Chaim Herzog (breaking government censorship), and arousing no concern among American liberals and democratic socialists, firm supporters of the Labor Alignment.37 In 1976, relatively free elections were permitted for municipalities in the West Bank. The elected candidates soon made it clear that they regarded the PLO as their sole legitimate representative. In recent years, the Begin government and others have attributed this outcome to PLO Zionist Organization of America, representing the Likud position. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  120  pressure and intimidation. No such claims were made at the time. On the contrary, the elections were regarded as a crowning achievement of the ‚Äúbenign occupation.‚Äù There was, in fact, interference in the electoral process, namely, by Israel, in favor of more conservative elements. Two nationalist candidates were expelled in violation of the governing military regulations, to ensure the election of more acceptable opponents. The PLO took no position with regard to the elections, Amnon Kapeliouk observes in a detailed commentary on them.38 He also points out that a significant political structure arose in the territories at the time, regarding the PLO as its representative and prepared to reach a political settlement with Israel. Instead of recognizing the Palestinian right to self-determination alongside of Israel, however, ‚Äúthe Rabin [Labor] government opened the door to Gush Emunim,‚Äù the fanatic religiouschauvinist settlers in the occupied territories. Since that time the inhabitants of the occupied territories have made known their support for the PLO, and for an independent Palestinian state, on every possible occasion. To cite only two of many examples, the mayors of West Bank towns sent a letter to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance when he toured the area in 1977, stating that the Palestinian people had chosen as ‚Äúits sole legal representative, irrespective of the place‚Ķthe PLO under the leadership of Mr. Arafat,‚Äù39 an act of no small courage given the nature of the occupation‚Äîpeople generally regarded as moderates had been expelled for much less. Turning to the present, after the PLO had been evacuated from Beirut in September 1982 (so that alleged PLO intimidation was now a thing of the past), a group of ‚ÄúPalestinian personalities‚Äù in the occupied territories were asked for their evaluation of the outlook, among them Elias Freij (the last remaining mayor of a major town, the others having been dismissed by Israel) and Rashad Shawa (the conservative and pro-Jordanian dismissed mayor of Gaza); Freij and Shawa are represented here as leading figures of the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  121  ‚Äúmoderate‚Äù nationalist alternative to the PLO. They were uniform, including Freij and Shawa, in their support for the PLO, some holding that support for the PLO had in fact increased as a result of the Lebanon invasion (Shawa).40 An indication of current opinion in the West Bank (no one doubts that the results would be similar in the Gaza Strip) is given by the results of a poll undertaken by the PORI Institute, a leading public opinion research organization in Israel, in March 1982.41 The results will come as no surprise to people who have been following developments in the occupied territories since 1967.* 98% were in favor of an independent Palestinian state, and 86% said that they wanted this state to be run solely by the PLO. Of other figures, the most popular (68% support) was Nablus Mayor Bassam Shak‚Äôa, dismissed shortly before by West Bank ‚ÄúCivilian Administrator‚Äù Menachem Milson as part of his general attack on free political expression. Other pro-PLO figures on the West Bank received various degrees of support. At the very bottom was Mustafa Dudin, who received the support of 0.2% of the population. Among Arab *  The actual wording of the questions is not given. Therefore one does not know  exactly how to interpret the Time paraphrase: ‚ÄúAs might be expected, 98% of the respondents said that they favored the creation of a Palestinian state. Yet only 59% agree with the P.L.O. that such a state should encompass ‚Äòall of Palestine‚Äô (i.e., including Israel); 27% seem ready to accept a Palestinian state made up only of the West Bank and Gaza Strip‚Äù (the actual PLO position, for several years). Surely, however, no sensible person can have much doubt that whatever the preferences of the population, as expressed in the Israeli poll, they would be more than willing to be relieved of Israeli or Jordanian occupation and to exercise their right of self-determination in an independent state‚Äîfor the large majority of them, a state organized by the PLO‚Äîset up alongside of Israel and coexisting with it. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  122  leaders, King Hussein of Jordan ranked low, admired by 4%. King Hussein is the U.S. choice for representative of the inhabitants of the West Bank, while Dudin is the choice of the government of Israel and its supporters here. He is the head of the ‚ÄúVillage Leagues‚Äù created by Israel in an effort to replace the elected leadership, and is claimed to represent the rural majority of the population‚Äîthe ‚Äúsilent majority.‚Äù He is regularly described in the U.S. press as a ‚Äúmoderate,‚Äù and it is claimed that only PLO terror prevents the population from supporting him openly; evidently, fear of the PLO is so great that close to 100% of the population were afraid to state their support for Dudin secretly and anonymously in an Israeli-run poll. Perhaps we might pause for a moment to consider the two personalities who are, respectively, the most popular (apart from the PLO) and the least popular in the West Bank: dismissed Mayor Bassam Shak‚Äôa and Mustafa Dudin. Shak‚Äôa was the victim of a terrorist attack in June 1980 in which both of his legs were blown off by an IDF bomb. No progress has been made towards discovering the identity of the assailants, though it seemed a relatively straightforward matter as several Israeli journalists pointed out, if only because the army had records of people who had access to the sophisticated type of explosives used. It is generally assumed that the terrorists were Jewish settlers in the area (see, for example, the comments of the Ha‚Äôaretz journalist cited above, chapter 2, section 1). When violent acts are carried out against Jewish settlers, houses of families of suspects are demolished, curfews imposed, subjects interrogated (and, they allege, often tortured), etc., while U.S. journals fulminate about Arab terrorism. In fact, even stone throwing can lead to curfews and other punishments, as, for example, the Times casually observes in reporting an incident in which yet  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  123  another Arab youth was killed by Israeli soldiers42 firing at his feet.* But in the case of the attack on Mayor Shak‚Äôa and others, it was difficult to detect even signs of an investigation, and obvious clues were not pursued.43 Ze‚Äôev Schiff wrote at the time in Ha‚Äôaretz that it would be politically impossible for the government to arrest and convict the guilty parties because these West Bank settlers had too much political support.44 Ha‚Äôaretz also reported that the suspects were believed to be Jewish extremists who used sophisticated IDF equipment, citing intelligence sources. The bombings (Mayor Karim Khalef of Ramallah was also seriously injured; both were subsequently dismissed by the Milson administration) were praised in the journal Nekudah of the religious West Bank settlers, and the spokesman for American Rabbi Kahane‚Äôs Kach Party announced at a press conference that they were in retaliation for the murder of Israeli settlers in Hebron a few weeks earlier. Six Jewish suspects were under investigation by the Israeli secret police (Shin Bet), but according to Knesset Member Shulamith Aloni, they said that ‚Äúthe Jews responsible are part of a close-knit group that has been impenetrable.‚Äù Stories about the affair are routinely censored in the Israeli press. Many journalists following the case, including Danny *  The report states that Samir Ghazal Taflak, 19 years old, was killed by a bullet  in the chest (another youth was seriously injured) when, according to an army spokesman, Israeli soldiers ‚Äúhad fired at the feet of youths who had hurled rocks at an Israeli bus, smashing one window.‚Äù Hundreds of students were protesting a curfew imposed on a camp of 12,000 people ‚Äúafter youths threw rocks at Israeli vehicles in the area,‚Äù one of a series of curfews in the past two months. ‚ÄúThe students waved the flag of the Palestine Liberation Organization and photos of its leader, Yasir Arafat, the sources said.‚Äù ‚ÄúAbout seven weeks ago a 14-year-old Nablus youth was shot and killed by a [Jewish] settler of nearby Elon Moreh after he had stoned the settler‚Äôs car.‚Äù Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  124  Rubinstein of Davar, suspect that a high-ranking government official was involved and that the Shin Bet is part of a cover-up. ‚ÄúMost Israelis were indifferent to the mayors‚Äô fates after the attacks anyway,‚Äù and ‚Äúthere was no public outcry or pressure on the government to conduct a fullscale inquiry.‚Äù45 After the terrorist attack and his subsequent dismissal, Shak‚Äôa was subjected to considerable government harassment. He was refused permission to travel to Holland on the grounds that ‚Äúhe will use the visit for the dissemination of false information about Israel and will present Israel as oppressing public figures in the [occupied] territories,‚Äù according to representatives of the security forces. There have been many other examples, another recent one being the denial of an exit visa to his daughter to enable her to resume her studies at North Carolina State University in October 1982.46 At the same time, Shak‚Äôa‚Äôs Israeli guards refused to permit journalists from Ha‚Äôaretz and the Jerusalem Post to interview him. A week later, there had been no action by the newspapers or the Press Association, leading one outraged Israeli citizen to compare this ‚Äúshocking incident‚Äù to what happens in the USSR. 47  2.3.2 The Carrot and the Stick Let us turn now to the least popular personality in the West Bank, Menachem Milson‚Äôs proteg√© Mustafa Dudin, head of the Village Leagues. It should be noted at once that journalists who cover the West Bank for the Hebrew press have no illusions about the support for Milson‚Äôs Village Leagues. Danny Rubinstein of Davar writes that ‚ÄúThe vast majority of the Arab population, led by city mayors, leaders of unions and other public figures in the West Bank, recognized the Israeli attempt to undermine the P.L.O.‚Äôs authority [by establishing the Leagues], and denounced it in the East Jerusalem newspapers, in Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  125  conferences and in declarations.‚Äù He describes the measures adopted by the Sharon-Milson administration to impose the rule of the Leagues by giving them ‚Äúvast financial support‚Äù and compelling inhabitants to turn to them for the needs of daily life.48 Exploiting its military success in Lebanon, Israel expanded the Village Leagues and formed them into a regional organization, assigning them the role of representative of the Palestinians in the occupied territories for dealings with Israel. On the invitation of the Israeli authorities in charge, Danny Rubinstein attended the meeting in Hebron where this ‚Äúpolitical task‚Äù was announced publicly for the first time. The representatives came armed and substantial Israeli military forces surrounded the area. Dozens of villagers outside stood up to cheer on command. The speakers praised former Civilian Administrator Menachem Milson, who was responsible for the worst atrocities in the West Bank, for ‚Äúhis service to the inhabitants of the West Bank‚Ķhis outstanding personality and warm compassion, all in eloquent rhetoric,‚Äù some so effusive that the audience burst out in laughter. It was, Rubinstein writes, ‚Äúa sad and oppressive day in Hebron.‚Äù49 Meanwhile in the Boston Globe, we read only that Milson ‚Äúreceived thunderous ovations at the first conference of the West Bank ‚ÄòVillage Leagues‚Äô he helped foster,‚Äù referring to the same meeting, a sure sign of his great popularity and the support for the Leagues on the West Bank‚Äî the immense popularity shown by the PORI Institute poll for the head of the Leagues, Mustafa Dudin, is still another sign. Milson is referred to in the Globe as a ‚ÄúMideast Maverick,‚Äù who ‚Äúcalls for a Palestinian role in the West Bank,‚Äù a leading partisan of the oppressed Palestinians, evidently.50 This is surely the appropriate characterization, as 1984 approaches, for the man who along with General Sharon initiated the most brutal period of repression in the West Bank, ‚Äúa reign of terror,‚Äù in the words of Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  126  the Israeli dove Uri Avneri, who describes Milson as a poor copy of ‚Äúhis former master, Ariel Sharon‚Äù: ‚ÄúSo far as compulsive lying, boasting and impudence are concerned, he is merely Sharon‚Äôs pocket edition,‚Äù Avneri continues, going on to recall the measures he instituted in an effort to break the will of the Palestinians, including formation of ‚Äúthe hated ‚ÄòLeagues,‚Äô which became the representatives of the Israeli conquest for the public,‚Äù ‚Äúarmed gangs of quislings‚Äù largely constituted of ‚Äúthe human refuse of the villages, known hooligans and criminals, who received weapons from the military government in order to create an atmosphere of terror.‚Äù51 In short, a true ‚ÄúMideast Maverick,‚Äù much to be admired for his defense of Palestinian rights. To illustrate Avneri‚Äôs description, Professor Milson, in his Globe interview, states that ‚Äúpartly due to my influence, the fact is that no house was demolished in the West Bank.‚Äù In fact, two weeks after his November 1, 1981 takeover, on November 16, four houses were destroyed in Beit Sahur in a collective punishment, and one house was destroyed in Bethlehem, the home of a man suspected of throwing a molotov cocktail at a bus.52 Milson assumed, correctly no doubt, that his statement would pass unchallenged in the United States, where he is presented as an advocate of peace and conciliation. He might, however, have argued correctly that the Labor Party resorted to this technique of collective punishment in the case of people suspected of some act of violence (or resistance, depending on one‚Äôs point of view) far more extensively than he did. The West Bank correspondent of Ha‚Äôaretz, Zvi Barel, reports General Sharon‚Äôs statement that the League members ‚Äúare not collaborators in the usual sense of the word.‚Äù Barel agrees, on the grounds that ‚Äúno past collaborators had enjoyed such wide government support as these people receive.‚Äù He describes how they are not only provided with arms to terrorize the population, but are even given ‚Äúthe privilege of making Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  127  the [Israeli] civil administration commit illegal acts to praise the name of the Village Leagues,‚Äù describing how the administration acts to serve ‚Äútheir desire for revenge.‚Äù Barel also illustrates how West Bank inhabitants are compelled to submit to the rule of the Milson-Dudin Leagues in order to survive, citing the case of Abu Adnan of the West Bank town of Halhul, whose mayor, Muhammed Milhem (who had called for a peaceful two-state political settlement), was also dismissed by the Milson administration. Adnan had sent his son (born and educated in the West Bank) to Greece for medical studies. His son was not permitted to return on the pretext that he was away when a census was taken; removal of the educated population has been a standard procedure of the occupation since the beginning. Requests to permit his son at least to visit were denied by the Milson administration. Finally, Adnan turned to the Village Leagues, signing a form stating his request to become a member, and offering a ‚Äúdonation‚Äù of 500 Israeli shekels. He at once received permission for his son to visit.53 The Hebrew press contains many similar examples illustrating how the Leagues gain their popularity. In testimony before Congress, a member of an American study group returning from a Middle East tour reported that ‚Äúthe vast majority‚Äù of the population ‚Äúdislike the Unions‚Äù (the Village Leagues) but ‚Äúfeel forced to deal with them‚Äù because of the arrangements imposed by the Military Government. The Leagues are ‚Äúwidely feared and are dealt with only as individuals and groups feel pressured to do so.‚Äù ‚ÄúThe greatest fear of West Bankers is that these Union of Villages officials will be selected by the Israelis as the ‚Äòmoderate‚Äô Palestinians who will ‚Äònegotiate‚Äô autonomy under the Camp David accords, and thus give the appearance of legitimacy to an autonomy agreement.‚Äù It is this fear that was realized in the subsequent meeting that Rubinstein reported. ‚ÄúShlomo Gazit, former Chief of Israeli Intelligence, has stated that the setting up of the Village Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  128  Leagues established a network of quislings to serve the purposes of the government and was not in the interest of Israeli security. He has called for the dissolution of the Village League program.‚Äù54 It is good to know that Congress was well-informed when it increased the enormous subsidy to Israel to still higher levels to pay for these admirable measures. The civilian administration of ‚ÄúMideast Maverick‚Äù Menachem Milson, which gave Dudin a position of power in the occupied territories and a position of prominence as a noted moderate in the United States, began on November 1, 1981. The ‚Äúreign of terror‚Äù that began at once received considerable press coverage in the United States at the time, but, memories being short and prejudices strong, the facts were quickly forgotten. The Israeli Black Book (see note 52) gives a detailed account of the first six months, along with testimony by Palestinians and Israeli soldiers. ‚ÄúThe civil administration orchestrated by Professor Milson,‚Äù it reports, ‚Äúis nothing but another attempt to revive an old, well-known colonial method in a new ‚Äòoriginal‚Äô Israeli form,‚Äù laying the basis for ‚Äúan Israeli Bantustan, which imposes on the Palestinians the role of hewers of wood and drawers of water for Israeli society.‚Äù It ‚Äúintends to destroy every social institution in the occupied territories in two ways: first, by harassing municipal councils, labor unions, and universities which mold national-political culture, and second, by constructing what seems to be an alternative power center in the shape of the Village Leagues,‚Äù basing itself on the assumption that the Palestinians are ‚Äúprimitive ‚Äònatives‚Äô who are easily pacified when the occupier buys off a few notables in their villages.‚Äù Its techniques are these: ‚Äúleaders and activists are arrested, inhabitants are expelled, meetings are banned, demonstrators are detained, and the demonstrations themselves are brutally dispersed; curfews and confinements are imposed, houses are blown up, and quislings from the Village Leagues are used in a terror campaign against Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  129  the population; universities and newspapers are shut down, journalists are detained or prevented from interviewing leaders, who, in turn, are not allowed to be interviewed anyway; censorship is applied to both newspapers and books, and humiliation, harassment, and terror are inflicted on the population by the Jewish settlers in towns and villages alike.‚Äù The Black Book then presents extensive evidence, in a virtually day-by-day account. These practices, in fact, go back to the earliest days of the occupation, but there is no doubt that they escalated to new levels of violence under the regime of the ‚ÄúMideast Maverick‚Äù and his chosen instrument. Small wonder that Dudin‚Äôs support in the West Bank amounted to 0.2% by March 1982, after six months of Milson‚Äôs beneficence. We return to the historical context, and some specific illustrations, in the next chapter. The conception of the Palestinians as primitive ‚Äúnatives‚Äù who can easily be bought off has deep roots in Zionist history, and is a natural concomitant to ‚ÄúWeizmann‚Äôs legacy,‚Äù as expressed by Ben-Gurion and others (see chapter 3, section 2.2.2, and for more detail, the next chapter). It was observed long ago by visitors to Palestine. The American journalist Vincent Sheean, for example, arrived in Palestine in 1929 as an avid Zionist sympathizer, and left a few months later as a harsh critic of the Zionist enterprise. He found that the Jewish settlers ‚Äúhad contempt [for the Arabs] as an ‚Äòuncivilized race,‚Äô to whom some of them referred as ‚ÄòRed Indians‚Äô and others as ‚Äòsavages‚Äô,‚Äù and felt that ‚ÄúWe don‚Äôt have to worry about the Arabs‚Äù who ‚Äúwill do anything for money.‚Äù They looked upon the indigenous population as ‚Äúmere squatters for thirteen centuries‚Äù so that it should ‚Äúbe feasible for the Zionists, by purchase, persuasion and pressure, to get the Arabs out sooner or later and convert Palestine into a Jewish national home,‚Äù an attitude which he thought was ‚Äúfrom their own point of view‚Ķperilous in the extreme.‚Äù Sheean ‚Äúcould not believe that the Arabs of Palestine were so different Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  130  from other Arabs that they would welcome the attempt to create a Jewish nation in their country.‚Äù55 These attitudes remain alive today, expressed in the actions of the Milson administration and its predecessors in the occupied territories, in the common view of Israeli leaders and others that the Palestinians can readily find a place in some other Arab land, and in the general disregard in the West‚Äîparticularly the United States‚Äîfor Palestinian rights. It might also be noted that even Mustafa Dudin‚Äîthe archetypal quisling‚Äîhas called for total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and the evacuation of all Jewish settlements established there since 1967. How this stand results from PLO intimidation has not yet been explained. Furthermore, well after the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut and southern Lebanon, Palestinian demands for an independent state and rejection of Israeli-imposed ‚Äúautonomy‚Äù remained unchanged, and ‚Äúwith the notable exception of Mustafa Dudin,‚Ķvery few Palestinians think they can reach their objectives by negotiating with Israeli officials.‚Äù In January 1983, the leader of the Ramallah League, Riyad el-Hatib, called for an independent Palestinian state, and the chairman of the Hebron area Village Leagues, Muhammad Nasser, called upon Israel to freeze settlements, describing them as ‚Äúan obstacle to peace‚Äù between Israel and the Palestinians.56 In the meeting that Rubinstein attended, representatives of the Leagues called for measures to prevent migration of Palestinians from the West Bank (‚Äúa clear antigovernment goal,‚Äù Rubinstein observes), while Dudin and others urged the Israeli military authorities to facilitate the return of Palestinian refugees, primarily from Lebanon, to the West Bank, a position with only the most marginal support within Israel. Again, it seems that the PLO must have a long arm.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  131  2.3.3 The ‚ÄúPeace Process‚Äù Returning to the PORI Institute survey of West Bank opinion, also of interest were the attitudes expressed towards the two Israeli political groupings. 0.9% preferred to see Begin‚Äôs Likud in power, while 2% preferred the Labor Party. 93% registered complete indifference. As for Camp David, 2% felt it helped the Palestinian cause, while 88% regarded it as a hindrance. In news reporting as in editorial commentary in the United States, the arrangements set in motion by the Camp David accords are known simply as ‚Äúthe peace process.‚Äù Evidently, those whose lives are at stake do not share the assumptions that underlie this usage, which simply reflects a tacit acceptance of the U.S. propaganda system by the media and scholarship. It is also quite likely that the inhabitants of the occupied territories understand some facts about ‚Äúthe peace process‚Äù that are little noted here. Specifically, it is plain, on the ground, that the government of Israel never had the slightest intention of joining ‚Äúthe peace process‚Äù in anything other than a rhetorical sense, beyond the Sinai agreements, which had the merit of giving Israel a free hand elsewhere by effectively excluding Egypt from the conflict. Not only is this obvious from the settlement program and the internal repression, but it is even clear from the official record, a fact that Abba Eban has pointed out. He cites the official ‚ÄúGovernment policy guidelines‚Äù adopted by the Knesset (by a single vote), which state that ‚ÄúAfter the transition period laid down in the Camp David accords, Israel will raise its claim and will act to fulfill its rights to sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district‚Äù (Eban‚Äôs emphasis). ‚ÄúThere is no resource of language,‚Äù he notes, ‚Äúthat can possibly bridge the gulf‚Äù between this decision and the Camp David Agreement, which leaves the status of the territories to be determined Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  132  after the transition period by negotiations between Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and elected representatives of the inhabitants of the territories, not by Israeli actions. Eban states that he is unable to find any precedent ‚Äúin the jurisprudence of any government for such a total contradiction between an international engagement and a national statement of policy.‚Äù Surely an exaggeration,* but nevertheless an understandable reaction to the immediate announcement by the government of Israel that it intended to disregard the Camp David Agreement, to which it pledges (and demands of others) total fidelity. 57 The poll results reflect the attitudes of those who have learned about the occupation, as conducted by the Labor Party and then Likud, from their own lives. They are deprived of New York Times editorials, and therefore‚Äîas their low regard for the Labor Party indicates‚Äîthey are unaware that under the Labor Party the occupation was a ‚Äúmodel of future cooperation‚Äù and a ‚Äúnine-year experiment in Arab-Israeli coexistence,‚Äù or that the Labor Party in 1980 ‚Äúhas taken a giant step toward compromise with the West Bank Palestinians and thus challenged the Arab world to reciprocate with acts of restraint and conciliation‚Äù58 the ‚Äúgiant step‚Äù was a reiteration, once again, of the rejectionist Allon plan put into effect by the Labor Party ten years earlier.  2.3.4 The United States and the Conquered Population *  To mention only one obvious case, consider the statement of U.S. government  policy by Kissinger and Nixon in January 1973 as they announced the signing of the Paris peace agreements concerning Vietnam, adding in the clearest and most explicit terms that the U.S. intended to violate every obligation to which it had just committed itself. For details concerning the facts, the consequences, and the U.S. reactions, see TNCW, chapter 3. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  133  The hopes and aspirations of the indigenous population are generally ignored in the United States, not because the facts are unknown‚Äîthe poll just cited, for example, appeared prominently in Time magazine‚Äî but because the Palestinians are not accorded the human rights that are properly and automatically recognized in the case of Israeli Jews, so that their attitudes are of no account, just as one would not ask the donkeys in the West Bank what their preferences might be. Those who have backed or tolerated U.S policy towards the region, or who support either of the two major political groupings in Israel, simply announce thereby their complete contempt for the indigenous inhabitants of the former Palestine. Of course, such attitudes cannot be openly expressed. We therefore read in the New Republic that ‚ÄúNo means exist of discovering what public opinion may be today [in] the occupied territories, which are the eye of the storm‚Äù‚Äîalthough the same author, who simply exudes sympathy for the Palestinians suffering under PLO terror, informs us confidently that Arafat‚Äôs ‚Äúextraordinary public relations success has no popular base,‚Äù and that the ‚ÄúPalestinians en masse leave the PLO alone.‚Äù59 Evidently, polls carried out by Israel give us no insight into public opinion, just as we learn nothing from the elected leadership and others, even from Israel‚Äôs favorite collaborator Mustafa Dudin. The same authority explains that there are genuine ‚Äúmoderates‚Äù who might ‚Äúagree to whatever is left of the concept of partition‚Äù (presumably he has in mind ‚Äúterritorial compromise‚Äù in the sense of the Labor Party). He even tells us who they are: Mayor Freij and dismissed Mayor Shawa (both of whom continue to support the PLO; see section 2.3.1 above), and Mustafa Dudin who, he informs us, ‚Äúhas met with the disdain of selfappointed Western tribunes for the Palestinians‚Äù‚Äîthough not this tribune, who is unconcerned by the fact that his candidate for ‚Äúresponsible leadership‚Äù insists upon a Palestinian state contrary to his Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
134  Rejectionism and Accomodation  claims, and is supported by a rousing 0.2% of the population. Again, the age of Orwell, nowhere better exemplified than in the semi-official journal of American liberalism, as we shall have ample occasion to see below. It might be added that the sentiments of the Palestinians in the occupied territories regarding an independent state and the legitimacy of the PLO appear to be widely shared among Arab citizens of Israel as well. One of the Arab leaders who has been most closely integrated into Israeli political life, Saif ad-din Zuabi, wrote a letter to Prime Minister Begin protesting the expansion of the ‚ÄúPeace for Galilee‚Äù invasion of Lebanon beyond the originally-announced 40km limit. Zuabi, ‚Äúwho is known for his moderate opinions, indicated in his letter that he has never been an admirer of Yasser Arafat, but after the war it became clear to everyone that Yasser Arafat is the most fitting representative of the Palestinian people.‚Äù60 Similar conclusions have often been expressed within the Israeli Arab community. We return to more detailed studies of Israeli Arab opinion on these matters in chapter 7, section 4. 1.1.  2.4 The Arab States and the PLO We have reviewed the international consensus and the positions of the U.S., Israel, and the Palestinians in the occupied territories. What about the Arab states and the PLO? The historical record is rather different from what is generally believed in the United States.  2.4.1 The Erosion of Rejectionism and the U.S.-Israeli Response In the immediate post-1967 period, the Arab states and the PLO took a rejectionist position comparable to the stand that has been Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  135  consistently maintained by Israel and the U.S. Not long after, this rejectionism began to erode. In February 1970, President Nasser of Egypt declared that ‚Äúit will be possible to institute a durable peace between Israel and the Arab states, not excluding economic and diplomatic relations, if Israel evacuates the occupied territories and accepts a settlement of the problem of the Palestinian refugees.‚Äù Amnon Kapeliouk observes that ‚Äúthis declaration received no response at the time in Israel.‚Äù61 Note that settlement of the refugee problem within the context of a negotiated peace has been the official position of the U.S., along with virtually the entire world apart from Israel, since 1949, and is regularly endorsed in UN resolutions. Note also that Nasser made no reference to a Palestinian state, in accordance with the international consensus of the time. Nasser also ‚Äúaccepted the [Secretary of State William] Rogers [June 1970] proposals for a cease-fire and subsequent negotiations,‚Äù a ‚Äúbrave and constructive step‚Äù in the words of Zionist historian Jon Kimche.62 After Nasser‚Äôs death, the new President, Anwar Sadat, moved at once to implement two policies: peace with Israel and conversion of Egypt to an American client state. In February 1971, he offered Israel a full peace treaty on the pre-June 1967 borders, with security guarantees, recognized borders, and so on. This offer caused much distress in Israel (it caused ‚Äúpanic,‚Äù in the words of the well-known Israeli writer Amos Elon),63 and was promptly rejected with the statement that Israel would not return to the internationally recognized pre-1967 borders. Note that Sadat‚Äôs offer of February 1971 was more favorable to Israel than what he proposed in November 1977 on the trip to Jerusalem that officially established him as ‚Äúa man of peace,‚Äù since he made no mention of Palestinian rights, allegedly the stumbling block in the Camp David ‚Äúpeace process.‚Äù Sadat‚Äôs offer was in line with the international consensus of the period, in particular, with the Rogers Plan, which had Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  136  been angrily rejected by Israel.64 In internal discussion in Israel, Labor Party doves recognized that a peace settlement was within reach, but recommended against it on the grounds that territorial gains would be possible if they held out.65 Israel‚Äôs only reaction to Sadat‚Äôs offer, apart from the immediate flat rejection, was to increase settlement in the occupied territories. On the same day that Sadat‚Äôs offer was officially rejected, the Labor government authorized plans for settlement in the hills surrounding the Arab portion of Jerusalem, well beyond the earlier borders of the city, as part of the process of ‚Äúthickening Jerusalem.‚Äù Noting this fact, Edward Witten comments on the similarity to Begin‚Äôs response to the Reagan plan in 1982: new settlements in response to a request for a settlement freeze (see section 2.2.1 above; we return to the facts). Witten also points out that Sadat clearly expressed his desire for ‚Äúcoexistence‚Äù with Israel at the same time in a Newsweek interview, and that Foreign Minister Abdullah Salah of Jordan announced that Jordan too was ready to recognize Israel, if it returned to the internationally-recognized pre-June 1967 borders (February 23, 1971). There appears to have been no Israeli response.66 In 1972, Israel‚Äôs Labor government angrily rejected the proposal of King Hussein of Jordan to establish a confederation of Jordan and the West Bank (again, a rejectionist position, denying Palestinian national rights). In response, the Israeli Knesset ‚Äúdetermined,‚Äù for the first time officially, ‚Äúthat the historic right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel [including the West Bank] is beyond challenge,‚Äù while Prime Minister Golda Meir stated that ‚ÄúIsrael will continue to pursue her enlightened policy in Judea and Samaria‚Ķ‚Äù Her political adviser Israel Galili, who was in charge of settlement in the occupied territories, stated that the Jordan River should become Israel‚Äôs ‚Äúagreed border‚Äîa frontier, not just a security border,‚Äù the latter term implying the possibility of some form of self-government, however Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  137  limited, for the indigenous population.67 Returning to Sadat‚Äôs February 1971 offer of a full peace treaty, Israel was backed in its rejection by the United States. Unfortunately for Sadat, his efforts came just at the time when Israel had established in Washington its thesis that it was a ‚Äústrategic asset‚Äù for the U.S. (see chapter 2). Kissinger assumed that Israel‚Äôs power was unchallengeable, and takes considerable pride, in his memoirs, in his steadfastness in blocking the efforts of his primary enemy‚Äîthe State Department‚Äî towards some peaceful resolution of the conflict. His aim, he writes, ‚Äúwas to produce a stalemate until Moscow urged compromise or until, even better, some moderate Arab regime decided that the route to progress was through Washington… Until some Arab state showed a willingness to separate from the Soviets, or the Soviets were prepared to dissociate from the maximum Arab program, we had no reason to modify our policy‚Äù of stalemate, in opposition to the State Department. 68 Kissinger‚Äôs account is remarkable for its ignorance and geopolitical fantasies, even by Kissingerian standards.* Sadat had explicitly decided that ‚Äúthe route to progress was through Washington,‚Äù joining Saudi Arabia and others (even when Sadat expelled Soviet advisers in 1972 *  Kissinger‚Äôs inability to comprehend what was happening in the Middle East  was almost monumental in its proportions. The second volume of his memoirs extends the story. See the review by James E. Akins (U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 1973 to 1976), who argues that ‚Äúthe truly tragic consequence of Watergate is that President Nixon was not in a strong enough position to dominate his secretary of state. Weakened and distracted by domestic issues, he allowed Kissinger to frustrate his own Middle East design. Had it not been for Watergate, it is possible, even probable, that Nixon would have achieved a just and lasting peace in the area and that the world would be much safer today.‚Äù See note 68. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  138  Kissinger did not see the light). Saudi Arabia was not only willing ‚Äúto separate from the Soviets‚Äù but in fact did not even have diplomatic relations with them. The USSR backed the international consensus including the existence of Israel within recognized (pre-June 1967) borders and with security guarantees.69 Apparently under Kissinger‚Äôs influence, the Nixon Administration decided to suspend State Department efforts aimed at a peaceful settlement in accordance with the international consensus and the explicit proposals of Egypt. An envoy was sent to a conference of U.S. ambassadors in the Mideast to announce the suspension of these efforts. ‚ÄúTo a man, the U.S. ambassadors replied that if the countries in the Mideast concluded that the process itself had ended, there would be a disastrous war.‚Äù70 Sadat also repeatedly warned that he would be forced to resort to war if his efforts at a peaceful settlement were rebuffed, but he was dismissed with contempt, apparently because of the widespread belief in Israel‚Äôs military supremacy. Warnings from American oil companies operating in the Arabian peninsula concerning threats to U.S. interests were also disregarded.71 Nahum Goldmann, long a leading figure in the Zionist movement, observed that Sadat had conducted a ‚Äúdaring‚Äù policy by ‚Äúdeclaring himself ready to recognize Israel, despite the opposition,‚Äù and that ‚Äúif he cannot show that he can obtain results, the army will be compelled to launch a war.‚Äù Israel listened no more than Kissinger did, and on the same assumptions. After Israel shot down 13 Syrian planes with one Israeli plane lost in September 1973. the editor of one major Israeli journal wrote: ‚ÄúThis battle will remind our Arab neighbors that they cannot manage their affairs without taking into consideration who is the true master of this region.‚Äù72 In October 1973, Sadat made good his threat. As a group of Israeli and American-Israeli scholars observe, ‚ÄúAfter the Egyptian Ra‚Äôis [Sadat] had realized that all diplomatic efforts would lead to a dead end, he Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  139  decided to try a limited military option which, combined with an oil embargo, would lead to a significant Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories.‚Äù73 To the great surprise of Israel, the U.S., and virtually everyone else, Egypt and Syria were remarkably successful in the early stages of the war and Saudi Arabia was compelled (reluctantly, it seems) to join in an oil boycott, the first major use of the ‚Äúoil weapon,‚Äù a move with considerable long-term implications in international affairs. Primary responsibility for these developments is attributable to Henry Kissinger‚Äôs ignorance and blind reliance on force. At that point, U.S. policy shifted, reflecting the understanding that Egypt and the oil-producing states could not be so easily dismissed or controlled. Kissinger undertook his shuttle diplomacy and other diplomatic efforts. Concealed behind the razzle-dazzle was the easily discernible intent, now surely clear in retrospect even to those who could not perceive it at the time, to accept Egypt as a U.S. client state while effectively removing it from the Middle East conflict with a Sinai agreement. Then Israel would be free to continue its policies of integrating the occupied territories‚Äîand to concentrate its forces for war on the northern border without concern for the major Arab military force, as when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978 and again in 1982. Egypt continued to press for a full-scale peace settlement, now joined by other Arab states. In January 1976, the U.S. was compelled to veto a UN Security Council Resolution calling for a settlement in terms of the international consensus, which now included a Palestinian state alongside of Israel. The resolution called for a settlement on the 1967 borders, with ‚Äúappropriate arrangements‚Ķto guarantee‚Ķthe sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries,‚Äù including Israel and a new Palestinian state in the occupied territories. The resolution was backed by the ‚Äúconfrontation states‚Äù Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  140  (Egypt, Syria, Jordan), the PLO, and the USSR. President Chaim Herzog, who was Israel‚Äôs UN Ambassador at the time, writes that the PLO not only backed this peace plan but in fact ‚Äúprepared‚Äù it; the PLO then condemned ‚Äúthe tyranny of the veto‚Äù (in the words of the PLO representative) by which the U.S. blocked this important effort to bring about a peaceful two-state settlement. The occasion for Herzog‚Äôs remarks was the Saudi Arabian peace proposal that had just been announced, which Israel was right to reject, Herzog asserts, just as it correctly rejected the ‚Äúmore moderate‚Äù PLO plan of January 1976. According to Herzog, the ‚Äúreal author‚Äù of the 1981 Saudi Arabian (Fahd) peace plan was also the PLO, who never seem to cease their machinations.74 Israel refused to attend the January 1976 Security Council session, which had been called at Syrian initiative. The Rabin government‚Äîa Labor Party government regarded as dovish‚Äîannounced that it would not negotiate with any Palestinians on any political issue and would not negotiate with the PLO even if the latter were to renounce terrorism and recognize Israel, thus adopting a position comparable to that of the minority Rejection Front within the PLO. 75 The main elements of the PLO had been moving towards acceptance of a two-state settlement, and continued to do so, at times with various ambiguities, at times quite clearly, as in this case. The Arab states and the PLO continued to press for a two-state settlement, and Israel continued to react with alarm and rejection. In November 1976, the Jerusalem Post noted that Egyptian Prime Minister Ismail Fahmy had offered four conditions for a Middle East peace settlement: ‚ÄúIsrael‚Äôs withdrawal to the pre-1967 war frontiers; the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the ban on nuclear weapons in the region; and the inspection of nuclear installations in the area.‚Äù It noted further President Sadat‚Äôs Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
141  Rejectionism and Accomodation  statement to a group of U.S. Senators ‚Äúthat he was prepared to sign a peace treaty with Israel if it withdrew from all Arab territories captured in the 1967 war, and if a Palestinian state was created on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip.‚Äù The Labor Party journal Davar quoted Prime Minister Rabin‚Äôs response to this disturbing ‚Äúpeace offensive‚Äù: But there is nothing new in all of this, in the objectives that the Arabs wish to obtain, stressed the Prime Minister when recalling that back in 1971 Sadat told Dr. Jarring of his willingness to reach a peace settlement as he understood it. On the contrary, he has even made the conditions harder, since then, as opposed to now, he did not link an IsraeliEgyptian agreement with agreements with other Arab countries and did not raise, in such a pronounced manner [in fact, at all], his demand for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.76 Thus no Israeli reaction was in order. The following year, Egypt, Syria and Jordan ‚Äúinformed the United States that they would sign peace treaties with Israel as part of an overall Middle East settlement.‚Äù77 The Palestinian National Council, the governing body of the PLO, issued a declaration on March 20, 1977 calling for the establishment of ‚Äúan independent national state‚Äù in Palestine‚Äîrather than a secular democratic state of Palestine‚Äîand authorizing Palestinian attendance at an Arab-Israeli peace conference. Prime Minister Rabin of Israel responded ‚Äúthat the only place the Israelis could meet the Palestinian guerrillas was on the field of battle.‚Äù78 The same session of the National Council elected a new PLO Executive Committee excluding representatives of the Rejection Front.79 Shortly after, the PLO leaked a ‚Äúpeace plan‚Äù in Beirut which stated Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
142  Rejectionism and Accomodation  that the famous Palestinian National Covenant would not serve as the basis for relations between Israel and a Palestinian state, just as the founding principles of the World Zionist Organization were not understood as the basis for interstate relations, and that any evolution beyond a two-state settlement ‚Äúwould be achieved by peaceful means.‚Äù80 Supporters of Israel have long treasured the Covenant as the last line of defense for their rejectionism when all else fails. Israeli doves, in contrast, have always dismissed this last-ditch effort. For example, Elie Eliachar, former president of the Council of the Sephardic Community in Israel and the first person from Jerusalem to represent it at the Zionist Congresses, made the following statement in a lecture at the Hebrew University in 1980: On the basis of personal contacts I have had with leaders of the PLO, in London and elsewhere [in] meetings that were held openly, and that interested people know all about, I can say categorically that the idea that the PLO covenant is an obstacle to negotiations is utter nonsense… There is no Arab organization in existence today which can bring about a durable peace in our region, except the PLO, including its extremist factions. Mattityahu Peled, asked why the PLO does not abandon the Covenant, responded: For the same reason that the Government of Israel has never renounced the decisions of the Basle Zionist Congress, which supported the establishment of a Jewish state in the historic land of Israel‚Äîincluding Transjordan. No political Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
143  Rejectionism and Accomodation  body would do this. Similarly Herut and the Irgun [its terrorist forerunner] never abandoned their map [which includes Transjordan, contemporary Jordan; the official slogan of Begin‚Äôs Herut Party still calls for an Israel on both banks of the Jordan]. We demand a ritual abandonment of the Covenant‚Äîa kind of ceremony of humiliation‚Äîinstead of concerning ourselves with the decisions that were accepted by the PLO from 1974, which support the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories evacuated by Israel. It is, in fact, interesting to see how Israeli propaganda has focused on the Covenant with increasing intensity as it is deemphasized by the PLO in favor of subsequent resolutions which drastically modify its terms, for reasons that are hardly obscure.81 We should note that the Convenant holds a rejectionist view comparable to that of the Labor Party and Likud. A few months after releasing the 1977 peace plan, the PLO endorsed the Soviet-American statement of October 1977, which called for the ‚Äútermination of the state of war and establishment of normal peaceful relations‚Äù between Israel and its neighbors, as well as for internationally guaranteed borders and demilitarized zones to enhance security. ‚ÄúThe United States had, however, quickly backed away from the joint statement under Israeli protest,‚Äù Seth Tillman observes, adding that ‚Äúwithout exception,‚Äù proposals for superpower collaboration to bring about a settlement and to guarantee it ‚Äúhave been shot down by Israeli leaders and supporters of Israel in the United States, who have perceived in them the bugbear of an ‚Äòimposed‚Äô settlement‚Äù‚Äîthat is to say, a settlement that is unacceptable (otherwise, no sane person would care whether it was ‚Äúimposed‚Äù or not) because it departs from their Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
144  Rejectionism and Accomodation  rejectionist principles. There were ‚Äúa few dissenters from the prevailing consensus,‚Äù Tillman points out, among them Nahum Goldmann, who described the Soviet-American agreement of October 1977 as ‚Äúa piece of real statesmanship,‚Äù adding that ‚Äúit is regrettable that Israel‚Äôs opposition and that of the pro-Israel lobby in America rendered the agreement ineffective‚Äù (Goldmann‚Äôs words), another piece in the familiar pattern.82  2.4.2 Sadat‚Äôs Trip to Jerusalem and the Rewriting of History The failure of many such efforts as these led Sadat to undertake his November 1977 trip to Jerusalem, motivated by a desire to convene a Geneva conference of major powers to settle the conflict, according to Hermann Eilts, who was U.S. Ambassador to Egypt at the time. 83 It is also likely that Sadat was motivated by concern over the escalating conflict across the Israel-Lebanon border, initiated by Israeli-Maronite bombing of Nabatiya and culminating in Israeli air raids that killed some 70 people, mostly Lebanese. 84 The United States has generally been opposed to a Geneva conference, which would include the USSR and the European powers. As Kissinger had explained, his diplomatic efforts were designed ‚Äúto keep the Soviets out of the diplomatic arena‚Äù and ‚Äúto ensure that the Europeans and Japanese did not get involved in the diplomacy‚Äù concerning the Middle East, where the U.S. role is to remain predominant.85 Israel has also consistently opposed the idea, adamantly so if the PLO participates. The reason was explained by Prime Minister Rabin of the Labor Party after the Knesset had approved a resolution to this effect. If Israel agrees to negotiate ‚Äúwith any Palestinian element,‚Äù he stated, this will provide ‚Äúa basis for the possibility of creating a third state between Israel and Jordan.‚Äù But Israel will never accept such a Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  145  state: ‚ÄúI repeat firmly, clearly, categorically: it will not be created.‚Äù86 The Labor Party‚Äôs rejection of the right of the Palestinians to any meaningful form of self-determination has been consistent and exceptionless. Sadat‚Äôs dramatic visit to Jerusalem did not open the way to negotiations for a comprehensive political settlement involving true accommodation in the sense of the earlier discussion and the international consensus. Rather, the resulting Camp David ‚Äúpeace process,‚Äù as the U.S. government and the press designate it, consummated Kissinger‚Äôs earlier efforts. Egypt has, temporarily at least, been incorporated within the U.S. system and excluded from the ArabIsraeli conflict, allowing Israel to continue its creeping takeover of the occupied territories, apart from the Sinai, now returned to Egypt and serving as a buffer zone. Diplomatic efforts remain largely in the hands of the U.S., excluding both the USSR and the rivals/allies of Europe and Japan. From 1977, the Begin government rapidly extended land expropriation and settlement in the occupied territories while instituting a considerably more brutal repression there, particularly from the fall of 1981, with the Milson-Sharon administration. The U.S. government signalled its approval by increasing the massive aid which, in effect, funded these projects‚Äîwhile also emitting occasional peeps of protest. As noted earlier (see section 2.3.3 above), the Begin government indicated from the start its rejection of the ‚Äúpeace process,‚Äù so it is not surprising that it moved at once to ‚Äúfulfill its rights to sovereignty‚Äù by large-scale development projects designed to ensure that the West Bank could not be separated from Israel. Evidently, the actual historical record‚Äîhere briefly reviewed up to Sadat‚Äôs November 1977 trip to Jerusalem‚Äîis not exactly in accord with the familiar picture of U.S.-Israel-Arab diplomatic interactions in this period. The preferred story is one of Arab intransigence and U.S.-Israeli Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  146  efforts at accommodation. Sadat, for example, is regularly portrayed as a typical Arab warmonger who tried to destroy Israel by force in 1973, then learned the error of his ways and became a man of peace under the kindly tutelage of Henry Kissinger and Jimmy Carter. As the New Republic puts the matter, Sadat‚Äôs ‚Äúdecision to make peace‚Äù came after the 1973 war: ‚ÄúFinally, after the enormous destructiveness of the 1973 war, Anwar Sadat realized that the time had come to replace the conflict of war with law and rights.‚Äù87 The other Arabs‚Äîparticularly the PLO‚Äî persist in their evil ways.* Endless references can be cited from the press to illustrate this version of history.88 To reconcile the actual history with the preferred picture has been a relatively simple matter; It has only been necessary to resort to Orwell‚Äôs useful memory hole. The historical record has been so effectively sanitized that even as well-informed a person as Harold Saunders (former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs) can write that ‚ÄúAs long as no Arab government but Egypt would make peace, Israel saw no alternative to maintaining its security by the force of its own arms.‚Äù89 Sadat‚Äôs pre-1977 peace efforts have been conveniently expunged from the record, like the January 1976 Security Council Resolution and much else. In Israel and Egypt, Sadat‚Äôs 1971 offer is described as his ‚Äúfamous‚Äù attempt to establish a genuine peace with Israel. 90 Similarly, *  The New Republic goes on to explain that one of the great achievements of the  Israeli war in Lebanon is that the destruction of the PLO and ‚Äúits elimination as an independent political force [will] allow those on the Arab side who have no designs on Haifa or Tel Aviv to negotiate free from intimidation‚Äù (my emphasis). Prior to 1982, this leading journal of American liberalism would have us believe, no Arabs were ‚Äúallowed‚Äù to consider a settlement that would include the existence of Israel. Compare the record sampled here. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
147  Rejectionism and Accomodation  Amnon Kapeliouk describes Sadat‚Äôs expression of willingness ‚Äúto enter into a peace agreement with Israel‚Äù (the words of the official English text of Israel‚Äôs recognition of Sadat‚Äôs offer) as a ‚Äúhistoric event in Israel-Arab relations.‚Äù91 Consider, in contrast, the two-page encomium to Sadat by Eric Pace, Middle East specialist of the New York Times, after Sadat‚Äôs assassination.92 There is no mention here of the real history, as briefly sketched above; indeed in the New York Times version, the well-documented facts are explicitly denied. Thus, referring to Sadat‚Äôs trip to Jerusalem in 1977, Pace writes: Reversing Egypt‚Äôs longstanding policy, he proclaimed his willingness to accept Israel‚Äôs existence as a sovereign state. Then, where so many Middle East negotiators had failed, he succeeded, along with Presidents Carter and Reagan and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel, in keeping the improbable rapprochement alive. An elegant example of what has sometimes been called ‚Äúhistorical engineering,‚Äù93 that is, redesigning the facts of history in the interests of established power and ideology, a crime of which we justly accuse our enemies. Such historical engineering is in fact quite widespread. To illustrate more closely how the system works, I will cite one final example, again from the New York Times, which is much more interesting in this connection than, say, the New Republic or Commentary, because of its image and pretensions as an independent journal. After the Lebanon war and the Beirut massacres of September, there was much debate about how Americans, and American Jews in particular, should relate to Israel. The contribution of the New York Times Magazine was a discussion by Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  148  Mark Helprin,* who is identified as a Middle East specialist with service in the Israeli army.94 Helprin begins by setting up a framework for discussing the issue. There are two extreme positions: ‚ÄúAmong Jews in the United States there are those who would see Israel fall, and those who care only for its aggrandizement.‚Äù These ‚Äútwo extremes,‚Äù he adds, ‚Äúhave been highlighted in the debate following the massacre of innocents in Beirut.‚Äù We must reject both of these extremes, he urges, and take the ‚Äúmiddle ground,‚Äù which is described rather vaguely, but is intended to be understood as the position of the Labor Party, it appears. Now of course, every commentator sees himself as occupying the middle ground between the extremists. The question is: who stands at the two extremes? As the sole example of those ‚ÄúJews in the United States who would see Israel fall,‚Äù Helprin cites George Habash, the leader of the rejectionist faction of the PLO. It is not surprising that he offers no other example; it would be difficult indeed to find real cases. What about the other ‚Äúextreme,‚Äù i.e., those who support the policies of Likud. Helprin does not elaborate on the constituency of this group, *  It would be misleading to describe this as just one man‚Äôs opinion, fully in place  in an independent journal. That would indeed be true if the range of permitted opinion extended beyond the rejectionist spectrum, but it does not, contrary to much pretense (the reference of note 111 below being one example). The Times Magazine published an interesting letter critical of Helprin‚Äôs article, by Julius Berman, Chairman, Conference of the Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (Dec. 12). Berman held that Helprin rejected the ‚Äúconsensus‚Äù of American Jews: that the PLO is excluded as a negotiating partner and that ‚Äúan independent Palestinian state would be a dagger poised at the heart of Israel.‚Äù The latter phrase is borrowed from Hitler, who used it with reference to Czechoslovakia. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  149  but others do, for example, Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg, who describes the Zionist Organization of America as (in recent years) ‚Äúthe American wing of the Liberal Party in Israel which, together with Begin‚Äôs Revisionists, make up the Likud.95 Thus the two extremes that have been ‚Äúhighlighted‚Äù in recent debate among American Jews are not exactly equally represented: one consists of George Habash, and the other, the Zionist Organization of America, and in fact, most others in the organized Jewish community. Helprin then proceeds to give the version of history as perceived in the ‚Äúmiddle ground.‚Äù Apart from the U.S., we find ‚Äúthe facile rejection of Israel and compassionate overembrace of its enemies by nearly all the world,‚Äù including Europe, which ‚Äúhardly reacted‚Äù to PLO atrocities in the past, saving its condemnations for Israel‚Äîa ridiculous falsification, of course, but one that appears to be widely believed in the U.S. and is sometimes supported with serious misrepresentation; for one example, by Saul Bellow, see TNCW, pp. 303-4. As for Israel, while it is not perfect, its ‚Äúcampaign in Lebanon was both late in coming and restrained in character when compared with what any other state, civilized or uncivilized, would do in reaction to the continual shelling of its cities, the murder of its children and the massing of arms against it for years without abatement.‚Äù Omitted are a few possibly pertinent facts: e.g., that Israel occupies Arab territory from which hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled or were expelled in 1967 (not to speak of questions that might be raised about earlier years) and that the PLO had scrupulously adhered to the July 1981 cease-fire in the face of constant Israeli provocations, a matter to which we return. As for the PLO, it ‚Äúis to the slaughter of men, women and children what France is to wine.‚Äù Assuming this to be a valid characterization, we may ask what analogy is appropriate for Israel with its far greater slaughters since the early 1950s, long before the PLO was founded, or Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
150  Rejectionism and Accomodation  for the pre-state Zionist terror organizations, which, Simha Flapan writes, ‚Äúestablished the pattern of terrorism adopted 30 years later by AI-Fatah.‚Äù96 According to official Israeli army statistics, 106 people died in the course of all terrorist actions in the north since 1967, considerably fewer than the number of victims of a single Israeli bombing raid. 97 Or to take another comparison, the total number of Israeli victims is approximately the same as the number killed when Israel shot down a civilian Libyan airplane over the occupied Sinai in February 1973; the plane had become lost in bad weather and was one minute flight time from the Suez Canal, towards which it was heading, when shot down by the Israeli air force.98 The total number of Israelis killed in all acts of terror from 1967 is 282,99 less than the number killed by Israel‚Äôs air terrorists in Beirut on July 17-8 1981, in ‚Äúretaliation‚Äù after a PLO response to Israeli bombing that broke the cease-fire. 100 What of recent years?* According to figures provided by Minister of the Interior Yosef Burg, in 1980 10 Jews were killed by terrorists and in 1981‚Äî8. In contrast, we have killed about a thousand terrorists in 1982, and caused the loss of life of thousands of inhabitants of an enemy country. If so, it results that for every 6-8 Jews sacrificed, we kill in return thousands of Gentiles. This is, undoubtedly, a spectacular situation, an uncommon success of Zionism. I might even dare to say‚Äî exaggerated.101  *  Note that we are taking these Israeli figures at face value, not asking how the  victims were killed, though a closer look at the terrorist incidents shows that the question is worth asking. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  151  Israeli terrorist acts over the years, beginning long before the PLO was formed, have undoubtedly claimed far more victims than those of the PLO, and while they are typically described as ‚Äúretaliation‚Äù here, the facts make clear that this is a term of propaganda, not description.102 So much for Europe, Israel and the PLO. Next, Helprin turns to the Arab states apart from post-1977 Egypt: ‚ÄúWere the confrontation states and the rejection states to allow that the Jews, too, have a right to political existence, they would get serene open borders and peace treaties‚ĶIsrael will not listen to the Arabs until they decide to put an end to their 30-year war against it.‚Äù He adds that ‚Äúwhen Arab officials speak of liberating or regaining the occupied territories, they mean all of Israel,‚Äù although ‚Äúthe Western press has been remiss at sniffing out this verbal trick.‚Äù The entire history just described‚Äîonly a small part of the story, which will be extended directly‚Äîis completely expunged from the record. Clearly, all of this is pure Agitprop. How can the New York Times and its writers expect to get away with it? The answer is simple enough; it is no trick at all, given overwhelming dominance of the means of articulate expression by one specific point of view. It is difficult to imagine, for example, that the New York Times Magazine would permit an article to appear reviewing the actual historical facts, at least, as long as the U.S. remains committed to its Greater Israel policies. This example, which is by no means unusual, illustrates very well what Walter Lippmann sixty years ago called ‚Äúthe manufacture of consent,‚Äù an art which ‚Äúis capable of great refinements‚Äù and will lead to a ‚Äúrevolution‚Äù in ‚Äúthe practice of democracy.‚Äù103  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  152  3. The Continuing Threat of Peace he well-known Israeli writer Amos Elon has written of the ‚Äúpanic and unease among our political leadership‚Äù caused by Arab peace proposals (see 2.4.1 above). ‚ÄúThe most extreme instance,‚Äù he adds, ‚Äúthough not the only one, was in early 1971, when Sadat threw Israel off balance with his announcement, for the first time, that he was willing to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and to respect its independence and sovereignty in ‚Äòsecure and recognized borders‚Äô.‚Äù104 Elon describes the harshly negative reaction of the government, the silence of most of the press, and the convoluted efforts of most Orientalists to prove that Sadat‚Äôs offer did not mean what it said‚Äîrather like Helprin‚Äôs insight into the devious ‚Äúverbal trick‚Äù of the Arabs when they speak of a settlement in which the occupied territories will be turned over to their inhabitants. The occasion for Elon‚Äôs article was the ‚Äúemotional and angry‚Äù reaction of the government to the justannounced Saudi (Fahd) peace plan of August 1981,105 a response which he found ‚Äúshocking, frightening, if not downright despair-producing.‚Äù* Elon had good reason for his despair. The Labor Party journal Davar  T  *  Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir stated that ‚ÄúEven the suggestion of  Saudi recognition of Israel is not new.‚Äù The Saudi plan called for a two-state settlement on the 1967 borders, with recognition of the right of all states in the region to exist in peace. It should be noted that many Labor leaders denounced the Saudi peace plan, e.g.. Chaim Herzog, who warned that it was prepared by the PLO (see section 2.4.1 and Party chairman Shimon Peres, who ‚Äúremarked today that the Saudi peace proposal threatened Israel‚Äôs very existence‚Äù (Ha‚Äôaretz, Aug. 10, 1981; Israeli Mirror). Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  153  found Israel‚Äôs reaction‚Äîincluding military flights over Saudi Arabia‚Äîto be so ‚Äúirrational‚Äù as to cause foreign intelligence services to be concerned over Israeli bombing of Saudi oil fields.106 Another wellknown journalist described ‚Äúthe frightened, almost hysterical response of the Israeli government to the Saudi plan‚Äù as ‚Äúa grave mistake,‚Äù adding that if the PLO offered to negotiate with Israel, ‚Äúthe government would undoubtedly declare a national day of mourning.‚Äù107 In fact, the PLO had repeatedly expressed a willingness to accept a negotiated settlement and to participate in general peace negotiations, but no call for a day of mourning was necessary, since the denial of the facts was still effectively in force. A few months later, in February 1982, Uri Avneri criticized a similar Israeli reaction to a Syrian proposal calling for ‚Äútermination of the state of war between the Arabs and Israel‚Ķ‚Äù along with confirmation of the right of the Palestinians to an independent state alongside of Israel in the occupied territories.108 B. Michael made a similar observation in Ha‚Äôaretz. Noting the immediate efforts to dismiss the statement of the Syrian Minister of Information that a peace agreement would be possible if Israel were to withdraw to its 1967 borders, he commented sardonically that ‚ÄúWe must therefore be careful not to underestimate the danger posed by the Syrian plot, and we must do our best to kill it while it is still small.‚Äù109 In the same month (February 1982), Saudi Arabia‚Äôs state radio twice ‚Äúcalled for direct peace negotiations between the Arabs and Israel, on condition that Israel recognize the PLO as the negotiating partner.‚Äù These initiatives too were ignored,110 as was a subsequent Iraqi initiative (see p. 367*). Israeli propaganda beamed to an American audience, however, regularly speaks of the willingness of ‚Äúsocialist Zionism‚Äù to make peace if only some Arab leader would show some sign that Israel may exist in Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  154  the region,111 ignoring‚Äîin fact, denying‚Äîthe actual extreme rejectionism of mainstream socialist Zionism and the halting and sometimes ambiguous steps of the PLO and the Arab states over the past years towards a political settlement, which, whatever one thinks of them, clearly go far beyond anything that the Israeli Labor Party has been willing to consider and in fact go beyond what the Israeli ‚ÄúPeace Now‚Äù group has proposed. American commentators are still more extreme in their rejection of the historical record, as in the sample of cases cited. In the earlier years, the PLO was no less rejectionist than Israel, and its call for a ‚Äúdemocratic secular state‚Äù was not what it appeared to be on the surface (see TNCW, p. 430). But it simply cannot be denied that from the mid-1970s, the PLO has moved increasingly towards an accommodationist position. While concealing this record, propagandists search desperately for statements by PLO spokesmen that reveal their unremitting hostility to Israel and unwillingness to accept it. Israeli doves have regarded such efforts with contempt, pointing out that the same logic would lead to the conclusion that no one should have any dealings with the Zionist movement or the State of Israel, since its leaders have consistently rejected any Palestinian rights and have repeatedly indicated that they regard any political settlement as a temporary stage leading to further expansion. What is more, they have acted on these principles. We return to the record, which is not without interest and is generally concealed here. That outright propagandists should resort to these deceptive practices is not very surprising; that, after all, is their vocation. It is more interesting that the practice is common across a broad spectrum of Western opinion, particularly in the U.S., as one aspect of the ideological support for Israel. There have been other examples of missed chances, before and since. Mattityahu Peled alleges that ‚Äúa historic opportunity was missed to start a dialogue between Israel and the PLO‚Äù in 1976, when plans Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  155  were devised for mutual conciliatory gestures, leading to further peaceful contacts. He states that the plan collapsed because of Israeli military actions in Lebanon. Just at the time when Arafat was scheduled to make a conciliatory statement, as part of the plan, the Israeli Navy began capturing boats belonging to Lebanese Moslems, turning them over to Israel‚Äôs Lebanese Christian allies, who then killed them.112 In the light of American beliefs about the history of terrorism, it should perhaps be observed that along with acts of piracy such as these, Israel has also resorted to hijacking of airplanes, and may indeed have initiated this practice. In December 1954, a Syrian civilian airliner was captured by Israeli military aircraft to obtain hostages for exchange with Israeli soldiers who had been captured within Syria. The Prime Minister of Israel, Moshe Sharett, states in his diary that he was informed by the State Department that ‚Äúour action was without precedent in the history of international practice.‚Äù Note that this Israeli action is a direct precedent for much later PLO actions to capture hostages for exchange with captured guerrillas, as in the major terrorist incidents that were widely and properly denounced in the West; at Ma‚Äôalot in 1974, for example.113 Returning to PLO initiatives, by the late 1970s, Seth Tillman concludes, ‚Äúthe evidence seemed persuasive‚Ķthat Arafat and al-Fatah [the PLO mainstream] were prepared to make peace on the basis of the West Bank-Gaza state and to accept Israel within its approximate borders of 1967,‚Äù though not to ‚Äúconcede the moral legitimacy of Israel.‚Äù In November 1978, requesting a dialogue with the United States in a discussion with Representative Paul Findley, ‚ÄúArafat issued the following statement: ‚ÄòThe PLO will accept an independent Palestinian state consisting of the West Bank and Gaza, with connecting corridor, and in that circumstance will renounce any and all violent means to enlarge the territory of that state. I would reserve the right, of course, to use nonvioClassics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
156  Rejectionism and Accomodation  lent means, that is to say, diplomatic and democratic means, to bring about the eventual unification of all of Palestine‚Äô.‚Äù Tillman reports further that he promised: ‚ÄúWe will give de facto recognition to the State of Israel.‚Äù Neither these statements, nor others of a similar nature that were conveyed directly to the State Department, ‚Äúelicited a response from the Carter administration.‚Äù114 In its April 1981 session, the PLO National Council unanimously passed a resolution endorsing a February proposal of Soviet President Brezhnev for peace in the Middle East in which Brezhnev‚Äîin accordance with what has been consistent Soviet policy‚Äîenunciated the following principles: The inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine must be secured up to, and including, the establishment of their own state. It is essential to ensure the security and sovereignty of all states of the region including those of Israel. These are the basic principles.115 Citing the unanimous PLO endorsement of the Brezhnev proposal at a Paris press conference on July 14, 1982, Issam Sartawi of the PLO National Council* stated that *  On April 10, 1983, Sartawi was assassinated at a meeting of the Socialist  International in Portugal. Responsibility for the assassination was announced by the Abu Nidal group, which has been at war with the PLO for a decade. In October 1973 Abu Nidal was condemned to death by a Fatah military tribunal. He is assumed to have been responsible for the assassination of several PLO figures in Europe, among them the leading PLO moderate Said Hammami in London in 1978, Naim Khader in Brussels in 1981, and others, and also for murderous attacks on synagogues and Jewish establishments in Vienna and Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
157  Rejectionism and Accomodation  From this it follows that the PLO has formally conceded to Israel, in the most unequivocal manner, the right to exist on a reciprocal basis. This eliminates automatically the obstacle placed by Secretary of State Kissinger in the way of U.S. recognition of the PLO and the establishment of U.S.PLO dialogue. See chapter 3, section 1.2. The statement was welcomed by the British and French governments (with qualifications in the former case) as a recognition of the right of Israel to exist on a reciprocal basis. A joint communiqu√© issued by Sartawi and Mattityahu Peled on July 20 noted that ‚ÄúThe PLO has made its willingness to accept and recognize the state of Israel on the basis of mutual recognition of each nation‚Äôs probably in France. He was also responsible for the attempted assassination of Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov in London in June 1982, the event that sparked the Israeli invasion of Lebanon to which we return. In an effort to piece together his murky and bloody history, Philippe Boggio describes him as ‚Äúa dangerous fomentor of antagonisms, an expert agitator who can do a better job than any army of demolishing the PLO‚Äôs naturally ambiguous relations with a good part of the world,‚Äù and whose activities have consistently been directed to undermining PLO efforts from the early 1970s ‚Äúto get all its factions to abandon the terrorist tactics discrediting the organisation.‚Äù The PLO has charged that he is an Israeli agent, noting that his operations ‚Äúfrequently serve Israeli interests indirectly,‚Äù a charge that is ‚Äúone of the assumptions you bear in mind‚Äù according to a French secret service specialist. It is generally assumed that he is supported by Iraq, sometimes Syria, where his offices are located and where he appears to have access to considerable funding. Philippe Boggio, Le Monde, Oct. 13, 14, 1982; Manchester Guardian Weekly, Oct. 31, 1982. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  158  legitimate right of self-determination crystal clear in various resolutions since 1977.‚Äù116 One might argue that this exaggerates the clarity of these declarations, but there is no doubt about the general drift of policy of the PLO and the Arab states, the ‚Äúpanic‚Äù that this has regularly inspired in Israel, and the reaction of dismissal or simply denial of the facts in the United States. To cite one last example, Ha‚Äôaretz published an interview with Shafiq el-Hout, official PLO spokesman in Beirut, who stated that ‚Äúthe PLO is prepared to offer peace to Israel on the condition that the Israelis will obey the UN resolutions and will recognize the national rights of the Palestinian people‚Ķ We are prepared to participate in any official effort aimed at bringing a just and comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East.‚Äù117 Again, perhaps not what Israel is prepared to accept, but hardly consistent with the incessant charge that the PLO is adamant in its refusal to accept the existence of Israel on any terms, that ‚Äúthe backbone of its existence is the philosophy of destruction of Israel, and the road to this is the use of terror‚Äù (Yitzhak Rabin).118 The concern over evidence of Arab moderation, illustrated repeatedly above, can be traced to the early days of the Zionist movement. Simha Flapan discusses ‚ÄúWeizmann‚Äôs opposition to negotiations with the Palestinians themselves for a political solution‚Äù from the early 1920‚Äôs, and his concern that the Arabs might be ‚Äúmoderate enough to be likely to agree to [a constitutional settlement] and thereby preclude forever the possibility of a Jewish state.‚Äù This concern grew when ‚Äúthe moderate trend gained the upper hand among the Palestinians,‚Äù a ‚Äúnew and moderate trend in Palestinian nationalism‚Äù that Weizmann viewed ‚Äúwith grave suspicion.‚Äù119 One can understand the reasons. Arab moderation might have stood in the way of Zionist goals at the time, and therefore had to be resisted. Comparable remarks hold today. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  159  In fact, it was not only the Saudi Arabian peace plan and other conciliatory gestures of the Arab states that were causing the familiar ‚Äúpanic by 1981-82. A still more serious problem was the increasing difficulty in portraying the PLO as merely a gang of terrorists, particularly, in the light of its observance of the U.S.-arranged cease-fire on the Lebanon-Israel border despite much Israeli provocation. There is good reason to believe that this threat was one prime factor impelling Israel to invade Lebanon, as we shall see. Putting such considerations to the side for the moment, the historical record seems plain enough. It strongly confirms the conclusion that the U.S. and Israel have headed the rejectionist camp, increasingly so as the 1970‚Äôs progressed. The Arab states that are directly involved in the conflict have approached or joined the international accommodationist consensus, as has the mainstream of the PLO. Irrelevantly to these considerations, it should perhaps be remarked, given the climate of irrationality on this matter in the United States, that this historical record does not show that the Arab states are decent regimes‚Äîthey most definitely are not‚Äînor does it bear on one‚Äôs judgments about the merits of the PLO.* It is simply a matter of fact. As for the matter of principle, it seems to me that rejectionist programs are unacceptable, for the reasons already indicated. Furthermore, whatever one‚Äôs views about these matters may be, there surely is no justification for maintaining the illusions and misrepresentations that are so characteristic of the American literature on this subject, one would think. *  Though the matter is of no relevance here, for the record, my own judgments  have been consistently harsh, both with regard to their actions and programs. See, e.g., Peace in the Middle East?, pp. 99f., 108; TNCW, pp. 262, 430; Socialist Revolution, April-June 1976. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  160  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  161  Notes‚ÄîChapter 3 Rejectionism and Accommodation 1.  2. 3.  4. 5. 6. 7. 8.  9. 10. 11. 12.  For examples, see virtually any article or editorial on the topic in the New Republic; e.g., for various aspects of the picture, Michael Walzer, ‚ÄúThe new terrorists,‚Äù Aug. 30, 1975; David Pryce-Jones, ‚ÄúThe Palestinian pattern,‚Äù Nov. 8,1982. Jon Kimche, There Could Have Been Peace (Dial, New York, 1973, p. 306). For discussion, see Fred J. Khouri, ‚ÄúThe Arab-Israeli conflict,‚Äù in P. Edward Haley and Lewis W. Snider, eds., Lebanon in Crisis (Syracuse Univ. Press, 1979). U.S. Department of State Bulletin (January 5, 1970), cited by Khouri, op. cit., p. 299. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, pp. 223f. Ibid., pp. 276-7; emphasis in original. For discussion of these matters, see my Peace in the Middle East? and TNCW. See, for example, Tom Hayden, The American Future (South End, Boston, 1980), for argument in support of his rejectionist position on the Arab-Israeli conflict (roughly, that of the Israeli Labor Party), in essentially the terms described. On his support for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which went well beyond the position of the Labor Party, see chapter 6, section 6.4. For references, see TNCW, pp. 249, 438. Foreign Affairs, Spring 1981. Thomas R. Stauffer, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 13 1982. For a detailed analysis of technical aspects of the problem, see Jehoshua Schwarz, ‚ÄúWater Resources in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip,‚Äù in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Judea, Samaria, and Gaza: Views on the Present and Future (American Enterprise Institute, Washington, 1982). Also Thomas R. Stauffer, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 20, 1982. For further references, see TNCW, p. 447. See also David Elstein and Sharon  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  13.  14. 15. 16. 17. 18.  19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.  26. 27.  28. 29.  162  Goulds, New Statesman, July 10, 1981 and Middle East International, July 31, 1981; Business Week, Dec. 20,1982, citing an Israeli estimate that by the year 2000 demand will outrun expected supply. Schwarz, op. cit. See Thomas R. Stauffer, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 20, 1982 and Middle East International, July 30, 1982, on what he calls ‚Äúthe lure of the Litani.‚Äù Economist, Sept. 11, 1982; Zvi Barel, Ha‚Äôaretz, Sept. 9, 1982. See ‚ÄúTalking Points,‚Äù New York Times, Sept. 9, 1982. Shaya Segal, Ma‚Äôariv, Dec. 7, 1982. Kapeliouk, Israel, p.23; Yitzhak Rabin, interview (‚Äú1983: New Opportunities for Peace‚Äù), Trialogue, Winter 1983. New York Times, Nov. 1, 1982. Lewis, who has been one of the most outspoken critics of recent Israeli policies in U.S. journalism, basically supports the Labor Party position, it appears. Boston Globe, June 1, 1978; Ma‚Äôariv, Oct. 11, 1981; Israeli Mirror, London. Amos Perlmutter, New York Times, May 17, 1982. Kapeliouk, Israel, pp. 220, 21. Ben-Gurion‚Äôs statement is ‚Äúknown to every child in Israel,‚Äù according to Kapeliouk. New York Times, Sept. 6, 1982. Sykes, Crossroads to Israel, p. 48. David Ben-Gurion, Memoirs (World, New York, 1970, p. 118). Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians, p. 134, citing a speech of October 12, 1936. For the actual record of Palestinian nationalism, see the outstanding two-volume study by Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, The Palestinian Arab National Movement (Frank Cass, London, 1974, 1977). Kapeliouk, Israel, p. 32. London Sunday Times, June 15, 1969. For a longer excerpt, see John K. Cooley, Green March, Black September (Frank Cass, London, 1973, pp. 196-7). See Porath, op. cit., for a serious discussion of the facts concerning Palestinian nationalism. Kapeliouk, Israel, p. 32. Cooley, Green March, Black September, p. 197.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation 30. 31.  32.  33. 34. 35.  36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.  44. 45. 46.  163  Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians, p. 83. See TNCW, p. 231, citing an official government document. As noted, this state is to incorporate parts of the West Bank, according to Labor Party doctrine. The reference is to Israel‚Äôs demand, later abandoned, that the negotiations take place in Jerusalem, recognized by virtually no one (specifically, not by the U.S.) as Israel‚Äôs capital. Arnold Forster, letter, New York Times, Dec. 20. 1982. New York Review of Books, Nov. 18, 1982. The Socialist International has been unusual, outside of the U.S. and Israel, in often taking a rejectionist stand, denying Palestinian rights, leading to sharp condemnation by Israeli doves. See TNCW, pp. 270-1. Cited by Tillman. The United States in the Middle East, p. 143, from the New York Times, August 6, 1978. See TNCW, p. 442, citing the Israeli journal Emda, December 1974. K. Amnon (Amnon Kapeliouk), ‚ÄúThe 1976 elections in the territories‚Äù Al Hamishmar, April 16, 1982. See TNCW, p. 269. See The Dawn (Al Fajr), Jerusalem, Sept. 3, 1982. The results appear in Time, May 24, 1982. ‚ÄúIsraeli Soldiers Kill Arab Youth in the West Bank,‚Äù special to the New York Times, Dec. 19, 1982. On the investigation (more accurately, apparent lack of investigation) in the Shak‚Äôa case, see TNCW, p. 445, citing discussion and protest in the Israeli press. Trudy Rubin, Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 18, 1982; see also New York Times, same date. Robert I. Friedman, ‚ÄúWest Bank Bombings,‚Äù Nation, Dec. 25, 1982; Middle East International, Jan. 21, 1983. Nov. 12, 1982 (see the reference of note 52); Ha‚Äôaretz, Oct. 1, 1982; Action Alert, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), October 27, 1982. In January 1983, Ms. Shak‚Äôa was granted an exit visa, after intervention by the State Department; ADC Bi-Weekly Report, Jan. 31-Feb. 11.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation 47. 48. 49.  50.  51. 52.  53. 54.  55.  56.  164  Menachem Golan, letter, Jerusalem Post, Nov. 3, 1982. New Outlook, June/July 1982. Rubinstein covers the West Bank for the Labor Party journal Davar. Danny Rubinstein, Davar, Nov. 15, 1982. There is an up-beat account the preceding day by David Richardson in the English-language Jerusalem Post. Michael Precker, ‚ÄúA maverick view of the West Bank; Begin‚Äôs former administrator calls for a role for the Palestinians,‚Äù Boston Globe, Dec. 19, 1982. The quoted phrases appear in the front-page notification of Precker‚Äôs article-interview. Uri Avneri, Haolam Haze, Oct. 13, 1982. For a detailed record of Milson‚Äôs actual achievements, including these, see Only Do Not Say That You Did Not Know, a publication of the Israeli Committee for Solidarity with Bir Zeit (the West Bank university that was closed by Professor Milson 3 days after he took office and kept closed for two months, then repeatedly closed and harassed afterwards), Jerusalem, June 1982, described as ‚Äúthe Black Book of the civil administration‚Äôs actions in the West Bank and Gaza strip.‚Äù It was published on June 5, 1982, to mark ‚Äúthe fifteenth anniversary of the Israeli occupation‚Äù‚Äîand the opening of Israel‚Äôs ‚Äúwar of aggression against the Palestinian people in Lebanon.‚Äù A translation is being prepared for publication. Zvi Barel, Ha‚Äôaretz, 20, 27 August 1982. Testimony of Merle Thorpe, Jr., President of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, Dec. 16, 1981; see chapter 2, note 11. Thorpe testified along with the other members of the study group, two formerly in the State Department, one a former Secretary of Commerce and former President of the World Jewish Congress (Philip Klutznick). Vincent Sheean, Personal History (Doubleday, Doran & Co., New York, 1935; sections reprinted in Walid Khalidi, ed., From Haven to Conquest, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1971). Norman Kempster, Los Angeles Times, September 29, 1982; Charles Hoffman, Jerusalem Post, Jan. 30, 1983. The first editorial in the new Arabic newspaper put out by the Village Leagues states that they will ‚Äúwork for the national goals of ending occupation and acquiring the right  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  57. 58. 59. 60.  61. 62. 63. 64. 65.  66. 67. 68.  69.  165  to self-determination, through direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians‚Äù (Supplement on the Palestinians under Israeli Rule, Israel & Palestine, vol. V, no. 110, 1982, citing Ha‚Äôaretz and the Jerusalem Post, June 17, 1982). Abba Eban, ‚ÄúObstacles to Autonomy,‚Äù New Outlook (Tel Aviv), June/July 1982. New York Times, May 19, 1976, Dec. 21, 1980; see TNCW, pp. 281f., for fuller discussion. Pryce-Jones, ‚ÄúThe Palestinian pattern.‚Äù Al Hamishmar, August 20, 1982. Saif ad-din Zuabi, who has long been associated with the Labor Party, was Vice-President of the Knesset and a high official of the Ministry of Agriculture. Kapeliouk, Israel, p. 281, citing an interview with Eric Rouleau, Le Monde, February 19, 1970. Kimche, There Could Have Been Peace, pp. 288f. Amos Elon, Ha‚Äôaretz, Nov. 13, 1981; reprinted in Israleft News Service (Jerusalem), Nov. 17, 1981. See Kimche, There Could Have Been Peace, pp. 286f. See the comments by General Haim Bar-Lev, a cabinet member in the Meir and Rabin governments, in the Labor Party journal Ot, March 9, 1972, quoted in TNCW, p. 460. Edward Witten, ‚ÄúCold Silence,‚Äù Ha‚Äôaretz, Jan. 6, 1983. See Peace in the Middle East?, pp. 120-2. Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1976, pp. 1279, 1291; for further discussion of this curious document, see TNCW, chapter 6); James Akins, review of Years of Upheaval (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1982), in American-Arab Affairs, Summer 1982. For some further examples of Kissinger‚Äôs astonishing inanities, which much impressed many journalists and academics, see TNCW, p. 406; also chapter 6, section 2.3, below. See Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, chapter 6, on Soviet policies. He observes that ‚ÄúThe official Soviet position has been consistent since 1948 in support of Israel‚Äôs right to exist and consistent since 1967 in support of Israel‚Äôs right to a secure national existence, as  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  70. 71.  72.  73.  74.  75. 76. 77. 78. 79.  166  called for in Security Council Resolution 242, within its 1967 borders.‚Äù The USSR has even offered to provide security guarantees (p. 246). Charles William Maynes (editor of Foreign Policy), Boston Globe, June 15, 1982. For some examples, see Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, January 2, 1975 (U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, 1975, Part III, Section VII). Ha‚Äôaretz, June 25, 1973; Yediot Ahronot, Sept. 16, 1973. Cited by Kapeliouk, Israel, pp. 49-50, along with a range of similar evaluations by Israeli generals (among them, Sharon), intelligence specialists, orientalists, and others. Amos Perlmutter, Michael Handel and Uri Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes Over Baghdad (Vallentine, Mitchel & Co., London, 1982, p. 33-4). They argue that Sadat‚Äôs war aims were limited because of the threat of nuclear retaliation by Israel, and also allege that Israel‚Äôs threat to use nuclear weapons impelled the U.S. to provide a massive shipment of conventional weapons to Israel. For more on this topic, see TNCW, pp. 321, 458. As for the USSR, ‚ÄúEvidence that the Soviet Union did not support President Sadat‚Äôs decision to go to war is persuasive‚Äù (Barry M. Blechman and Douglas M. Hart, ‚ÄúThe Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons,‚Äù International Security, vol. 7, no. 1, 1982). Jerusalem Post, November 13, 1981. On the January 1976 Arab initiative, which has virtually disappeared from history in the U.S. (it is not even mentioned in the unusually careful review in Tillman, The United States and the Middle East, for example), see TNCW, pp. 267, 300, 461. For references and discussion, see TNCW, p. 268; also section 2.4.2, above. Jerusalem Post, Nov. 15, 1976; Davar, Nov. 21, 1976; Israleft News Service, Dec. 1, 1976. Bernard Gwertzman, New York Times, August 21, 1977. New York Times, March 21, 1977. Tillman, The United States and the Middle East, p. 213. Tillman gives  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  80. 81.  82. 83. 84.  85. 86. 87. 88.  167  an extensive (though incomplete) record of PLO moves towards accommodation, some of them fairly explicit. See also my articles in New Politics (Winter, 1975-6; Winter 1978-9), reviewing many of these developments. See also TNCW, chapters 9, 13. David Hirst, Manchester Guardian weekly, August 7, 1977. Elie Eliachar, quoted by Merle Thorpe, in the congressional testimony cited in note 54; Mattityahu Peled, interview, Hotam, Jan. 28, 1983; the Basle program did not actually refer to a ‚ÄúJewish state‚Äù but rather to the vaguer concept of a national ‚Äúhome‚Äù. The history of the exploitation of the Covenant would make an interesting research project, which might contain some surprises. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, pp. 217, 271-2, 238. Letter, New York Times, Jan. 12, 1982. See TNCW, p. 321; also John K. Cooley, ‚ÄúThe Palestinians,‚Äù in Haley and Snider, eds., Lebanon in Crisis, pp. 28-9, citing Sadat directly to this effect. See chapter 2, section 2.2.2. Cited by Amnon Kapeliouk, Le Monde diplomatique, August 1982, from Ma‚Äôariv, Dec. 5, 1975. Editorial, New Republic, Nov. 29, 1982. For example, Theodore Draper writes that ‚ÄúEven Mr. Sadat admittedly did not accept [Israel‚Äôs] existence until he decided to come to Jerusalem‚Äù in 1977, and even then his ‚Äúprogram called for peace on the most extreme Arab terms, except for those Arab extremists who would be satisfied with nothing but the total destruction of the state of Israel‚Äù (New York Times Book Review, May 17, 1981; for a longer quote, see TNCW, p. 460). Or Mitchell Cohen, Professor of Political Science at CUNY: ‚ÄúWe must also note the historical persistence of the Palestinian national movement‚Äôs insistence on no compromise and no partition, which helped lead it to destruction in 1948 and to Beirut in 1982‚Äù (New Republic, Oct. 25, 1982). Or Arthur P. Mendel, Professor of History at the University of Michigan: it is now likely ‚Äúthat Hussein will follow Sadat‚Äôs example and negotiate with Israel the compromise that most Israelis and Palestinians (in contrast to the P.L.O.) have long wanted‚Äù (letter, New  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  89.  90.  168  York Times, Oct. 10, 1982). Or Kenneth Jacobson, director of Middle Eastern Affairs for the Anti-Defamation League: ‚ÄúIn fact, the PLO is the major obstacle to Arab-Israeli peace, ideologically committed to Israel‚Äôs destruction, never moving an iota from that commitment‚Ķ‚Äù (Christian Science Monitor, July 13, 1982). Or Ivan Novick, who, with innumerable others, explains that ‚Äúthe core problem of the Arab-Israeli dispute is the failure of the Arab nations to come to terms with the existence of the permanence of the Jewish State‚Äù; see note 34). Or Yitzhak Rabin: ‚Äúthe facts speak for themselves‚Äù; ‚Äúthe main reason‚Äîthe heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict‚Äîwas, and still is, the fact that except for Egypt, there has been no readiness on the part of the Arab leaders to reconcile themselves with the existence of Israel as a viable, Jewish, independent state‚Äîregardless of its boundaries‚Äù; and as for Egypt, ‚Äúfor 28 years [i.e., until 1977], no one believed that Egypt would make peace with Israel‚Äù (Harvard International Review, Sept-Oct. 1982; recall his statement in Davar. Nov. 1976, referring to Sadat‚Äôs willingness to make peace in 1971, section 2.4.1 above, though in that case to an Israeli audience, who could be expected to know the facts). Or, to cite one of 1000 editorials: ‚Äúthe unexpected conquest of the land in 1967 and the Arabs‚Äô refusal to reclaim it with a peace treaty have left the Begin-Sharon bulldozers in charge of policy‚Äù (Max Frankel, editor, New York Times, Nov. 15, 1982). See also note 111. And so on, in an almost endless litany. New York Times, June 20, 1982, referring to the situation as of 1982. Note that as in the case of many of the references of the preceding note, this was written well after numerous other Arab initiatives, beyond the pre-1977 ones just reviewed. ‚Äú‚ĶSadat was the first Arab leader who, a year after coming to power, declared his willingness to make peace with Israel in his famous reply [February 1971] to [UN negotiator] Dr. Jarring‚Äôs memorandum‚Äù (editorial, Ha‚Äôaretz, October 8, 1981); four days after Sadat‚Äôs ‚Äúinitiative, later known by his own name, for solving the Middle East problem,‚Äù Gunnar Jarring presented his ‚Äúfamous report of 8 February 1971‚Ķto which Egypt gave a positive reply‚Äù (Ghali Shoukri, Egypt: Portrait of a  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  91. 92. 93.  94. 95.  96. 97.  98. 99.  169  President, Zed press, London, 1981, pp. 50-51). See also Mordechai Gur (Ma‚Äôariv, Oct. 11 1981; Israeli Mirror): ‚ÄúIn February 1971 [Sadat] said that he was prepared to make peace with Israel.‚Äù Also Rabin, p. 68. and many others. Kapeliouk, Israel, pp. 59-60. Eric Pace, ‚ÄúAnwar el-Sadat, the Daring Arab Pioneer of Peace With Israel,‚Äù New York Times, Oct. 7, 1981. Frederic L. Paxson, one of a group of American historians who offered their services to the state for this purpose during World War I; see TNCW, p. 70. Mark Helprin, ‚ÄúAmerican Jews and Israel: Seizing a New Opportunity,‚Äù New York Times Magazine, Nov. 7, 1982. See note 34. Hertzberg is responding to the President of the ZOA, who alleges that support for his (basically, Likud) position is far broader, excluding only ‚Äúa tiny, unrepresentative minority of the American Jewish community, a fringe element,‚Äù in Hertzberg‚Äôs paraphrase. See also Julius Berman‚Äôs response to Helprin, p. 72*. Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians, p. 116. As noted by Amnon Kapeliouk, Le Monde diplomatique, July 1982; see Shulamit Har-Even, Ha‚Äôaretz, June 30, 1982 (reprinted in Palestine/Israel Bulletin, Sept. 1982); also B. Michael, Ha‚Äôaretz, June 22, 1982, citing the official IDF spokesman. To cite an example almost at random, a single Israeli air raid on Beirut in July, before the really massive bombing began, killed 209 people, ‚Äúalmost all of them civilian‚Äù (Robert Fisk, London Times, July 13, 1982). Kapeliouk, Israel, p. 41. B. Michael, Ha‚Äôaretz, July 16, 1982, citing official police statistics in response to the claim by Defense Minister Sharon that the number of victims was 1392‚Äîa number that turned out to include 285 IDF soldiers, 392 Arabs from the occupied territories (some of them killed in preparing alleged terrorist attacks), 326 victims of terrorism of unspecified origin in various other countries, etc. Sharon repeated the same figure in a safer format, a New York Times Op-Ed (Aug. 29, 1982), writing that ‚Äúsince 1965, 1,392 civilians have died and 6,400 have  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  100. 101.  102. 103.  104. 105.  106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111.  170  been wounded as a result of P.L.O. terrorist raids against our people.‚Äù Recall Avneri‚Äôs description of Sharon as a ‚Äúcompulsive liar,‚Äù like his ‚Äúpocket edition,‚Äù Menachem Milson. The characterization is, in fact, not uncommon in the Israeli press, but in the Times Sharon is safe from refutation. TNCW, pp. 296-7. In this interchange, 6 Israelis and 450 Arabs, nearly all Lebanese civilians, were reported killed. Migvan (Labor Party), October/November 1982, quoting Aluf Hareven of the Van Leer Institute, in a debate on ‚ÄúZionism – 82‚Äù held at Tel Aviv University. See TNCW, pp. 458f., and discussion below. Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (Allen & Unwin, London, 1932, p. 248; first published in 1921). See TNCW, chapter 2, for further discussion in a broader context. See note 64, above. On Israel‚Äôs immediate rejection of the Fahd plan, see Norman Kempster, Los Angeles Times‚ÄîBoston Globe, Aug. 10, 1981, and the brief story in the New York Times on the same day. Daniel Bloch, Davar, Nov. 13, 1981. We return to a fuller discussion in chapter 7. Yoel Marcus, Yediot Ahronot, Nov. 6, 1981. See Palestine/Israel Bulletin, April 1982, citing Haolam Haze, February 3, and the Jerusalem Post, February 1, 1982. ‚ÄúHow Syria‚Äôs Peace Plan Was Swept under the Carpet,‚Äù Ha‚Äôaretz, Feb. 12, 1982; Israeli Mirror. Jerusalem Post, International Edition, Feb. 14-20, 1982; cited in Palestine/Israel Bulletin, April 1982. For example, Amos Oz, ‚ÄúHas Israel Altered its Visions?,‚Äù New York Times Magazine, July 11, 1982 (see chapter 2, note 64). Compare the picture portrayed by Mark Helprin in the same journal; see note 94. See also note 88. See also Amos Oz, ‚ÄúFrom Jerusalem to Cairo,‚Äù Encounter, April 1982, for an intriguing method of evading the historical record. Oz claims that ‚Äúthere is no symmetry‚Äù between Israel and the PLO, because ‚Äúthe PLO resembles the militant position in Israel,‚Äù namely, the position that  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  171  ‚Äúdisregard[s] the identity of the Palestinian problem‚Äù (note that this ‚Äúmilitant position,‚Äù contrary to what he asserts, is the mainstream position in Israel, adopted by both political groupings, and has been such since the days of Weizmann and Ben-Gurion). How does he conclude that the PLO resembles this position? By totally ignoring the record of their actual proposals, as reviewed briefly above, and restricting himself to their unwillingness to recognize the legitimacy of Zionism or to support partition ‚Äúas a fundamental and right solution,‚Äù rather than a compromise imposed by circumstances (a stand in which they mimic Ben-Gurion and others, contrary to Oz‚Äôs claims). He also grossly misrepresents Sadat, claiming that his ‚Äúvisit to Jerusalem‚Äù represented a conceptual revolution.‚Äù With this technique of presenting a completely false picture of the history of socialist Zionism including the stand of the Labor governments and the current position of the Labor Alignment, and ignoring the diplomatic efforts of the Arabs including the PLO in favor of irrelevant commentary about the PLO attitude towards the ‚Äúlegitimacy‚Äù of Zionism, Oz is able to maintain the pose of the tragic victim, so willing to make peace if only the Arabs were not committed to their militancy. This pose has been a great success among western intellectuals, though Israeli doves naturally find it extremely offensive; and pernicious, in that it makes a major contribution to reinforcing attitudes and policies in the west (primarily, the U.S.) that contribute directly to settlement and oppression in the occupied territories, aggression in Lebanon, and so on. 112. Jerusalem Post, March 6, 1981. Rabin, who was Prime Minister at the time, conceded the facts but said that the boats were captured before the proposed gesture, and that this was simply an excuse for the PLO to back out of the agreement. Shimon Peres, who was Defense Minister at the time, declined to comment. 113. See TNCW, p. 458, citing Livia Rokach‚Äôs very important study, Israel‚Äôs Sacred Terrorism (AAUG, Belmont, 1980), based largely on Sharett‚Äôs Personal Diary, (Yoman Ishi, Hebrew, Ma‚Äôariv, 1979). 114. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, pp. 215-8. Congressman Findley was the senior Republican member of the House Middle East Subcommittee. See New York Times, Nov. 27, 1978 for a brief report; Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  172  there is no further mention of the matter in the Times. Tillman cites Arafat‚Äôs statement to Findley with no qualifications, making no mention of the allegation that Findley transmitted it inaccurately or that the PLO retracted it. According to Tillman, ‚ÄúThwarted by the lack of American response to its signals of willingness to compromise and angered by the Camp David agreement and Egypt‚Äôs separate peace with Israel, the PLO reverted to bluster and threat and stepped up acts of terror‚Äù; p. 218. 115. Israel & Palestine (Paris), July-August 1982; Brezhnev‚Äôs statement is cited from his address to the 26th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1981. See also Shmuel Segev, Ma‚Äôariv, March 2, 1983, noting the re-endorsement of this position at the PLO National Council meeting in Algiers in February 1983. I noticed no reference to these facts (or much else reported here) in the U.S. press, apart from quotes from Arafat and Sartawi in an article from Tunis by Lally Weymouth, special to the Boston Globe, Dec. 21, 1982. There is an oblique and inaccurate reference to the facts in the New York Times at the end of a story on a different topic by Thomas Friedman, who writes that the Brezhnev plan ‚Äúindirectly recognized the right of Israel to live in peace,‚Äù and was endorsed by the PLO; there was nothing ‚Äúindirect‚Äù about it. It is doubtful that even this reference would have appeared in the Times had it not been for the context, a story worth emphasis as illustrating PLO intransigence; see note 116. 116. Israel & Palestine, July-August 1982. Sartawi‚Äôs relations with the PLO had been stormy. While he was regularly defended by Arafat against the ‚Äúradicals‚Äù and rejectionists, his conflicts with them were sufficiently harsh so that he occasionally resigned from the National Council, with varying interpretations as to what had in fact occurred. See TNCW, pp. 443-4 for a mid-1981 example. See also Thomas L. Friedman, ‚ÄúA P.L.O. Moderate Resigns In Protest,‚Äù New York Times, Feb. 21, 1983, reporting at length Sartawi‚Äôs resignation from the National Council once again after he was prevented from addressing the group (the resignation was not accepted; see Trudy Rubin, Christian Science Monitor, March 11, 1983; it is also worth noting that Labor Party leader Shimon Peres had succeeded in preventing him from speaking at the Socialist International Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Rejectionism and Accomodation  173  meeting, just prior to his assassination). Some PLO officials stated that Arafat did not object ‚Äúto the substance of his ideas but that the P.L.O. leader feared it would lead to a dispute that could upset the entire conference and scuttle his own quiet maneuvering to gain approval for more meetings with Israelis,‚Äù but Friedman questions this interpretation in the light of the statement by the official PLO representative that Sartawi ‚Äúdid not represent the views of the Palestinian leadership.‚Äù Peled is far more marginal in Israeli politics than Sartawi was within the PLO. Peled had been associated with the tiny Sheli party, a dovish Zionist party that has no current members in the Knesset, but broke relations with it after the Lebanon war when some of its leaders denounced his meetings with Arafat and gave their support to ‚Äúcrimes against humanity‚Äù in Lebanon (Peled, interview; see note 81). These facts are suppressed by those who point to Sartawi‚Äôs troubled relationship with the central PLO decision-making body as proof of PLO iniquity. 117. Ha‚Äôaretz, July 10, 1981, cited in a July 1982 publication (Who will stop them?, Hebrew), of the Committee Against the War in Lebanon, Jerusalem. 118. Migvan, Labor Party Monthly, August 1982. For further discussion of these matters, see TNCW, Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, and the regular reporting in such journals as the New Outlook, Israel & Palestine, and Palestine/Israel Bulletin. 119. Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians, pp. 70ff. Within the mainstream, he notes, Moshe Sharett (then Shertok) disagreed with this view, arguing that it was pointless to deny that the leadership is the ‚Äúlegal representative‚Äù of the Palestinians and to refuse to negotiate with them (pp. 149-50).  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
4. Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  I  t is widely believed that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 opened a new chapter in the U.S.-Israel ‚Äúspecial relationship.‚Äù That seems dubious; the U.S. remains committed to ensuring Israel‚Äôs military dominance in the region, so that further aggression resulting from the imbalance of force is not unlikely. No less crucially, the U.S. remains committed‚Äîrhetoric aside‚Äîto financing Israel‚Äôs settlement programs in the occupied territories. The latter commitment, however it may be disguised, is expressed with considerable clarity in the aid increases requested by the President and increased further by Congress after the Lebanon war. This U.S. commitment eliminates the possibility for a peaceful resolution of the Israel-Arab conflict and for any recognition of the elementary rights of the Palestinians. It is nevertheless true that the events of summer 1982 shook one pillar of the special relationship, the ideological element in the ‚Äúsupport for Israel‚Äù (again, I note here the misleading terminology; see chapter 1), though the other two major elements, the diplomatic and material support for a Greater Israel, remained unchanged‚Äîin fact, were strengthened‚Äîas 1982 drew to a close. Israel‚Äôs 1982 invasion can only be understood in the context of the Arab-Jewish conflicts in Palestine, then beyond, that developed from what the indigenous population saw as ‚Äúthe Zionist invasion‚Äù and what
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  175  the settlers regarded as ‚Äúthe return to their homeland.‚Äù These developing interactions were complex, and often tragic. It would take a lengthy and detailed study to do them justice. The preceding chapter was concerned with the attitudes and policies of a broad range of actors within a narrow historical period: following the 1967 war. This chapter will extend the time frame while narrowing the focus to developments within the former Palestine (cis-Jordan). The discussion is, needless to say, far from comprehensive; I will review some facts that seem to me to have a direct bearing on understanding the current situation.1  1. The Pre-State Period The Arabs of Palestine were overwhelmingly opposed to a Jewish state, or to large-scale Jewish immigration, which often led to their dispossession from their lands. ‚ÄúThey had not been consulted at any level in the preparation of European plans for the disposal of their homeland and felt in no way bound peaceably to accept their implementation.‚Äù2 This attitude is generally described as ‚Äúintransigence‚Äù or even ‚Äúanti-Semitism‚Äù in the American literature, which tends to accept as the natural point of departure the position expressed by Lord Arthur Balfour, author of the Balfour declaration of 1917 which committed Britain to ‚Äúfacilitate‚Äù the ‚Äúestablishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people‚Äù on the condition that ‚Äúnothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine…‚Äù Two years later, he wrote a memorandum discussing the contradictions in the various pledges given during the war, noting that a French-controlled administration was simply imposed on the Syrians.3 Expressing views held widely across the political spectrum, he continued: Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
176  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  The contradiction between the letter of the Covenant and the policy of the Allies is even more flagrant in the case of the independent nation of Palestine than in that of the independent nation of Syria. For in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country, though the American [King-Crane] Commission has been going through the form of asking what they are. The four great powers are committed to Zionism and Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long tradition, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land. The people of ‚Äúthe independent nation of Palestine‚Äù never accepted the legitimacy of this point of view, and resisted it in a variety of ways. They repeatedly resorted to terrorist violence against Jews. The most extreme case was in late August 1929, when 133 Jews were massacred. The ‚Äúmost ghastly incident‚Äù was in Hebron, where 60 Jews were killed, most of them from an old Jewish community, largely antiZionist; the Arab police ‚Äústood passively by while their fellow Moslems moved into the town and proceeded to deeds which would have been revolting among animals,‚Äù and a still greater slaughter was prevented only by the bravery of one member of the vastly undermanned British police.4 Many were saved by Muslim neighbors.* *  The massacre followed a demonstration organized at the Wailing Wall in  Jerusalem to counter ‚ÄúArab arrogance‚Äù‚Äî‚Äúa major provocation even in the eyes of Jewish public opinion‚Äù (Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians, p. 96). See Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  177  The opposition of the indigenous population to the Zionist project was never a secret. President Wilson‚Äôs King-Crane Commission reported in 1919 that ‚Äúthe Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine‚Äù and estimated that the latter‚Äî‚Äùnearly nine-tenths of the whole‚Äîare emphatically against the entire Zionist programme.‚Äù The Commission warned that to subject them to this program ‚Äúwould be a gross violation of the principle [of self-determination], and of the people‚Äôs rights, though it kept within the forms of law,‚Äù a conclusion disregarded by the great powers, including the U.S. The Commission, while expressing ‚Äúa deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause,‚Äù recommended limitation of Jewish immigration and abandonment of the goal of a Jewish state. The Recommendations had no influence on policy and are barely even mentioned in standard histories. Where mentioned, they are generally dismissed. Thus the ESCO Foundation study (see note 1), while recognizing that the opinions summarized in the Commission report ‚Äúundoubtedly reflected the prevalent political attitude in Syria and Palestine,‚Äù nevertheless disparages the report on various grounds; crucially, Sheean, in Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest, for a detailed eyewitness account. This provocation was organized by Betar, the youth movement of Vladimir Jabotinsky‚Äôs Revisionist organization, which is the precursor of Begin‚Äôs Herut, the central element in the Likud coalition. The very name, ‚ÄúBetar,‚Äù reflects the cynicism of this fascist-style movement, which, in Flapan‚Äôs words, described Hitler ‚Äúas the saviour of Germany, Mussolini as the political genius of the century, and often acted accordingly. The name is an acronym for ‚ÄúBrith Yosef Trumpeldor‚Äù (‚Äúthe Covenant of Joseph Trumpeldor‚Äù). Trumpeldor was killed defending the northern settlement of Tel Hai from Bedouin attackers; Jabotinsky ‚Äúopposed the Labour call for mobilisation to help the threatened settlements‚Äù (Flapan, p. 104). Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  178  because ‚Äúit gave due consideration to only one part of the issue,‚Äù namely Arab views, and did not give ‚Äúequal consideration to the Jewish problem.‚Äù Or to state the facts from a different point of view, the Commission‚Äôs report gave due consideration only to the views of inhabitants of the land (recall that much of the indigenous Jewish minority was anti-Zionist), without giving equal consideration to the plans of European Zionists.5 In 1936-9, the Palestinian Arabs attempted a nationalist revolt after the failure of a long strike, which was ignored and ineffectual. David Ben-Gurion, eminently a realist, recognized its nature. In internal discussion, he noted that ‚Äúin our political argument abroad, we minimize Arab opposition to us,‚Äù but he urged, ‚Äúlet us not ignore the truth among ourselves.‚Äù The truth was that ‚Äúpolitically we are the aggressors and they defend themselves‚Ķ The country is theirs, because they inhabit it, whereas we want to come here and settle down, and in their view we want to take away from them their country, while we are still outside.‚Äù The revolt ‚Äúis an active resistance by the Palestinians to what they regard as a usurpation of their homeland by the Jews… Behind the terrorism is a movement, which though primitive is not devoid of idealism and self-sacrifice.‚Äù6 The revolt was crushed by the British, with considerable brutality, after the 1938 Munich agreement permitted them to send sufficient military force.7 In later years, the indigenous Arab population rejected the idea, accepted as natural in the West, that they had a moral obligation to sacrifice their land to compensate for the crimes committed by Europeans against Jews. They perhaps wondered why a more appropriate response would not have been to remove the population of Bavaria and turn it into a Jewish state‚Äîor given the self-righteous moralizing they hear from the United States, why the project could not Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  179  have been carried out in Massachusetts or New York. Many profess to find their lack of concern for the problems of the Jews incomprehensible or profoundly immoral, asking why the Palestinian Arabs, unlike the Jewish immigrants, were unwilling to accept a ‚Äúterritorial compromise,‚Äù something less than what they hoped but a fair settlement, given conflicting demands. Perhaps the assessment is legitimate, but it is surely not hard to understand why the indigenous population should resist this conclusion. If someone were to take over your home, then offer you a few rooms in a ‚Äúfair compromise,‚Äù you might not be overwhelmed by his generosity, even if he were homeless, destitute, and persecuted. As for the wretched survivors of Hitler‚Äôs Holocaust themselves, it is likely that many‚Äîperhaps most‚Äîwould have chosen to come to the United States had this opportunity been offered,* but the Zionist move*  To my knowledge, there has been no serious study of this question. For  conflicting opinions, see Lieut.-General Morgan, British Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, 1943-44, and Chief of UNRRA (the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) Operations in Germany, 1945-46; and Yehuda Bauer, a well-known Israeli historian. Morgan believes that what ‚Äúwas represented as being the spontaneous surge of a tortured and persecuted people toward their long-lost homeland‚Äù was in fact the result of superb Zionist organization and ‚Äúiron discipline‚Äù in the camps, misrepresented by ‚Äúthe skill of the Zionist propaganda campaign.‚Äù ‚ÄúI fancy that, in reality, there were few among the travellers [Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe] who, of their own free will, would have gone elsewhere than to the U.S.A.‚Äù His allegations concerning Zionist exploitation of UNRRA for political goals with little concern for the interests of the refugees read remarkably like subsequent Zionist allegations concerning Arab exploitation of its successor organization, UNRWA, in connection with the Palestinian refugees in its charge. Bauer, in contrast, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  180  ment, including American Zionists, preferred that they settle in a Jewish state8, a story being relived today with Jewish emigrants from the USSR.9 After the war, tens of thousands of Jewish displaced persons died in camps from miserable conditions and lack of care, and congressional Displaced Persons (DP) legislation gave priority not to Jews but to refugees from the Russian-occupied Baltic states, many of them Nazi sympathizers, including even SS troopers. There was little American Zionist support for legislation intended to bring DPs to the U.S. in contrast to massive support for resolutions calling for the establishment of a Jewish state. Dinnerstein comments: ‚ÄúUnspoken publicly, but in the air privately, was the Zionist concern that fewer European Jews would resettle in Israel if the possibility existed of getting to the United States.‚Äù Jewish support for the legislation, which was extensive, was from non-Zionist or anti-Zionist groups, 10 overwhelmingly. Some found this objectionable. Roosevelt‚Äôs adviser Morris Ernst wrote concludes that the vast majority of the refugees preferred to go to Palestine, citing an UNRRA questionnaire indicating that 96.8% preferred to go to Palestine with only 393 of 19,311 wanting to go to the U.S. (pp. 202-3; his source is a Hebrew investigative commission report, published in Tel Aviv in 1946). He also concludes that by late 1947 about half would have preferred to go to the U.S., though after the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948 ‚Äúmost Jews chose it‚Äù (pp. 317-8)‚Äîno alternative was in fact available. The Report to President Truman by his envoy Earl G. Harrison on the conditions and needs of displaced persons concluded that Palestine was the first choice of the Jewish DPs, noting however that many want to go there ‚Äúbecause they realize that their opportunity to be admitted into the United States or into other countries in the Western hemisphere is limited, if not impossible.‚Äù Archival sources in Israel might well provide the answer to this question. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  181  in 1948 of his shock at the refusal of American Jewish leaders to consider the possibility of giving ‚Äúthese beaten people of Europe a choice,‚Äù instead of offering them only the option of emigration to Palestine; the program he advanced ‚Äúwould free us from the hypocrisy of closing our own doors while making sanctimonious demands on the Arabs,‚Äù he wrote, adding that he ‚Äúwas amazed and even felt insulted when active Jewish leaders decried, sneered and then attacked me as if I were a traitor‚Äù for suggesting that the survivors of the Holocaust be permitted the choice of emigrating to the United States.11 The question remains a sensitive one, not surprisingly. In 1980 a private commission of prominent American Jews was established, headed by former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, ‚Äúto examine the behavior of Jewish organizations in this country at the time of the Nazi campaign to annihilate European Jews.‚Äù 15 months later the commission had ‚Äúsplit up in anger and dissension,‚Äù with charges and countercharges as to what had gone wrong. The commission‚Äôs main financial backer alleged that ‚ÄúIt became apparent that the vestiges of the old establishment were fighting to protect its name.‚Äù Goldberg, as well as research director Seymour Finger, denied this charge, claiming that ‚Äúthe promised money wasn‚Äôt forthcoming.‚Äù ‚ÄúCommission sources said that [established Jewish groups] had objected to the panel‚Äôs examining such painful questions as whether thousands, or tens of thousands, of Jews could have been saved if American-Jewish organizations had acted forcefully and applied pressures on the Roosevelt Administration.‚Äù A draft report stated that it was ‚Äúincontrovertible‚Äù that ‚Äúthe Jewish leadership in America at no stage decided to proclaim total mobilization for rescue.‚Äù Established Zionist organizations, the draft report continued, were ‚Äúriveted to postwar plans‚Äù and the creation of a Jewish state, so that the ‚Äúenergies of those American Jews who were profoundly concerned were dissipated, when the ground was burning under their Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
182  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  feet.‚Äù One of the leading members of the American Jewish community, Rabbi Stephen Wise, who was also close to Roosevelt, opposed a congressional effort in 1943 to set up a commission ‚Äúto effectuate the rescue of the Jewish people of Europe‚Äù because the resolution failed to include a provision demanding that the British open up Palestine to Jews. The draft states: What is certain is that the exclusive concentration on Palestine as a solution, coupled with its intrinsic pessimism as to other alternatives, distracted the Zionist movement as well as large segments of American Jews from giving serious attention to various rescue plans offered by the advocates of separating rescue from political or ideological 12 considerations. These conclusions accord reasonably well with the scholarly literature; see note 10. Note that the mandate of the Goldberg Commission did not extend to the question raised above: the attitude of established Jewish organizations, particularly the Zionist organizations, to Jewish immigration after Europe was liberated, a question touched upon only obliquely in the scholarly literature. Whether there would have been a way to reconcile competing claims and needs in the former Palestine is not clear. By the time of the Second World War and the Nazi Holocaust, the question had become academic, at least for the large majority of the Zionist movement. In the spring of 1942, the American Zionist movement endorsed the idea of a Jewish state (the ‚ÄúBiltmore program‚Äù) and in November, ‚Äúthe creation of a Jewish state became the official goal of the Zionist movement‚Äù under Ben-Gurion‚Äôs initiative.13 Prior to this, the official position had been a commitment to some form of ‚Äúparity‚Äù between Jewish and Arab Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  183  populations.* This commitment to Jewish statehood preceded the discovery of firm information that the Nazi state was undertaking its Final Solution,14 though its vicious anti-Semitism had long been apparent.  2. The War of Independence/Conquest In November 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations recommended the partition of mandatory Palestine (cis-Jordan) into a Jewish and an Arab state. The recommendation was accepted by the bulk of the Zionist movement‚Äîthough not by Begin‚Äôs terrorist army (the Irgun Tsvai Leumi) and LEHI (the Stern Group), the terrorist force commanded by the current Foreign Minister, Yitzhak Shamir ‚Ć‚Äîand rejected  *  Simha Flapan argues that these commitments were tactical maneuvers. See  also TNCW, pp. 258-9, citing, in particular, Nahum Goldmann‚Äôs rather cynical interpretation of the outspoken rejection of the concept of a Jewish state by BenGurion and others. ‚Ć  It has been known for some time that this group, an offshoot of the Irgun,  offered to cooperate with the Nazis against the British. The topic has recently been brought to public attention in Israel, where columnist B. Michael published a LEHI proposal of January 1941 to the Nazis (Ha‚Äôaretz, Jan. 31, 1983; also Feb. 6). The proposal expressed its sympathy for the ‚ÄúGerman conception‚Äù of a ‚ÄúNew Order in Europe‚Äù and offered to cooperate in the formation of a Jewish state ‚Äúon a national and totalitarian basis, which will establish relations with the German Reich‚Äù and protect Nazi interests in the Middle East. An English version appears in Lenni Brenner, Zionism in the Age of the Dictators (Lawrence Hill, Westport Conn., 1983), translated from the original in the Nazi archives, from David Yisraeli, The Palestine Problem in German Politics (Bar Ilan University, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  184  with near unanimity by the Arabs of Palestine.15 General Assembly resolutions are considered to be non-binding; Israel, for example, holds the world record for rejection of subsequent ones. The U.S. remained ambivalent, for a time preferring a trusteeship until Truman recognized the Jewish state established in May 1948. Civil strife broke out immediately after the partition recommendation, with terror and violence on both sides. As usual, it is the record of Arab violence that remains in popular consciousness, but that is far from the whole story. For example, on December 18 the Palmach‚Äîthe kibbutzbased strike force of the Haganah (the Defense Force of the Jewish settlement in Palestine, the precursor of the IDF)‚Äîcarried out a ‚Äúretaliation‚Äù operation against the village of Khissas, killing 10 Arabs, including one woman and four children. Israeli military historian Uri Milshtein writes that this operation, commanded by Moshe Dayan, was contrary to the Haganah policy ‚Äúnot to ‚Äòheat up‚Äô relatively quiet areas,‚Äù but was justified by Dayan on the grounds that it had a ‚Äúdesirable effect.‚Äù Sykes suggests that this operation, three weeks before the first Arab irregulars entered the country, may have ‚Äúprecipitated the next phase of the war.‚Äù16 The better-organized Jewish community had the advantage in the military conflict. By May, its armies had taken over parts of the territory assigned to the Palestinian state. The Irgun-LEHI Deir Yassin massacre in April had already taken place, one major factor in causing the flight of much of the Arab population. This fact was reported with much enthusiasm in official statements of Irgun and LEHI, specifically, by the terrorist commander Menachem Begin, who took pride in the operation in which some 250 defenseless people were slaughtered, including more than 100 women and children, with 4 killed among the attacking forces. Ramat Gan, Israel, 1974). Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  185  Recently discovered personal testimonies of the leaders of the operation reveal that the majority favored eliminating whoever stood in their way, including women and children, and proceeded to do so, murdering captured and wounded. Begin praised his killers for their humanity, for ‚Äúacting in a way that no other fighting force had ever done,‚Äù a refrain that has been echoed after every war, including the 1982 war, and that is loyally repeated by supporters who are much in awe of Israeli ‚Äúpurity of arms,‚Äù a new phenomenon in the history of warfare. The Irgun command sent an internal message of congratulations on the ‚Äúwonderful operation of conquest,‚Äù saying: ‚ÄúAs in Deir Yassin, so everywhere… Oh Lord, Oh Lord, you have chosen us for conquest.‚Äù The Haganah command condemned the operation, including the looting and plunder that appear to have been the objective according to the recently discovered documents, noting that the village was one of those that had avoided any cooperation with the Arab forces. The massacre was also condemned officially by the Palestinian Yishuv (the pre-state Jewish settlement). An official government military history accords the incident 3 lines, giving the date, reporting that combat was ‚Äúlight,‚Äù and finishing with the statement that ‚Äúin the course of the conquest of the village about 200 of its inhabitants were killed, including women and children.‚Äù An additional paragraph then explains how Arab propaganda over what it called ‚Äúthe Deir Yassin massacre‚Äù backfired; ‚Äúthere is no doubt‚Äù that the affair contributed effectively to the collapse of the Arab forces because of the fear induced concerning ‚Äúthe cruelty of the Jews.‚Äù 17 By May, about 300,000 Arabs had fled, about 1/3 of them from territories assigned to the Palestinian State.18 The armies of the Arab states entered the war immediately after the State of Israel was founded in May. Fighting continued, almost all of it within the territory assigned to the Palestinian state, leading to an eventual further partition, with about half of the proposed Palestinian state Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  186  incorporated within Israel and the remainder taken over by Jordan (then Transjordan) and Egypt. This arrangement persisted until 1967, when the remainder too was conquered by Israel (along with the Syrian Golan Heights and the Sinai). About 700,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled in the 1948 conflict. It is common to refer to these events in a manner such as this: ‚ÄúEvents during 1947-1948 led to a situation whereby Jordan became the Arab successor state in Palestine.‚Äù19 This is inaccurate. The events led to a situation whereby Jordan and Israel became ‚Äúthe successor states.‚Äù The Gaza region was divided between Israel and Egypt, and the remainder of the territory assigned to the Palestinian state was divided between Israel and Jordan. Israel and Jordan, but not Egypt, annexed the territories they occupied. About half the Palestinian state became part of Israel. For many years, it was claimed that the Palestinians fled in 1948 on the orders of Arab leaders. The basis for this claim was undermined by Erskine Childers in 1961, though one hears it still. In fact, it seems that the Arab leadership tried to prevent the flight, which was encouraged by Israeli terror and psychological warfare, sometimes direct expulsion.20 Additional thousands of Arabs‚Äîcitizens of Israel, in this case‚Äîwere expelled from Israel‚Äôs Galilee region during the attack on Egypt in 1956,* and hundreds of thousands more fled or were expelled from the conquered territories during and after the 1967 war21. In a detailed *  This fact, previously unknown, was revealed by former Prime Minister Yitzhak  Rabin of the Labor Party, who at the time was commander of Israel‚Äôs northern region, where the expulsions took place. He estimates that 3-5000 Arabs‚Äî Israeli citizens‚Äîwere expelled by the Army to Syria at that time. These Arabs had been expelled from their native villages in 1951 in the course of water diversion projects. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  187  investigation of the refugee flight, W. W. Harris estimates that of a prewar population of about 1.4 million, approximately 430,000 left their homes from June to December 1967 (most of them in June), with considerable variation among regions (over 90% of the 100,000 people in the Golan Heights fled, but less than 20% of the 400,000 residents of the Gaza Strip, with other local variations). High population losses in some areas resulted from ‚Äúa legacy of assorted fears,‚Äù for example, in the vicinity of Qibya, where Israeli forces commanded by Ariel Sharon had conducted a major massacre in 1953 (see chapter 6, section 6.3). Israeli hawks on occasion threaten a new expulsion if the Arabs do not mind their manners, as when Defense Minister Sharon warns that ‚Äúthe Palestinians should not forget 1948.‚Äù ‚ÄúThe hint is clear,‚Äù Amnon Kapeliouk comments, citing Sharon‚Äôs statement.22 In the U.S., it is commonly argued that the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan was illegitimate. The argument has merit, but then it is difficult to see why it does not apply with equal force to Israel‚Äôs annexation of half of the designated Palestinian state‚Äîthough this question is, in fact, academic, and has been since 1949. The argument also overlooks the fact that Israel and Jordan were acting in accord with a secret agreement to partition Palestine in 1947-8, both of them regarding the Palestinian leadership as a primary enemy. Yoram Peri observes that Ben-Gurion‚Äôs ‚Äútacit understanding with King Abdullah of Transjordan, which allowed the latter to move into the territories west of the River Jordan, which had been allotted by the 1947 UN Partition Plan to the Arab Palestinian state,‚Ķwas not revealed either to the Cabinet nor to the military command,‚Äù leading to internal conflict when the Southern Commander, Yigal Allon, was prevented from launching an expedition into the West Bank by Ben-Gurion in October 1948. It has been argued further that the entry of the Arab states into the war was in part motivated by opposition to the ambitions of King Abdullah and Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
188  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  that‚Äù‚ĶEgyptian intentions were not to invade Palestine, but to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict.‚Äù23 Similar beliefs led Nahum Goldmann to recommend against the May decision to establish the State of Israel at the time, on the assumption that a peaceful diplomatic settlement might be possible. King Abdullah was assassinated by a 19-year old Palestinian in July 1951. This fact is commonly cited as proof that the Palestinians (or Arabs more generally) will not tolerate a ‚Äúmoderate‚Äù leadership that will accept the existence of Israel. A closer look at the backgrounds‚Äîin particular, the Israeli-Jordanian plan to destroy the planned Palestinian state‚Äîsuggests a somewhat different interpretation. As for Nahum Goldmann, he became President of the World Zionist Organization from 1956 to 1968 but remained critical of Israel‚Äôs diplomacy, including its entry into the Cold War system on the side of the U.S. and its post-1967 rejectionism. He was also critical of the tactic of converting the Holocaust into a device to justify atrocities and murder. At the beginning of the Jewish New Year, in October 1981, he wrote: We will have to understand that Jewish suffering during the Holocaust no longer will serve as a protection, and we certainly must refrain from using the argument of the Holocaust to justify whatever we may do. To use the Holocaust as an excuse for the bombing of Lebanon, for instance, as Menachem Begin does, is a kind of ‚ÄúHillul Hashem‚Äù [sacrilege], a banalization of the sacred tragedy of the Shoah [Holocaust], which must not be misused to justify politically doubtful and morally indefensible policies. 24 Goldmann was also one of those who felt that American ‚Äúsupporters of Israel‚Äù were causing it considerable harm. At the January 1981 meeting Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
189  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  of the World Jewish Congress in Israel, he spoke of the need ‚Äúto effect a change in our policy towards the Arabs.‚Äù ‚ÄúWhat Israel is doing in this regard is very bad,‚Äù he added, ‚Äúand equally bad is the effect of the screams uttered by American Jewry.‚Äù25 He was also a sharp critic of the Lebanon invasion. Goldmann died in August 1982, after a lifetime of service to the Zionist cause. Prime Minister Begin did not attend his funeral and ‚Äúno official statement of grief was issued by the government,‚Äù the American Jewish press observed, noting that this indicated the ‚Äúshabby way‚Äù in which the Israeli government treats ‚Äúits opponents.‚Äù A headline in the Jerusalem Post read: ‚ÄúGoldmann‚Äôs Death is Ignored.‚Äù PLO chairman Yasser Arafat sent condolences, stating: The Palestinians mourn the death of Nahum Goldmann. He was a Jewish statesman of a unique personality. He fought for justice and legitimate rights for all peoples.26  3. The Israel-Arab Wars In the U.S., it is intoned with ritual uniformity that Israel‚Äôs wars, prior to the 1982 Lebanon invasion, were strictly defensive. Even serious political analysts make such statements, for example, Hans Morgenthau, who wrote that ‚ÄúFour times the Arabs tried to eliminate Israel by war‚Äù; it is, furthermore, ‚Äúan undisputed historical fact‚Äù that the wars had to do with ‚Äúthe existence of a Jewish state in the midst of the Arab world.‚Äù27 In press reporting, this is also taken regularly as an undisputed historical fact. As one of innumerable examples, consider David Shipler‚Äôs explanation of why the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 caused ‚Äúa crisis of conscience‚Äù in Israel:  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
190  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  … this has been a different kind of war for Israel. Never before did Israel go to war when its actual existence was not threatened. Never before was it clearly responsible for initiating the fighting without being provoked by some Arab military move with devastating potential.28 Similarly, Robert Moskin describes Chaim Herzog‚Äôs history of the ArabIsraeli wars as ‚Äúa volume that anyone who wants to understand what Israel has endured will have to read or refer to,‚Äù29 implying that the wars have all been ‚Äúendured‚Äù by Israel, a passive victim of Arab aggressiveness.* The assumption that prior to the 1982 Lebanese invasion, Israel‚Äôs posture was strictly defensive is shared not only by a wide range of political analysts and journalists, but also by people regarded as critics of Israeli adventurism. Jacobo Timerman, for example, published a critique of the Lebanon invasion that is regarded as quite harsh, and in part is. He begins by asserting that Israel‚Äôs ‚Äúprevious wars were in *  Moskin also refers to the role of ‚ÄúSoviet armaments, advisers and agitation‚Äù and  other Russian conniving as a factor in inciting the militant Arabs, noting that the USSR has supplied weapons (specifically, anti-aircraft missiles) to the Arabs (in contrast, U.S. supply of jet bombers to Israel, used for bombing raids deep within Egypt, merely demonstrates our commitment to peace) and that ‚ÄúIn 1970 Soviet pilots were flying combat missions for Egypt‚Äù (namely, defensive missions when Israel was carrying out deep penetration bombing raids against civilian targets in Egypt, a fact that he fails to mention). Moskin criticizes Herzog‚Äôs book because he ‚Äúremains neutral about the morality or necessity of the [1982] attack beyond the Litani River,‚Äù tacitly implying that one could raise no question about the invasion of southern Lebanon south of the Litani, an assumption adopted quite generally by the American press, which grants Israel the same right of aggression accorded to the United States itself. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  191  defense against aggression‚Ķ The fact that the invasion of Lebanon was the first war launched by the state of Israel could not go unnoticed.‚Äù30 Such statements, which are common, are untrue‚Äîindeed, astonishing‚Äîcertainly with regard to the 1956 Israeli-French-British attack on Egypt and the 1978 invasion of Lebanon (not generally counted as one of the Arab-Israeli wars, perhaps because the aggression was too obvious, or perhaps because only some 2000 Palestinians and Lebanese were killed and 250,000 made refugees, with many towns left in ruins).31 The 1973 war was a clear case of an Arab attack, but on territory occupied by Israel, after diplomatic efforts at settlement had been rebuffed (see chapter 3). Hence it is hardly ‚Äúan undisputed historical fact‚Äù that in this case the war had to do with ‚Äúthe existence of a Jewish state.‚Äù On Sadat‚Äôs war aims, see chapter 3, note 73 and text. On the 1948 war, see above. The 1967 war also involves complexities often ignored by supporters of Israel here. It is, in fact, intriguing to see how the facts are presented. An interesting example is Michael Walzer‚Äôs investigation of ‚Äújust wars.‚Äù Surveying a record of 2500 years, he finds only one example of ‚Äúlegitimate anticipation,‚Äù that is, legitimate resort to a preemptive military strike in violation of the standard doctrine on this matter as embodied in the United Nations Charter (see note 31): namely, Israel‚Äôs attack in June 1967. This is, furthermore, a ‚Äúclear case‚Äù of resistance to aggression. ‚ÄúIt is worth setting down some of the cases about which we have, I think, no doubts: the German attack on Belgium in 1914, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, the Japanese attack on China, the German and Italian interventions in Spain, the Russian invasion of Finland, the Nazi conquests of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Belgium, and Holland, the Russian invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Egyptian challenge to Israel in 1967.‚Äù32 Walzer offers no argument or evidence to show that the ‚ÄúEgyptian Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
192  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  challenge‚Äù to Israel stands on a par with the ‚Äúclear cases‚Äù of aggression cited. He simply states that Israel had a ‚Äújust fear‚Äù of destruction‚Äî which, even if true, would hardly substantiate his claim. Israeli generals take a rather different view. The former Commander of the Air Force, General Ezer Weizmann, regarded as a hawk, stated that there was ‚Äúno threat of destruction‚Äù but that the attack on Egypt, Jordan and Syria was nevertheless justified so that Israel could ‚Äúexist according to the scale, spirit and quality she now embodies.‚Äù33 Citing corroboratory statements by Chief of Staff Chaim Bar-Lev and General Mattityahu Peled, Amnon Kapeliouk wrote that ‚Äúno serious argument has been advanced to refute the thesis of the three generals.‚Äù See chapter 2, section 3. American intelligence held a similar view.34 Furthermore, the interactions leading up to the war included provocative and destructive Israeli actions and threats, which Walzer ignores,35 alongside of Egyptian and other Arab actions such as the closing of the Straits of Tiran, which Egypt claimed to be an internal waterway. Among others who, unlike Walzer, have doubts about the Egyptian ‚Äúchallenge‚Äù as a ‚Äúclear case‚Äù of aggression is Menachem Begin, who had the following remarks to make: In June 1967, we again had a choice. The Egyptian Army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him. Begin of course regards the Israeli attack as justified; ‚ÄúThis was a war of self-defense in the noblest sense of the term.‚Äù36 But then, it may be recalled that the term ‚Äúself-defense‚Äù has acquired a technical sense in modern political discourse, referring to any military action carried out by a state that one directs, serves or ‚Äúsupports.‚Äù What is, perhaps, of some Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  193  interest is that an American democratic socialist dove goes well beyond Menachem Begin in portraying Israel‚Äôs actions as defense against aggression. However one evaluates these complex circumstances, it is plainly impossible to regard the ‚ÄúEgyptian challenge‚Äù as a ‚Äúclear case‚Äù of aggression, on a par with the Nazi conquests, etc. Rather, this is a ‚Äúclear case‚Äù of the style of apologetics adopted by many supporters of Israel.37 Immediately after the armistice agreements of 1949, Israel began encroachments into the demilitarized zones along with military attacks with many civilian casualties and the expulsion of thousands of Arabs, some of whom later formed terrorist bands that carried out what they presumably regarded as reprisals and what Israel and its supporters regard as unprovoked terrorism; the terms ‚Äúterrorism‚Äù and ‚Äúreprisal,‚Äù as noted earlier, are to a considerable extent terms of propaganda, not description. These actions set the stage for further conflicts with Egypt and Syria. Israeli raids in the Gaza Strip led to fedayeen attacks that served as the pretext for the 1956 invasion, though as is known from captured Egyptian documents and other sources, Egypt was attempting to calm the border region in fear of such an attack. 38 The aggressors concocted an elaborate and largely successful propaganda campaign in an effort to show that it was Nasser who was planning an attack, not they, comparing him to Hitler while they effectively mimicked Goebbels. Many details are provided by Kennett Love, who was then the Middle East correspondent of the New York Times. He describes, for example, how the Times failed to publish his interview with Nasser in which Nasser offered to demilitarize the frontier: ‚Äúdistorted versions of Nasser‚Äôs effort to pacify the frontier were splashed across New York‚Äôs front pages under headlines representing him as a warmonger,‚Äù including a Times report stating that ‚ÄúMany neutrals say Premier Nasser‚Äôs statement [on demilitarizing the frontier] was bellicose and is certain to increase Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  194  tension.‚Äù Two days after the Times killed Nasser‚Äôs interview it ran a front-page headline, based on distorted news agency versions of the interview, which read: ‚ÄúGaza War Threat Voiced by Egypt.‚Äù39 The aggressors themselves at the same time were attributing fabricated bellicose statements to Nasser, taking earlier writings of his out of context and grossly changing their sense, etc. The distortions of Western propaganda, which in this case reflect a remarkable degree of moral cowardice quite apart from the falsification of the facts, remained effective even after the outright aggression by Israel, France and England. In particular, it is still widely held that Israel‚Äôs aggression was in fact defensive, at worst a ‚Äúpreemptive strike‚Äù in response to Nasser‚Äôs threats. The incident is an example‚Äîone of many‚Äîof how facts can be overwhelmed by a powerful propaganda system employing the ‚Äúfree press‚Äù as its instrument. The Israeli occupying army carried out bloody atrocities in the Gaza Strip, killing ‚Äúat least 275 Palestinians immediately after capturing the Strip during a brutal house-to-house search for weapons and fedayeen in Khan Yunis‚Äù and killing 111 Palestinians in ‚Äúanother massive bloodletting‚Äù at the Rafah refugee camp in ‚Äúdisorders‚Äù after ‚ÄúIsraeli troops stormed through the hovels, rounding up refugees for intelligence screenings.‚Äù General E. L. M. Burns, Commander of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), commented that this furnished ‚Äúvery sad proof of the fact that the spirit that inspired the notorious Deir Yassin massacre of 1948 is not dead among some of the Israeli armed forces.‚Äù The head of the Gaza observer force, Lt.-Col. R. F. Bayard of the U.S. Army, reported that treatment of civilians was ‚Äúunwarrantedly rough‚Äù and that ‚Äúa good number of persons have been shot down in cold blood for no apparent reason.‚Äù He also reported that many UN relief officials were missing and presumed executed by the Israelis and that there had been extensive looting and wanton destruction of property. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
195  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  Israel claimed that the killings were caused by ‚Äúrefugee resistance,‚Äù a claim denied by refugees (there were no Israeli casualties).* Love cites Moshe Dayan‚Äôs diaries confirming the looting, which caused ‚Äúmuch shame to ourselves,‚Äù and indicating that there had been practically no resistance.40 The aftermath of the 1982 Lebanon war was similar, though in this case the occupying army left it to its local clients to carry out the worst massacre. It is an unfortunate fact that occupying armies often behave in this fashion,41 but then, they usually do not bask in the admiration of American intellectuals for their unique and remarkable commitment to ‚Äúpurity of arms.‚Äù Encroachments in the demilitarized zones in the north for water diversion projects and agricultural development‚Ć led ultimately to the shelling of Israel from the Golan Heights by those described here as ‚ÄúSyrian-killers-for-the-fun-of-it‚Äù in a typical misrepresentation of the facts.42 Swedish UNTSO Commander General Carl von Horn wrote that ‚Äúit [was] unlikely that these [Syrian guns] would ever [have] come into action had it not been for Israeli provocation,‚Äù including armed *  For an eyewitness account from an Israeli source of atrocities committed by the  Israeli occupying army until ‚ÄúBen-Gurion himself gave orders to stop the looting, murder and robbery,‚Äù see Mark Gefen, Al Hamishmar, April 27, 1982‚Äîa timely (though ignored) report, considering what was to follow shortly. ‚Ć  Israeli encroachments and attacks in this area were in part motivated by a  desire to take control of the waters of the Jordan and prevent diversion within Arab territories. This led to conflict between Israel and both the UN and the U.S. The American-planned Johnston project designed to arrange for sharing of the Jordan waters was undermined by Israeli opposition, and ‚Äúthe Israeli raid on Syria in December 1955 annihilated the very wreckage of his work‚Äù (Love. Suez, p. 277). The occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights in 1967 settled this issue. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  196  encroachments into areas farmed by Palestinians.43 General (Res.) Mattityahu Peled points out that after the Israeli conquest of the Golan Heights in 1967, the Syrian artillery was barely moved. There was no subsequent shelling because the cease-fire arrangements were clarified. Prior to 1967, Israel followed a ‚Äúplanned strategy‚Äù designed to impose its interpretation of the 1949 Armistice Agreements, including settlement in the demilitarized zones which infringed on the rights of the local inhabitants, leading to shelling in reprisal. The conquest of the Heights did not change the military situation, but showed that negotiated settlement is possible, as had been true before too, he argues. If Israel were truly to accept UN Resolution 242, returning the Golan Heights to Syria, demilitarization of the Heights would cause no security problem, he argues further, as the facts he reviews suggest.44 It is also generally overlooked that Arabs too have reason to fear shelling from the Golan Heights. By 1970, there were already nearly 100 casualties in the Jordanian city of Irbid resulting from Israeli air attacks and shelling from the Golan Heights.45 Syrian shelling served as the pretext for the conquest of the Golan in 1967 in violation of the cease-fire, and for subsequent actions leading to its virtual annexation by the Begin government in December-January 198l-82.46  4. After the 1967 Conquest Apart from the Syrian border, the years following Israel‚Äôs retreat from the Sinai were relatively tranquil. The Egyptian border was quiet and the Jordanian border, nearly so. Within Israel, vast areas of Arab land were expropriated and converted to Jewish settlement, used in part to settle Jewish refugees who fled or were expelled from Arab countries in the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  197  aftermath of the 1947-49 war.47 Arab citizens were thus compelled to become a work force for Jewish enterprises (including kibbutzim), a phenomenon that became quite noticeable by the 1960s.  4.1 The Settlement Policies of the Labor Governments Immediately after the 1967 war, the Labor government began its moves to integrate the occupied territories within Israel. East Jerusalem was immediately annexed, and the city‚Äôs borders were considerably extended into the Arab West Bank (a program called ‚Äúthe thickening of Jerusalem‚Äù), with considerable Jewish settlement and expulsion of Arabs from some sections of the Old City. Paramilitary settlements were established, then permanent civilian settlements, in the occupied territories. A harsh military occupation was instituted and has since been maintained.48 Settlement in the occupied territories began immediately after the war, sometimes without government authorization, though this regularly came later. Five weeks after the war, a settlement was established on the Golan Heights, and shortly after, at Kfar Etzion in the West Bank. Amnon Kapeliouk observes that by December 1969, the Meir government had established as one of its ‚Äúessential goals‚Äù the ‚Äúacceleration of the installation of military settlements and permanent agricultural and urban settlements in the territory of the homeland‚Äù (the official wording). Secretary of Defense Moshe Dayan, who played a central role in these Labor government projects, stated that ‚Äúthe settlements established in the territories are there forever, and the future frontiers will include these settlements as part of Israel.‚Äù These future frontiers, then, were to stretch from the Golan Heights in the north to the southernmost part of the Sinai at Sharm el-Sheikh (Israeli ‚ÄúOphira‚Äù; Dayan‚Äôs statement that he ‚Äúpreferred Sharm el-Sheikh without peace to a peace without Sharm Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  198  el-Sheikh‚Äù later became famous, during the period when the Labor government was evading Arab peace initiatives), and from Gaza and northeastern Sinai to the Jordan river, all areas where settlements were established under the Labor government. Alongside of the inevitable ‚Äúsecurity argument,‚Äù it was commonly held that it would be wrong, perhaps even racist, to deny to Jews the right to settle in these areas (the West Bank, furthermore, was the heartland of ‚Äúthe historic land of Israel‚Äù). There was, however, no reciprocity. Arabs in the occupied territories could not settle in Israel; for example, those who had been expelled from Jaffa in April 1948. Arabs could not buy land in Israel, Dayan explained, ‚Äúbecause that would disturb the territorial continuity of the Jewish population‚Äù (it would be virtually impossible anyway because of the legal devices that effectively restrict land use to Jews, to which we return). But Jewish settlements in the densely-populated Gaza area, in contrast, were designed to ‚Äúbreak the territorial continuity‚Äù of Arab settlement to prevent ‚Äúeventual selfdetermination‚Äù for the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, Ha‚Äôaretz explained, and the same considerations soon applied in the West Bank as well. Similar arguments were advanced in the course of Labor‚Äôs program of ‚ÄúJudaization of the Galilee‚Äù within Israel proper, where it was felt to be necessary to establish Jewish settlements to break up the concentrations of Arab citizens. In the occupied territories, Israel was to establish ‚Äúpermanent rule,‚Äù Dayan held. Foreign Minister Abba Eban, a Labor dove, took note of the fact that according to international law, settlement was permissible only in the name of military security; but he and others recognized that it was not motivated by such considerations, while continuing to support it. Eban rejected ‚Äúthe conception that maintains that the basic criterion for settlement in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] must be the strict necessity of obtaining secure boundaries,‚Äù adding that for him the ‚Äúkey expresClassics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  199  sion‚Äù was ‚Äúthe territory of the homeland,‚Äù as indicated in the December 1969 government program. Dayan, with his customary frankness, stated that ‚Äúfrom the point of view of the security of the State, the establishment of the settlements has no great importance‚Äù; rather, it was necessary to create ‚Äúpolitical faits accomplis on the principle‚Ķthat no place of settlement or agricultural use will be abandoned.‚Äù In his extensive study of Israel‚Äôs post-1967 settlement program, W. W. Harris shows that the Allon Plan, which provided the basic framework for the policy, at first actually envisaged absorption of about 40% of the West Bank and annexation of the Gaza Strip, and by 1977 (ten years after it was first proposed in July 1967) it included some additional encroachments into the West Bank as well as extensive settlement in the Golan Heights (then well-advanced) and an Israeli takeover of a strip of the Sinai from the Mediterranean to Sharm el-Sheikh.49 Much material of the sort just cited is in Hebrew sources or relatively inaccessible studies and was little noted in the United States, even denied, though the facts of settlement were clear enough to those who chose to be aware of what was happening. There were, of course, certain problems: ‚Äúthe main difficulty encountered when planning the settlement of Judea and Samaria,‚Äù Elisha Efrat explains, is that it is inhabited by Arabs ‚Äúwho are not prepared to leave any place of their own free will‚Äù and who ‚Äúare not at the mercy of absentee ‚Äòeffendi‚Äô landowners who are willing to sell their land,‚Äù as was (conveniently) the case during the settlement of Israel itself.50 Efrat is a planner with the Israel Ministry of the Interior and a professor at Tel Aviv university, where, he informs us, he prepared a longer study of these problems ‚Äúin the framework of the Tel-Aviv University Research Project on Peace,‚Äù a name that Orwell would have appreciated. In September 1973, the Labor Party approved the ‚ÄúGalili Protocols,‚Äù which called for extensive additional rural and urban settlement and Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  200  commercial and industrial development in the territories, including the Golan, the West Bank, Gaza, and northeastern Sinai, where the city of Yamit was to be established (the native population had been brutally expelled, driven into the desert, their settlements levelled). Not even the Labor ‚Äúmoderates‚Äù (Allon, Eban) criticized the decision, though Arieh Eliav, the most noted dove, abstained from the vote and criticized the document, as did Shulamith Aloni. Minister of Justice M. Y. Sh. Shapira declared that ‚Äúthis document expresses the hope that with the passage of time we will be able to find a permanent solution for keeping the territories annexed, included, or united to the State of Israel.‚Äù A month later, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal in a surprise attack, initiating the 1973 war. Sadat had stated that ‚ÄúYamit means war, at least for Egypt.‚Äù51 The treatment of the inhabitants of northeastern Sinai merits attention, not only because of its character but also in the light of the reaction in the United States, to which we return, when the new Jewish settlers were compelled to leave this Egyptian territory, with handsome compensation, as part of the Camp David ‚Äúpeace process.‚Äù After initial expropriations in 1969, military forces commanded by General Ariel Sharon, in January 1972, ‚Äúdrove off some ten thousand farmers and bedouin, bulldozed or dynamited their houses, pulled down their tents, destroyed their crops and filled in their wells,‚Äù to prepare the ground for the establishment of six kibbutzim, nine villages, and the city of Yamit.* Subsequently Israeli bulldozers uprooted orchards (what is called in technical terms ‚Äúmaking the desert bloom‚Äù), CARE aid from the U.S. was withheld to force landowners to sell their lands, mosques and schools were destroyed, and the one school to escape demolition was *  Public criticism led to a military commission of inquiry that issued a reprimand  to Sharon; Yoram Peri, Between Ballots and Bullets, p. 97. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  201  turned over to a new kibbutz.52 The Minister of Housing, Labor Alignment dove Avraham Ofer, visited the area in the summer of 1975 and was disturbed to find that a few hundred Bedouin still remained along the coastline. He demanded that the Israeli army evacuate the area since it was to become a national park to ‚Äúserve the masses of vacationers and bathers who, it is expected, will flow to the golden coast of Yamit.‚Äù These Israeli vacationers would naturally be disturbed if there were Bedouin encampments nearby, disfiguring the terrain. In the journal of Mapam (the dovish, kibbutz-based left-wing of the Labor Alignment), Ezra Rivlis reported that Yamit is to be ‚Äúa Zionist, chalutzic, desert city,‚Äù much like Tel Aviv, built on the sands in the earliest days of the Jewish settlement‚Äîan apt analogy, since in that case too Arabs alleged that their lands had been taken by force. Rivlis describes how ‚Äúalong the barbed wire, on the other side, the Bedouin stare at us wideeyed, dispossessed, with no arrangements or solutions as yet to their problems.‚Äù He adds that ‚Äúin the background of their stubborn refusal to compromise, it is said, lies the hidden incitement of representatives of Sadat and Fatah.‚Äù53 What other reason could there be for this stubborn refusal? Dark references to a sinister ‚Äúhidden hand‚Äù when Arabs irrationally refuse some such ‚Äúcompromise are common in the Israeli press, including the left-wing press, as in this case. As has so often been the case, the Arabs refused the kind of ‚Äúcompromise offered to them by their benign adversaries, who even were so kind as to permit them to serve as an underpaid and exploited labor force in the lands from which they had been expelled. It was therefore necessary to resort to force, in the manner just indicated, after the failure of peaceful means, a regrettable necessity, particularly for a state that has always been committed to such sublime moral standards and humanistic principles, from which it is forced to depart by Arab intransigence, as American supporters are quick to inform us. In the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  202  American Jewish press, Samson Krupnick described the ‚Äúmost unique and exciting experience‚Äù of observing the birth of Yamit and the arrival of the first ‚ÄúAmericans, Canadians, Russian olim [immigrants] and some Israelis.‚Äù54 In the U.S., there was general silence on these matters, which scandalized many Israelis, apart from such expressions of admiration for this unique and exciting experience. In particular, these events elicited no comment from democratic socialists who were singing hymns of praise to Israel while denouncing anyone who dared raise questions about these policies as anti-Semites, bloody-minded radicals who support terrorism and hate democracy, etc. See chapter 2, note 60, and examples below.  4.2 Settlement under Begin and Reagan 4.2.1 Policies The post-1973 Kissinger diplomacy was designed to exclude Egypt from the Arab-Israel conflict, thus making it possible for the Labor government to pursue its settlement program along the lines of the Allon Plan (see chapter 3). Settlement was accelerated when Begin took power in 1977. There was a further substantial expansion in the settlement program after President Reagan announced that he regarded the West Bank settlements as ‚Äúlegal.‚Äù This reversal of U.S. government policy (at least at the rhetorical level) set in motion a huge ‚Äúland grab‚Äù operation on the West Bank under a deceitful guise of legality intended to satisfy liberal American opinion. It aroused much protest among Israeli doves, but little comment here at the time.55 One opponent of Israeli rejectionism, former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem Meron Benvenisti, observed shortly after that the settlement program ‚Äúnow completely ruled out a future solution‚Äù because of its Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  203  extent and design, and that the commitment of the Labor Alignment not to withdraw from an area constituting 40% of the West Bank (the original intent of the Allon Plan of July 1967, as noted earlier) also meant ‚Äúthat its alleged aspiration not to rule over Arabs was meaningless.‚Äù56 Benvenisti undertook extensive research on the postReagan land grab operation. He found that under various ruses, the government had taken over more than half of the West Bank (outside of annexed East Jerusalem), and was planning to settle 100,000 people there by 1986. The nature of the settlement plans had meanwhile changed. The newer concept is to focus on ‚Äúdevelopment of large urban centres which will organically link vital areas of the West Bank to the major Israeli urban centres.‚Äù These are to be ‚Äúdormitories for Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.‚Äù The intent is to create a ‚Äúdual society‚Äù: ‚ÄúThe Arab towns and villages are to become like ghettos‚Ķsurrounded by large Jewish dormitory suburbs, settlements, military camps‚Äîall served, linked and carved up by fast access highways.‚Äù The Jewish areas will have ‚ÄúJewish services and standards‚Ķlike elections and free speech,‚Äù while the Arab ghettos will remain under ‚Äúthe military government‚Äîor, if you prefer, the civil administration‚Äù of Menachem Milson (who has since resigned). In these ghettos, there is ‚Äúa low level of service, almost no governmental investment in infrastructure or development.‚Äù Their boundaries are ‚Äúsharply defined and no building will be permitted outside them‚Äù (there is virtually no room within them). These plans, he notes, are supported by the Labor Party under its current version of the Allon Plan, a fact which ‚Äúmakes nonsense of the [Labor] Alignment plan to keep only those areas where there is low density Arab population.‚Äù57  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  204  4.2.2 Reactions The immediate occasion for Benvenisti‚Äôs revelations was the recentlyannounced Reagan Peace Plan, which called for a settlement freeze while stating that ‚ÄúAmerica will not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of settlement.‚Äù The latter statement was a bit ironic, as the U.S. press was kind enough not to observe, in the light of Reagan‚Äôs role in setting off the land grab that led to the current situation. The statement is also false, since the Reagan administration moved at once to increase aid to Israel, and as noted earlier, the U.S. government has always been scrupulous in avoiding any supervision or other arrangements that might serve to restrict the use of the lavish American funding in conformity with the stated policy of denying support for settlement in the occupied territories. In fact, in his meetings with Begin, Reagan was careful to avoid the question of settlements, a fact brought out in a ‚Äúwell-documented‚Äù analysis by Senator John Glenn, whose plausible conviction is ‚Äúthat what heads of government say to each other through emissaries or in public pronouncements is far less important than what they say to each other in private, face to face.‚Äù ‚ÄúThe consent that the Israelis have obviously read into a consistent record of silence on the part of the President over at least a year and a half has carried the de facto annexation of the West Bank by Israel very close to, if not beyond, the point of no return.‚Äù58 The message sent by liberal Democrats was still clearer, as they spearheaded the effort to increase aid to Israel even beyond the increases advocated by the Reagan administration. To put the matter in slightly clearer terms than those employed in the media and other commentary, the U.S. once again expressed its support for further settlement in the occupied territories, on two levels: first, openly, by offering‚Äîin fact, increasing‚Äîthe aid that will enable these Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
205  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  programs to be pursued; and second, more subtly, by avoiding any reference to these matters in private discussion, so that it will be even clearer that the public rhetoric is for show, to be ignored in practice, as in the past. The message is surely understood, a fact recognized by both critics and supporters of Israel‚Äôs current policies. In the former category, Chaim Bermant writes that there are ‚Äútwo principal arguments for a withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza.‚Äù The ‚Äúmoral argument‚Äù holds that Israel will not remain a democratic state if it continues to ‚Äúretain the land of another people and maintain dominion over them.‚Äù The ‚Äúpractical argument‚Äù is that the U.S. ‚Äúwill not tolerate the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and if the occupation should continue, all American aid will be reduced and perhaps even stopped altogether.‚Äù Bermant states that ‚Äúmoral arguments have some force in Israel, perhaps more so than anywhere else, but they are not in themselves enough to effect a withdrawal from occupied territory‚Äù or even to check the policy of ‚Äúgalloping annexation.‚Äù As for the ‚Äúpractical argument,‚Äù it would have force ‚Äúif it were at all valid.‚Äù But it is not, since Begin (like his predecessors, we may add) has shown that whatever protests this or that American administration might make against the expansion of Jewish settlement or the infringement of human rights, in the West Bank, he has been able to strengthen his grip on the area without any diminution of American aid. Indeed, he is even anticipating an increase… Indeed the American Government has been financing the very policies it denounces with such consistency that one doesn‚Äôt have to be an Arab to wonder if the denunciations are sincere.59 True; one only has to be committed to elementary rationality and Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  206  honesty, an observation that has some interesting consequences when applied to commentary on this matter in the United States. On the other side of the Israeli political fence, Wolf Blitzer, under the heading ‚ÄúLessons from aid victory,‚Äù reports the successful outcome of the battle between the Administration, who wanted to ‚Äúpunish‚Äù Israel by increasing aid to it, and Congress, which preferred a ‚Äúsofter line,‚Äù increasing the aid still further. The final outcome, he notes, was that the full aid package sought by the Administration was accepted ($2.485 billion in economic and military assistance), but with ‚Äúimproved terms,‚Äù with $500 million converted from loans to outright grants. ‚ÄúThe entire aid affair clearly represented an important and badly-needed substantive and symbolic victory for Israel,‚Äù thanks to the crucial assistance of congressional liberals, as he notes.* These loyal supporters were helped by ‚Äúthe reaffirmed vision of Israel as a working democracy, especially following the West Beirut massacres.‚Äù60 Presumably there is also a lesson here as to how to obtain further victories in Congress. It would be interesting to know how the reported 400,000 people who demonstrated in Israel in protest over the massacres will react to the fact‚Äîand fact it is‚Äîthat the practical outcome of their efforts, given the way things are in the United States, was to accelerate the militarization of Israeli society and its expansion *  Particularly noteworthy, Blitzer observes, was the defeat of Congressmen who  ‚Äúhad been targeted by the Jewish community.‚Äù This lesson has no doubt been carefully noted by Senator John Glenn, a presidential aspirant, who has been similarly ‚Äútargeted‚Äù because of such indiscretions as the one cited on p. 189. See Curtis Wilkie, ‚ÄúGlenn campaign gets a buffeting,‚Äù Boston Globe, Feb. 20, 1983, discussing what New York Magazine called Glenn‚Äôs ‚Äúsignificant Jewish problem,‚Äù a nontrivial one considering traditional Jewish financial support for Democratic candidates, Wilkie notes. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  207  into the occupied territories. In passing, we might note some curious aspects of Bermant‚Äôs ‚Äúmoral argument.‚Äù The argument rests on consequences for the Jews, not for the conquered population, whose rights and wishes are null‚Äînot an untypical stance among liberal Zionists, or among Western intellectuals generally, as we have seen repeatedly. We might also ask what the basis is for the belief that moral arguments have more force in Israel than elsewhere, also a standard doctrine even among critics of Israeli policies. It would be difficult to justify this conclusion on the basis of the historical record. A more accurate picture is presented by Labor Party Knesset member (Gen.) Chaim Herzog, a military historian and former Israeli diplomat and the successful Labor Party candidate for President in March 1983. He writes that ‚ÄúWe must be guided in our [foreign policy] relationships by the one criterion that has guided governments of Israel ever since the establishment of the state, namely: ‚ÄòIs it good for the Jews?‚Äô‚Äù61 The context for Herzog‚Äôs observations was his rejection of the (mild and limited) domestic criticism of Israel‚Äôs support for murderous dictators in Latin America‚Äîspecifically, recent visits by Israeli high officials to such countries as Argentina, where, Haolam Haze reports, ‚Äúthe Israeli foreign minister last week extended a warm handshake to the Generals in Buenos Aires who had murdered about 1000 Jews in Argentina‚Äù (exactly as was done by other high Israeli political and military figures, including those of the Labor Party, while the Argentine massacre was at its height; Jacobo Timerman states that ‚ÄúI saw with my own eyes how Argentine jailers tortured Jews in prison while the Israeli government requested the Jewish community there to remain silent‚Äù).62 This Labor dove is also annoyed by the occasional displeasure voiced over the crucial aid offered by Israeli military advisers, arms salesmen and technical experts to the government of Guatemala for Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  208  counterinsurgency and the hunt for ‚Äúsubversives,‚Äù helping to implement an anti-guerrilla campaign that ‚Äúis showing more signs of success than El Salvador‚Äôs, mainly because it is more brutal,‚Äù with thousands ‚Äútortured, mutilated and killed‚Äù and tens of thousands driven to Mexico while ‚Äúmany peasants are herded into protected villages, leaving the countryside as a free-fire zone for the army,‚Äù a campaign that led to the killing of ‚Äúat least 5,000 Indians‚Äù in the summer of 1982.63 In this case, unlike Argentina, there are no embarrassing questions as to whether it is ‚ÄúGood for the Jews.‚Äù Blitzer‚Äôs ‚Äúlessons from the aid victory‚Äù emphasize the importance of preventing critical discussion of Israeli policies in the U.S., as when the revered moralist Elie Wiesel explains that it is improper to criticize Israel outside its borders (but not improper to criticize others, e.g., the PLO), and in fact illegitimate to question its policies even within, since only those ‚Äúin a position of power‚Äù possess the relevant information (see chapter 2, section 2.1). Apparently on the same assumptions, Israeli physicist Gerald Horwitz of the Hebrew University, in a letter to the New York Times (Jan. 9, 1983), condemns Mattityahu Peled for an critical Op-Ed on December 30. He contends that Peled‚Äôs article ‚Äúrepresents an anti-democratic and nationally objectionable act‚Äù because there is no justification ‚Äúin a democratic society such as Israel‚Äîwhere disagreements with the Government can freely be brought to the press, to the polls, and even to the street‚Äîto turn to an external government, to an external voting population, to bring about by coercion a change which its proponent cannot succeed in persuading his own countrymen to accept.‚Äù The very fact that Peled voiced a criticism outside of Israel shows that he ‚Äúdoes not understand democratic procedures,‚Äù which require that Israelis refrain from such ‚Äúnationally objectionable acts‚Äù as criticizing policies of the government‚Äîparticularly, in the U.S., where the ‚Äúexternal voting population‚Äù is expected to pay the bills. Apparently, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  209  it is legitimate, according to this intriguing concept of democracy, to write in support of the government‚Äôs policies in the U.S., but not to criticize them. He does not explain how we are to deal with another problem, namely, that someone in the U.S. might quote something that Peled writes in Israel. Note that there is also apparently no violation of democratic principles when Americans visiting Israel condemn U.S. policies as ‚Äútoo harsh towards Israel,‚Äù a common practice. The same issue of the Times contains a slightly more subtle expression of totalitarian attitudes in an Op-Ed by Annette Dulzin of Yediot Ahronot, who discusses Israel‚Äôs ‚Äúmoral strength‚Äù as shown by the reaction to the Beirut massacres (presumably such comment is legitimate according to the doctrine of Wiesel, Horwitz and others, particularly in the light of Blitzer‚Äôs observation about the utility of such testimonies to Israel‚Äôs moral strength for increasing U.S. military and economic aid). She writes that ‚ÄúThe world‚Äôs news media not only search out Israel‚Äôs imperfections with a magnifying glass, they also turn their attention to the extremes of its political spectrum,‚Äù conveying as ‚Äúrepresentative of the body politic‚Äù the views of ‚Äúpeople made irresponsible by their hatred of [Begin]‚Äù as well as ‚Äúthe most grotesque ideas expressed by Mr. Begin‚Äôs most mindless worshippers.‚Äù In fact, in the U.S. at least, the media characteristically ignore even serious ‚Äúimperfections‚Äù and rarely report, let alone convey as representative,‚Äù positions at the extremes; but those who regard only total conformity as permissible might well consider the occasional deviation as outrageous, and with a sufficient dose of paranoia, even as typical. Returning to Benvenisti, his conclusion is that Reagan‚Äôs peace plan is largely irrelevant in any event because it overlooks the ‚Äúradical changes‚Äù which followed his earlier approval of the settlement policy. The ‚Äúunilateral implementation of Israel‚Äôs version of autonomy on the ground‚Äù does not require ‚Äúthe odd new settlements‚Äù that might be ruled out by Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  210  Reagan‚Äôs proposal‚Äîwhich, nevertheless, the Begin government angrily rejected, immediately announcing plans for new settlements. This ‚Äúunilateral implementation‚Äù is in violation of the terms of the so-called ‚Äúpeace process,‚Äù but then, as Abba Eban observed, Israel had announced at once its rejection of these terms; see chapter 3, section 2.3.4. We return in chapter 6 to the actual impact of Reagan‚Äôs September 1982 peace plan on West Bank settlement. Note that Labor‚Äôs effective endorsement of the new arrangements underscores the hypocrisy of its superficially positive response to the Reagan proposals. Labor‚Äôs actual policy is explained by Yitzhak Rabin. He notes that until now Jordan has refused to accept the Allon Plan (‚Äúterritorial compromise‚Äù) as a basis for settlement and that Reagan‚Äôs plan is also unacceptable to the Labor Alignment for this reason. He ‚Äúemphasized‚Äù that Labor does not differ from Likud about the ‚Äúright of settlement‚Äù but only about its manner, and that if Jordan does join the negotiations Israel should agree to a 4-6 month settlement freeze, ‚Äúbut not throughout the negotiations, which might be prolonged.‚Äù As for the PLO, Rabin continued to reiterate the longstanding Labor policy that it cannot be a partner to negotiations ‚Äúeven if it accepts all of the conditions of negotiations on the basis of the Camp David agreements, because the essence of the willingness to speak with the PLO is the willingness to speak about the establishment of a Palestinian state, which must be opposed.‚Äù A few months later he reiterated the call for a ‚Äúlimited‚Äù settlement freeze (‚Äúlet us say, six months‚Äù) if Hussein agreed to join the negotiations, though not before, adding that Labor is ‚Äúin favor of certain settlements in the Jordan Valley, the greater Jerusalem area [which is by now very ‚Äúgreat‚Äù], Gush Etzion [in the West Bank] and the southern part of the Gaza Strip.‚Äù64 The Labor Party position is elaborated further by Uzi Shimoni of Kibbutz Ashdot Yaakov, head of the propaganda (hasbara) branch of the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
211  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  party, in its journal. Israel ‚Äúhas the right to all of the Land of Israel,‚Äù but it should agree to ‚Äúrelinquish‚Äù its rights in part, returning areas of heavy Arab population concentration in the West Bank to Jordan. It should make this concession ‚Äúnot because of the wishes of the Arabs of the territory,‚Äù which are irrelevant, just as they are irrelevant to American liberal opinion, but so as to avoid the ‚Äúdemographic problem.‚Äù At the same time, Israel must intensify settlement elsewhere so that it will become impossible to return the territories to the local population and Arab rule, as Begin agreed to do in northeastern Sinai over strong Labor opposition (see p. 110*). ‚ÄúThe Likud government‚Äôs relinquishing defensible borders in the south of the State of Israel makes it even more necessary that any peace agreement must be conditioned on the principle that the Jordan River will be our Eastern border and that the Golan Heights will be part of the State of Israel… If Yamit had grown to the size of Netanya, for example, there would have been no agreement to return it to Egypt.‚Äù65 Commenting on Benvenisti‚Äôs research, Anthony Lewis wrote: But it is the Arab leaders who need most of all to understand the meaning of the Benvenisti study. They have maneuvered for years, avoiding negotiation. But unless they move now‚Äîunless they accept the fact of Israel and talk about ways to secure the rights of Palestinians in accommodation with that fact‚Äîthere will be nothing left to negotiate.66 Lewis has been unusual in mainstream American journalism in his willingness to reveal some unpleasant truths about Israel‚Äôs recent  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  212  policies.* He is right to observe that there will soon be nothing to negotiate. But we learn something important about American intellectual and political culture from the fact that even at the outer fringes of mainstream journalism‚Äîthus essentially across the board with very few exceptions‚Äîthe same illusions are put forth as unquestioned fact. As discussed in chapter 3. it is Israel and the U.S. who have maneuvered to avoid negotiations, while the Arab leaders and the PLO have largely joined the international accommodationist consensus, and have accepted ‚Äúthe fact of Israel‚Äù long ago. If there is little left to negotiate, that is primarily the result of U.S.-Israeli rejectionism and the policies of the Labor government, then Likud, in the occupied territories, all subsidized by American munificence and backed by ‚Äúsupporters of Israel.‚Äù And no mainstream political grouping in Israel offers any basis for negotiations or political settlement apart from the kind of ‚Äúterritorial compromise‚Äù that would eliminate the last vestiges of Palestinian rights.  4.2.3 Policies (Continued) Returning again to Benvenisti (see note 57), he goes on to elaborate the consequences of the current programs being implemented by the Likud government, with tacit Labor backing, indeed, extending Labor‚Äôs policies when in office. ‚ÄúThe economy of the West Bank,‚Äù he states, *  Lewis, whose position generally accords with that of the Labor Party, is  considered so ‚Äúanti-Israel‚Äù by the American Zionist establishment that their press urges readers to boycott his talks (Jewish Week, New York; reported by Jewish Post & Opinion. Dec. 3, 1982). Like the regular behavior of the AntiDefamation League, this is another illustration of the Stalinist character of the American Zionist institutions noted and condemned by Israeli doves; see chapter 2, section 2.1. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  213  ‚Äúmay be characterized as undeveloped, non-viable, stagnant and dependent. It is an auxiliary sector of both the Israeli and Jordanian economies.‚Äù It is a ‚Äúcaptive market‚Äù for Israeli manufactures, Israel‚Äôs largest single market, where 25% of Israel‚Äôs exports are sold.67 There is ‚Äúno capital investment, no government investment in industrial infrastructure, no credit facilities or capital market, no protection from the import of Israeli goods.‚Äù There are, however, Israeli taxes. The working population increasingly serves as a cheap labor force for Israel, a repetition of what happened to the Arab population within Israel itself; in the terms preferred by Col. (ret.) Sasson Levi, a specialist in Arab affairs who ‚Äúserved in a key capacity in the military government of Judea and Samaria,‚Äù the Arabs of the territories benefit from ‚Äúthe opportunity given to them to work in Israel.‚Äù68 Continuing with the rhetoric preferred by the conquerors, Israeli scholars Sandler and Frisch (see note 67) are euphoric about ‚Äúthe remarkable accomplishments of the territories in the last decade‚Äù and ‚Äúthe benefits derived from contact with Israel.‚Äù Like Col. Levi and many others, they have little to say about why the Palestinians in the territories do not appear to share their enthusiasm. Perhaps this is yet another manifestation of Irving Howe‚Äôs ‚Äúsour apothegm: In the warmest of hearts there‚Äôs a cold spot for the Jews‚Äù; or perhaps, as Levi remarks, the reason is that ‚Äúthe terrorist organizations continued to incite the people.‚Äù Israel‚Äôs policies in the West Bank, Benvenisti concludes, are ‚Äúan outgrowth of an imperial concept‚Äî‚ÄôI want this‚Äô‚Äîcombined with the ability to go about taking it.‚Äù It must be stressed again that this ‚Äúability‚Äù is conferred by lavish U.S. funding, ideological support of the kind described, and diplomatic support; for example, the U.S. veto of an April 2, 1982 Security Council resolution calling on Israel to reinstate the ousted elected mayors Bassam Shak‚Äôa of Nablus, Karim Khalef of Ramallah, and Ibrahim Tawil of El Bireh, recent targets of terrorist attack (see this Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  214  section above).* The U.S., which stood alone in voting against the resolution (Zaire abstained), regarded it as ‚Äúone-sided.‚Äù69 In fairness, it should be noted that Israel is not the only state to be accorded such diplomatic protection by the U.S. A few months earlier, the U.S. vetoed a Security Council resolution condemning ‚ÄúSouth Africa‚Äôs utilization of the illegally occupied territory of Namibia as a springboard for armed invasions and destabilization of the People‚Äôs Republic of Angola.‚Äù Other countries too have been afforded such diplomatic protection, for example, Indonesia at the time of its invasion of East Timor, as liberal hero Daniel P. Moynihan relates with much satisfaction in his memoirs, referring to his success in blocking United Nations action to deter the aggression and prevent the subsequent *  On the same day, the U.S. vetoed a resolution which ‚Äúnamed no names and  made no charges,‚Äù but ‚Äúsimply repeated United Nations Charter principles opposing intervention in the affairs of other countries and the use of force.‚Äù It was implicitly directed against U.S. intervention in Nicaragua, which at that time was still being denied. The U.S. objected to the resolution on the grounds that it ‚Äúbreeds cynicism‚Äù and ‚Äúharms the United Nations‚Äù because ‚Äúit undermines the Inter-American system‚Äù and ‚Äúmocks the search for peace‚Äù The basis for this charge was that the resolution called upon the Secretary General of the UN to keep the Security Council informed about the crisis in Central America and the Caribbean. Observers could recall no previous occasion when one country cast two vetoes on two different subjects at the same session. Those whose sense of humor inclines them in this direction might be intrigued to look back at the learned discussions by distinguished Western anthropologists on Russian vetoes in the early days of the UN, when the U.S. dominated the organization; the explanation offered was that Russian negativism resulted from the practice of swaddling infants, ‚Äúdiaperology,‚Äù as the theory was called by the occasional skeptics. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  215  massacre that Moynihan partially and misleadingly acknowledges.70 The policies that Benvenisti describes were established by the Labor government shortly after the 1967 conquest, then accelerated by Begin. The consequences were predicted from the start by Israeli doves, who were generally ignored or denounced here in the post-1967 raptures about Israel‚Äôs unique magnificence‚Äîwhen, for example, Irving Howe was explaining that Israel offers ‚Äúabout as good a model as we have for the democratic socialist hope of combining radical social change with political freedom‚Äù (precisely at the time when such hopes, such as they were, were rapidly receding), and issuing vitriolic denunciations of those who attempted to report some of the facts as obsessed by ‚Äúa complex of values and moods verging on the pathology of authoritarianism,‚Äù * among *  See my Peace in the Middle East?, chapter 5, for extensive discussion of  Howe‚Äôs virulent attacks on Daniel Berrigan and unnamed ‚ÄúNew Leftists‚Äù (particularly ‚ÄúNew Left students‚Äù and ‚Äúyoung professors,‚Äù the main targets of Howe‚Äôs venom during the years of their active opposition to the Indochina war), and comparison with the facts that he entirely ignores. It is interesting that this style of invective, carefully avoiding fact and argument, is regarded rather highly in the intellectual community‚Äîat least, when the targets are active opponents of the violence of some favored state. See chapter 2. One should bear in mind, in this connection, the mythical picture that has been constructed of the New Left and the student movement, and of the self-designated ‚Äúresponsible‚Äù figures who were offended by its principled objection to aggression and massacre. Those who are in a position to design the historical record assure us that they were courageously defending ‚Äúcivilized values‚Äù against the excesses of the student movement, as they indeed were, if we include among these values the right of the U.S. to murder peasants in Indochina without any vulgar disruption at home, such as resistance to military service, for example. This is an important story in itself, which would carry us too far afield. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  216  other similar thoughts to which we return.71 In essence, these policies are supported by both major political groupings and there is no indication, despite the recent Reagan plan, that the American policy of lending them the required support will change. It is possible that the same story will be relived in southern Lebanon‚Äîwhat some Israeli doves now refer to bitterly as ‚Äúthe North Bank‚Äù‚Äîin coming years. See chapter 6, section 7.1. Danny Rubinstein points out that there has been opposition within Israel to the settlement policy, but it has been ineffectual because of lack of support from the United States‚Äîa complaint of Israeli doves that we have already noted several times. Reagan‚Äôs reversal of the earlier American stand on the legality of the settlements gave a ‚Äúdispensation‚Äù to the Israeli government to carry out ‚Äúa massive settlement program,‚Äù building 70 settlements in place of the 10 previously announced. ‚ÄúAs long as the Americans, our only friends, do not raise problems, then the internal opposition is silent,‚Äù a ‚Äúsad fact‚Äù that was also proven during the Lebanon war, he notes. Those who think that the Israeli government is bringing about a ‚Äúcatastrophe‚Äù for Israel are unable to make harsher criticisms than those heard from Washington. We have reached ‚Äúthe last moment‚Äù in the occupied territories, with vast resources (provided by the U.S.) being devoted to settlement there, amounting to virtual annexation. Settlement projects are being carried out across the spectrum: by the construction company of the Histadrut Labor Union (Solel Boneh),* religious groups, Rabbi Kahane‚Äôs followers who ‚Äútell the *  At a demonstration of ‚Äúabout 2000 Peace Now activists‚Äù protesting new  settlements, Professor Avishai Margalit, a well-known philosopher at the Hebrew University, ‚Äúattacked the Histadrut for participating in the massive construction programs in the territories, [a stand] which went against the position taken by most of its [Peace Now‚Äôs] members who were for a solution Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
217  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  Arabs that they must get out of here,‚Äù and so on.72 Histadrut firms are now also operating stone quarries in Lebanon, supplying cut stone to the ‚ÄúIsraeli security forces‚Äù (i.e., occupying army), and are engaged in many other projects to ‚Äúenable the Israeli army to settle down there during the winter months.‚Äù73  4.3 The Demographic Problem and its Solution The commitment to integrate the occupied territories within Israel in some form raised the ‚Äúdemographic problem‚Äù discussed earlier. The only real solution to the problem is some sort of transfer of the population. As noted earlier, it has been alleged that this was Defense Minister Sharon‚Äôs intent (see chapter 3, section 2.2.1), and some such notion seems implicit in the logic of the Likud moves towards ‚Äúde facto annexation.‚Äù It is not surprising, then, to hear the Deputy Speaker of the Knesset, Meir Cohen, say ‚Äúthat Israel had made a grave mistake by not expelling 200,000 to 300,000 Arabs from the West Bank‚Äù in 1967. In fact, Labor has had somewhat similar ideas, though they were more delicately put. Prime Minister Rabin had urged that Israel create in the course of the next 10 or 20 years conditions which would attract natural and voluntary migration of the refugees from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to Jordan. To achieve this we have to come to agreement with King  involving a territorial compromise between us and the Arabs,‚Äù i.e., the Labor Party position; Ha‚Äôaretz, Nov. 28, 1982 (Israeli Mirror). The platform of Peace Now opposes ‚Äúcontinued rule over another people‚Äù and calls for ‚Äúpartition of the Land of Israel,‚Äù but is unclear about precisely what is intended. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  218  Hussein and not with Yasser Arafat.74 It has been traditional in Labor Zionism to see the King of Jordan (formerly, Transjordan) as the partner for negotiations, not the local population; see below, chapter 4, section 9.1. Rabin was breaking no new ground in this respect. Furthermore the feeling that ultimately the Arabs must somehow find their place elsewhere has deep roots in Zionist thinking, including such figures as Berl Katznelson, one of the heroes of socialist Zionism (a man who ‚Äúrose gradually to the status of a secular ‚Äòrabbi‚Äô for most of the early pioneers‚Äù75), though he had in mind Syria and Iraq as the ultimate repository for the indigenous population. 76 The same idea had been advocated by Chaim Weizmann, David BenGurion, and many others. As Ben-Gurion stated, expressing a common view, ‚Äúthere is nothing morally wrong in the idea,‚Äù even if the transfer is compulsory, i.e., is expulsion.77 Recall his view that the indigenous population, about whom he seems to have known little and cared less, have no ‚Äúemotional involvement‚Äù in the country, no attachment to their traditional homes.* One hears the same views expressed today. General *  See chapter 3, section 2.2.2. Another important advocate of removal of the  indigenous population was Yosef Weitz, a high official of the Jewish National Fund. When he held this position in the early 1940s, he explained that the proper solution ‚Äúis the land of Israel, at least the Western Land of Israel [cisJordan] without Arabs, because there is no room for compromise. They must be completely removed, leaving ‚Äúnot one village, not one tribe,‚Äù with the possible exception of Bethlehem, Nazareth, and the Old City of Jerusalem. They must be removed to Trans-Jordan, Syria or Iraq. This plan was widely discussed in the Palestinian Jewish community and was authorized by the top leadership, including Moshe Sharett (then Shertok) and Berl Katznelson, well-known doves. See Israel Shahak, ‚Äú‚ÄòThey should leave and empty out the region‚Äô,‚Äù letter, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
219  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  Aharon Yariv, former head of military intelligence, commented on ‚Äúwidely held opinions‚Äù in favor of exploiting a future war situation to expel 7-800,000 Arabs; such a plan exists, he said, and the means to execute it had been prepared.78 Another former intelligence chief, General Shlomo Gazit (now President of Ben-Gurion University), warned in a lecture at Hebrew University against evacuating any part of ‚Äúhistoric Eretz Israel,‚Äù which must ‚Äúremain entirely under Jewish control‚Äù as ‚Äúa basically Jewish state.‚Äù It is therefore necessary to face ‚Äúthe problems of the Arabs of historic Eretz Israel.‚Äù He explained that ‚ÄúIsrael regards this as a humanitarian, not a political problem, and it therefore follows that the solution for them must be found outside historic Eretz Israel.‚Äù79 Chalk up another one for Orwell. Similar thoughts are expressed by Michael Walzer, though in this case with respect to the Arab citizens of Israel proper: since the original inhabitants of the land are ‚Äúmarginal to the nation,‚Äù their problems might be ‚Äúsmoothed‚Äù by the benevolent policy of ‚Äúhelping people to leave who have to leave,‚Äù he suggests.80 Walzer (then at Harvard, now at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton) is much respected in U.S. intellectual circles as a humanitarian and moral thinker. All of this is entirely natural on the assumption of Zionists across the spectrum (with some exceptions) that the Arabs have no real ties to their homes in Palestine, and will be just as content‚Äîperhaps more so‚Äîoutside of the land of the Jews. See chapter 3.  4.4 The Workforce and the Labor Alignment  Koteret Rashit, March 16, 1983, citing Weitz‚Äôs diaries and letters (published in 1965) and the Sharett diaries. See also TNCW, p. 236. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  220  As many Israeli doves had expected and feared, the 1967 war led to radical changes within Israel: a growing reliance on force and violence, alliance with ‚Äúpariah states‚Äù such as South Africa, increased chauvinism, irrationality and religious fanaticism,81 and grandiose conceptions of Israel‚Äôs global mission. It has also predictably led to much heavier dependence on the U.S., service to U.S. global interests, and association with some of the most reactionary currents in American society. At the same time, internal political changes have been taking place within Israel. Menachem Begin succeeded in mobilizing much of the ‚ÄúOriental‚Äù (Sephardic) Jewish population‚Äînow a majority and becoming increasingly so‚Äîbehind his chauvinistic and aggressive policies, though there is much diversity within this community and it is a great oversimplification, as we shall see, to contrast Sephardi hawks to Ashkenazi doves. These segments of the population had long regarded the Labor Party and its institutions as an oppressive bureaucracy, representing management and the hated kibbutzim, often islands of wealth and luxury alongside of ‚Äúdevelopment towns‚Äù‚Äînotorious for their lack of development‚Äîfor the Oriental Jews, many of whom serve as the labor force for kibbutz industry. The 1981 election campaign brought these feelings to sometimes violent expression and led to considerable soulsearching on what had gone wrong and some close attention to what was happening in the development towns. It was observed that support for Labor came primarily from the wealthy and educated, while the working class and underclass tended to support Begin. The question was raised why the kibbutz has become ‚Äúthe object of hate‚Äù in the development towns, the apparent answer being given by the comparison between kibbutz wealth and privilege and the conditions in working class areas, and by the ‚Äúmaster and servant‚Äù relation between the kibbutzim and their exploited labor force from the development towns.82 Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  221  These attitudes of the working class and underclass, incidentally, began to manifest themselves with considerable clarity just at the time when American democratic socialists, who previously had been remote from the Zionist movement, began to speak of Israel as a ‚Äúmodel…for the democratic socialist hope of combining radical social change with political freedom.‚Äù83 Ha‚Äôaretz devoted a series of searching articles to the very visible anger of the Oriental community towards the Labor Alignment and their alienation from it, based on discussions with Alignment leaders, kibbutz members, and people in the development towns. This alienation and anger extend across social classes, and are ‚Äúparticularly harsh among the educated youth,‚Äù an under-represented minority in the Oriental Community. ‚ÄúThe alienation between the inhabitants of the development towns and the kibbutzim began to appear visibly in the 1977 elections, but was revealed in all its ugliness in the last [1981] elections.‚Äù* It is, in fact, striking even within the Labor Alignment itself, where there is strong feeling against the kibbutzim for their ‚Äúarrogance and ‚Äúisolation‚Äô‚Äô from the working classes in the development towns that provide much of their labor force. There is also growing opposition to the Histadrut (the socialist labor union, which plays a major role in Israeli society) on the part of the Oriental Jewish working class, which constitutes the majority of workers, though not officials and managers. Some studies indicate that Oriental Jewish workers consider that Likud represents them better than Labor does, by about two-to-one. Others show that Labor Alignment voters support it with little enthusiasm, for negative reasons, rather in the manner of most of the 27% of American voters who voted *  The timing is inexact. It began to appear, quite visibly, in the late 1960s. In  fact, it was always reasonably clear. I recall personal incidents reflecting this antagonism in 1953, when I lived for a time in a kibbutz in Israel. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  222  for Ronald Reagan, according to electoral analyses here. The leadership is particularly disliked. While 30% of the electorate support the Alignment, only 4% support its leader, Shimon Peres, ‚Äúa shocking attitude.‚Äù Among Oriental Jewish workers from the development towns who are employed in the kibbutzim, 70% voted for Likud, as compared with a 60% Likud vote in the Oriental community as a whole, a reflection of the ‚Äúservant-master‚Äù relation between the Oriental Jewish proletariat and ‚Äúthe two socialist institutions that serve as the showwindow of the Labor party,‚Äù the Histadrut and the kibbutzim. The kibbutzim are hated by the working class particularly for their attitudes of ‚Äúarrogance‚Äù and ‚Äúbossism,‚Äù and for ‚Äúthe impossibility of establishing real human relations with kibbutz members.‚Äù The hatred is in fact ‚Äúincreasing‚Äù (referring to the development town Beit Shean). In the last elections, the vote for Likud increased beyond the national average in regions where there was a concentration of kibbutzim alongside of Oriental Jewish communities in moshavim (semi-collectivized communities) and development towns. Another source of bitterness is memories of how the refugees from the Arab countries were received and treated in the Ma‚Äôabarot (transitional resettlement camps) in Israel. One educated Oriental Jewish businessman who ‚Äúsucceeded in breaking out of the circle of poverty and distress‚Äù (a 1951 immigrant from Libya) recalls that in his Ma‚Äôabara, ‚Äúall the managerial positions were held by Ashkenazim [Europeans]. The bosses were only Ashkenazim.‚Äù ‚ÄúWhen we arrived in the Ma‚Äôabara,‚Äù he reports, ‚Äúthere were many Poles and Rumanians among us, but after a few months you would see how whole communities of them disappeared, while we remained stuck in place.‚Äù The Ashkenazim were associated with the Labor Party (Mapai). ‚ÄúThey treated us like third class citizens. They subjected us to extensive brainwashing, and wanted to break our connection with our culture and our traditions [a longClassics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  223  standing and frequently expressed complaint]. Our social structure broke down‚Äîit was their fault.‚Äù ‚ÄúThere is real hatred, hatred for what was done by the Alignment, which is seen by a whole generation as the successor to Mapai from a cultural, economic and social class standpoint.‚Äù ‚ÄúMapai also destroyed us from the point of view of our selfimage. That will not be forgotten easily.‚Äù He complains, characteristically, that the Labor Party organized the lives of the Oriental Jews in the Ma‚Äôabarot ‚Äúthe way they organize the lives of the Arabs in Gaza today.‚Äù When the immigration of Russian Jews began, these tensions became far worse, because of the comparison between the ‚Äúde luxe‚Äù treatment of these European immigrants and the long-standing oppression and impoverishment of the Jews from Arab countries.84 Tamar Maroz presents a detailed and illuminating record of working class and lower middle class attitudes as expressed in the Oriental communities, among a group that she regards, with some plausibility, as ‚Äúthe silent majority.‚Äù The lines are rather sharply drawn: Begin is a ‚Äúmessiah,‚Äù a ‚Äúhero,‚Äù ‚Äò‚Äòone of us,‚Äù ‚Äúhonest,‚Äô‚Äô a man of the people who lives simply in a rented apartment, a ‚Äúreal Jew.‚Äù Peres, the head of the Labor Party, is a ‚Äúcapitalist,‚Äù a commonly repeated insult; the people of the Labor Alignment are swindlers, bureaucrats, the ‚Äúestablishment,‚Äù ‚Äúcareerists.‚Äù Likud is ‚Äúanti-establishment.‚Äù Begin ‚Äúis concerned for the workers‚Äù; Labor, in contrast, is not. Its ‚Äúdevelopment towns‚Äù were constructed as working class slums for kibbutz industry, where the rich kibbutzniks are the managers and ‚Äúdo nothing.‚Äù Begin cares about the Oriental community; Labor has contempt for them. Defense Minister Sharon is also a hero, who doesn‚Äôt fear and pander to the Americans, as Labor does; he should be the next head of the government, and it is a disgrace that he was forced to resign as Defense Minister. There can be no peace with the Arabs: ‚Äúif we don‚Äôt fight, they will destroy us‚Äù; ‚Äúa good Arab is a dead Arab.‚Äù Peace Now are traitors and have contempt Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  224  for the religious values of the people. ‚ÄúBegin is our father, and ‚ÄòPeace Now‚Äô is our enemy.‚Äù The Likud ‚Äúlifted up the weak, for whom the Alignment (Ma‚Äôarach) showed no concern.‚Äù The opinions she records verbatim are forceful, and have an ominous ring.85 The contempt of Europe-based Labor Zionism for the Oriental Jews and their ‚ÄúArab culture‚Äù is notorious. It may reflect the widely-expressed fear of ‚ÄúLevantinization‚Äù in what the settlers anticipated would be a modern European society, as well as the felt need to denigrate Arab society and culture in general as a justification for taking back ‚Äúthe Land of Israel‚Äù from its temporary occupiers and the parallel need to demonstrate that the Oriental Jews were rescued by Zionism from a miserable existence. Whatever the causes of these attitudes towards the ‚Äúhuman dust,‚Äù as they were sometimes called, a serious price is now being paid by the Labor Alignment. The development towns were generally established in remote areas, often along the border, where they were not only neglected but also subject to vicious (and, furthermore, tactically idiotic) terrorist attacks by the PLO, particularly in the early 1970s. Michael Elkins described one such ‚Äúfrontline settlement.‚Äù Avivim, after a particularly brutal attack on a school bus in which 12 children were killed (20 Lebanese civilians were killed in retaliatory shelling of the Lebanese town of Bint Jubeil, which appears to have been selected at random). He describes the ‚Äúrubblestrewn road that is Avivim‚Äôs main street‚Äù where he talked with ‚Äúa ragged. pinched-faced kid,‚Äù and the ‚Äújerry-built shacks thrown together in 1963 when the Jewish Agency‚Äîfollowing Israel‚Äôs policy of populating its borders‚Äîsettled about 60 families of unskilled immigrants from the Atlas Mountains of Morocco in this inhospitable place‚Äù where the settlers live ‚Äúout of sight and out of mind of most Israelis.‚Äù One ‚Äútypical‚Äù story of suffering was told by a settler who said: ‚ÄúWe starve here, we get sick here. I don‚Äôt want to stay here‚Äînobody wants to stay. It is an awful Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  225  place, nobody cares about us.‚Äù Israeli officials allege that ‚Äúthis negative attitude was the result of the shocking school-bus incident‚Äîand strictly a temporary phenomenon.‚Äù But Elkins‚Äôs ‚Äúown feeling was that many Israelis living in the frontier villages are profoundly unhappy with their lot‚Äîand not primarily because of the Arab commando attacks, but because of what the settlers judge to be the lack of concern for their welfare by other, more affluent Israelis.‚Äù He quotes one who says: ‚ÄúWe won‚Äôt be driven out of this area by the Fatah‚Ķbut the cold hearts of our own people in Tel Aviv‚Äîthat can drive us out.‚Äù86 Similar stories can be told concerning the larger towns established for the Oriental Jews, who support Begin in what they see as revenge against their oppressors of the Labor Alignment. The bitterness and violence of the 1981 electoral campaign, which evoked memories of Germany and Austria in the early 1930s among older citizens,87 was a reflection of these conflicts. The bitterness is so great that Labor Party leader Shimon Peres was literally unable to speak in the northern city of Kiryat Shemona, even with hundreds of security officers present to maintain order. Crowds shouting ‚ÄúBegin King of Israel‚Äù 88 and other slogans drowned him out, and the few supporters‚Äî‚Äùhated visitors from the nearby kibbutzim‚Äù‚Äîwere barely in evidence. 89 In the older cities too there is serious disaffection within the Oriental Jewish community. Anti-Ashkenazi hatred erupted in a dramatic fashion when police arrived with a bulldozer to demolish a room added without a permit to a small house in a Tel Aviv slum, leading to the fatal shooting of one member of the family. In response, swastikas were painted on houses in wealthy Ashkenazic neighborhoods, along with such slogans as ‚ÄúAshkenazim to Auschwitz, Treblinka and Dachau,‚Äù ‚ÄúThe Sephardic Revolution Has Begun,‚Äù and the like. In an investigation of the situation in Tiberias, Leah Etgar found a group of about 300 young men of Moroccan origin, mostly unemployed and preparing for Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  226  violence‚Äîmurder if necessary‚Äîdirected against Arabs and Jews who employ them. In general, they ‚Äúlove Begin, because he is a great man‚Äî and hate the Labor Alignment, which during its rule did nothing for the Moroccans while now there is at least food, television, and stereophonic radios.‚Äù Again, the kibbutzim are a prime irritant. One man fired from Kelet Afikim ‚Äúhates the kibbutzim.‚Äù He claims that they discriminate against the Moroccan Jews. ‚ÄúThey ask if they are Moroccans and if they voted for the Likud, and that is the end of the job… They hate us and we hate them.‚Äù But the primary hatred is directed against Arabs, their competitors in the job market who agree to accept work for very low wages or that Jews do not want, as servants or in hotels, or jobs that require work on the Sabbath, excluded for these men from religious families. ‚ÄúOnly the Arabs have money and they go to the movies and your heart breaks.‚Äù Your ‚Äúheart also breaks‚Äù when you are compelled to ride by bus and see Arabs in their private cars. ‚ÄúSomething really tears you up inside.‚Äù Others complain that Arabs not only take their work but steal their girl friends. ‚ÄúWhat girl will go out with a Jewish man who has no work, honor or livelihood. They even take our women, the scoundrels.‚Äù One can see ‚Äúthe hatred in the eyes.‚Äù All agree that there is ‚Äúno solution‚Äù except ‚Äúto exterminate the Arabs, because they are ruining the lives of the Jews.‚Äù These men feel that ‚Äúthey have no choice, except to proceed to violence.‚Äù They have already demonstrated at the town buildings against the increase in the Arab population in the city, and they now want to gather arms, and are preparing ‚Äúto pick up boards and sticks and to break the heads of the others [the Arabs].‚Äù A similar story is reported by Michal Meron from the town of Netivot near Gaza (‚Äúugly,‚Äù ‚Äúdirty,‚Äù largely inhabited by Sephardis). This was in March 1983, after the dismissal of Sharon as Defense Minister; the young men here ‚Äúno long call Begin King, now Sharon is King of Israel.‚Äù Meron interviews many of them, lounging around billiard parlors, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  227  dressed in designer jeans and leather jackets, virtually all unemployed and refusing the employment (for example, packing fruits and vegetables) that is offered to them. They despise the Ashkenazim and the Peace Now activists; one is sorry that he did not have the chance to throw the grenade that killed a Peace Now demonstrator in Jerusalem in February. But their hatred for the ‚ÄúAraboushim‚Äù (a term of contempt for Arabs, with connotations similar to ‚Äúkike‚Äù or ‚Äúnigger‚Äù) is far deeper and more intense. ‚ÄúI hate Arabs because on account of them I am unemployed,‚Äù because they work at ‚Äúhalf the wages‚Äù we would accept and ‚Äútwice as hard.‚Äù ‚ÄúFor money they will do anything.‚Äù ‚ÄúThe Arab has no honor and the Jew does, that‚Äôs the problem.‚Äù ‚ÄúWith my own hands I would kill all of them, they are animals,‚Äù one man says while the others laugh, ‚Äútheir hatred of Arabs uniting them in a special manner.‚Äù ‚ÄúA good Arab is a dead Arab,‚Äù they repeat.90 Cases of attacks on Arabs are sometimes reported in the press‚Äîe.g., the beating of an Arab hospital worker in Gedera by two armed men who threatened ‚Äúto do much worse things if he does not leave Gedera.‚Äù91 Some who have close contacts with the Arab community allege that such incidents are not uncommon, but are generally unreported (in this case, the victim was threatened with death if he went to the police). It has also been widely observed that attitudes are more reactionary among the young*‚Äîthe universities, for example, have been dominated by student groups that engage in such activities as breaking up Arab social events with clubs and chains92‚Äîso that the prospects are for an intensification of chauvinism and violence. The *  To mention another indication, a recent poll shows that 40% of 14-15 year-  olds oppose equal rights for Communists, Arabs, and released prisoners. Davar, Aug. 6, 1982. In fact, 65% of the population favor imposing further constraints on reporting in radio and television; Davar, Al Hamishmar. March 20, 1983. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  228  tendencies since 1967 are rather clear, as are their causes.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  229  5. The Ways of the Conqueror 5.1 The West Bank he religious settlers in the West Bank, operating freely with army support, take pride in creating a pogrom-like atmosphere among the Arabs, who must be trained not to ‚Äúraise their heads,‚Äù this being the only way to treat Arabs, who ‚Äúadore power‚Äù and will live in peace with the Jews only when ‚Äúwe show him that we are strong.‚Äù How? ‚ÄúWe enter a village, shoot a bit at windows, warn the villagers and return to the settlement. We don‚Äôt kidnap people, but it can happen that we catch a boy who had been throwing stones, take him back with us, beat him a bit and give him over to the Army to finish the job.‚Äù The same West Bank settler also explains how official investigators act to protect Jews who shoot to hit and to kill (including firing at children). This particular interview ended because the settler‚Äîa friend of the journalist‚Äî‚Äùwas in a hurry to get back home before the Sabbath.‚Äù93 The settlers are quite open about the measures they take towards Arabs and the justification for them, which they find in the religious law and the writings of the sages. In the journal of the religious West Bank settlers we find, for example, an article with the heading ‚ÄúThose among us who call for a humanistic attitude towards our [Arab] neighbors are reading the Halacha [religious law] selectively and are avoiding specific commandments.‚Äù The scholarly author cites passages from the Talmud explaining that God is sorry that he created the Ishmaelites, and that Gentiles are ‚Äúa people like a donkey.‚Äù The law concerning ‚Äúconquered‚Äù peoples is explicit, he argues, quoting Maimonides on how they must ‚Äúserve‚Äù their Jewish conquerors and be ‚Äúdegraded and low‚Äù and ‚Äúmust  T  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  230  not raise their heads in Israel but must be conquered beneath their hand …with complete submission.‚Äù Only then may the conquerors treat them in a ‚Äúhumane manner.‚Äù ‚ÄúThere is no relation,‚Äù he claims, ‚Äúbetween the law of Israel [Torat Yisrael] and the atheistic modern humanism,‚Äù citing again Maimonides, who holds ‚Äúthat in a divinely-commanded war [milhemet mitzvah] one must destroy, kill and eliminate men, women and children‚Äù (the rabbinate has defined the Lebanon war as such a war). ‚ÄúThe eternal principles do not change,‚Äù and ‚Äúthere is no place for any ‚Äòhumanistic‚Äô considerations.‚Äù94 We return to a further examination of this phenomenon. which has its counterparts throughout the Middle East region. A recent device for protecting settlers who attack Arabs is to transfer all investigation of the illegal use of arms by settlers from police to the military. Settlers simply refuse to cooperate with police, who do not ‚Äúdare question or arrest Jewish suspects,‚Äù even one ‚Äúseen on television shooting directly into a crowd of demonstrating Arabs while soldiers stood behind him and were holding their fire‚Äù (the head of the district council of a Jewish settlement near Ramallah, in this case).95 When Palestinians are beaten or detained by settlers, Arab policemen are afraid to intervene. ‚ÄúPalestinian lawyers say: the settlements are so formidable that the Arab police and courts never dare to serve a summons or make a search, leaving settlers beyond the law when it comes to conflicts with Arabs.‚Äù The general character of the occupation is indicated by an incident in an Arab village in March 1982. Four settlers claimed that a stone was thrown at their car in this village. They fired ‚Äúinto the air,‚Äù shooting one boy in the arm. Another boy was kidnapped, beaten, locked in the trunk of the car, taken to a Jewish settlement and locked in a room where he was beaten ‚Äúon and off during most of the day,‚Äù then taken to the military government compound in Ramallah, where the boy was held while the settlers went Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  231  on their way.96 A standard bit of black humor in the occupied territories is that Arabs should stop flying and begin walking on the ground so they won‚Äôt be shot so often when settlers fire into the air.97 Children and teenagers are often the main victims, since they are generally the ones involved in protests and demonstrations. Danny Tsidkoni reports from Gaza that informants in an Arab village told him that several very young children threw stones at a car driven by armed settlers, who broke the leg of one boy and the hand of one girl in ‚Äúretaliation.‚Äù98 A soldier reports that 30 12-13 year-old children were lined up facing a wall with their hands up for five hours in Hebron one very cold night, kicked if they moved. He justified the punishment because they are not ‚Äúall innocent lambs as they look now, with their hands up and their eyes asking pity… They burn and they throw stones and participate in demonstrations, and they are not less harmful than their parents.‚Äù Afterwards, the children were taken to prison at an Army camp. Parents began to arrive to find out what had happened to their children, including one old man ‚Äúwith the dignity of a Christian saint.‚Äù He did not ask to see his son, but only wanted to know whether he was there and to bring him a coat. ‚ÄúThe guard at the gate simply looked him up and down, and cursing him, ordered him to leave.‚Äù The old man stood all night waiting, in the freezing cold. In another case, a settler suspected of murdering an Arab boy ‚Äúalready had a criminal record for breaking the arm of an eleven-year-old boy who allegedly had thrown a stone at an Israeli vehicle.‚Äù 99 The aged are also not spared. ‚ÄúFor five days an elderly Arab woman has lain unconscious in a Jerusalem hospital after being brutally beaten in the small flat in which she lives with her husband in the Muslim quarter of the Old City.‚Äù She was attacked by religious Jews from a nearby Yeshiva (religious school) while her 85-year-old husband was praying in the Al Aqsa mosque. He heard that Jewish settlers had killed Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  232  his wife, rushed home, but could not enter his apartment because, he said, ‚Äúthe Jews were on the roof of our building hurling bricks and bottles.‚Äù An Arab youth who tried to save the woman was also brutally beaten, and lies next door in the hospital. He ‚Äúidentifies his attackers as the Jewish zealots from the Yeshiva.‚Äù They ‚Äúscarcely bothered to deny the attack.‚Äù When questioned about it, ‚Äúan American zealot blandly talked of the need to cleanse the area of ‚Äòterrorists‚Äô.‚Äù The group ‚Äúis known to to the police as ‚Äòthe blessing of Abraham,‚Äô a Yeshiva comprised mostly of European and American-born Jews who have returned to their faith with a burning desire to reclaim land lost to the Arabs.‚Äù Several years ago they established the Yeshiva in an old Arab area; eighteen Arab families had since moved out, and this couple was the only one remaining as the ‚ÄúJewish zealots‚Äù sought ‚Äúto ‚Äòredeem‚Äô property that had once been inhabited by Jews as long ago as the 16th century.‚Äù The couple had rejected cash offers which were followed by threats of violence; ‚Äúthere is no doubt that those threats were carried out this week.‚Äù The police arrested a few of the Jewish extremists but they are to be charged only with ‚Äúriotous behavior.‚Äù ‚ÄúThe assault on Mrs Mayalleh and the fact that she and her husband are now homeless seemed to be accepted as a fait accompli by the police,‚Äù which is typical of the ‚Äúindulgent attitude by authorities.‚Äù ‚ÄúThe vicious attack scarcely rated a mention in the local press.‚Äù100 One not untypical issue of a Palestinian weekly contains two stories on the front page. The first deals with the week-long curfew imposed on the Dheisheh refugee camp after an Israeli observation post was burned and stones were thrown at an Israeli vehicle. It reports that inhabitants lacked food and that Israeli authorities raided houses, confiscating large numbers of books, magazines and tapes with national songs, while the men were forced to stand outside the police station during the cold nights. Soldiers searched the house of a man who had died two months Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  233  earlier and ‚Äúburned his private library and the school books of his children.‚Äù The second story cites Ha‚Äôaretz (Zvi Barel, Oct. 31): ‚ÄúTwo Arab youths were injured by an Israeli time bomb in the stands of Hebron‚Äôs Hussein School football field… The explosion occurred minutes before the beginning of the game… The Israeli army which searched the area discovered another time bomb.‚Äù101 There are no curfews or collective punishment (standard practice for Arab communities) in the neighboring Jewish settlement, which has often been the source of violence and racist gangsterism. One wonders whether there was even an investigation. Other stories are still more grim, for example, the allegation by a Rakah (Communist Party) Knesset Member that there was ‚Äúconfirmed information‚Äù of the disappearance, torture and murder of convicts in various prisons,102 or the detailed testimony of prisoners concerning torture under interrogation,* sometimes with the cooperation of medical personnel, for many years.103 The extensive reports of torture by Arab prisoners have generally been dismissed in the U.S., just as little notice is taken of reports of Palestinian refugees, or in general, of the travail and concerns of the Palestinians. Reports by prisoners or refugees of course have to be carefully evaluated; in particular, the conditions of transmission must be carefully considered, as well as the fact that they may have a stake in exaggerating or falsifying, or in suppressing the truth out of fear of their interrogators or guards. But surely such reports should be taken seriously. These remarks are truisms, characteristically disregarded in *  This testimony comes primarily from Arab prisoners. MK Shulamit Aloni, one of  Israel‚Äôs leading civil libertarians, reported that Jewish prisoners in military prisons allege that conditions are so severe that some were driven insane. MK Charley Biton, a Sephardi, added that 90% of those in military prisons are from the Oriental Jewish community. Davar, Jan. 24. 1983. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  234  two cases: where refugees or prisoners have a tale to tell that is useful for ideological or propaganda purposes (e.g., atrocity reports about some enemy), in which case all caution is thrown to the winds; or where their stories reflect badly on some revered state, in which case they are disregarded.104 In the case of Palestinian prisoners in Israel, particular care has been taken to ensure that little is known here, though it has become more difficult over the years to meet this requirement. One interesting example was the unusually careful study conducted by the London Sunday Times Insight team which, after a lengthy investigation, found evidence of torture so widespread and systematic that ‚Äúit appears to be sanctioned at some level as deliberate policy,‚Äù perhaps ‚Äúto persuade Arabs in occupied territories that it is least painful to behave passively.‚Äù The study was offered to the New York Times and Washington Post but rejected for publication and barely reported. A study by the Swiss League for the Rights of Man (June 1977), presenting similar material, received no notice here. The same is true of the reports of torture by Israeli journalists.105Various Israeli rebuttals were published though not, to my knowledge, the devastating Sunday Times response. More interesting than the attempt at rebuttal, however, was the conclusion that torture of Arabs by Israelis is legitimate, a position expressed, perhaps not surprisingly, in the New Republic, the semiofficial journal of American liberalism, where Seth Kaplan concludes that the question of how a government should treat people under its control ‚Äúis not susceptible to simple absolutism, such as the outright condemnation of torture. One may have to use extreme measures‚Äîcall them ‚Äòtorture‚Äô‚Äîto deal with a terrorist movement whose steady tactic is the taking of human life.‚Äù106 To my knowledge, this is the first explicit  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  235  defense of torture to have appeared in the West* apart from the ravings of the ultra-right in France during the Algerian war. No less interesting was the response of the Israeli judiciary. Amnesty International raised the question whether the remarkably high level of confessions of Arab prisoners might suggest inhumane treatment. To this, Israeli Supreme Court Justice Moshe Etzioni responded that ‚Äúthe Arabs in any case‚Äîif they are arrested‚Äîdo not take much time before they confess. It‚Äôs part of their nature‚Äù‚Äîa comment that we may place alongside of Martin Peretz‚Äôs ‚ÄúArabs exaggerate‚Äù and others of the same ilk concerning Jews and other oppressed peoples over the years. It is perhaps of some interest to note that the genetic defect of Arabs noted by Justice Etzioni appears to be somehow contagious, since by now Jewish prisoners are confessing to crimes that they did not commit after police interrogation, including cases of interrogation by police *  See also Michael Levin, ‚ÄúThe Case for Torture,‚Äù Newsweek, June 7, 1982. A  professor of philosophy at City College of New York, Levin plays a game familiar from every Phil. 1 course, constructing an outlandish case where torture might be ‚Äúmorally mandatory‚Äù (a terrorist has hidden an atomic bomb on Manhattan Island, etc.), then noting that ‚Äúonce you concede that torture is justified in extreme cases, you have admitted that the decision to use torture is a matter of balancing innocent lives against the means needed to save them‚Äù; finally, he advocates torture ‚Äúas an acceptable measure for preventing future evils,‚Äù rejecting talk about ‚Äúterrorists‚Äô ‚Äòrights‚Äô,‚Äù assuring us that Western democracies will not ‚Äúlose their way if they choose to inflict pain as one way of preserving order,‚Äù etc. This should be understood in the context of the hysteria being whipped up at the time concerning ‚Äúinternational terrorism,‚Äù defined so as to include ‚Äúretail terrorism‚Äù conducted by enemies but not ‚Äúwholesale (or retail) terrorism‚Äù conducted by friends (or by us). On this matter, see Herman, The Real Terror Network. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  236  investigators previously identified by Arabs as torturers.107 Amnesty International, incidentally, is not very popular in Israel, at least since it published a rather mild and understated report on treatment of suspects and prisoners in 1979. An editorial in Ha‚Äôaretz, entitled ‚ÄúAmnesty is at it again,‚Äù commented that the organization had ‚Äúturned itself into a tool of Arab propaganda by publishing the document,‚Äù criticizing among other things its reliance on the ‚Äúdistorted and malicious report‚Äù in the London Sunday Times. The left-wing Mapam journal took a different tack. An editorial observed that ‚ÄúExperience tells us that it is extremely difficult to effectively defend oneself against terrorists or even ordinary criminals without bringing great pressure to bear on the suspects, in order to eventually bring them to trial at all,‚Äù and recommended that ‚Äúconstant vigilance‚Äù be exercised to determine that there are no ‚Äúexcesses‚Äù in the use of the required ‚Äúgreat pressure.‚Äù108 Quite apart from alleged torture under interrogation, the conditions of Arab political prisoners are horrifying, not a great surprise, perhaps, when we consider the scale of arrests in the occupied territories: some 200,000 security prisoners and detainees have passed through Israeli jails, almost 20% of the population, which has led to ‚Äúhorrendous overcrowding‚Äù and ‚Äúappalling human suffering and corruption.‚Äù109 The occasional trials of military offenders sometimes shed light on practices in the occupied territories. A number of reserve officers connected with the Peace Now movement threatened to make charges against soldiers public unless there was an investigation, leading to a trial that ‚Äúbrought forth evidence of methodically brutal treatment of the local townspeople last spring‚Äù (1982), at the peak of the atrocities carried out under the Milson-Sharon administration. Reuters reports that at the trial, Maj. David Mofaz, the deputy military governor of Hebron at the time of the alleged atrocities, testified that ‚ÄúIsraeli soldiers were Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  237  given orders to harass and beat up Palestinian residents‚Äù and that they ‚Äúviciously struck and kicked defenseless young Arab prisoners.‚Äù He testified that ‚Äúhe personally was ordered to beat up Arabs by the West Bank military commander,‚Äù but he knew that ‚Äúthe orders came from higher up, from the chief of staff.‚Äù He said that ‚Äúthe army had orders to harass the West Bank population in general, not just those involved in anti-Israeli demonstrations,‚Äù giving examples. An Israeli captain testified that he had personally beaten Palestinian detainees and that ‚ÄúIsraeli soldiers routinely beat up Palestinian detainees on the occupied West Bank with the knowledge of senior officers.‚Äù110 On the same day, another brief report in the same American journal describes how Turkish women, ‚Äúsuspected leftists,‚Äù are placed in coffinlike boxes ‚Äúin an attempt to extract information during questioning,‚Äù one minor example of a systematic pattern of torture and repression that also evokes little interest here, though perhaps the same report from another military dictatorship (say in Poland), might have elicited some comment. According to the Jerusalem Post, ‚Äúa military court has allegedly heard evidence that Defence Minister Ariel Sharon urged Israeli soldiers to beat Arab schoolchildren in the West Bank,‚Äù referring to the same trial of soldiers ‚Äúaccused of brutally mistreating Arab youths in Hebron last March,‚Äù a trial that ‚Äúhas attracted almost no publicity in Israel‚Äù‚Äî though it did shortly after. The source is a major in the reserves who told the court that the military governor had quoted Sharon to this effect. At the trial, soldiers reportedly told the court that they had beaten Arab high school students while the major stood by and watched, hitting them as hard as they could. One said: ‚ÄúAfterwards, I left the shed where this was happening because I couldn‚Äôt stand beating up people who couldn‚Äôt fight back.‚Äù The Hebrew press reports the testimony of the vice-commander of the Judea region, who reports that in a meeting with Civilian AdministraClassics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  238  tor Menachem Milson, General Sharon gave instructions as to how to deal with demonstrators: ‚ÄúCut off their testicles.‚Äù The Chief of Staff went a step further, telling soldiers on the northern front that ‚Äúthe only good Arab is a dead Arab,‚Äù as reported by Abraham Burg, son of the Minister of Interior. The vice-commander reports also that his superior officer General Hartabi led troops into a Hebron school where they beat the students with clubs. In another incident, Hartabi imposed a curfew on the Dheisha camp after a stone was thrown at his car and ordered his troops to fire in the streets and at the rooftop solar water tanks, destroying the hot water supply and also making a terrifying racket. Another curfew was imposed on the Dhahriyeh camp south of Hebron on January 30 after youths stoned Israeli vehicles passing through the town. An Israeli woman was injured, and later died. A report in the U.S. press three weeks later notes that the curfew is still in effect, because ‚Äúit is necessary for the investigation,‚Äù an Israeli military source said, adding: ‚ÄúIt prevents people from working and causes financial losses. But it also gives them an incentive to help us find the people who carried out the attack. The sooner we find them, the sooner all this will be over.‚Äù Meanwhile the people are allowed out of their homes only two hours a day, schools are closed, and there is no employment. The treatment is somewhat different when Israeli West Bank terrorists go on a rampage. A minor fact, not noted in the press accounts, is that two weeks before the demonstrators unaccountably began to stone passing Israeli vehicles, 20,000 dunams of land used for orchards and grain were expropriated by Israeli military authorities.111 The trial of the soldiers did receive publicity later on, particularly when the defense established its claim that the orders to brutalize prisoners and impose collective punishments came directly from Chief of Staff Eitan. He was called to testify before the military court and confirmed that he had ordered such punishments as expulsion, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  239  harassment of inciters, the establishment of detention or exile camps ‚Äúeven without regular prison conditions‚Äù (which are grim enough), and a wide variety of collective punishments against towns where there had been resistance to the conquerors (primarily, stone throwing) and against families of pupils who ‚Äúcaused disturbances‚Äù (this device ‚Äúworks well with Arabs,‚Äù he testified). The Chief of Staff opposed calling leaders in for warnings. ‚ÄúWe demean ourselves,‚Äù he said: ‚ÄúInstead of conversations, we should carry out arrests.‚Äù He also said that Jewish settlers must travel armed and feel free to open fire when attacked, say, by children throwing stones. The military court sentenced four soldiers to several months imprisonment,* but ruled that Eitan‚Äôs orders were legal. Maj. Mofaz, the highest ranking officer charged, was released; his lawyers had held‚Äîaccurately it appears‚Äîthat he and others were *  For comparison, ‚ÄúAn Israeli military court sentenced seven West Bank Arab  teenagers to jail terms ranging from six to nine months and fined them $650 each yesterday for stoning an Israeli police chief in his car in the occupied territory‚Äù (Washington Post‚ÄîBoston Globe, March 18, 1983). Later, Chief of Staff Eitan expressed his views on proper punishment again, this time to the Knesset‚Äôs Foreign Affairs and Defense and Committee. For every incident of stone-throwing by Arab youths, he said, ten settlements should be built: ‚ÄúWhen we have settled the land, all the Arabs will be able to do about it will be to scurry around like drugged roaches in a bottle.‚Äù Defense Minister Moshe Arens was asked by opposition Knesset members to reprimand Eitan for this remark, but declined because Eitan ‚Äúhas great achievements to his credit‚Äù during his tenure as Chief of Staff‚Äîin fact, two great achievements, intensification of the repression in the conquered territories and destruction of the virtually defenseless Palestinian society in Lebanon. Gad Becker, Yediot Ahronot, April 13, 1983; David K. Shipler, New York Times, April 14, 20, 1983. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
240  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  ‚Äúmerely following the orders and guidelines laid down by their superiors,‚Äù Edward Walsh reports. Apart from beating of Arab detainees and civilians, charges included forcing people to crawl on all fours and bark like dogs, laud Begin and Border Guards (who were allegedly responsible, though not punished), slap one another (children were ordered to slap their parents), along with other punishments that work well with Arabs. Maj. Mofaz ordered soldiers to write numbers on the arms of prisoners on the Day of the Holocaust, but the military court accepted his defense that this order was only given in jest (though it was carried out).112 The New Republic, democratic socialists, Elie Wiesel and others have not yet rendered their judgment as to whether these practices fall within the range of those that are acceptable for dealing with terrorists; the same silence has held for many years in similar circumstances, though there has been no shortage of praise for Israel‚Äôs remarkably high moral values and sympathy for its travail under the burdens of occupation imposed upon it by Arab intransigence. Aharon Bachar writes of ‚Äúthe things that are being done in my name and in yours‚Äù: ‚Äúwe will never be able to escape the responsibility and to say that we did not know and we did not hear.‚Äù He describes a meeting between Labor Alignment leaders (including some of the most noted hawks, such as Golda Meir‚Äôs adviser Israel Galili) and Menachem Begin, where they presented to Begin ‚Äúdetailed accounts of terrorist acts [against Arabs] in the conquered territories.‚Äù They described the ‚Äúcollective punishment in the town of Halhul,‚Äù in these words: The men were taken from their houses beginning at midnight, in pajamas, in the cold. The notables and other men were concentrated in the square of the mosque and held there until morning. Meanwhile men of the Border Guards [noted for their cruelty] broke into houses; beating Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
241  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  people with shouts and curses. During the many hours that hundreds of people were kept in the mosque square, they were ordered to urinate and excrete on one another and also to sing Hatikva [‚ÄúThe Hope,‚Äù the national anthem of Israel] and to call out ‚ÄúLong Live the State of Israel.‚Äù Several times people were beaten and ordered to crawl on the ground. Some were even ordered to lick the earth. At the same time four trucks were commandeered and at daybreak, the inhabitants were loaded on the trucks, about 100 in each truck, and taken like sheep to the Administration headquarters in Hebron. On Holocaust Day, the 27 of Nissan [the date in the Jewish calendar], the people who were arrested were ordered to write numbers on their hands with their own hands, in memory of the Jews in the extermination camps. The report continues, detailing how prisoners are beaten, tortured and humiliated, how settlers are permitted into the prisons to take part in the beating of prisoners, how the settlers brutalize the local inhabitants with impunity, even in the case of a settler who killed an Arab, whose identity is known, but who is not arrested.113 All legitimate, presumably, by the standards of the New Republic, as quoted above. The same correspondent reports similar stories a few weeks earlier, presented to top government officials who did not even take the trouble to check the information, provided by an Israeli soldier.114 A week later, Yoram Peri again published sections of the report transmitted to Begin by the Labor Party delegation. There had been no question raised in the Knesset concerning it, he noted, and the matter had been passed over silently elsewhere. But, he added bitterly, why be surprised? ‚ÄúAfter all, who are they [the victims]? Araboushim, twoClassics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  242  legged beasts‚Äù (the latter a reference to Prime Minister Begin‚Äôs characterization of ‚Äúterrorists‚Äù). He writes that the ‚Äúfrightening metamorphosis that is coming over us…places in question the justice of the Zionist movement, the basis for the existence of the state,‚Äù but it receives no attention in the Knesset, the World Zionist Congress (then in session in Jerusalem), or elsewhere. It is time to recognize, he concludes, that ‚Äúthere is no such thing as an enlightened occupation, there cannot be a liberal military administration.‚Äù The pretenses of the past 15 years are simply lies. By now, 3/4 of a million young Israelis who have served in the IDF ‚Äúknow that the task of the army is not only to defend the state in the battlefield against a foreign army, but to demolish the rights of innocent people just because they are Araboushim living in territories that God promised to us.‚Äù115 Writing identification numbers on the arms of prisoners is a practice that many have naturally found particularly shocking. It is apparently common, and the circumstances just described are not unique. Peace Now military officers describing the daily ‚Äúbrutality and violence‚Äù of the IDF and the settlers in the territories, the ‚Äúrepression, humiliation, maltreatment and collective punishment,‚Äù report that soldiers regularly write the numbers of Arab IDs on the wrists of Arab prisoners, and one recalls a particularly ‚Äúappalling incident‚Äù of this sort that he witnessed‚Äî again, on the Day of the Holocaust. Another describes an incident in which a group of fresh recruits were issued clubs and told: ‚ÄúBoys, off you go to assault the locals.‚Äù He describes the treatment of Arab prisoners, who are required to clean the soldiers‚Äô rooms, mess halls and latrines. ‚ÄúAt night, they are put into a small room and beaten up‚Äù so badly that ‚Äúmany of them cannot even stand up‚Äù‚Äî‚Äúyoungsters,‚Ķmost of whom have not been tried, people who will be released due to lack of evidence.‚Äù Aharon Geva writes in Davar that ‚ÄúSome of us Israelis behave like the worst kind of anti-Semites, whose name cannot be mentioned Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  243  here, like the very people who painted a picture of the Jew as a subhuman creature‚Ķ‚Äù116 In fact, what has been happening in the occupied territories for many years is all too familiar from Jewish history. Stories such as these, which abound, have constituted the daily lives of those subjected to Israeli rule for many years. Outright murders by Israeli soldiers or settlers are sometimes reported in the U.S., but the regular terror, harassment and degradation pass unnoticed among those who are paying the bills. It is, for example, most unlikely that an American newspaper would print the report by Aharon Bachar, which appeared in a mass-circulation Israeli journal, on the atrocities reported to the Prime Minister by a high-level (and generally hawkish) Labor Alignment delegation. The few people who have tried to transmit some of the facts reported in the mainstream Hebrew press have either been ignored, or subjected to a campaign of lies and vilification that is reminiscent of Stalinist practices.  5.2 The Golan Heights Until December 1981, the Golan Heights had been spared this treatment. Over 90% of the population had fled or were expelled at the time of the Israeli conquest of the Heights in 1967. Israeli settlements were then established, but the Druze population generally ‚Äúaccepted the authority and jurisdiction of the military government,‚Äù according to a report by a leading Israeli civil rights association.117 On December 14, the day after martial law was declared in Poland, the Knesset passed a law extending civilian law and administration to the Golan Heights‚Äîin effect, annexation. In January, new regulations were imposed requiring that the inhabitants carry Israeli IDs. There was overwhelming opposition to this integration into Israel. On February 13, four leading Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  244  members of the Druze community were placed under administrative arrest and a general strike was called, supported by ‚Äúthe overwhelming majority‚Äù of the population. The Israeli military command closed the area, forbidding villagers to move between villages and preventing journalists, lawyers and medical staff from entering. Expressions of solidarity in the Israeli Galilee and the West Bank were suppressed and organizers were placed under house arrest. No supplies were allowed to enter. All telephones were disconnected (reports of a similar policy in Poland at the same time caused great outrage here). Residents who were imprisoned after a ‚Äúsummary trial‚Äù were denied legal aid. For three days before the closure was lifted in April, ‚Äúall villagers were restricted to their homes (they were even forbidden to visit the toilets which are in outhouses),‚Äù and ‚Äúallegedly, forbidden to go out on balconies or to open windows.‚Äù A woman who was sent to a hospital by a local doctor after the closure was lifted was refused exit by the military when‚Äîlike most others‚Äîshe refused to accept an Israeli ID. Inhabitants reported shooting and other physical violence; one was hospitalized with bullet wounds and others still carried scars or fresh wounds when the Israeli civil rights delegation visited after the closure was lifted, having previously been denied entry. The press reported many more details, for example, the case of a three-year-old boy who was beaten with a club by a soldier after he threw an Israeli ID card to the floor; his mother was shot when she came to his aid. The national water company reduced water supplies. Jewish settlements (including kibbutzim) complained because they were deprived of their normal workforce of Golan Druze.118 A lead article in Ha‚Äôaretz observed that there was no protest in the Knesset apart from Rakah (Communist) and that editors did not protest the prohibition of entry of journalists. ‚ÄúIn the general Israeli Jewish public the indifference is shocking. Only some few hundreds of meters away from the besieged Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  245  Druze village, young Israelis enjoy the sun, take photos in the snow, eat and gossip. On one side, barbed wire and human beings in a cage, on the other, people skiing, going up and down in lifts. In the middle, the Israeli Army.‚Äù119 Subsequently, former Supreme Court Justice Chaim Cohen described the Golan Law as ‚Äúthe law of the barbarians.‚Äù120 One reason for objections of the Druze to the Golan Law was ‚Äúthe great fear of expropriation of their lands.‚Äù They ‚Äúknow well that most of the lands of the Druze in Israel [whose loyalty to the state is so unquestioned that they regularly serve in the armed forces] were expropriated in the last 30 years and handed over to Jews.‚Äù121 All of this, and much more, care of the American taxpayer, who must be kept uninformed, and generally has been, quite successfully.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  246  5.3 The Attack on Palestinian Culture Throughout this period, the Arab intelligentsia have been a particular target of attack, in accordance with ‚Äúthe clear plan of Sharon to drive out and destroy any sign or element with an Arab national character, to bring about full Israeli control in the territories.‚Äù122 Bir Zeit university in the West Bank has been one of the favorite targets, with ‚Äúnight raids on women‚Äôs and men‚Äôs dormitories, and on student and faculty apartments,‚Äù disruption of classes by military checkpoints, confiscation of students‚Äô ID cards making it illegal for them to travel, and in general, ‚Äúdaily humiliation inflicted on students [which] placed them under psychological pressure that made the normal functioning of the University difficult‚Äù123‚Äîan understatement, as more detailed reporting shows. More recently, much of the foreign faculty has been expelled for refusing to sign a statement that they will not offer support for the PLO (as does the overwhelming majority of the West Bank population), eliciting a protest from the State Department.124 Secretary of State George Shultz condemned the Israeli loyalty oath as ‚Äúan abridgment of academic freedom‚Äù and as ‚Äútotally unnecessary‚Äù for Israel‚Äôs security, a clear infringement ‚Äúof freedom, freedom of thought,‚Äù and called upon ‚Äúpeople in the intellectual community particularly‚Ķto speak up‚Äù in protest. That American intellectuals should suddenly become exercised over violations of academic freedom under Israeli occupation seems unlikely, given their dismal record of ‚Äúsupport for Israel.‚Äù There was, however, a statement of protest by two hundred Israeli academics, organized before the Shultz statement.125 The expulsion of foreign faculty (by November, 22 had been expelled, including the President of al-Najah University in Nablus, and many more had been banned from Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  247  teaching and were facing expulsion) is particularly harmful, since ‚Äúmany talented West Bankers educated abroad are unable to get Israeli work permits.‚Äù126 One aspect of the problem, noted by David Richardson, is illustrated by the case of Mohammad Shadid, an American-trained political scientist at al-Najah university, one of those banned from teaching and facing expulsion. He lost the right to return to the West Bank, where he was born, because he happened to be out of the country studying when a census was taken in 1967; requests by his family to allow him to return under a ‚Äúfamily reunion scheme‚Äù were simply ignored, and he is now an American citizen. Richardson observes that what the civil administration is trying to do is to suppress the local intelligentsia, and to ‚Äúmake political use‚Äù of the signed statements as part of the effort to undermine support for the PLO in the occupied territories. Furthermore, a degree for a West Bank student is a ‚Äúpassport to emigration,‚Äù since ‚Äúmost of the young graduates cannot hope to find employment in their own society‚Äù‚Äîas Israel is reconstructing it.127 In fact, Israeli policy in the occupied territories has clearly been designed to remove elite groups, either by direct expulsion (‚Äúmoderates‚Äù have been a particular target) or by eliminating the possibility of meaningful employment, in the hope that no nationalist or cultural leadership will remain.128 After Shultz‚Äôs protests, the anti-PLO pledge was technically ‚Äúwithdrawn,‚Äù in fact transferred in virtually the same terms to the general work permit.129 Mohammad Shadid is no unique case. President Salah of al-Najah University, who was expelled in October, is also a native of the West Bank, born in Nablus, who was studying abroad in 1967 and is therefore considered a ‚Äúforeigner‚Äù by the Israeli government; in its brief story on the expulsion, the New York Times refers to him as ‚Äúa Jordanian national,‚Äù technically correct but missing a rather important point. In a press conference on the morning of his expulsion, unreported here to my Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
248  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  knowledge, Dr. Salah stated that Israel‚Äôs strategy is to destroy the infrastructure of the universities, as it is to destroy the infrastructure of Palestinian society. This started with the municipalities. Now they‚Äôve come to a second attempt after the first one failed. Their ultimate aim is to destroy any Palestinian infrastructure in the homeland.130 Danny Rubinstein reports that most of the ‚Äúforeign lecturers‚Äù at the University ‚Äúare not really ‚Äòforeigners,‚Äô but rather Palestinians, natives of the West Bank, who do not have Israeli identity cards (from the military administration) so that the authorities can revoke their residence permits and expel them from the country.‚Äù He also notes that the harassment of the West Bank universities, of which the latest expulsions are only a part, elicits little interest in the Israeli academic community. The same is true of lsraeli journalists with regard to restrictions on Arab colleagues, publishers with regard to censorship, lawyers with regard to legal issues, and so on. At a time when the academic community in Israel went on strike over wages, no academic organization raised any question about the regular harassment of the West Bank universities. Those who have been concerned are ‚Äúvery few and without influence on the course of events.‚Äù131 The former acting president of al-Najah University, W. F. Abboushi (a professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati), faced continual harassment, he reports, alleging that his protest over similar practices on an earlier occasion at Bir Zeit university had led to beating by Israeli soldiers. From his experience, he believes that ‚Äúit is impossible to run a Palestinian university under Israeli occupation‚Äù and that ‚Äúgenerally, life in the West Bank has become almost unbearable, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  249  particularly for the students who are constantly subjected to harassment, including arbitrary search and arrest, imprisonment, beating, and sometimes even severe physical abuse.‚Äù The worst has been since the takeover of the ‚Äúcivil administration‚Äù by Professor Menachem Milson, the ‚ÄúMideast maverick‚Äù praised here for his advocacy of a Palestinian role in the affairs of the West Bank (see chapter 3, section 2.3.2). Abboushi says that ‚Äúperhaps over one-third of our student body had been in Israeli jails,‚Äù where they were ‚Äúroutinely beaten.‚Äù Like much of the faculty and administration, most of the so-called ‚Äúforeign students‚Äù at al-Najah were in fact Palestinian Arabs who had lost their right of residence because they were out of the area when the 1967 census was taken. The situation worsened after the invasion of Lebanon, when Israeli soldiers ‚Äúattacked the university using real bullets‚Äù to disperse a demonstration protesting the invasion.132 In his article ‚ÄúA threat to freedom‚Äù (note 127), David Richardson observes that just as the Israeli academic community has by and large showed ‚Äúindifference‚Äù to the treatment of their Arab colleagues under the military occupation, so Israeli journalists have for the most part remained (purposefully) ‚Äúignorant of the fact that three West Bank editors have been confined to their places of residence for almost two years and thereby prevented from pursuing their professions properly.‚Äù Boaz Evron investigated this matter, visiting the three editors in violation of his resolve not to enter the occupied territories. The three editors were confined to their West Bank villages three years ago, he reports. No reason was given. None of them had ever been accused of any crime, and the security services refused to provide their lawyers with any charges. As editors, they are responsible for what appears in their journals, published in Jerusalem, but they are unable to see these journals, since distribution is forbidden in the West Bank areas where they are confined: ‚Äúthe Kingdom of the Absurd.‚Äù ‚ÄúIf this were happening Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  250  to Jewish journalists, we would be raising a cry to the heavens,‚Äù he observes, ‚Äúbut here we accept it all peacefully. What is so terrible? Is anyone being killed?‚Äù The technique of the occupation, in this case, is ‚Äúto keep them on a short leash,‚Äù not to act brutally, but to make sure that they recognize always ‚Äúthat the whip is held over their heads.‚Äù133 The treatment of the editors of the Jerusalem journal Al Fajr illustrates what Arab intellectuals may expect if they ‚Äúraise their heads,‚Äù in the terminology of the West Bank settlers‚Äîif they try to act with a measure of intellectual independence.* One was picked up by the police and kept in solitary confinement for 17 days. He was made to stand for 24 hours with a bag over his head and his arms bound, until he fainted. He was then charged with possessing two copies of a PLO journal. A second has been prevented for a year from visiting the occupied territories, where his family and friends live and where his professional responsibilities are focused. A third was kept in jail for a week for failure *  For an account of harassment and arbitrary arrest, detention and alleged  beatings of journalists from Al Fajr, harassment of other Arab journals, and the forms taken by Israeli censorship, see Robert I. Friedman. ‚ÄúNo Peace for West Bank Press.‚Äù CPJ Update, Committee to Protect Journalists, January 1983. Israeli officials defend the censorship on the grounds that ‚ÄúIt‚Äôs no secret that Palestinians in general, and the Arab press, support the PLO‚Äù (it is kept a secret in some circles in the US., where the fact is consistently denied, e.g., in the New Republic; see p. 63), and Israel is ‚Äúin a state of war with the PLO.‚Äù Israeli journalists who have investigated the censorship allege, however, that it is politically motivated, and often entirely arbitrary (e.g., love poems have been censored though they had no reference to the national question). Words are censored that Israeli officials find objectionable, e.g.. the word ‚Äúsumud,‚Äù referring to the steadfastness of the samid who chooses the ‚Äúthird way,‚Äù neither resistance nor capitulation; see below, section 6. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  251  to change the license on a new car. A fourth was confined for two and a half years in Ramallah. The journal is subjected to heavy censorship, often not permitted to republish material from the Hebrew or more conformist Arabic press. It is even prevented from publishing factual information about such matters as the opening of a school that had been closed, or events in the occupied territories. Journalists from Al Fajr are continually taken for interrogation, degraded, threatened, arrested. ‚ÄúIf things like this happened to your journalists,‚Äù one editor said to an Israeli reporter, ‚Äúall the world would respond with great anger. You shout about the suppression of intellectuals in the USSR, but you close your eyes to what is happening to the intellectuals in the West Bank, right under your noses.‚Äù134 Michal Meron, who reports these facts, writes that Al Fajr ‚Äúis not an example of what it is possible to call free journalism.‚Äù The reason is that those who participate in the journal ‚Äúsee in their task a national mission, and their pen is ready to serve only the Palestinian interest.‚Äù The editors, in fact, are outspoken about their political commitments. One states to Meron that ‚Äúwe see in the PLO our sole representative, and therefore we support its point of view. We are in favor of the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside of the State of Israel.‚Äù Perhaps some might see in this a justification for the constant harassment of a journal that does not really merit the appellation ‚Äúfree press.‚Äù One might ask how such a stand differs in principle from that of Soviet authorities with regard to Zionist publications within the USSR. Or we might ask just what one should expect of honest journalists working under military occupation and living in what they‚Äîand virtually the entire world, including the U.S. government‚Äîregard as occupied East Jerusalem. Other questions arise as well. While Meron was disparaging Al Fajr because of its commitment to ‚Äúthe Palestinian interest,‚Äù the Jerusalem Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  252  Post, highly regarded within Israel and elsewhere, was celebrating its Jubilee. Editor Erwin Frenkel published an article in the Jubilee issuejust a week before Meron‚Äôs article on Al Fajr appeared, in which he explained that the goal of the paper today is ‚Äúthe same as it was from the start‚Äù 50 years ago: ‚Äúthe fulfilment of Zionism.‚Äù Its predecessor, the Palestine Post, was founded under the British Mandate ‚Äúfor a purpose that was political‚Äù; and under conditions far less onerous than those faced by the Arabs under Israeli occupation, it maintained this purpose, even after the state was founded. The journal also exercised selfcensorship. Readers of the Israeli press can hardly fail to notice that the English-language Post is more cautious in what it publishes than is the Hebrew press. The reasons are obvious, and editor Frenkel states them clearly: ‚ÄúBoth within the newspaper and without, it was generally presumed that Hebrew was a private language of the Jews, in which they addressed only each other… English, on the other hand, was public. It enabled access from the outside, the Gentile world, the Arab foe. In short, what could be written in Hebrew could not necessarily be exposed in English.‚Äù Frenkel claims that this posture was modified in the 1960s, that ‚Äúthe old constraints of English‚Äù were abandoned and ‚ÄúEnglish would no longer inhibit expression.‚Äù 135 I do not believe that this is true, judging by my own limited exposure to the Hebrew and Englishlanguage press, and I would guess that a systematic investigation would support this conclusion. But even if the earlier constraints were dropped, the journal by its own admission remains subject to the critique that Meron applies to Al Fajr, and surely did even more so before the alleged abandonment of ‚Äúthe old constraints,‚Äù without the justification that it is attempting to survive with extremely limited resources under a harsh military regime where it attempts to express the aspirations of a conquered and oppressed people. A few days earlier, the Congress of Jewish Journalists from the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  253  Diaspora opened, with 60 journalists from 14 countries. The deputy chairman of the Zionist Congress in Israel, Yitzhak Koren, informed the gathering ‚Äúthat anti-semites today blamed every Jew, wherever he might live, for Israel‚Äôs actions, and that it was therefore extremely important for the Jewish press to show Israeli policies in a positive light.‚Äù136 The constant and sometimes almost fanatic harassment of West Bank intellectuals and educational institutions, along with the general fear of permitting independent cultural expression, suggests that Israel‚Äôs leaders may be recalling some lessons from their own history, to which they frequently appeal. Every Israeli schoolchild knows the story of Rabbi Jochanan Ben Zakkai, who foresaw the destruction of the Temple in 70 AD when Jerusalem was under Roman siege. He opposed the final resistance and sought a way to save his people from destruction by an appeal to the Roman commander. Not being permitted to leave Jerusalem by its defenders, he had his disciples pretend that he was dead and carry him out in a coffin for burial. He reached the Roman camp and was granted his request to open a school in the small town of Yavneh. The famous Jewish historian Heinrich Graetz relates that the Roman commander ‚Äúhad nothing to urge against the harmless wish of Jochanan, for he could not foresee that by this unimportant concession he was enabling Judaism, feeble as it then appeared, to outlive Rome, which was in all its vigor, by thousands of years.‚Äù137 Most of the scholars of the next generation were his pupils. According to the tradition, he consoled them for the destruction of the Temple with a quote from the Prophet Hosea: ‚ÄúFor I desire mercy, not sacrifice.‚Äù Both the appeal to the prophetic tradition and the significance of maintaining a school to keep the culture alive may well have a certain resonance today. Israeli Arab citizens are, incidentally, also frequently denied the right of cultural expression. To cite one recent example, the High Court of Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  254  Justice upheld the government‚Äôs refusal to permit Najwa Makhoul, a lecturer at the Hebrew University with a Phd degree from MIT, to publish an Arabic political-literary journal, citing undisclosed ‚Äúsecurity reasons.‚Äù ‚ÄúThe security of the state has silenced yet another Arab,‚Äù B. Michael observes, adding that Israeli intellectuals, professors, writers and poets have nothing to say. The journal was ‚Äúenvisioned as a forum for serious analyses of Palestinian-Israeli society, as well as more general articles written [in] a Third World context‚Ķ[with] a scientific, Marxist and feminist perspective.‚Äù It would have been the only publication based in the Galilee, where most Israeli Arabs live, and not connected with a political party, and would have provided jobs for Arab university graduates, no small problem in Israel.138 This scandal was not reported in the U.S. to my knowledge, and at the time of writing has evoked no protest, though the facts have been known for many months to individuals and organizations devoted to intellectual freedom throughout the world. The ‚Äúsecurity reasons‚Äù are no doubt comparable to those used by other states to prevent groups that are ‚Äúmarginal to the nation‚Äù (in Michael Walzer‚Äôs phrase) from having an independent cultural and political life. As for the lack of interest here, that should be no more surprising than the fact that there is no protest when the well-known Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, invited to take part in a UNICEF poetry reading, is denied a visa under a section of immigration law that allows the State Department to bar people for certain ideological reasons‚Äù‚Äîas the State Department confirmed. If an Israeli poet were denied entry to the United States for ‚Äúideological reasons‚Äù‚Äîassuming this to be possible‚Äîthere would be no limits to the outrage and indignation, the charges of a return of Nazism, etc. In this case, there is no response at all. Similarly, when Israeli censors banned the play ‚ÄúThe Patriot‚Äù by the Hebrew writer Hanoch Levin, there was considerable protest in Israel, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  255  widely reported here as further proof of the deep commitment to democratic principles in Israel. A few months before, the police banned a play by a Druze writer, Salman Natour, describing the life and opinions of a young Israeli Arab, and arrested the director. There was virtually no protest in Israel, and nothing was reported here. The same was true in early 1983 when an Arab from Nazareth was arrested ‚Äúfor publishing a newspaper without permission‚Äù‚Äîfour information leaflets. He appealed to the responsible Israeli government authority in the Galilee, Israel Koenig, but his petition was rejected.139 Examples are numerous; the silence here is unbroken.  5.4 ‚ÄúThe Opportunity to Work in Israel‚Äù As one might expect, the experiences of those who enjoy ‚Äúthe opportunity given to them to work in Israel‚Äù (Sasson Levi; see section 4.2.3) are also not entirely delightful. One problem that they face is that they are not permitted to spend the night within Israel. Since employers do not want to pay the costs of shipping workers back and forth, some have adopted the idea of locking them into factories at night, a practice that became public knowledge when several were found burned to death in a locked room after a fire in a small Tel Aviv factory. Others have been kept under armed guard behind barbed wire in factory detention camps, including one owned by Histadrut, the socialist trade union. These practices aroused some protest in Israel where, for example, Natan Dunvitz wrote in Ha‚Äôaretz that ‚Äúit is unacceptable to treat Arab workers as Black slaves were treated in American cotton fields.‚Äù There was no mention here, to my knowledge, apart from a letter of mine,140 and the facts were not considered worthy of notice by those who were celebrating Israel‚Äôs advance towards democratic socialism. One might Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  256  ask, incidentally, what the reaction would be if it were learned that Jewish workers were burned to death in a locked room in a Moscow factory or kept in factory detention camps because they are not permitted to spend the night in Russian areas. Praise for Russia‚Äôs march toward democratic socialism and its high moral purpose, perhaps? The same regulation leads to other problems. Two moshavim (semicollective settlements) were recently condemned by the Moshav movement for arranging ‚Äúdecent housing‚Äù for seasonal agricultural workers, instead of bringing them from their homes in the Gaza Strip 200 km away every morning and returning them there in the evening, as required by law. Their work day thus ran from 3AM to 8PM, and they were found to be tired, strangely. The phrase ‚Äúdecent housing‚Äù appears in the English language press account. The Hebrew press tells a different story, with pictures to illustrate: the ‚Äúdecent housing‚Äù consisted of barns, storehouses, abandoned buildings where they are crammed into rooms, old buses; the headline in Haolam Haze reads: ‚ÄúToo far away for any eye to see, hidden in the orchards, there are the sheep pens for the servants, of a sort that even a state like South Africa would be ashamed of.‚Äù Amos Hadar, Secretary General of the Moshav movement, strongly opposes providing housing for the workers, which is in any event illegal. If they are given housing, he says, ‚Äúafter a short while the workers from the territories will bring their families and house them in camps. That would be Arab settlement on land of the Jewish National Fund. That cannot be.‚Äù Journalist Aryeh Rubinstein adds sarcastically: ‚Äúhis children will help with the picking and his wife will clean the ‚Äòmaster‚Äôs‚Äô house.‚Äù Hadar is asked whether he agrees to the use of Arab labor, ‚Äúbut only on condition that they will live in subhuman conditions, degraded, and not under human conditions, more or less.‚Äù ‚ÄúCorrect,‚Äù he answers, conceding that ‚Äúreally, there is a difficult question here.‚Äù ‚ÄúThere is no choice but to employ Arabs,‚Äù he says. They must be brought from Gaza Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  257  in the morning and returned there in the evening. ‚ÄúIt is hard, it is costly, it is problematic from an economic standpoint‚Äîbut there is no other solution, if Jews in the State of Israel are unable to pick the oranges and grapes.‚Äù Another officer of the Moshav movement concedes that hired labor troubles him: ‚ÄúBut I am troubled far more by the fact that we, with our own hands, are establishing settlements for Arabs within the Green Line [the pre-June 1967 borders].‚Äù As for the problem of bringing in workers from such a distance, he asks: ‚ÄúWhat are 200 kilometers in comparison with the loss of the justice of our struggle for the land?‚Äù‚Äîespecially when others are doing the travelling, with a work day from 3AM to 8PM. But the problem will apparently soon be resolved, since the Border Guards have been ordered to evacuate the Arab workers from the camps set up for them.141 Further steps towards ‚Äúthe democratic socialist hope.‚Äù This only skims the surface. There is also, for example, the issue of child labor, of children aged six or seven trucked in by labor contractors at 4 AM to work on private or collective farms for ‚Äúa meager subsistence wage,‚Äù though ‚Äúoften they are cheated on that.‚Äù Again, the matter has not been discussed in the United States, to my knowledge. And there is the matter of Arab trade unions, long a target of repression, again with little notice here from democratic socialist supporters of Israel, American union leaders who tell us how much they ‚Äúlove‚Äù Israel (see chapter 2, section 2.1*), or others. To cite only one recent case, the club of the Ramallah trade union was closed by orders of the military governer in December 1982, all written materials were seized, and its secretary, Bassem Barguti, was arrested, held for a month and then sentenced to two months in prison on charges of possessing forbidden material of political significance, including, according to the charges, some that was literally ‚Äúobscene‚Äù (a publication that included the colors of the PLO Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
258  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  flag) and some that was defamatory of the Israeli army (a calendar with a demand for release of prisoners in the Ansar concentration camp in Lebanon).142  5.5 Israeli Inquiries and American Suppression Coverage of events in the occupied territories is far more comprehensive in Israel than in the U.S., but it too is impeded, in part by censorship, in part by ‚Äúinternal censorship.‚Äù See chapter 2, section 1. TV journalists (including Rafik Halabi; see note 48) complain that they are kept away from 90% of the serious demonstrations in the territories and that they are not permitted to film much of what is happening, including soldiers firing at demonstrators, etc.143 ‚ÄúOnly a small part of the actions of the settlers, in or out of uniform, reaches the Israeli press,‚Äù Amnon Kapeliouk reports: ‚Äúfacts about harassment and maltreatment of Palestinians are not published,‚Äù sometimes, because editors feel that they are ‚Äútoo hard to bear,‚Äù as one decided when ‚Äúsettlers caught an old man who had protested when his lands were taken and shaved off his beard‚Äîjust what Polish anti-Semites did to Jews.‚Äù144 A great deal of information about human rights violations, particularly in the occupied territories, has been made available by the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights. Its Chairman from 1970, Dr. Israel Shahak, has compiled a personal record of courage and commitment to human rights that few people anywhere can equal, and has been untiring in exposing the facts about the occupation and circulating information, much of it from the Hebrew press, where several outstanding journalists (frequently cited above) have attempted to provide an honest record‚Äîsometimes, some say, using material provided by Arab journalists who hope to be able to reprint the stories Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  259  from the Hebrew press. The work of the League is little known here, in part, because human rights organizations prefer not to know the facts. The League had been an affiliate of the New York-based International League for Human Rights, but was suspended in 1973 on the interesting grounds that the governing Labor Party had attempted to take over and destroy the League by methods so crude that they were quickly blocked by the Israeli Courts; on similar grounds, it would be proper for Amnesty International to suspend a Moscow chapter attacked by the government. One professed civil libertarian, Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law School (who had already distinguished himself by defending preventive detention in Israel and denouncing political prisoners in jail*‚Äîa particularly despicable practice, as would be at once recognized in any other context)‚Äîattempted to cover up the disgraceful Labor government takeover attempt with gross misrepresentation of the facts and slanderous accusations directed against Shahak, who has, in fact, been bitterly attacked by American Zionists who are horrified at his *  The particular target of Dershowitz‚Äôs slanders was the Israeli Arab writer Fouzi  el-Asmar, held for 15 months without charges under administrative detention. On the basis of information provided to him by the Israeli secret police, Dershowitz arrived at the ‚Äúpersonal conviction‚Äù that he was a terrorist ‚Äúcommander,‚Äù as he proceeds to assert without qualification, so that the detention was legitimate. There is, by now, little pretense in Israel or elsewhere that there was any substance to these charges, but it is interesting that in the U.S. it is not considered that Dershowitz‚Äôs stand represents any departure from civil libertarian standards. The attitude within the American Communist Party to Soviet judicial proceedings is similar. See Alan Dershowitz, ‚ÄúCivil liberties in Israel,‚Äù in Howe and Gershman, eds., Israel, the Arabs & the Middle East, and the responses in Commentary, July 1971, to the original article. See also note 107. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  260  belief that Palestinians are human; see his entry in the Anti-Defamation League ‚Äúenemies list,‚Äù for example.145 Again, these facts fall under the ideological aspect of the ‚Äúspecial relationship,‚Äù as discussed earlier.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  261  6. The Testimony of the Samidin he account given above is primarily from Israeli sources. There is ample testimony from the victims, but it is virtually unknown here. Suppose that some American intellectual who expressed his undying love for the Soviet Union were to return from a visit there and write that Jews are prosperous and generally content apart from some youthful rabble-rousers and Zionist terrorists who try to incite them, basing his conclusions on discussions with Russian experts on Jewish affairs, government officials, and Russian academics and taxi drivers. It is an understatement to say that such a person would be dismissed with contempt and disgust. Comparable practices are quite common, however, in the case of Western visitors to Israel.146 The standard practice of dismissing Arab sources falls into the same category. It is simply an expression of racist attitudes so deeply entrenched as to be quite unrecognized, one aspect of the amazing double standard with regard to Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs that we have observed throughout, and that would be apparent to any observer of the American scene with even a pretense of rationality. I have mentioned the reports of Arab prisoners, available only to the most dedicated researcher and excluded from mainstream journalism and scholarship. The same is true, by and large, of the writings of Palestinian intellectuals. For example, much insight into the lives of Israeli Arabs is provided in a personal memoir by Fouzi el-Asmar (see section 5.5* above).147 It is an important and, I think, shocking fact that this material is essentially unavailable in the U.S., which bears a major responsibility for what has happened to the indigenous inhabitants of the former Palestine. The same can be said about material produced by Palestinian intellectuals from the occupied territories. It is, for example,  T  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
262  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  fairly safe to predict that the thoughtful and revealing study by Raja Shehadeh, his ‚Äújournal of life in the West Bank,‚Äù will remain unknown in the United States (see note 48). That would be a shame‚Äîindeed, a scandal, given the crucial American role in perpetuating the conditions he describes. Shehadeh distinguishes three ways of responding to occupation. The first is that of ‚Äúblind hate,‚Äù the second, ‚Äúmute submission.‚Äù To the captive population, the first way is that of the freedom fighter, the second, that of the quisling. To the conqueror, the first way is that of the terrorist, the second, that of the moderate. The paymasters keep to the rhetoric of the conqueror, naturally. What then is ‚Äúthe third way‚Äù? That is the way of the Samid, ‚Äúthe steadfast one,‚Äù who watches his home turned into a prison. ‚ÄúYou, Samid, choose to stay in that prison, because it is your home, and because you fear that if you leave, your jailer will not allow you to return. Living like this, you must constantly resist the twin temptations of either acquiescing in the jailer‚Äôs plan in numb despair, or becoming crazed by consuming hatred for your jailer and yourself, the prisoner.‚Äù To be Samid is like being in a small room with your family. You have bolted the doors and all the windows to keep strangers out. But they come anyway‚Äîthey just walk through the walls as if they weren‚Äôt there. They say they like your room. They bring their families and their friends. They like the furniture, the food, the garden. You shrink into a corner, pretending they aren‚Äôt there, tending to your housework, being a rebellious son, a strict father or an anxious mother‚Äî crawling about as if everything was normal, as if your room was yours for ever. Your family‚Äôs faces are growing pale, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
263  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  withdrawn‚Äîan ugly grey, as the air in their corner becomes exhausted. The strangers have fresh air, they come and go at will‚Äî their cheeks are pink, their voices loud and vibrant. But you cling to your corner, you never leave it, afraid that if you do, you will not be allowed back. The strangers are advised by specialists, ‚Äú‚Äòexperts on Arab mentality‚Äô churned out by the Hebrew University and called ‚Äòadvisers on Arab affairs‚Äô.‚Äù148 If need be, they can use the means of violence that they monopolize, to whatever degree is required, ensuring that the Samidin will be no more than drugged roaches in a bottle, in the graphic phrase of Chief of Staff Eitan. See section 5.1* above. Shehadeh gives examples, from his personal experience as a lawyer attempting the hopeless task of working within a legal system devised to ensure failure to protect the rights of the vanquished, and from his life as a Samid. There is the example of ‚Äúa criminal who was sentenced to life, and released soon after by the Israelis and given a gun,‚Äù well-placed in what passes for a courtroom alongside of ‚Äúthe Israeli‚Äôs man in court,‚Äù who has also chosen the second way. There are the Israeli soldiers who herd demonstrating students into a bus, then shave each one down the middle of his head, ‚Äúbranded‚Äù‚Äîeach one ‚Äúa new fida‚Äôi‚Äù (‚Äúfreedom fighter‚Äù or ‚Äúterrorist,‚Äù according to one‚Äôs point of view). And the soldiers who find slogans painted on a wall, who ‚Äúwait until night and then wake up all the people on the street and make them whitewash the wall, ‚Ķ mainly old people wrapped in dressing-gowns, shivering, bewildered, some cursing‚Äù after the soldiers have broken into their houses to get them out. There is the military governor who closes an exhibition of Palestinian art, plays, fashion shows of Palestinian dress at Birzeit college on the grounds that ‚Äúexpressions of Palestinian culture are Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  264  dangerous political acts.‚Äù And the Arab policemen at one of the innumerable roadblocks who have standing orders from the Israeli military ‚Äúto take in for questioning any Jewish woman seen with an Arab.‚Äù Roadblocks carry their own terror when manned by Israeli military, many of whom rejoice in the opportunity to humiliate defenseless Arabs in accordance with the doctrine of ‚Äúpurity of arms.‚Äù They can also be dangerous, as for Shehadeh‚Äôs uncle who was stopped by some soldiers just after the 1967 war, marched off to a nearby field and shot along with his companion, their bodies then set on fire and found days later. There is also the case of the Arab lawyer who was engaged to contest the sale of land of a nearby village to the Jewish National Fund, whose representatives had frightened an old woman into signing documents selling the land (purchased by charitable tax-deductible contributions by Americans, and then reserved for Jewish use). He was warned by the military government to keep off the case, and when he refused, was arrested ‚Äúon suspicion of driving without a licence‚Äù and sentenced to six months in prison and a fine of 7500 Israeli pounds. The Jewish National Fund is represented by a West Bank lawyer, one who has chosen the second way, ‚Äúso that it can never be said that the land was taken against our will,‚Äù an important consideration for Americans called upon the explain why all of this is right and just. There is the client who ‚Äúhas clearly been severely tortured,‚Äù and many other images that shape the world of the Samid. There are other experiences that entice the Samid to undertake the first way, as the conquerer would no doubt prefer, so as to rid himself of the troublesome intruder in the Land of Israel. For example, the case of Hani, shot by an Israeli soldier during a demonstration against the racist American Rabbi Meir Kahane, who openly calls for driving the Arabs out of the Land of the Jews, and acts accordingly, with particular Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
265  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  effectiveness while he is performing his duties in the occupied territories in the military reserves. Hani says that he was not taking part in the demonstration, but since he was shot, he was a participant by definition, ‚Äúthrowing stones and petrol bombs at soldiers‚Äù and injured when he fell, as he was instructed by the soldier standing over him after he was shot. An ambulance arrived from Ramallah hospital, but the soldiers insisted that he first be taken, bleeding from his wounds, for questioning at the military headquarters. He was finally taken to Ramallah hospital for surgery, but the soldiers decided that he must be taken to Israel‚Äôs Hadassah Hospital on Mt. Scopus in Jerusalem instead. There, he could not be admitted to the emergency room because, he was told, ‚Äúthere is no room.‚Äù He was taken to the Hadassah branch hospital at the other end of town. Seven hours after he was shot, he was admitted to a hospital. His mother must borrow ‚Äúvast sums to pay for his hospitalization in Hadassah,‚Äù despite the promises that the military government would pay the bill. At the hospital, ‚Äúthe hostility and coldness were marked‚Ķand nurses did not bother to conceal their animosity,‚Äù perhaps because of a subsequent shooting of Jews at Hebron. Hani‚Äôs calls went unanswered, and he ‚Äúwould be left unfed for whole days on end.‚Äù Hani‚Äôs mother fears to appeal the decision of the Israeli military that ‚Äúnot enough evidence was found to incriminate anyone,‚Äù knowing ‚Äúthat if she files charges, her son will be charged for participating in the demonstration against Kahane,‚Äù or he will simply be picked up on some charge and beaten by soldiers, like others. All of this is part of the life of the Samid. The Samid sees ‚Äúmany Israeli faces fly by,‚Äù but ‚Äúthree stand out‚Äù: First, the slightly pudgy, bespectacled face of the Ashkenazi intellectual; around him his Sephardi and Druse imitators. They look at me with the arrogance of colonizers. Their eyes Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
266  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  express surprise mingled with anger that I, the native, should dare to think that I understand what they are up to. Then comes the gross, almost unlined face of Ariel Sharon and his gang of thugs: a petrifying combination of retardation and power: they mean evil and will succeed. Their faces are blank, completely free of even a twinge of conscience. And last, and in some way more disturbing than any: the weak face of the ‚Äòbeautiful Israeli‚Äô who is upset by the occupation, not because it is evil, but because it ruins his looks. And he has every right to be concerned, because the lines on his face are ugly: those of a pampered narcissist who sees in his ever-present mirror his beauty fading‚Äîand begins to pout. It is not too difficult to attach names to the faces, though there are other Israelis too, as Shehadeh eloquently describes‚Äîto one of whom I am indebted for sending me a copy of his book. The faces of Israel seen by the Samid are rather different from those depicted by the admiring American visitor: Saul Bellow, for example, who sees an Israel where ‚Äúalmost everyone is reasonable and tolerant, and rancor against the Arabs is rare,‚Äù where the people ‚Äúthink so hard, and so much‚Äù as they ‚Äúfarm a barren land, industrialize it, build cities, make a society, do research, philosophize, write books, sustain a great moral tradition, and, finally create an army of tough fighters‚Äù149 or Irving Howe, whose Israelis are busy realizing ‚Äúthe democratic socialist hope of combining radical social change with political freedom.‚Äù Evidently, things look a bit different from the wrong end of the club.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  267  7. The Cycle of Occupation, Resistance, Repression and Moral Degeneration hese developments in Israel and the occupied territories were a direct consequence of the 1967 military victory, which a number of perceptive Israeli observers saw as a long-term defeat for the society they cherished, not without certain illusions of their own, in some cases. They were aware of what Eric Rouleau of Le Monde described in the early days of the occupation as ‚Äúthe classical chain reaction‚Äîoccupation, resistance, repression,‚Äîmore resistance,‚Äù and of further links in the chain: Israeli journalist Victor Cygielman wrote in 1968 that ‚ÄúOne thing is sure, terrorism will not succeed in wrecking Israel, but it may succeed in ruining Israeli democracy,‚Äù referring to the demoralizing effect of ‚Äúsuch measures of collective punishment as the blowing up of houses, administrative arrests and deportation to Jordan.‚Äù At the same time, Uri Avneri noted further that the ‚Äústeep spiral of terror and counter-terror, killing and retaliation, sabotage and mass deportation.. .will bring undreamt-of miseries to the Palestinian people‚Ķ[while] turning Israel into an armed and beleaguered camp forever,‚Äù leading ultimately to ‚ÄúSemitic suicide.‚Äù150  T  7.1 Americans Hear the News Similar warnings have repeatedly been voiced through the years by Israelis and others who called for an end to the occupation. By late 1982, the message had even reached the New York Times. Editor Max Frankel noticed that Israeli ‚Äúdissenters fear endless cycles of Palestinian terror and Israeli war‚Äîand the degradation of Israeli society as it grows Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  268  dependent on the manual work of‚Ķa permanent ‚Äòguest population‚Äô‚Äù151; those who had been making the same point for 15 years had been given short shrift by the Times, which was extolling the occupation as ‚Äúa model of future cooperation,‚Äù an ‚Äúexperiment in Arab-Jewish coexistence‚Äù (editorial, May 19, 1976) as the spiral of violence and repression mounted ever more steeply. Others too had begun to hear the news by mid-1982. Irving Howe, who for years had been berating the bearers of unwelcome tidings as ‚Äúelitist,‚Äù anti-democratic, subject to ‚Äúthe pathology of authoritarianism,‚Äù and worse, reviewed Rafik Halabi‚Äôs West Bank Story (see note 48) in the New York Times Book Review, discovering to his sorrow that all was not well, primarily because of Menachem Begin.152 His comments caused much distress in Israel, even eliciting an article in the Labor Party journal Kol Hair reporting that ‚Äúthe former diplomat Zvi Rafiach recently returned [from the U.S.] quite shaken, bringing with him the issue‚Äù with Howe‚Äôs review. The journal comments, a bit unfairly, that ‚Äúin fact Howe had little to say in criticism concerning the new book; he only knew how to speak and weep about himself.‚Äù But the matter is serious, the article continues, since ‚Äúonly with difficulty did he find a good word to say about the country that he loves.‚Äù And Howe is no ordinary admirer of Israel: ‚ÄúAll America recognizes Howe, and knows that he is a lover of Israel. When no more supporters of Israel will remain in the United States‚Äîhe will still be waving the blue and white flag.‚Äù ‚ÄúWho else will we lose because of you, Likud government?,‚Äù the writer laments.153 In his review, Howe writes that Halabi‚Äôs commentary on life under the military occupation, ‚Äúthough open to dispute at some points, is strong enough to disturb even the most ardent supporters of Israel. At least, it disturbed this one.‚Äù The book ‚Äúfills me with a deep dismay‚Äîlet me be candid and say pessimism,‚Äù even when we correct for Halabi‚Äôs Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  269  exaggerations, as when he says that the occupation has a ‚Äúcorrupting effect‚Ķon the moral and social fiber of Israeli society‚Äù (‚ÄúLet us be a little cautious and say instead a coarsening effect‚Äù). Howe learned from the book that ‚Äúthe Begin Government‚Äôs intention has been the gradual takeover of the West Bank and that its vision of ‚Äòautonomy‚Äô is little more than an enforced Arab docility.‚Äù This, in May 1982. He suggests instead that Israel ‚Äúshould announce its readiness to withdraw, provided satisfactory security arrangements are worked out,‚Äù but fears that this policy cannot be adopted ‚Äúas long as Mr. Begin remains in office.‚Äù Equally, it could not be adopted if the Labor opposition that Howe supports were in office, as the record of the past 15 years, and Labor‚Äôs current positions, make crystal clear. Howe also learned that Labor had stumbled into ‚Äò‚Äòerror‚Äù in its occupation policy, and that ‚ÄúLabor‚Äôs incoherence was replaced by Menachem Begin‚Äôs coherence.‚Äù But in fact Labor‚Äôs rejectionism and pursuit of the Allon Plan were clear from the start and were not in the least ‚Äúincoherent‚Äù to those who chose to look at the facts. And the brutal and repressive character of the occupation in the West Bank was clearly apparent under the Labor government, a fact well recognized by Israeli doves in the late 1960s, as we have seen, not to speak of the repression in the Gaza Strip in the early 70s or Labor‚Äôs brutal treatment of the Sinai Arab farmers at the same time; see pp. 105f. The kind of ‚Äúardent support‚Äù that Howe was providing‚Äîin particular, his personal attacks on those who knew what he is now beginning to learn, Daniel Berrigan for example‚Äîwas a not insignificant factor in helping to establish the ‚Äúerrors‚Äù that he is now beginning to perceive with dismay, exactly as Israeli doves and others have been pointing out, with little effect, for many years; it might have been in place for Howe to address this point, which he heard years ago. Howe is concerned that Begin‚Äôs policies will ‚Äúthreaten the Jewish character of Israel‚Äù‚Äîwould we have similar concern about the Islamic; Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  270  or Christian, or White character of some state? In the same context, he speaks of the ‚Äúunderpopulated Galilee,‚Äù to which development funds should be allocated instead of the West Bank. The concept ‚Äúunderpopulated Galilee‚Äù is common in Israel, with a particular interpretation: there is a large population of Arab citizens, but there are too few Jews there (recall that many Arabs fled or were expelled from the Galilee in 1948, and that thousands more were expelled during the 1956 attack on Egypt; see section 2* above). The many Arabs, Israeli citizens, are excluded from the ‚Äúnational lands‚Äù (reserved for Jews). Their own lands have often been expropriated for Jewish settlement, they are unable to build for their expanding populations because of restriction of land use to Jews, and they have therefore been compelled to find work in Jewish enterprises. There is much concern in Israel over their ‚Äúland robbery,‚Äù over the ‚Äúinvasion‚Äù of ‚Äúnational lands‚Äù by Israeli citizens of the wrong ethnic affiliation. It was for such reasons that the Jewish Agency, under the Labor government, established the program of ‚ÄúJudaization of the Galilee,‚Äù to reverse this specific form of ‚Äúunderpopulation.‚Äù It was in response to the same problems that Israel Koenig of the Ministry of Interior, whose jurisdiction covers this region, issued the notorious ‚ÄúKoenig memorandum‚Äù in 1976 (under the Labor government), calling for measures to ‚Äúthin the concentrations of existing Arab population,‚Äù reduce employment and educational opportunities for Arabs and otherwise encourage their emigration, undermine their organizations by covert means, etc.‚Äîpolicies that some Israelis described as reflecting ‚Äúfascist values.‚Äù Koenig retained his position after the exposure of this secret memorandum and is still applying his values; see end of section 5.3 above. In short, Howe‚Äôs concept ‚Äúunderpopulated Galilee‚Äù conceals a tale.154 Howe also reviews some minor examples of the harsh practices that have been in force for 15 years and their ‚Äúcoarsening‚Äù effects‚Äîon the Israelis‚Äîand expresses his dismay as one of those ‚Äúwho Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
271  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  admire and think of ourselves as partisans of Israeli society,‚Äù indeed an ‚Äúardent supporter,‚Äù and who continues to support the Labor Party, which was responsible for initiating these practices, with no detectable qualifications. It is not entirely clear how to reconcile Howe‚Äôs self-description as an ‚Äúardent supporter‚Äù‚Äîstill less, the picture presented in Kol Hair‚Äîwith his earlier account of his stand: ‚ÄúI have never been a Zionist; I have always felt contempt for nationalist and chauvinist sentiments‚Äù (see note 83). This account is perhaps plausible, pre-1967, but what about more recent years? A closer look at some of Howe‚Äôs writings may help dispel the mystery, while providing some insight into the nature of post-1967 support for Israel in significant circles, as discussed in chapter 2. We may begin, perhaps, with Howe‚Äôs explanation of why unnamed ‚ÄúNew Left intellectuals‚Äù oppose Israel‚Äînamely, because of their ‚Äúgrowing distaste‚Äù and ‚Äúdownright contempt‚Äù for ‚Äúthe very idea of democracy,‚Äù so that they ‚Äúdespise Israel not because of her flaws but because of her virtues,‚Äù because of Israel‚Äôs commitment to ‚Äúcombining radical social change with political freedom.‚Äù Howe explains that to regain the favor of these ‚ÄúNew Left intellectuals,‚Äù whoever they may be, Israel would have to institute a fascist-style dictatorship in a bloody revolution. Then, he writes, this is what we would see: Everywhere the New Left rejoices. Brigades of youth from Scarsdale, Evanston, and Palo Alto race to Israel to help with ‚Äúthe planting.‚Äù The New York Review plans a special issue. And Jean-Paul Sartre and Mme. de Beauvoir take the next plane to Israel, prepared to write a thousand pages in four weeks on The Achievements of the Israeli Revolution (while getting the street names of Tel Aviv wrong).155 Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
272  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  In fact, Sartre was honored by the Hebrew University in recognition of his support for Israel, the New York Review has always been strongly pro-Israel, and the mainstream of the New Left tended towards the positions of Israeli doves. But facts are really irrelevant here, which is why Howe feels free to ignore them in his writings on this topic. The point is to destroy one‚Äôs enemies, relying on a useful convention of political discourse: slander and abuse are quite legitimate and argument and evidence are superfluous when the targets are activist elements of popular dissident movements. It is convenient to have one‚Äôs political enemies committed to the destruction of Israel and bloody fascist revolutions, so they are, whatever the facts. Note that Israel is really irrelevant to this drama, except insofar as the overwhelming support for Israel is used as a stick to beat the student movement, the New Left, peace activists, etc. Hence the possibility that someone who has ‚Äúnever been a Zionist‚Äù might appear to be such an ‚Äúardent supporter‚Äù of Israel‚Äîperhaps even to himself as well, after only a few years of playing the role‚Äîthat he will still be waving the blue and white flag when everyone else has deserted the cause. From 1967, many others have adopted the same device, which has proven a useful and highly effective one; see chapter 2 and references cited for further discussion of the phenomenon illustrated here, which is of some significance in the development of the ‚Äúspecial relationship‚Äù in the 1970s, particularly in its ideological aspect.  7.2 The Rise of Religious-Chauvinist Fanaticism The predictable cycle of repression, terror, and violence continues to arouse much concern in Israel, particularly among older, more Europeoriented segments of the population, who recognize all too clearly what Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  273  is happening. The first warnings came from Professor Yeshayahu Leibovitz, one of Israel‚Äôs best-known scholars, who has continued to speak out forcefully against the occupation (also against the war in Lebanon), a fact that has won him little praise. Amnon Rubinstein, former Dean of the Tel Aviv University Law School and a Knesset member, describes a series of actions by ‚Äúextremist and racist elements,‚Äù including military rabbis, adding that ‚Äúan ill wind is blowing against the direction of the Zionist vision, against the character of humanistic Judaism, against all that we had wanted Israel to become.‚Äù ‚ÄúPerhaps the worst sign of this,‚Äù he adds, ‚Äúis that it is becoming hard to distinguish between the lunatic fringe and the mainstream of our political life.‚Äù He describes anti-Arab terrorism by student leaders at the Hebrew University who threatened the university authorities with violence if they were disciplined, attacks by ‚Äúunknown cowardly inhabitants of Kiryat Arba [the religious settlement at Hebron] on the house of an Arab widow,‚Äù the failure of the authorities to react, the refusal of a construction company to rent an apartment in Jerusalem to a Christian couple, the sentiment among youth that the Arabs must be expelled, etc., concluding that ‚Äúwhat we are witnessing is not the action of minor and marginal fringe movements.‚Äù As internal conflict intensified in Israel in the wake of the Lebanon war, Rubinstein‚Äîamong many others‚Äîwarned in still clearer terms of the consequences of the ‚ÄúNazi storm trooper style‚Äù of the agents of ‚Äúcriminal violence,‚Äù now fortified by ‚Äúa political ideology of violence‚Äù with tacit government support and overt support from Gush Emunim Rabbis who publicly ‚Äúincite to kill Arab civilians.‚Äù Again he described how right-wing students ‚Äúuse their fists to control the campuses of the Jerusalem and Tel Aviv universities,‚Äù using ‚Äúnot only fists but clubs and iron chains,‚Äù and threatening violence if the university were to attempt disciplinary action. ‚ÄúLarge areas of Israel are simply closed to anyone who is not from the Likud‚Äù because of the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  274  violence of the supporters of Begin and Sharon, which they make no attempt to control (see section 4.4 above). Those who oppose the Likud are threatened with murder, or silenced ‚Äúby shouting, screaming and threats,‚Äù and are attacked if they attempt to distribute their materials. Perpetrators of overt violence ‚Äúare rarely caught.‚Äù He warns of a sorry fate if these tendencies continue.156 What Rubinstein and others fear is a virtual civil war, in which elements of a fascist character are increasingly visible‚Äîa fact that they do not disguise. But quite apart from the scale of the verbal and physical violence and its socioeconomic, ethnic and religious-cultural roots, there are other indications to support Rubinstein‚Äôs judgment that the ‚Äúill wind‚Äù is a serious phenomenon, not confined to the lunatic fringe.157 The Director General of the Israel Broadcasting Authority (radio and television), who ‚Äúis a long-time admirer of South Africa and a frequent visitor there,‚Äù wrote an ‚Äúemotional article‚Äù in 1974 expressing his preference for South Africa over Black Africa, complete ‚Äúwith citations of research proving the genetic inferiority of blacks‚Äù‚Äîa view which ‚Äúseems to reflect the feelings of many in the Israeli elite.‚Äù The journal of Mapam (the left-wing of the Labor Alignment) is capable of publishing an explanation of the superiority of Israeli pilots, based on American research which has ‚Äúproven‚Äù that Blacks (including, apparently, Arabs) are inferior in ‚Äúcomplex, cognitive intelligence‚Äù (which is why ‚ÄúAmerican Blacks succeed only in short-distance running‚Äù). The same journal also devoted 2 full pages to racist idiocies tracing genetic differences between Jews and Gentiles to Abraham, and explaining the alleged cultural ascendance of the U.S. over Europe in terms of the change in the proportion of the Jewish populations. The article begins by noting that ‚Äúin the atmosphere prevailing today in the Holy Land, everything is possible, even racist doctrine‚Ķ,‚Äù but then proceeds to give a rather sympathetic portrayal of the author of the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  275  example they provide, letting the interested reader know how to obtain more information. In the Labor Party journal, we read about ‚Äúgenetic experiments‚Äù that have shown that ‚Äúthe genetic differences among Jewish communities [Poland and Yemen are cited] are smaller than those between Gentiles and Jews‚Äù (the medical correspondent, reporting research conducted at Tel Aviv University), while the Ministry of Education sponsors a creationist congress organized by Orthodox scientists from Ben-Gurion University in which the theory of evolution is dismissed as ‚Äúspeculation,‚Äù ‚Äúsecular dogma‚Äù and ‚Äúmyth‚Äù while most of the participating scientists ‚Äúreaffirmed their belief in divine creation.‚Äù158 It is not too surprising, then, to discover that Israel‚Äôs Christian Maronite allies in Lebanon are really Syrian Jews in origin159‚Äîthough it is likely that they lost this status after the Beirut massacres, a few days after this information appeared. It is, however, primarily in religious circles that such ‚ÄúKhomeinism‚Äù (as it is now sometimes characterized in Israel) is to be found. These circles are increasingly influential as a result of the social and demographic processes noted earlier. There also appear to be efforts to support Islamic fundamentalism in the occupied territories in opposition to secular (and hence more dangerous) forms of Palestinian nationalism. Commenting on this phenomenon in both the West Bank and Gaza, Danny Rubinstein observes that the military authorities‚Äîwho generally clamp down on demonstrations with an iron hand‚Äîallowed busloads of ‚ÄúIslamic fanatics‚Äù to pass through IDF roadblocks to join demonstrations at Bir Zeit‚Äîand al-Najah Universities, one sign oftheir support for Islamic fundamentalism against left and ‚Äúnationalist‚Äù (read: pro-PLO) trends.160 ‚ÄúThe uniting of religious fanaticism with extremist nationalism is not an unknown phenomenon in Israel in the past few years,‚Äù Eliahu Salpeter writes, citing as one example the pronouncements of a young Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  276  Rabbi on the ‚Äúfilth‚Äù of mixed marriages and the ‚Äúhybrid children‚Äù they produce, ‚Äúa thorn in the flesh of the Jewish society in Israel‚Äù that may become a real catastrophe unless proper measures are taken‚Äîhe recommends total school segregation and exclusion of Arabs from the universities. The Rabbi denies that he is prejudiced against Arabs, insisting that he has ‚Äúclose Arab friends‚Äù‚Äîa remark familiar to Jews, Salpeter comments. Salpeter cites other examples of the dangerous religious-nationalist brew: e.g., the failure to find those responsible for the terrorist attack on Arab mayors, the difference in treatment of Arabs who throw rocks and religious Jews who stone people who drive on the Sabbath. 161 In earlier years, the Rabbinate had cited biblical authority to justify expulsion of the Arabs (a ‚Äúforeign element‚Äù) from the land, or simply their destruction, and religious law was invoked to justify killing of civilians in a war or raid.162 After the 1973 war, the highly-respected Lubavitcher Rabbi (New York) deplored the failure to conquer Damascus.163 He also warned against abandoning any of the conquered territories, condemning those ‚Äúwho for the sake of miserable money and honors, and especially in order to be well-regarded by the big Goy [Gentile] in Washington, are ready to threaten the security of the Holy Land by giving up territories against the opinions of military experts,‚Äù which is ‚Äúagainst the Jewish Religion‚Ķ‚Äù164 Another American Rabbi* explained that the religious law empowers Israel to ‚Äúdispossess‚Äù the Arabs of the conquered territories: ‚ÄúAs long as the war which initiated the conquest was conducted under instructions from the Israeli government, who halachicly [by religious law] possesses the same *  Rabbi Isaac J. Bernstein, who is identified as ‚Äúspiritual leader of Manhattan‚Äôs  Jewish Center…an executive member of the Rabbinical Council of America and a lecturer in Talmud at Stern College.‚Äù Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  277  powers as the biblical king, all territories captured as a result of this war belong to Israel.‚Äù As for ‚Äúthe argument that by not surrendering the territories, we might be heightening the possibility of a future war,‚Äù this is ‚Äúnot valid‚Äù under religious law which ‚Äúindicates that, on the contrary, we must start a war to prevent even the possibility of permanent settlement nearer our borders than heretofore.‚Äù165 After Sadat‚Äôs visit to Jerusalem, a group of leading Rabbis and religious authorities in Israel and the U.S. warned the government that it is ‚Äúforbidden‚Äù to return any territories of the Land of Israel,166 and the Supreme Rabbinical Council of Israel later reiterated this judgment, citing biblical obligations and religious law.167 The chief Rabbis also gave their endorsement to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, declaring that it conformed to the Halachic (religious) law and that participation in the war ‚Äúin all its aspects‚Äù is a religious duty. The military Rabbinate meanwhile distributed a document to soldiers containing a map of Lebanon with the names of cities replaced by alleged Hebrew names taken from the Bible, along with the explanation that much of Lebanon belonged to the Hebrew tribe of Asher. They also provided a strategic analysis of the Lebanon war under the heading ‚ÄúJoshua son of Nun to the clearing of the nests of the enemies in Lebanon,‚Äù referring to the biblical account of the conquest of the Land of Canaan168‚Äîthe phrase ‚Äúclearing the nests of terrorists‚Äù is now a standard way of referring to operations against Palestinian vermin. Speaking to soldiers under the auspices of the hasbara (‚Äúpropaganda‚Äù; literally, ‚Äúexplanation‚Äù) officer, a military Rabbi in Lebanon explained the biblical sources that justify ‚Äúour being here and our opening the war; we do our Jewish religious duty by being here‚Äù.169 Such pronouncements are by no means novel, and since 1973 at least, they have been taken seriously in significant circles. In the masscirculation journal Yediot Ahronot in 1974, Menahem Barash wrote with Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  278  much admiration about the teachings of Rabbi Moshe Ben-Zion Ushpizai of Ramat-Gan, who used biblical texts and traditional commentary to explain how Israel should deal with the Palestinians, ‚Äúa plague already written in the Bible.‚Äù ‚ÄúWith a sharp scalpel and convincing logic‚Äù the Rabbi uses the writings of the ‚Äúgreatest sages‚Äù to elucidate the commandments, still binding today, as to how to ‚Äúinherit the land‚Äù that was promised by God to Abraham. We must follow the doctrines of Joshua, he explains, referring to the genocidal texts that appear in the book of Joshua and elsewhere. ‚ÄúThe biblical commandment is to conquer the land of Israel in its detailed borders, to take possession of it and to settle it.‚Äù It is ‚Äúforbidden‚Äù to ‚Äúabandon it to strangers‚Äù (Gentiles). ‚ÄúThere is no place in this land for the people of Israel and for other nations alongside it. The practical meaning of [the commandment to] possess the land is the expulsion of the peoples who live in it‚Äù and who try to prevent the Jews of the world from ‚Äúsettling in our land.‚Äù It is ‚Äúa holy war, commanded in the Bible,‚Äù and it must be fought against Palestinians, Syrians, Egyptians ‚Äúor any other people in the world‚Äù who seek to block the divine commandment. There can be no compromises, no peace treaties, no negotiations with ‚Äúthe peoples who inhabit the land.‚Äù ‚ÄúYou shall destroy them, you shall enter into no covenant with them, you shall not pity them, you shall not intermarry with them,‚Äù the divine law dictates. Whoever stands in our way must be annihilated, the Rabbi continues with his ‚Äúconvincing logic,‚Äù citing numerous traditional authorities. All of this is reported quite seriously, and with much respect.170 After the Beirut massacres of September 1982 there was a renewed outpouring of militant support for the war in religious circles. The influential Gush Emunim group, which spearheads West Bank settlement, published a statement praising Begin, Sharon, and Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan, describing the war as a ‚Äúgreat act of sanctification of God‚Äôs Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
279  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  name.‚Äù The statement also spoke of ‚Äúthe return of the territory of the tribes of Naftali and Asher to the boundaries of Israel,‚Äù and of Israel‚Äôs ‚Äúresponsibility to act to the limits of its ability to destroy the foundations of evil in the entire world.‚Äù171 Two months before, Rabbi Elazar Valdman of Gush Emunim wrote in the journal Nekudah of the religious West Bank settlers: We will certainly establish order in the Middle East and in the world. And if we do not take this responsibility upon ourselves, we are sinners, not just towards ourselves but towards the entire world. For who can establish order in the world? All of those western leaders of weak character?172 In Israel, one does not take pronouncements of Gush Emunim lightly. Their influence has been considerable, and they have regularly created policy (with state support) by their actions in the occupied territories. This statement therefore caused some consternation. One of the founders of the movement, Yehuda Ben-Meir, sharply denounced it, stating that ‚Äúaccording to Gush Emunim, we must conquer not only Syria and Turkey but with the blood of our children we must become the guardian of the entire world.‚Äù173 It may seem odd that such ludicrous pronouncements are taken seriously, but in the current atmosphere of spreading ‚ÄúKhomeinism‚Äù among significant circles of the fourth greatest military power in the world, they cannot be disregarded, and are not, by serious Israeli commentators. We return to further indications of this grandiose self-image, and its implications.174 Those who really deserve the name ‚Äúsupporters of Israel‚Äù will not be unconcerned over such developments. Within Israel itself, they have often led to near despair. Boaz Evron writes that ‚Äúthe true symbol of the state is no longer the Menorah with seven candlesticks; the true symbol Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
280  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  is the fist.‚Äù175 In conformity with his judgment, when West Beirut was invaded, IDF Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan announced: What must be destroyed‚Äîwe will destroy. Whoever must be imprisoned‚Äîwe will imprison.176 Aharon Meged writes of his sadness with regard to ‚Äúthe new ‚ÄòZionist mentality‚Äô,‚Äù which is coming to reign and ‚Äúcannot be stopped‚Äù: ‚Äúthe age of military Zionism.‚Äù ‚ÄúThe old fear of a ‚ÄòSparta‚Äô‚Äîis changing to fear of a ‚ÄòPrussia‚Äô.‚Äù Like Danny Rubinstein (see note 172), he is much concerned over the ravings of Rabbi Valdman, and offers the hope that return of the territories can still overcome this fate, citing Chief Sephardic Rabbi Ovadiah Yoseph, who agreed that return of territories is legitimate if it would lead to peace. It may incidentally be noted that his Ashkenazi counterpart, Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren, drew the opposite conclusion from religious law, holding that retaining ‚ÄúJudea and Samaria‚Äù takes precedence over the religious duty to save life (‚Äúpikuach nefesh‚Äù). He ‚Äúrejects categorically‚Äù the idea that achievement of peace would justify territorial compromise.177 The example once again illustrates the fact that one should be rather cautious in contrasting Ashkenazi doves with Sephardi hawks.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  281  8. Conflicts within Israel 8.1 Within the Jewish Community uring the war in Lebanon, the conflict between two communities‚Äîroughly, the older, West Europe-oriented, wealthier and more educated sectors, and the working class and lower middle class (mostly Sephardic) Jews joined by much of the youth and by religious-chauvinist elements, many from the recent U.S. and USSR immigrations‚Äîbecame increasingly sharp. In a study of the protest against the war, sociologist Benjamin Beit-Halahmi of Haifa University observed that ‚Äúit is clear that the opposition to the 1982 war is that of a minority of the Israeli population,‚Äù the ‚Äúelite.‚Äù The Sephardic community and the youth were less represented, and in general supported the war‚Äîas did some leaders of the traditional peace groups, he notes. The favorable publicity given to the opposition by the press is misleading, since the journalists too tend to belong to the elite. ‚ÄúOpposition to the 1982 war increased even further the alienation of the traditional Ashkenazi elite, which identifies with a progressive tradition in Zionism. This group is in the midst of a process of alienation, which has been growing stronger since 1977 [when Begin‚Äôs Likud took power], and each development since then causes this alienation to deepen.‚Äù As for the war itself, ‚Äúthe price of the direct military victory and of political and human oppression is paid not only by the vanquished, but by the victors as well.‚Äù178 The lines of the conflict were drawn still more sharply after the Lebanon war (see section 7.2 above), a matter to which we return.  D  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
282  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  8.2 Non-Jews in the Jewish State The conflict between the two communities has long been simmering within Israel. There is, of course, a still deeper internal conflict. Israel has been and remains a vibrant democracy on the western model for its Jewish citizens, but it has always embodied a fundamental contradiction, as noted earlier (see chapter 3, section 2.2.1). Israel is a Jewish state with a minority of non-Jewish citizens. It is not the state of its citizens, but of the Jewish people, those in Israel and in the diaspora. There is no Israeli nationality. While it is commonly argued that Israel is Jewish only in the sense that England is English, so that those who (vainly) insist on the facts are uniquely rejecting the rights of Jewish nationalism, that is a flat falsehood. A citizen of England is English, but a citizen of Israel may not be Jewish, a non-trivial fact, much obscured in deceptive rhetoric.179 The legal structures and administrative practice of the state and society reflect these principles, again, a fact consistently suppressed in the voluminous literature concerning Israel and in particular in admiring left-liberal commentary; and also by Israelis writing for an American audience. Thus Amos Oz asserts that ‚ÄúTo this day, only about 5 percent of the land is privately owned; the rest is public property, in one way or another,‚Äù including the lands of the kibbutz in which he lives. He presents this fact (the actual figure appears to be about 8%) as one indication that: …Israel could have become an exemplary state, an open, argumentative, involved society of unique moral standards and future-oriented outlook, a small-scale laboratory for democratic socialism‚Äîor, as the old-timers liked to put it, ‚Äúa light unto the nations.‚Äù But at that point, when Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
283  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  everything seemed ready for such an emergence, crisis set in.180 The ‚Äúvision‚Äù is being lost, though it may still be resurrected by ‚Äúa growing tendency on the part of young Israelis‚Äù (mythical, to judge by available evidence) to recover ‚Äúthe ideological, ethical and political propositions of the early Zionists.‚Äù* But Oz and others who advance such arguments do not present accurately the ‚Äúpropositions‚Äù of the early Zionists‚Äîfor example, the transfer proposals discussed earlier‚Äîor the ‚Äúone way or another‚Äù in which the land remains ‚Äúpublic property,‚Äù a rather significant matter. Through a complex system of legal and administrative arrangements, *  In the U.S., Oz is regarded as a spokesman for the ‚Äúpeace forces‚Äù in Israel.  See, for example, Hayden, The American Future, or Oz‚Äôs interview with Eugene Goodheart, Partisan Review, #3, 1982. Here he recommends that Israel ‚Äúmake a generous proposal which will no doubt be rejected by the Palestinians right now‚Äù (what is should be, he does not say). So far there has been a firm and consistent rejection by the Palestinians of any such proposals from Israeli moderates and doves.‚Äù ‚ÄúThere is,‚Äù he says, ‚Äúno Palestinian equivalent to the Israeli Peace Now movement. The ‚Äúso-called reasonable Palestinians‚Ķdo hint or suggest that they will accept the idea of partition, accept the existence of Israel under certain terms and are ready to negotiate,‚Äù but to their own people, they ‚Äúare just as extremist as Arafat‚Äù‚Äîwho, in fact, has urged negotiations and a two-state settlement for years, going beyond even the Israeli Peace Now movement (which is vague about these matters), let alone the Labor Party, in a search for a peaceful settlement (see final * in section 4.2.3 above and chapter 3). It is an interesting commentary on left-liberal American intellectuals that this is taken seriously here. Predictably, Oz also grossly misrepresents the positions of critics of Israeli policies. See also chapter 3, note 111. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  284  public land is under the control of the Jewish National Fund, an organization committed to use charitable funds (specifically, tax-free contributions from the United States) in ways that are determined to be ‚Äúdirectly or indirectly beneficial to persons of Jewish religion, race or origin.‚Äù Much of the development budget is in the hands of the Jewish Agency, which has similar commitments. These and other ‚Äúnational institutions‚Äù serve the interests of Jews, not citizens of Israel, 15% of whom are non-Jews. The consequences of these arrangements and others like them for the lives of non-Jewish citizens are considerable, 181 putting aside here the activities of these and other ‚Äúnational institutions‚Äù in the occupied territories. We would hardly regard similar arrangements in a ‚ÄúWhite State‚Äù or a ‚ÄúChristian State‚Äù as an illustration of ‚Äúunique moral standards‚Äù and ‚Äúdemocratic socialism‚Äù of the highest order. The notorious UN Resolution identifying Zionism as a form of racism can properly be condemned for profound hypocrisy, given the nature of the states that backed it (including the Arab states), and (arguably) for referring to Zionism as such rather than the policies of the State of Israel, but restricted to these policies, the resolution cannot be criticized as inaccurate. The devices that are used to perpetuate discriminatory practices are sometimes remarkable. For example, the state offers benefits to large families, but some way must be found to ensure that Arab citizens are excluded. The standard method in such cases is to restrict benefits to families of those who have served in the armed forces, hence not to Arab families. But there is still a problem, since religious Jews are exempt from army service. The legislation therefore incorporates a special provision for families of students in yeshivas (Jewish religious schools). There are numerous similar examples. It might also be noted that Israel is perhaps the only western democracy in which there is legal discrimination against Jews. To cite one recent example, in 1983 the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  285  Knesset again defeated a bill that would have given Reform and Conservative Jews equal rights with those of Orthodox Jews, not a small matter given the role of the Rabbinate in civil life in Israel. 182 Given the founding principles of the state, it is a crucially important matter to maintain a clear distinction between Jews and non-Jews. ‚ÄúThe officials of the Ministry of the Interior are very tough with any members of the Israeli minorities who try to change their names, because they are afraid that they may want to try ‚Äòto appear in public as Jews,‚Äô and this may bring about mixed marriages, God forbid,‚Äù it is reported in an article critical of these practices. Repeatedly, Arabs have been condemned by the courts for pretending to be Jews. In 1977, an inhabitant of Kafr Kassem was sentenced to a year in prison ‚Äúfor pretending to be a Jew in order to marry a [Jewish] woman,‚Äù after ‚Äúhe had tried to convert‚Äîbut did not succeed.‚Äù183 The sentence might have been expected to cause some embarrassment‚Äîbut apparently did not‚Äîin the light of the history of this criminal‚Äôs village, where 47 Arabs were murdered by Israeli Border Guards in 1956.184 This was recognized to be a crime. The officer held responsible for the orders by the court was fined one piaster (ten cents) for a ‚Äútechnical error.‚Äù Gabriel Dahan, who was convicted of killing 43 Arabs in one hour, served just over a year, the longest sentence served, and was then promptly engaged as officer for Arab affairs in Ramle.* Note that his crime was considered by the courts to be *  See Tom Segev. ‚ÄúKafr Kassem Remembered.‚Äù Ha‚Äôaretz, Oct. 23, 1981, for a  rare report in the Israeli literature, reconstructing the events, which, Segev notes, are not taught in Jewish or Arab schools and are not known to many Israelis. Meir Pail is quoted as saying that ‚Äúonly a pathological hatred of the Arabs‚Äù made the massacre possible. Former Prime Minister Sharett said that the massacre ‚Äúhad made one thing clear: To spill Arab blood was permissible for Jews.‚Äù Segev reports the attempts to cover up the atrocity, the special Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  286  approximately equal in severity to that of the inhabitant of the village who pretended to be a Jew. To cite only one further example, the city of Denver has a sister city: Karmiel, in the Galilee. The citizens of Denver who relax in Karmiel Park are surely unaware that their sister city has excluded Arab citizens of Israel; even a 20-year Druze veteran of the Israeli Border Guards was denied the right to open a business there. Furthermore, this ‚Äúmagnificent example of Zionism at its successful best,‚Äù as it is described by an admirer,185 is built on the lands of an Arab village, expropriated under a cynical ruse in the mid-1960s.186 In short, the citizens of Denver are victims of a clever propaganda trick, which can be successful‚Äîand is‚Äîbecause of the ‚Äúideological support‚Äù for Israel noted earlier, which protects it from scrutiny. Quite generally, when one looks beneath the surface, one finds that the utopian vision has always been seriously flawed. Americans who now write ruefully about contemporary Israel as a ‚ÄúParadise Lost‚Äù187 are victims of considerable delusion and very effective propaganda, though they are right in feeling that much that was praiseworthy in the society, sometimes uniquely so, was lost (as many predicted) as a result of the 1967 military victory. While it is convenient (and not totally false) to shift the blame to Arab intransigence, honesty should compel us to privileges accorded the prisoners, and their successful subsequent careers, particularly that of Issachar Shadmi, who was in charge and had told the soldiers under his command that ‚Äúit was ‚Äòbetter to kill someone‚Äô (or, according to another version, ‚Äòseveral people‚Äô) than to get bogged down by arrests.‚Äù The victims had technically violated a curfew, which they knew nothing about since it was imposed after they had left the village for work; they were killed on their return that evening, cold-blooded premeditated murder. On expropriation of the lands of the village, both before and after the massacre, see TNCW. p. 465. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  287  recognize that the primary source lies elsewhere: in the policies of the Labor governments and their successor and the support offered to these policies by the United States, crucially including the attitudes and activities of alleged ‚Äúsupporters of Israel,‚Äù who have much to answer for, if truth be acknowledged. The fundamental internal contradiction in the commitment to a ‚Äúdemocratic Jewish State‚Äù has always been present, but it becomes more difficult to suppress with steps towards integration of the occupied territories, one reason why the Labor Alignment‚Äîmore concerned with the democratic socialist image than Likud‚Äîhas always been opposed to absorbing the Arabs of the occupied territories within the state proper. In the earlier history of Zionism, the issue was sometimes frankly addressed. As noted earlier, it was not until 1942 that the Zionist movement was officially committed to the establishment of a Jewish state. Earlier, its leaders‚Äîparticularly those from the labor movement that dominated the Palestinian Yishuv (Jewish settlement)‚Äîforcefully opposed the concept of a Jewish state on the explicit grounds that ‚Äúthe rule of one national group over the other‚Äù is illegitimate. David BenGurion and others declared that they would never agree to a Jewish state, ‚Äúwhich would eventually mean Jewish domination of Arabs in Palestine.‚Äù188 With the coming of the war and the Nazi genocide, these currents were reduced to a minority, though they persisted until the UN partition resolution of November 1947. Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the issues have generally been suppressed while the prospects feared have been realized; and in the U.S., they have been concealed by means that hardly do credit to those responsible.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
288  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  9. The Zionist Movement and the PLO n the pre-state period, the nuclei of the two present political groupings were in often bitter conflict, in part, class conflict. The Labor Party was a party of Jewish workers (NB: not workers; in fact, it opposed efforts by the Mandatory government to improve the conditions of Arab workers* while urging a boycott of their labor and produce),189 while the Revisionists, the precursors of Begin‚Äôs Herut, were in fact an offshoot of European fascism, with an ideology of submission of the mass to a single leader, strike-breaking, chauvinist fanaticism, and the rest of the familiar paraphernalia of the 1930s.190  I  9.1 ‚ÄúThe Boundaries of Zionist Aspirations‚Äù *  Few leaders of the pre-state Labor Party were so concerned with justice for the  Arabs as Chaim Arlosoroff, who was assassinated in 1933 (by Revisionists, Labor alleged). It is therefore interesting to consider his views on this matter. In a 1932 memorandum to Chaim Weizmann, he wrote that a major problem was that the British administration was ‚Äúconsiderate of the sensibilities of the Arabs and Moslems,‚Äù and ‚Äúit would be very hard for them to depart from this practice to the extent of becoming responsive to our demands.‚Äù Another problem was that the Mandatory authorities might promulgate ‚Äúregulations for the protection of tenant farmers,‚Äù etc., all harmful to the Zionist enterprise. He therefore proposed ‚Äúa transition period during which the Jewish minority would exercise organized revolutionary rule.‚Äù On the powerful influence of Bolshevik ideas on the Labor Party, particularly its leader David Ben-Gurion, see Yoram Peri, Between Ballots and Bullets. The left wing of the Labor Alignment, Mapam, was predominantly Stalinist until the mid-1950s. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
289  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  The two factions also differed in their political tactics when the prospects for a Jewish state became realistic. Supporting a British partition proposal of 1937, Labor Party leader David Ben-Gurion stated that: The acceptance of partition does not commit us to renounce Transjordan; one does not demand from anybody to give up his vision. We shall accept a state in the boundaries fixed today, but the boundaries of Zionist aspirations are the concern of the Jewish people and no external factor will be able to limit them.191 Ben-Gurion, and the large majority of the Zionist movement, reacted with similar pragmatism to the partition proposal of 1947. In contrast, even after the state was established in 1948, Menachem Begin declared that: The partition of the Homeland is illegal. It will never be recognized. The signature of institutions and individuals of the partition agreement is invalid. It will not bind the Jewish people. Jerusalem was and will forever be our capital. Eretz Israel [the Land of Israel] will be restored to the people of Israel. All of it. And forever.192 Echoes of these conflicting positions remain today. It might be noted that the ‚Äúboundaries of Zionist aspirations‚Äù in BenGurion‚Äôs ‚Äúvision‚Äù were quite broad, including southern Lebanon, southern Syria, today‚Äôs Jordan, all of cis-Jordan, and the Sinai.193 This was, in fact, one of Ben-Gurion‚Äôs constant themes. In internal discussion in 1938, he stated that ‚Äúafter we become a strong force, as the result of the creation of a state, we shall abolish partition and expand to the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
290  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  whole of Palestine… The state will only be a stage in the realization of Zionism and its task is to prepare the ground for our expansion into the whole of Palestine by a Jewish-Arab agreement… The state will have to preserve order not only by preaching morality but by machine guns, if necessary.‚Äù The ‚Äúagreement‚Äù that Ben-Gurion had in mind was to be with King Abdullah of Jordan, who would be induced to cede areas of cis-Jordan under his control, while many of the Arab residents would leave.194 Earlier, Ben-Gurion had explained to Arab interlocutors that ‚Äúour land‚Äù included Transjordan, and that it extended from the Sinai to ‚Äúthe source of the Jordan.‚Äù195 In internal discussion he urged that ‚Äúwe do not suggest now to announce the final aim,‚Äù which is ‚Äúfar-reaching,‚Äù even more so than the aim of those who were opposing partition. ‚ÄúI am unwilling to abandon‚Ķthe great Jewish vision, the final vision,‚Äù he added. This vision, here unspecified in scale, ‚Äúis an organic, spiritual and ideological component of my Jewishness and my Zionist aspiration,‚Äù Ben-Gurion explained.196 Zionist leaders were sometimes quite open about the matter in public discussion. The Twentieth Zionist Congress at Zurich in August 1937 took the official position that ‚Äúthe scheme of partition put forward by the Royal Commission [the British Peel Commission] is unacceptable,‚Äù but, nevertheless, the Congress indicated a degree of support for the idea. In particular, Ben-Gurion and Weizmann favored it. In a press interview concerning the deliberations at the Congress, Ben-Gurion explained: The debate has not been for or against the indivisibility of Eretz Israel. No Zionist can forgo the smallest portion of Eretz Israel. The debate was over which of two routes would lead quicker to the common goal. The ‚Äútwo routes‚Äù were rejection of partition, or acceptance on the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
291  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  assumption that circumstances would later permit a further expansion of the borders of the Jewish state to all of the territories that fell within ‚Äúthe boundaries of Zionist aspirations,‚Äù as Ben-Gurion understood them.* Chaim Weizmann, asked about the exclusion of the Negev from the proposed Jewish state, responded: ‚ÄúIt will not run away.‚Äù197 In a similar vein, Labor dove Chain Arlosoroff wrote to Weizmann in 1932 that ‚Äúthe desire to establish national sovereignty in a part of Palestine‚Ķcontains a core of sound thinking,‚Äù since ‚Äústate power‚Äù in this region ‚Äúcould become a strategic base for potential future progress.‚Äù198 In a letter to his son, discussing partition, Ben-Gurion wrote that A partial Jewish state is not the end, but only the beginning… I am certain that we will not be prevented from settling in the other parts of the country, either by mutual agreement with our Arab neighbors or by some other means… [If the Arabs refuse] we shall have to speak to them in a different language. But we shall only have another language if we have a state. In May 1948, feeling quite confident of Israel‚Äôs military superiority (contrary to the ‚ÄúDavid and Goliath legend‚Äù discussed earlier), BenGurion presented the following strategic aims to his General Staff: *  After the 1967 war, long after he had left office, Ben-Gurion changed his views  and came to oppose the expansionist policies he had always advocated and pursued while in a position of authority, thus isolating himself completely from his former Labor Party associates. By some remarkable logic, this fact is regularly adduced by Labor supporters here to show how conciliatory Labor Zionism really was. See chapter 6, section 6.3, below, for one of many examples. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
292  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  …we should prepare to go over to the offensive with the aim of smashing Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria… The weak point in the Arab coalition is Lebanon [for] the Moslem regime is artificial and easy to undermine. A Christian state should be established, with its southern border on the Litani river [within Lebanon]. We will make an alliance with it. When we smash the [Arab] Legion‚Äôs strength and bomb Amman, we will eliminate Transjordan too, and then Syria will fall. If Egypt still dares to fight on, we shall bomb Port Said, Alexandria, and Cairo. An interesting portent. After the Armistice Agreement was signed in February 1949, Ben-Gurion decided to establish another fait accompli. He ordered two brigades to Eilat, on the Gulf of Aqaba, which they took with no resistance on March 10. Violation of cease-fires has been a standard practice; recall the attack on the Golan Heights in 1967 (see p. 21). Shortly after, Ben-Gurion was touring the border with a young general, whom he asked, ‚ÄúHow would you take those hills?,‚Äù pointing to the Mountains of Edom beyond the Jordanian border. The general made some suggestions and then said, ‚ÄúWhy do you ask? Do you want to conquer those hills?‚Äù Ben-Gurion responded: ‚ÄúI? No. But you will conquer them.‚Äù He also maintained what his official biographer calls ‚Äúhis dream of annexing the Sinai Peninsula.‚Äù After the 1956 conquest of the Sinai,* Ben-Gurion announced the founding of ‚Äúthe Third Kingdom of *  Menachem Begin ‚Äúswore‚Äù before the Israeli Knesset that David Ben-Gurion had  proposed the conquest of the West Bank in 1956 in a discussion with his coconspirator in the attack on Egypt, French Socialist Prime Minister Guy Mollet, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
293  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  Israel,‚Äù and informed the Knesset that ‚ÄúOur army did not infringe on Egyptian territory… Our operations were restricted to the Sinai Peninsula alone.‚Äù199  9.2 Moderates and Extremists Pre-state Zionism exhibits a number of striking similarities to divisions within the PLO between the Rejectionists, who refuse to accept any compromise, and the mainstream around Yasser Arafat, who have joined the international consensus on a two-state settlement (see chapter 3), though they too do not abandon their ‚Äúdream‚Äù of a unitary democratic secular state, a goal to be achieved, they now say, through a process of peaceful interaction with Israel. The fact that the accommodationist elements that dominate the PLO refuse to abandon their ‚Äúdream‚Äù has been exploited regularly as an argument that it is impossible to have any dealings with them. For example, David Krivine describes ‚Äúthe agony which Jewish Israelis are going through at present in seeking a solution to the problem of the Palestinians,‚Äù discussing a seminar on that subject in Jerusalem. The ‚Äúagony‚Äù is caused by the fact that there is no one to speak to: not even Meir Pail‚Äôs plan for a two-state settlement ‚Äúhad any chance of acceptance by the Arabs‚Äù‚Äîwhich is of course false: a similar plan was ‚Äúprepared‚Äù by the PLO, proposed at the UN, rejected by Israel and vetoed by the U.S. as far back as January 1976, as we have seen.  who was allegedly receptive. Mordechai Basok, ‚ÄúBegin‚Äôs ‚Äòscoop‚Äô,‚Äù Al Hamishmar, Sept. 9. 1982. If this is true, then the operation was presumably aborted as a consequence of Eisenhower‚Äôs unexpectedly harsh response to the invasion of Egypt. One might also wonder whether there was a more general plan involving the Arabs of the Israeli Galilee as well; see section 2. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
294  Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  It is this alleged refusal of the PLO to accept ‚Äúeven that‚Äù that is ‚Äúthe real holdup, which has shattered the complacency of all Israeli disputants, left-wing and right-wing.‚Äù The problem is ‚Äúthat the PLO‚Äîin all its factions‚Äîhas only one aim, to retrieve the whole of Palestine; that is, to eliminate Jewish statehood.‚Äù200 See also chapter 3, note 111. By the same logic, British anti-Semites might have argued in 1947‚Äî and perhaps did‚Äîthat it was impossible to deal with the ‚Äúmoderate‚Äù Zionists who accepted partition, given the nature of their ‚Äúdream,‚Äù a point that is regularly and conveniently ignored. Elsewhere, incidentally, Krivine has put the matter a bit more honestly, explaining that: the one group we won‚Äôt talk with, it is true, is the PLO‚Äîbut not because they are nasty people. The obstacle is the subject on the agenda. It can only be the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank, and that we can‚Äôt agree to.201 Quite generally, the PLO has the same sort of legitimacy that the Zionist movement had in the pre-state period, a fact that is undoubtedly recognized at some level within Israel and, I think, accounts for the bitter hatred of the PLO, which, rational people must concede, has been recognized by Palestinians as ‚Äútheir sole representative‚Äù whenever they have had the chance to express themselves. Israeli doves have not failed to take note of this fact, and have also observed that ‚ÄúThose who shall sober up from the collective intoxication will have to admit that the Palestinians are the Jews of our era, a small, hunted people, defenseless, standing alone against the best weapons, helpless‚Ķthe whole world is against them.‚Äù202 Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  295  9.3 The Use of Terror The similarities extend to the use of terror. Commenting on the PLO‚Äôs resort to terror, Noah Lucas observes that though this ‚Äúearned it little sympathy in the world, it nevertheless succeeded in establishing the image of its cause as the quest of a victimized people for national selfdetermination, rather than a neglected refugee problem as it had hitherto been widely regarded.‚Äù He adds that ‚ÄúThere is no escaping the analogy with Zionism in the late forties.‚Äù203 Recall that the current Prime Minister of Israel and its Foreign Minister are former terrorist commanders, with a bloody record of atrocities to their credit including the killing of Jews* as well as Britons and many Arabs,204 while the Secretary-General of the Jewish Agency until 1981 (Shmuel Lahis) was *  Barnea and Rubinstein state that ‚Äúthe Hagana archives contain the names of  40 Jews who were killed by Irgun and LEHI (Stern Group) men in the course of their underground work or in the context of settling internal accounts,‚Äù reviewing the record. This does not include Jews killed by terrorist attacks aimed at others, as in the King David Hotel bombing. The official history of Begin‚Äôs Irgun describes how they drowned a member who they thought might give information to the police, if captured; see Shahak, Begin And Co. The Haganah Special Actions Squads undertook ‚Äúpunitive actions against informers within the Jewish community‚Äù as one of its tasks (Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, p. 99). A Haganah prison in Haifa contained a torture chamber for interrogation of Jews suspected of collaboration with the British, the Haifa weekly Hashavua Bair revealed in its 35th anniversary issue (April 1983), in an interview with a high military officer of the Haganah. In his review of Halabi (see note 152), Irving Howe attributes the alleged assassination of ‚Äúa few of these [Village League] quislings‚Äù in the West Bank to the ‚Äúfratricidal violence that seems so frequent in Arab politics‚Äù (my emphasis). Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  296  a man who murdered several dozen Arab civilians under guard in an undefended Lebanese village during the land-clearing operations of October 1948; he was immediately amnestied after receiving a sevenyear prison sentence, then granted a second amnesty which ‚Äúdenies the punishment and the charge as well‚Äù and later granted a lawyer‚Äôs licence by the Israeli Legal Council on the grounds that his act carried ‚Äúno stigma.‚Äù205 As noted earlier, the self-defense forces based in the labor movement (the Haganah) also engaged in terrorist violence, though to a more limited extent than the outright terrorist groups‚Äîagainst Arabs, and also against dissident Jews, including a religious Jew organizing among the largely anti-Zionist native Jewish inhabitants of Palestine who was assassinated by two Haganah agents ‚Äúas he left the small synagogue in the ‚ÄòShaarey Tsedek‚Äô hospital‚Äù in June 1924. The official history of the Haganah describes this ‚Äúspecial activity‚Äù matter-of-factly, justifying the order ‚Äúto remove the traitor from the land of the living‚Äù on the grounds of the ‚Äúpathological character‚Äù of his anti-Zionist activities (furthermore, he was alleged to be a homosexual, the history reports). As one proof of the inveterate evil of the Palestinians, or perhaps all Arabs, David PryceJones, the New Republic specialist on this topic, cites the fact that King Abdullah of Jordan ‚Äúwas killed while leaving Friday prayers in the Mosque of Omar in Jerusalem.‚Äù So different from the Zionists, with their fabled ‚Äúpurity of arms‚Äù and ‚Äúsublime‚Äù moral sensibilities, much lauded in this journal.206 The record is long and bloody, as in the case of most nationalist movements; in the single month of July 1938, for example, the Irgun killed 76 Arabs with bombs in market places and the like.207 The official history of the Irgun makes little pretense that these actions were retaliatory, as is often alleged, referring proudly, for example, to the murder of 27 Arabs to prevent celebration over the British White Paper Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  297  limiting Jewish immigration, the murder of 52 more Arabs when an Irgun member was arrested by the British, etc.208 The record is generally suppressed in the U.S., where cynics refer to terror and intimidation as an invention of the PLO. In the years after the state was established, there was also ample resort to terrorism, a few examples of which have already been cited. It is noteworthy that former terrorists are honored in Israel, as the examples of Begin, Shamir, and Lahis indicate; there is no stigma‚Äù attached to their murderous deeds, again, a standard feature of nationalist movements. There are many other examples. The Israeli Cabinet recently decided to issue a new series of stamps in memory of Zionist heroes, including Shlomo Ben-Yosef, who was hanged by the British for shooting at an Arab bus; the murderers of Lord Moyne in 1944; and two men ‚Äúexecuted for their part in the 1955 Cairo security mishap‚Äù209‚Äîthis, a rather coy reference to the terrorist bombings (actually, 1954), which were a ‚Äúmishap‚Äù in that the perpetrators were caught. Since terrorism is considered to have been an honorable vocation, it is not surprising that its perpetrators have been protected by government authorities. For example, one of the suspected assassins of UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948 was a close friend of Ben-Gurion‚Äôs,* but he kept secret the fact that his friend had confessed the murder.210 Efforts have been made to suppress the record in other ways as well. After the 1954 ‚Äúmishap,‚Äù the Israeli government angrily rejected the *  Barnea and Rubinstein (see note 204) write: ‚Äúaccording to the accepted  version, the present Foreign Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, was one of those who planned the murder.‚Äù They also note that Shamir has refused many requests to explain his role in the murder of Eliahu Giladi, a LEHI officer condemned to death by the LEHI command (headed by Shamir) in 1943. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  298  Egyptian charges against the captured terrorists, denouncing the ‚Äúshow trial‚Ķagainst a group of Jews…victims of false accusations.‚Äù The journal of the governing Labor Party accused the Egyptian government of ‚Äúa Nazi-inspired policy,‚Äù though the government was well aware of the facts.211 There are numerous other examples. Perhaps the most remarkable illustration of the ability to efface atrocity concerns Deir Yassin, where 250 people were murdered by Begin‚Äôs Irgun and LEHI in April 1948 (see section 2 above). A year later, Ha‚Äôaretz reported the ‚Äúsettlement festival‚Äù for religious settlers who were founding Givat Shaul Beth (now part of Jerusalem) in ‚Äúthe former village of Deir Yassin.‚Äù Ha‚Äôaretz reports further: ‚ÄúPresident Chain Weizmann sent his greetings in writing…the chief Rabbis and Minister Moshe Shapira took part in the ceremony‚Ķthe orchestra of a school for the blind played‚Ķ‚Äù212 In 1980, the remaining ruins were bulldozed to prepare the ground for a settlement for Orthodox Jews. Streets were named after units of the Irgun which perpetrated the massacre, and of Palmach, the kibbutz-based strike force of Haganah, which took part in the operation but not the massacre. These units were to be ‚Äúimmortalized on the site,‚Äù in the words of the Israeli press.213 More recently, most of the Deir Yassin cemetery was bulldozed to prepare the ground for a highway to a new Jewish settlement.214 Nahum Barnea writes that ‚Äúat first Deir Yassin was forgotten. Now it is celebrated.‚Äù He describes a (to him, horrifying) tour to Deir Yassin organized by the Society for the Protection of Nature, perhaps, he suggests bitterly, because ‚Äúnature was the only thing not destroyed there on April 9, 1948.‚Äù The tour (an annual event) was led by a former Irgunist, who whitewashed the operation before a largely passive audience. The actual site of the village is now a mental hospital, as is the Acre prison, site of another Irgun operation.215 None of this is particularly surprising, or unique to the Jewish national Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  299  movement. It can, furthermore, be explained in terms of the circumstances in which the Zionist movement developed and won its victories, which were hardly propitious. The actual record does, however, highlight the cynicism of the constant denunciation of the PLO as a movement unique in its inexplicable commitment to terror, guilty of such acts as intimidating ‚Äúmoderates,‚Äù along with major crimes against innocents that contrast so strikingly with the standards of its enemy. The actual record also helps to explain the feelings and attitudes of Palestinians who have fled or been driven from their homes, or who live under military occupation, or who remain as second-class citizens in a land that not long ago was their own. To explain is not to justify, but if circumstances can help to explain the resort to terror in pre-state Zionism and increasingly in subsequent years, then the same is true with regard to those who see themselves, not unreasonably, as the victims of Zionist success.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  300  10. The Problem for Today t is often argued that it is hypocritical for Americans or Europeans to condemn Israel for its treatment of the native population, considering the history of European colonization, which was surely vastly more barbaric than anything that can be attributed to the Jewish settlers. If the argument has merit, then the same is true of earlier resort to similar efforts; for example, when Japanese imperialists in the pre-war years argued that what they were doing in Manchuria was based on a European model. Or suppose that Israel were to enslave the Arab population, arguing in justification that, after all, the American colonists indulged in literal human slavery for a century after their independence. Whatever merit the charge of hypocrisy may have, the fact is that brutal and inhuman practices that were tolerated when the plague of European civilization spread over much of the world no longer are. Israelis often complain that they are held to higher standards than others. If they have in mind those who massacred American Indians and enslaved Blacks they are quite right, for the little that that observation is worth. In the real world of today, however, they have been largely immune from serious critical analysis, at least in the United States, where the true history is little known and they are depicted as guided by uniquely high moral principles though surrounded by barbarians whose sole aim is to murder innocents and to deny them their rightful home. The conflict over Palestine has sometimes been depicted as one of ‚Äúright against right,‚Äù an arguable‚Äîand in my view, defensible‚Äîproposition, though naturally not one that the Palestinians are likely to accept as morally valid. It is not clear that there is much to be gained by pursuing this question. Israel is a reality, a fact that few now contest despite increasingly desperate pretense to the contrary on the part of its  I  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  301  numerous supporters and apologists. The same obviously cannot be said for the Palestinians, whose right to national self-determination is denied by the leaders of the rejectionist camp, Israel and the United States, whose power is dominant in the region. That is the primary topic that Americans must address.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  302  Notes‚ÄîChapter 4 Israel and Palestine: Historical Background 1.  2. 3. 4. 5.  6. 7. 8.  There is a substantial literature on this topic, the overwhelming mass of it from the Zionist point of view. One useful study is Noah Lucas, The Modern History of Israel (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1974). Another, for the earlier years, is Sykes, Crossroads to Israel. On interactions between Jews and Palestinians, see, among many others, Porath, Emergence of the Palestinian National Movement. The Palestinian National Movement; Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians; Khalidi, ed., From Haven to Conquest; David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1977); Edward W. Said, The Question of Palestine (Times Books, New York, 1979); Barry Rubin, The Arab States & Palestine (Syracuse, 1981). On the earlier years, there is much valuable material in the ESCO Foundation Study, Palestine: a Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies (Yale, New Haven, 1947), with the collaboration of a distinguished group of scholars, generally liberal Zionist in complexion. There are useful bibliographical notes in the books by Lucas and Said. Lucas, The Modern History of Israel, p. 101. Sykes, Crossroads to Israel, p. 5. My emphasis. Ibid., pp. 109-10, 123. Vol. 1, pp. 218, 221. The Recommendations of the Commission are reprinted in George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (G. F. Putnam‚Äôs Sons, New York, 1946, Appendix H); also Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest. Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians, pp. 141-2, citing a 1938 speech. See Porath, The Palestinian National Movement, for a careful analysis of the revolt. Frederick Morgan, Peace And War: A Soldier‚Äôs Life (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1961; relevant parts reprinted in Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest). Yehuda Bauer, Flight and Rescue: Brichah (Random House, New York, 1970). The Harrison Report is reprinted as an appendix in Leonard Dinnerstein, America and the Survivors of the  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  9.  10.  11. 12.  303  Holocaust (Columbia, New York, 1982). See TNCW, p. 433. In this case, preferences are clear, since a choice is available. Despite extensive pressures to compel immigration to Israel, most, particularly from European Russia, now prefer immigration to the U.S. Another relevant case is that of the Ethiopean [PW79]Jews (Falashas), who have been subject to savage persecution with little attempt on Israel‚Äôs part to do anything for them or to ‚Äúgather them in.‚Äù They of course are Black; also, Israel had close relations with Ethiopia through much of the worst period of persecution. For some recent comment, see Simcha Jacobovici, alleging that ‚Äúfor at least six years all major Jewish organizations, uncharacteristically adhering to Israel‚Äôs line on a diaspora matter, have suppressed information about the Falashas‚Äô plight and have refused to undertake major initiatives to save them,‚Äù in sharp contrast to Russian Jews (Op-Ed, New York Times, April 23,1983). Saul S. Friedman, No Haven for the Oppressed (Wayne State, Detroit, 1973, pp. 222f.); Dinnerstein, op. cit., p. 223 and elsewhere; Alfred Lilienthal, The Zionist Connection (Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1978, p. 56). On the reluctance of American Zionists to consider resettlement of Jews outside of Palestine during the war years and before, see Henry L. Feingold, The Politics of Rescue (Rutgers, New Brunswick, 1970, pp. 13f., 69ff., 109, 123f., 237f., 264f., 298f.). See also Yehuda Bauer, American Jewry and the Holocaust (Wayne State, Detroit, 1981, pp. 123f.); Uri Davis, Israel: Utopia Incorporated (Zed, London, 1977, pp. 24-5); TNCW, p.466, among others. There is a scathing indictment of the policies of the Zionist leadership in Rabbi Moshe Shonfeld, The Holocaust Victims Accuse: Documents and Testimony on Jewish War Criminals, Part I (Neturei Karta of USA, Brooklyn, 1977); the publisher is affiliated with the Jerusalem Neturei Karta, the organization of Orthodox anti-Zionist Jews that has its roots in the pre-Zionist Jewish settlement and that now supports secular democracy rather than a Jewish state. Morris L. Ernst, So Far So Good (Harper & Brothers, New York, 1948, pp. 175-6). Bernard Weinraub, New York Times, Jan. 4, 1982. For further discussion  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  13. 14. 15.  16.  17.  18. 19.  304  and controversy over this matter, see Bernard Weinraub, New York Times, Jan. 20; Richard Bernstein, New York Times, Feb. 9, 1983. Lucas, Modern History of Israel, p. 192. Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians. There is interesting discussion of the interactions among the various Arab and Jewish parties during this period in Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians, and Rubin, The Arab States & Palestine. Uri Milshtein, Davar, Oct. 23, 1981; Sykes, Crossroads to Israel, p. 337. For a contemporary record of Irgun-LEHI terrorism in December 1947, see Peace in the Middle East?, pp. 64-5, citing a report by the Council on Jewish-Arab Cooperation, which concludes that these actions were undertaken to create conflict in peaceful areas. See TNCW, pp. 464-5 and references cited for additional examples of Zionist terrorism, including major massacres. Little of this is known here; the information appears in standard Israeli (Hebrew) sources. Israel Segal, ‚ÄúThe Deir Yassin File,‚Äù Koteret Rashit, Jan. 19, 1983; Toldot Milhemet Hakomemiut, prepared by the Historical Branch of the General Staff, Israel Defense Forces (Ma‚Äôarachot, Israel, 1959; citation from the 14th edition, 1966, p. 117). English translations of a number of other documents concerning the Deir Yassin and other Irgun massacres are provided in a privately printed anthology by Israel Shahak, Begin And Co. As They Really Are (Jerusalem, 1977). This was, in fact, only one of a number of such massacres, though it was the worst. See also TNCW, pp. 464f. Units of Palmach participated in the attack, though not in the massacre. The village ‚Äúhad refused permission for foreign Arab volunteers to use it as a base for operations against the Jewish life-line into Jerusalem‚Äù (Jon Kimche). On the massacre, see the report from the scene by Jacques de Reynier, head of the International Red Cross delegation in Palestine, and remarks by Zionist historian Jon Kimche, reprinted in Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest; also Israeli military historian Meir Pail, an eye-witness, cited in TNCW, p. 465, and much more extensively in Shahak, Begin And Co. See also section 9.3. Lucas, Modern History of Israel, pp. 252, 460. Mordechai Nisan, Professor of Political Science in the School for  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  20.  21. 22.  23.  24. 25. 26. 27.  305  Overseas Students of the Hebrew University, in Elazar, ed., Judea, Samaria and Gaza, p. 193. Nisan is an admirer of the use of terror (against Arabs). See TNCW, p. 304. Erskine Childers, Spectator, May 12, 1961; reprinted in Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest. See also his essay in Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, ed., The Transformation of Palestine (Northwestern, Evanston, 1971), citing mainly Zionist sources on the terror and expulsion, and reviewing some of the remarkable propaganda exercises undertaken to disguise the facts. Eli Tabor, Yediot Ahronot, Nov. 2, 1982. Al Hamishmar, April 16, 1982. See p. 49 and note 49 below. On the 1948 and 1967 expulsions, see Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch. About 200,000 fled across the Jordan in 1967. Yoram Peri, Between Battles and Ballots, p. 58; Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians. p. 337. Flapan gives a detailed account of these interactions; see also Rubin, The Arab States & Palestine. Michael Widlanski reports from Jerusalem that recently discovered British diplomatic documents reveal that Britain exerted pressure on Transjordan, Egypt, Syria and Iraq to refrain from coming to formal or informal peace agreements with Israel after the 1949 armistice, fearing that peace might lead to an Israeli-dominated neutralist bloc (at this time, Israel had not yet chosen sides in the Cold War system) that might oppose British interests in the Middle East. The documents also allegedly show that Britain used the Arab League to limit the influence of the USSR, France, the U.S. and Israel at the time. Michael Widlanski, Cox News Service, Winnipeg Free Press, Jan. 24, 1983. On conflicts between the U.S. and Britain in the Middle East at the time, see TNCW, introduction and chapters 2, 11, and references cited. Shalom Network Newsletter (Berkeley), Oct./Nov. 1981, reprinted from the London Jewish Chronicle. See chapter 6, section 6.4*. Reprinted in Israel & Palestine (Paris), Oct/Nov. 1981. World Jewish Congress News & Views, Sept. 1982; Jewish Past & Opinion, Sept. 17, 1982; SOUTH, November 1982. New Leader, Dec. 24, 1973. For a fuller quote, see my Peace in the Middle East?, p. 187.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds 28.  29.  30.  31.  32. 33. 34.  306  David K. Shipler, ‚ÄúA Crisis of Conscience Over Lebanon,‚Äù New York Times, June 18, 1982. One expects such a version of history from outright propagandists; e.g., Nathan I. Nagler, Chairman of the New York Region, Anti-Defamation League of B‚Äônai Brith, who refers to the ‚Äúfive attempts at military means‚Äù of the Arabs who ‚Äúinvaded Israel, bent on her destruction‚Äù (letter, New York Times, June 19, 1982). It is more interesting that it is regularly expounded by serious journalists and scholars. J. Robert Moskin, review of Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars. New York Times Book Review, Nov. 28, 1982. The Times weekly book review section appears to be reserved for ‚Äúsupporters of Israel‚Äù as a matter of editorial policy, a topic that merits a special study, particularly, in the light of the role of the Review in influencing the distribution of books in U.S. libraries, bookstores, etc. Jacobo Timerman, The Longest War (Knopf, New York, 1982; lengthy sections appeared in the New Yorker, Oct. 18, 25). Timerman also repeats other standard myths, and sometimes fabricates new ones. We return to some examples in the next chapter. The attack was in response to a PLO terrorist operation that left 34 Israelis dead in an interchange of fire on a coastal road after a bus had been seized. Putting aside the question of proportionality or of the merits of the principle of international law (binding on members of the United Nations) that the use of force is permissible only in the case of selfdefense against armed attack, the Israeli retaliation was irrelevant to the terrorist incident that provoked it since the terrorist operation by seaborne commandos was launched from a point north of the area invaded by Israel. The border had previously been relatively quiet, apart from Israeliprovoked military interchanges. See the next chapter. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (Basic Books, New York, 1977, p. 292), my emphasis. Ha‚Äôaretz, March 29, 1972; for a more extensive quote, See Cooley, Green March, Black September, p. 162. Le Monde hebdomadaire, June 8-14, 1972; Kimche, There Could Have Been Peace, p. 258.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds 35. 36.  37. 38.  39.  40. 41.  307  See Cooley, Green March, Black September; Charles Yost, Foreign Affairs, January 1968; and many other sources. Menachem Begin, August 8 speech at the National Defense College, excerpts in the New York Times, Aug. 21, 1982, reprinted from the Jerusalem Post. For a number of other examples from the same pen, see TNCW. See TNCW, pp. 331, 463, and sources cited, particularly, Ehud Yaari, Egypt and the Fedayeen (Hebrew; Givat Haviva, 1975), based on captured Egyptian documents; Kennett Love, Suez: The Twice-fought War (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1969, pp. 92f., 408f.); Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1981). See Rokach, Israel‚Äôs Sacred Terrorism, for information from Prime Minister Moshe Sharett‚Äôs diaries. There is also important material in the memoirs of the commanders of the UN forces on the borders, who characteristically took up this post sympathetic to Israel but ended their tours quite critical of its encroachments and resort to unprovoked violence. Such reconstruction of unwanted facts is not unusual. For another example of skillful re-editing, by which the Times succeeded in converting a London Times report with an unwanted message into its precise opposite (to be picked up in the Times version by Newsweek with some additional fillips and to enter official history), see N. Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights (South End, Boston, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 135f.). The same section gives numerous other examples of successful news management, of particular interest in this case because of their efficacy in enabling the Human Rights Administration to participate actively in one of the major acts of mass murder in recent years. These two volumes give many other examples of behavior which is, in fact, fairly systematic, though not exceptionless, as explained and illustrated there. See also TNCW, chapters 3, 4 and elsewhere, and references cited. For more on this subject, and particularly discussion of the mechanisms, see Edward S. Herman, The Real Terror Network (South End, Boston, 1982). Neff, Warriors at Suez, pp. 420-1; Love, Suez, pp. 551f. To cite one case that has not exactly become common knowledge in the  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  42. 43.  44. 45. 46. 47.  48.  308  U.S., the American occupying army in Japan engaged in rape, pillage and murder, according to Japanese sources (see Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War, Pantheon New York, 1978, pp. 236f.). For discussion of other examples of the treatment of prisoners, collaborators, and other victims of liberation by the U.S. and its allies, also largely unknown here, see Chomsky and Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights, vol. II, pp. 32-48. Alfred Friendly, ‚ÄúIsrael: Paradise Lost,‚Äù Manchester Guardian weekly, July 11, 1982. Carl Van Horn, Soldiering for Peace, cited along with other evidence from UN and Israeli sources by Fred J. Khouri, Arab Perspectives, January 1982. See also Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch. Mattityahu Peled, ‚ÄúA burden rather than an asset,‚Äù Ha‚Äôaretz, Oct. 30, 1980. John K. Cooley, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 30, 1970. See p. 21, and section 5.2, below. For documentation, see Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel (Monthly Review, New York, 1976). On the possible role of Israeli terrorism in the flight from Iraq, see TNCW, p. 462, referring to reports in the Israeli press by Iraqi Jews and the account by Wilbur Crane Eveland, who was military attach√© in the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad at the time, in his Ropes of Sand (Norton, New York, 1980, p. 48). See also Rabbi Moshe Schonfeld, Genocide in the Holy Land (Neturei Karta of the USA, Brooklyn, 1980, pp. 509ff.); see note 10. For discussion and references, see TNCW, chapter 9 (1974, 1982); also Rafik Halabi, The West Bank Story (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1981) and references of note 1. There are important personal accounts by Raymonda Tawil (My Hope, My Prison, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1980) and Raja Shehadeh (The Third Way, Quartet, London, 1982); Shehadeh, a West Bank lawyer, is also the principal author of an informative study of the legal devices and practices of the military administration: Raja Shehadeh, assisted by Jonathan Kuttab, The West Bank and the Rule of Law (International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 1980). See also Emanuel Jarry, Le Monde diplomatique, Sept.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  49.  50. 51. 52. 53.  54. 55. 56.  57.  309  1981, and Danny Rubinstein, New Outlook, June/July 1982. On the sharp intensification of repression under the Sharon-Milson repression from November 1981, see Only Do Not Say That You Did Not Know; chapter 3, note 52. For specific references and much further discussion, see Kapeliouk, Israel. On ‚Äúthe Judaization of the Galilee,‚Äù see TNCW, chapter 9. The most detailed study of the settlement program is William Wilson Harris, Taking Root: Israeli Settlement in the West Bank, the Golan and GazaSinai, 1967-1980 (Research Studies Press, Wiley, New York, 1980). Elisha Efrat, ‚ÄúSpatial Patterns of Jewish and Arab Settlements in Judea and Samaria,‚Äù in Elazar, ed., Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Kapeliouk, Israel, p. 65, pp. 44-5, pp. 296f. Amnon Kapeliouk, Le Monde, May 15, 1975, translated in Middle East International, July 1975. Al Hamishmar, Aug. 22, 29, 1975; A. Droyanov, Sefer Tel Aviv, 1936, vol. 1, sections reprinted in Matzpen, July 1975. See my article ‚ÄúThe Interim Agreement,‚Äù New Politics, Winter, 1975-6, for these and other references. Jewish Post & Opinion, Sept. 26, 1975. See TNCW, pp. 280-1, for discussion. Danny Rubinstein, Davar, March 16, 1981. See also Benvenisti‚Äôs proposal for ‚Äúmutual recognition of the national aspirations of Israelis and Palestinians‚Äù in the Jerusalem Post, April 7, 1981. Benvenisti was then a candidate for the Knesset on the Citizens Rights List. David Richardson, ‚ÄúDe facto dual society,‚Äù interview with Meron Benvenisti, Jerusalem Post, Sept. 10, 1982. For more details on Benvenisti‚Äôs research and conclusions, see David K. Shipler, New York Times, Sept. 12, 1982. Shipler gives the figure of 55-65 percent of the West Bank under Israeli government control. See also Ian Black, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Sept. 19, 1982; Anthony Lewis, New York Times, Nov. 1, 1982, reporting on a briefing by Benvenisti in Washington. See also Lesley Hazelton, ‚ÄúThe Israelis‚Äô ‚ÄòIrreversible‚Äô Settlements,‚Äù Nation, Dec. 18, 1982, describing the vast extent of the settlement projects and noting, inter alia, that Labor ‚Äúis trying to prove  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  58. 59. 60.  61. 62.  63. 64. 65. 66. 67.  68. 69. 70. 71.  72. 73. 74.  310  itself as settlement-conscious as Likud.‚Äù Government officials agree that Benvenisti‚Äôs data are accurate, Hazelton reports. See also Amos Elon, ‚ÄúAriel for example,‚Äù Ha‚Äôaretz, Nov. 11, 1982. describing a new town south of Nablus. Philip Geyelin, ‚ÄúOn Israeli Settlements, Reagan Really Isn‚Äôt Trying,‚Äù Los Angeles Times, Dec. 27, 1982. Chaim Bermant, ‚ÄúFinancial Influence,‚Äù Jerusalem Post, Dec. 19. 1982. Wolf Blitzer, ‚ÄúLessons from aid victory,‚Äù Jerusalem Post, Dec. 24, 1982. For detailed background, see G. Neal Lendenmann, ‚ÄúAid Levels to Israel,‚Äù American-Arab Affairs, Winter 1982-3. Chaim Herzog, ‚ÄúGood for the Jews?,‚Äù Jerusalem Post, Dec. 24, 1982. Interview with Jacobo Timerman in the dissident journal Haolam Haze, Dec. 22, 1982. On earlier Israeli relations with the Argentine neo-Nazis, including military aid, see TNCW, pp. 291-2. Economist, Nov. 13, 1982; Feb. 19, 1983. See chapter 2, section 2.2.3. Davar. Nov. 11, 1982; interview in Trialogue, journal of the Trilateral Commission, Winter 1983. Uzi Shimoni, ‚ÄúThe Allon Plan‚Äîan expression of Zionist and security activism,‚Äù Davar, Dec. 21, 1982. Anthony Lewis, New York Times, Nov. 1, 1982. And sold for hard currency; see p. 46. The figure that Richardson cites seems too high. Shmuel Sandier and Hillel Frisch, in Elazar, ed., Judea, Samaria and Gaza, give the figure of about 12%. Sasson Levi, in Elazar, ed., Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Bernard Nossiter, New York Times, April 3, 1982. New York Times, Sept. 1, 1981. See TNCW, chapter 13, for details and references. Irving Howe, ‚ÄúThe Campus Left and Israel,‚Äù New York Times Op-Ed, reprinted in Howe and Carl Gershman, eds., Israel, the Arabs, and the Middle East (Bantam, New York, 1972). Danny Rubinstein, Davar, Nov. 5, 12, 1982. Ha‚Äôaretz, Nov. 18, 1982; Israeli Mirror. David K. Shipler, New York Times, April 4, 1983, citing Meir Cohen‚Äôs  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80.  81. 82.  83.  84.  311  remarks to the Knesset‚Äôs Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on March 16 (the Jerusalem Post commented that the lack of reprimand by his Herut party ‚Äúinevitably‚Äù gives the impression that ‚Äúhe articulates the tacit premises of official policy‚Äù; cited by Jewish Post & Opinion, March 30); Francis Ofner, ‚ÄúSketching Rabin‚Äôs Moves towards Peace,‚Äù Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 1974, dispatch from Tel Aviv. See TNCW, p. 234, for more on Rabin‚Äôs views. Amos Oz, ‚ÄúHas Israel Altered its Visions?,‚Äù New York Times Magazine, July 11, 1982. See TNCW, p. 235-6, for quotes and reference. See Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians., pp. 69f., 82, 222, 259ff., for extensive discussion. Ha‚Äôaretz, May 26, 1980. Yediot Ahronot, Jan. 15, 1982; Israeli Mirror. Michael Walzer, ‚ÄúNationalism, internationalism, and the Jews: the chimera of a binational state,‚Äù in Howe and Gershman, eds., Israel, the Arabs and the Middle East. See TNCW, pp. 255f., 286f., for some examples, and my articles in New Politics, Winter 1975-6, Winter 1978-9, for more. See Amos Elon, Ha‚Äôaretz, Sept. 28, 1981 (on the development town Beit Shemesh); Shevach Weiss, Al Hamishmar, Oct. 2, 1981; Z. Dorsini, Davar, Sept. 21, 1981; Avshalom Ginat, Al Hamishmar, Sept. 18, 1981. See Davis, Israel: Utopia Incorporated, for some useful background, and The Dawn (Al Fajr, Jerusalem), Nov. 5, 12, 1982, for informative discussion. Also the extensive discussion by Ellen Cantarow, ‚ÄúA Family Affair,‚Äù Village Voice, Jan. 25, 1983; and David K. Shipler, New York Times, April 6, 7, 8, 1983. Irving Howe, see above. Howe states: ‚ÄúI have never been a Zionist; I have always felt contempt for nationalist and chauvinist sentiments‚Äù (‚ÄúThinking the Unthinkable About Israel: A Personal Statement,‚Äù New York Magazine, Dec. 24, 1973). We return to the matter. Ze‚Äôev Yaphet, ‚ÄúNo Lessons were Learned, Nothing was Done,‚Äù ‚ÄúThe Exhaustion of the Kibbutz Movement,‚Äù Ha‚Äôaretz, Oct. 15, 22, 1982. Also ‚ÄúMapai destroyed us,‚Äù Ha‚Äôaretz, Oct. 15, 1982.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds 85. 86. 87.  88.  312  Tamar Maroz, Ha‚Äôaretz, Feb. 25, 1983. Michael Elkins, Newsweek, June 8, 1970. Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek, for example, who ‚Äúexpressed his horror at the growth of fascism in Israel,‚Äù noting that ‚Äúthe events he was now observing in Jerusalem were familiar to him from his experiences in Europe of the 1930s‚Äù (in Vienna) and ‚Äúwould also be familiar to anyone who had recently arrived in Israel from Latin America.‚Äù Al Hamishmar, June 22, 1981; Israeli Mirror. This is one of the standard slogans, reflecting the almost hysterical love for Begin in large circles. Americans inclined to ridicule such ‚ÄúKim ilSungism‚Äù on the part of the Israeli underclass might turn to some of their own sophisticates, e.g., the review by left-liberal social critic Murray Kempton of a book by Joseph Alsop on FDR. Kempton describes the ‚Äúmajesty‚Äù of Roosevelt‚Äôs smile as ‚Äúhe beamed from those great heights that lie beyond the taking of offense‚Ķ Those of us who were born to circumstances less assured tend to think of, indeed revere, this demeanor as the aristocratic style‚Ķ [We are] as homesick as Alsop for a time when America was ruled by gentlemen and ladies.‚Äù Roosevelt and Lucy Mercer ‚Äúwere persons even grander on the domestic stage than they would end up being on the cosmic one,‚Äù and met the crisis in their lives, a secret love affair, ‚Äúin the grandest style.‚Äù ‚ÄúThat Roosevelt was the democrat that great gentlemen always are in no way abated his grandeur‚Ķ[though] this majesty had its notes of condescension to be sure… [His blend of elegance with compassion] adds up to true majesty. He left us with ‚Äúnostalgia‚Äù that is ‚Äúaching.‚Äù His ‚Äúenormous bulk‚Äù stands between us ‚Äúand all prior history‚Ķendearingly exalted‚Ķsplendidly eternal for romance,‚Äù etc., etc. Incidentally, FDR took such complete command that he ‚Äúleft social inquiry‚Ķa wasteland,‚Äù so much so that ‚Äúten years went by before a Commerce Department economist grew curious about the distribution of income and was surprised to discover that its inequality had persisted almost unchanged from Hoover, through Roosevelt and Truman‚Ķ‚Äù But no matter: he brought us ‚Äúcomfort‚Ķowing to his engraving upon the public consciousness the sense that men were indeed equal.‚Äù Murray Kempton, ‚ÄúThe Kindly Stranger,‚Äù New York Review af Books, April 15,  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  89. 90.  91. 92. 93. 94. 95.  96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103.  313  1982. The article called forth one comment: in the June 10 issue, Noel Annan referred to ‚Äúthe encomium that Murray Kempton justly bestowed on Roosevelt.‚Äù Yediot Ahronot, Oct. 31; Shimon Weiss, Davar, Nov. 1, 1982. David K. Shipler, ‚ÄúEthnic Conflict Erupts in Israel,‚Äù New York Times, Dec. 29; Leah Etgar, ‚ÄúThe Arabs took our jobs and are running Tiberias,‚Äù Yediot Ahraonot, Dec. 10, 1982; Michal Meron, ‚ÄúTown without pity,‚Äù Supplement to Yediot Ahronot, March 11, 1983. Ha‚Äôaretz, Nov. 26, 1982. See TNCW, pp. 287f., for some examples. Zvi Barel, ‚ÄúTalking to a settler,‚Äù Ha‚Äôaretz, April 20, 1982. On the immunity of the settlers, see TNCW, p. 279. Yedidia Segal, Nekudah, Sept. 3, 1982. Amnon Rubinstein, Ha‚Äôaretz, April 5, 1982; Ha‚Äôaretz, April 4, 1982; Danny Rubinstein, Davar, April 9, 1982, who observes that with the police and the civilian authorities removed, the settlers ‚Äúcan act as they wish in the territories,‚Äù giving many examples. David Shipler, New York Times, March 22, 21 1982. Barel, ‚ÄúTalking to a settler.‚Äù Danny Tsidkoni, Davar, May 18, 1982. Michal Meron, Yediot Ahronot, March 29, 1982; Amnon Kapeliouk, Al Hamishmar, March 26, 1982. James McManus, Guardian (London), April 7, 1983. The Dawn (Al Fajr), Nov. 5, 1982. MK Tawfiq Toubi, reported in The Dawn, Dec. 3, 1982. For one recent example, see the report by Felicia Langer, the Israeli Communist lawyer who defends many Arabs, quoting an Arab prisoner who recounts in detail what he says happened to him under interrogation in the ‚ÄúSarafand‚Äù interrogation center, leaving him in such a condition that the Nablus prison authorities refused to admit him without a doctor‚Äôs report from a military hospital. He specifically implicates Israeli doctors. The Dawn (Al Fajr), Dec. 31, 1982. See Langer‚Äôs book With My Own Eyes (Ithaca, London, 1974), and the more extensive Hebrew original Bemo Eynay for many examples. There is ample further evidence. For a  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  314  few examples, see TNCW, p. 447. 104. For extensive evidence concerning both categories, see Chomsky and Herman, Political Economy of Human Rights. Predictably, our insistence that refugee reports be taken seriously and considered with the same caution and concern whatever their origin has repeatedly been interpreted as apologetics for some official enemy, a matter that merits little comment apart from an inquiry, which might be illuminating, into some of the techniques typically adopted by those whom Bakunin aptly called the ‚Äústate worshipping‚Äù intellectuals; in the West, those who pretend to be anti-Communist while mimicking Stalinist practice. 105. London Sunday Times, June 19, 1977. There is considerable further evidence in the testimony of Paul Eddy and Peter Gillman of the Sunday Times before the UN Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (A/SPC/32/L.12, 11 Nov. 1977), including also interesting analysis of the efforts at rebuttal on the part of David Krivine of the Jerusalem Post and the Israeli government. See TNCW, p. 447. 106. Seth Kaplan, New Republic, July 23, 1977. 107. Amnesty International Newsletter, Sept. 1977; Martin Peretz, New Republic, Aug. 2, 1982; Amnon Rubinstein, Ha‚Äôaretz, Feb. 27, 1981; TNCW, p. 454. For another remarkable example of a ‚Äúconfession,‚Äù regarded by the Washington Post as a ‚Äúvindication of Israel‚Äôs system of justice‚Äù and given a stamp of approval also by ‚Äúcivil libertarians‚Äù Monroe Freedman and Alan Dershowitz, see Chomsky and Herman, Political Economy of Human Rights, vol. I, p. 381. 108. Report and Recommendations of an Amnesty International Mission to the Government 0f Israel. including the Government‚Äôs response and Amnesty International‚Äôs comments (London, 1980); Ha‚Äôaretz, Sept. 3, 1980; Al Hamishmar, Sept. 3, 1980 (Israeli Mirror). 109. Mattityahu Peled, Ha‚Äôaretz, Aug. 8, 1980; see references to the U.S., British and Israeli press on conditions in the prisons in TNCW, pp. 4467. 110. Jerusalem Post, Dec. 24, 1982; Reuters, Los Angeles Times, Boston Globe, Dec. 29, 1982; Boston Globe, Jan. 5, 1983. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  315  111. Jerusalem Post, Dec. 12, 1982; ‚Äú‚ÄòCut off their testicles,‚Äô Sharon said with regard to demonstrators in the West Bank‚Äù Yediot Ahronot, Dec. 29, 1982; Ma‚Äôariv, Feb. 18, 1983, quoting Avraham Burg; The Dawn (Al Fajr), Jan 21, Feb. 4, 1983, on the expropriation and the curfew; Michael Precker, Dallas Morning News‚ÄîBoston Globe, Feb. 17, 1983. The expropriation was noted by Trudy Rubin, Christian Science Monitor, March 4, 1983. 112. Zvi Barel, Ha‚Äôaretz, Jan. 20, 1983 (Israleft News Service; Barel, Ha‚Äôaretz Weekly, Feb. 6-11, 1983; Edward Walsh, Washington Post‚Äî Boston Globe, Feb. 18; David Richardson, Jerusalem Post, Feb. 18; Barel, Ha‚Äôaretz, Jan. 30 (translated in The Dawn (Al Fajr), Feb. 11); Eitan Mor, Yediot Ahronot, Feb. 18, 1983; Reuven Padhatzur, Ha‚Äôaretz, March 11, 1983, explaining how the defense ‚Äúbroke the rules of the game‚Äù by building its case on the demonstration that IDF policy is responsible for the atrocities; the defense was successful, since higher officers, who gave the orders, could not be (and were not) tried. See also Marcus Eliason, AP, Boston Globe, Jan. 22, 1983, reviewing Eitan‚Äôs orders and also his statement, which is correct, that the practice of demolishing houses in collective punishment and deportation was practiced much more extensively by his Labor predecessors. Also New York Times, Feb. 10, 18. The sanitized New York Times accounts may usefully be compared to those cited from other American journals, particularly the detailed account of Eitan‚Äôs testimony by Norman Kempster, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 10, 1983. Ahronot, Dec. 3, 1982. 113. Aharon Bachar, ‚ÄúDo not say: We did not know, we did not hear‚Äô,‚Äù Yediot Ahronot, Dec. 3, 1982 114. Aharon Bachar, Yediot Ahronot, Nov. 5, 1982. 115. Yoram Pen, Davar, Dec. 10, 1982. 116. ‚ÄúPeace Now officers recount atrocities,‚Äù Al Hamishmar, May 11, 1982; Aharon Geva, Davar, April 4, 1982 (Israeli Mirror). 117. ‚ÄúHuman Rights Violations on the Golan Heights: February-May, 1982,‚Äù Report of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Israel Office of the American Jewish Committee (1982). The following account and quotes are from this study. The events discussed were reported by some of the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  118.  119. 120. 121. 122. 123.  124. 125.  126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133.  134.  316  Israeli press, despite efforts by the authorities to prevent journalists from discovering the facts or even entering the area. Ha‚Äôaretz, April 16; David Richardson, Jerusalem Post, April 16; Emmanuel Elnekaveh, Yediot Ahronot, Feb. 25; Yoram Hamizrahi, Feb. 25; Nahum Barnea, Davar, April 13, 1982. Ha‚Äôaretz, March 15, 1982. Ha‚Äôaretz, Jerusalem Post, April 16; see also editorial, ‚ÄúShame on the Golan,‚Äù Jerusalem Post, April 16, 1982. Amos Elon, Ha‚Äôaretz, April 13, 1982. Danny Rubinstein, Davar, April 12, 1982. See TNCW, pp. 277-8, for some examples, including even the closing of art exhibits. Jerusalem Post, July 13, 1982; Israleft News Service. The harassment of Bir Zeit apparently began with the Likud takeover in 1977. For some early discussion, see Manfred Ropschitz, ed., Volunteers for Palestine Papers 1977-1980 (Miftah, Kfar Shemaryahu, 1981). UPI, Boston Globe, Nov. 17, 1982. New York Times, Nov. 20, 23, 1982; Benny Morris, Jerusalem Post, Nov. 21, 1982. Israleft News Service, Dec. 1, 1982, contains a detailed chronology and material from the Israeli press. See the advertisement of the Ad Hoc Committee for Academic Freedom, New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, April 1, 1983. Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 16, 1982. David Richardson, ‚ÄúA threat to freedom,‚Äù Jerusalem Post, Nov. 19, 1982; Norman Kempster, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 20, 1982. See, among others, Danny Rubinstein, Davar, May 16, 1980; TNCW, p. 274. Boston Globe, Nov. 22; New York Times, Nov. 23, 1982. New York Times, Oct. 21; The Dawn (Al Fajr), Nov. 12, 1982. Danny Rubinstein, Davar, Nov. 19, 1982. W.F. Abboushi. Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 30, 1982. Boaz Evron, Yediot Ahronot, Dec. 3, 1982. Shortly after, the restrictions on one of the editors (and several other people) were lifted; Jerusalem Post, Dec. 21, 1982 (Israleft News Service). Michal Meron, Yediot Ahronot (supplement), Dec. 10, 1982.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  317  135. Erwin Frenkel, ‚ÄúA newspaper‚Äôs loyalties,‚Äù Jerusalem Post Jubilee Supplement, Dec. 1, 1982. 136. Ha‚Äôaretz, Nov. 29, 1982. 137. H. Graetz, History of the Jews (Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia, 1893, vol II, p.324). See The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia (New York, 1942, vol. 6). 138. Press Release, Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Oct. 27, 1982; Ha‚Äôaretz, Oct. 28, 1982 (Israleft News Service, Nov. 15). B. Michael, Ha‚Äôaretz, Nov. 7, 1982. The Dawn (Al Fajr), Dec. 10, 1982. 139. Boston Globe, Nov. 27, 1982, under ‚ÄúNames and Faces,‚Äù where brief odd items involving various personalities are presented; Al Hamishmar, Nov. 16, 1982; Ha‚Äôaretz, March 8, 1983. 140. Letter, New York Review of Books, March 17, 1977. See TNCW, p. 283, for references from the Israeli, British and Swedish press. 141. Aharon Dolav, Ma‚Äôariv, Dec. 10, 1982; Ben-Tsion Tsitriv, Haolam Haze, Dec. 22, 1982; Yigal Bichkov, Ha‚Äôaretz, Dec. 9, 1982. There is a watered-down version in the English-language press: Aryeh Rubinstein, ‚ÄúSleeping scandal,‚Äù Yitzhak Oked, ‚ÄúArab labourers‚Äô housing to be probed,‚Äù Jerusalem Post, Dec. 26, 1982. 142. Ian Black, New Statesman, Sept. 29, 1978 (for further references from the Hebrew press, see Chomsky and Herman, Political Economy of Human Rights, vol. II, p. 360; TNCW, p.283); Felicia Langer, Report of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, Jan. 19, 1983 (Langer was the lawyer representing Barguti). 143. Hotam, Feb. 19, 1982. 144. ‚ÄúThe Gangrene of the Occupation,‚Äù Al Hamishmar, Feb. 19, 1982. 145. For details, see Peace in the Middle East?, pp. 196-7, and references cited, and Adnan Amad, ed., Israeli League/or Human and Civil Rights (The Shahak Papers) (Palestine Research Center, Beirut, 1973); the latter also contains documentation provided by the League on a wide range of serious human rights violations under the Labor government. See also Shahak, The Non-Jew in the Jewish State (a collection of documents, mostly from the Israeli press; privately printed, Jerusalem, 1975), and much else. See Pro-Arab Propaganda in America: Vehicles Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  146.  147.  148.  149.  150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155.  156. 157. 158.  318  and Voices, Anti-Defamation League of B‚Äônai Brith (New York, January 1983). This book (including this entry) contain numerous falsehoods and slanders, as one would expect in the ‚Äúenemies list‚Äù of an organization now largely dedicated to defamation. Saul Bellow and Stephen Spender, to mention two examples; see TNCW, pp. 302, 454. Still worse, in my view, are those who give similar stories on the basis of alleged statements by unidentified ‚ÄúArab friends,‚Äù in the New Republic style sampled several times above, and again in the next chapter. Fouzi el-Asmar, To be an Arab in Israel (Francis Pinter, London, 1975; Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1978); translated from the Hebrew original. For discussion in a far more general context, see Edward Said, Orientalism (Pantheon, .New York, 1978). Also Kapeliouk, Israel, on some of the pronouncements of Israeli Orientalists. Saul Bellow, To Jerusalem and Back (Viking, New York, 1976). See TNCW, chapter 10, for further samples from this classic contribution to a familiar 20th century genre. All cited in a 1969 essay included in my Peace in the Middle East?, pp. 61, 55. Editorial Notebook, New York Times, Nov. 16, 1982. New York Times Book Review, May 16, 1982. ‚ÄúMinus One Friend,‚Äù Kol Hair, June 4, 1982. For references and more on these matters, see my articles in New Politics, Winter 1975-6, 1978-9, and TNCW, pp. 285ff., 436-7. Irving Howe, ‚ÄúThe Campus Left and Israel.‚Äù Howe cites no Tel Aviv street names, but he does illustrate by giving Minister Yigal Allon the wrong first name. ‚ÄúMainstream chauvinism,‚Äù Ha‚Äôaretz, March 19, 1982; ‚ÄúThis is not verbal violence,‚Äù Ha‚Äôaretz, Feb. 13, 1983. See TNCW, chapter 9 and Afterword for many examples. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, ‚ÄúIsrael and South Africa,‚Äù New Outlook, March/ April, 1983; Hotam, April 18, 1975, Oct. 1, 1982; Davar, Sept. 8, 1981; Charles Hoffman, ‚ÄúA monkey trial, local style,‚Äù Jerusalem Post,  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  159. 160. 161. 162.  163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174.  175. 176.  319  March 22, 1983. This kind of material is common in religious circles. For example, the Habad organization of the Lubavitcher Rabbi, much respected here and in Israel, explains that ‚Äúthe body of a Jew is of an entirely different type than that of a non-Jew‚Äù; they are, in fact, ‚Äútwo entirely different species‚Äù (Likutey Sihot, 1965). For some background discussion, see Israel Shahak, Khamsin, nos. 8-9, 1981. Yediot Ahronot, Sept. 14, 1982; a response to a query in a column called: ‚ÄúSoldiers ask.‚Äù Danny Rubinstein, ‚ÄúReligion against Nationalism,‚Äù Davar, March 12, 1982. Eliahu Salpeter, Ha‚Äôaretz, Nov. 4, 1982. For examples from publications of the military Rabbinate, see Peace in the Middle East?, pp. 108-9; Shahak, Begin and Co.; Said, Question of Palestine, p. 91; TNCW, p. 305. Ha‚Äôaretz, May 16, 1974. Al Hamishmar, Jan. 4, 1978. Rabbi Isaac J. Bernstein, Dialogue (New York), Winter 1980. Yediot Ahronot, Dec. 9, 1977. Menachem Barash, Yediot Ahronot, March 29, 1979. Francis Cornu, Le Monde, July 2, 1982; Yoela Har-Shefi, Al Hamishmar, July 25, 1982. Haim Handwerker, Ha‚Äôaretz, July 15, 1982. See chapters 5, 6, on the nature of such hasbara. Menachem Barash, Yediot Ahronot, Dec. 20, 1974. Ma‚Äôariv, Oct. 3, 1982. Cited by Danny Rubinstein, Davar, Oct. 8, 1982, in an article expressing concern over the intentions of the movement. Yediot Ahronot, Oct. 4, 1982. There was something similar in the wake of the 1967 victory; see Peace in the Middle East?, chapter 4, and particularly Kapeliouk‚Äôs Israel, which investigates in detail how Israel‚Äôs grandiose self-image contributed to the near disaster of 1973. ‚ÄúStrength, Strength, Strength,‚Äù Yediot Ahronot, Sept. 10, 1982. Military correspondent Ze‚Äôev Schiff, ‚ÄúWar Crime in Beirut,‚Äù Ha‚Äôaretz,  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  177. 178.  179.  180. 181.  182. 183.  184. 185.  186.  320  Sept. 20, 1982. This article, commenting on the Beirut massacre, was widely quoted in the U.S. press, but not this remarkable statement by the Chief of Staff. Davar, Sept. 3, 10, 1982. Also Aviezer Ravitzky, Ma‚Äôariv, Oct. 21, 1982 (Israeli Press Briefs). Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, ‚ÄúThe Consensus that Never Was,‚Äù Migvan, Aug. 1982. An abbreviated version appears in the New Outlook, October 1982. See Peace in the Middle East?, pp. 132f., 172ff., TNCW, 240f., for discussion of some examples from the left-liberal segment of the political spectrum. Oz, ‚ÄúHas Israel Altered its Visions?‚Äù For discussion of these matters, see Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State (Texas, Austin, 1980); TNCW, chapter 9 and Afterword, and sources cited there, including Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel. See also Elia T. Zureik, The Palestinians in Israel (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979). Jewish Post and Opinion, March 30, 16, 1983. The family benefits legislation is currently before the courts. Yediot Ahronot, April 20, 1979; Ha‚Äôaretz, July 28, 1977. Had the pretender succeeded in the ruse, he would have been a bigamist, but it is clear that ‚Äúattempted bigamy‚Äù was not the major charge. In another case, ‚Äúan inhabitant of the West Bank was convicted of pretending to be a Jew,‚Äù also with the intent of marrying a Jewish woman (Ma‚Äôariv, April 27, 1976). Note that the charge was not that he attempted to pass as an Israeli, but that he pretended to be a Jew. For details on the events and the legal process, see Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, chapter 6. Professor Raphael Jospe, ‚ÄúReport on Visit to Karmiel as Scholar in Residence,‚Äù report to the American Zionist Federation, April 1, 1982, circulated by the Zionist Academic Council as part of its educational program in American universities. For some facts concerning Karmiel, see TNCW, pp. 247f., and references cited.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  321  187. Alfred Friendly, ‚ÄúIsrael: Paradise Lost.‚Äù 188. See TNCW, pp. 257f., for citations and further references. See also note 14, above. 189. See TNCW, p. 439, for some references. For the Arlosoroff memorandum, published in 1948 in the Labor Party journal Jewish Frontier, see Khalidi, ed., From Haven to Conquest. 190. For quotes from some contemporary documents, see Peace in the Middle East?, p. 88. See also Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians, chapter 2. 191. Speech of 1937, cited in New Outlook (Tel Aviv), April 1977, from BenGurion‚Äôs Memoirs. 192. Menachem Begin, The Revolt (New York, Schuman, 1951, p. 335). See Shahak, Begin And Co., for extensive documentation from official sources on the positions taken by Begin‚Äôs terrorist army (Irgun Tsvai Leumi) and the political party (Herut) that was formed from it. 193. Report to the World Council of Poalei Zion (the forerunner of the Labor Party), Tel Aviv, 1938; cited by Israel Shahak, J. of Palestine Studies, Spring 1981. 194. Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians, pp. 265-6. 195. David Ben-Gurion, My Talks with Arab Leaders (Third Press, New York, 1973, pp. 27, 52), reporting talks of 1934 and 1936 with Musa Alami and George Antonius. 196. Speech of Oct. 13, 1936, Ben-Gurion, Memoirs, vol. 3, 1936, p. 467 (Hebrew). 197. Sykes, Crossroads to Israel, pp. 174-5. 198. Arlosoroff memorandum; see note 189. 199. Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion: A Biography (Delacorte, New York, 1978, pp. 91-2, 166, 186-7, 249-50). All emphases in original. 200. David Krivine, ‚ÄúThe Palestinian puzzle,‚Äù Jerusalem Post, Feb. 20, 1981. 201. David Krivine, letter, Economist, July 10, 1982. 202. ‚ÄúLiberated Territory No. 20,‚Äù Ha‚Äôaretz, June 13, 1982, advertisement. 203. Lucas, Modern History of Israel, p. 437. Though his analogy is in part correct, I do not think he is correct in suggesting that it was the resort to terror‚Äîwhich was real enough‚Äîthat established this image for the Zionist movement. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Israel and Palestine: Historical Backgrounds  322  204. Nahum Barnea and Danny Rubinstein, Davar, March 19, 1982. 205. Al Hamishmar, March 3, 1978; Jerusalem Post, Feb. 28, 1978 (a somewhat sanitized version). 206. Toldot Hahaganah, vol. II (Ma‚Äôarachot, pp. 251f.); see TNCW, pp. 4612; David Pryce-Jones, New Republic, Year-end Issue, 1982. See p. 97. 207. For a small sample, see TNCW, pp. 463f. and references cited, among them the rather admiring account of Irgun-LEHI atrocities by J. BowyerBell (Terror out 0f Zion, St. Martin‚Äôs, New York, 1977). See also the books by Hirst, Sykes, and others cited earlier, and for the later years, also Rokach, Israel‚Äôs Sacred Terrorism. Recall Flapan‚Äôs comment on the Irgun model for PLO terrorism, many decades later, cited above, p. 74. 208. See Shahak, Begin And Co., for translations from the Hebrew original. 209. Jerusalem Post, Feb. 15, 1982. See chapter 2, note 36 and text. 210. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, pp. 180-1. 211. Rokach, Israel‚Äôs Sacred Terrorism. See p. 20. 212. Cited by Nahum Barnea, Davar, April 9, 1982. 213. See TNCW, p. 465, for references. 214. The Dawn (Al Fajr), Jerusalem, Sept. 24, Oct. 1, 1982. 215. Davar, April 9, 1982, the anniversary of the massacre.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
5. Peace for Galilee  S  ince 1949, Israel has sought to remove the displaced Palestinian refugees from the border areas and to destroy their emerging political and military structures. The 1982 invasion of Lebanon was a further stage in these efforts. Their general character over the years was indicated by Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur in an interview in the Israeli press after the 1978 invasion of Lebanon, which drove another quarter-million Arabs from their homes with heavy casualties, in retaliation for a PLO terrorist attack in Israel. Gur observed that ‚ÄúFor 30 years, from the War of Independence [which Palestinians call ‚Äúthe War of Conquest‚Äù] until today, we have been fighting against a population that lives in villages and cities,‚Äù noting such incidents as the bombing of the Jordanian city of Irbid, the clearing of all inhabitants from the Jordan valley by bombing, driving a million and a half civilians from the Suez Canal area during the 1970 ‚Äúwar of attrition,‚Äù and other examples, all undertaken in alleged retaliation against Arab attacks. His remarks were accurately summarized by the noted Israeli military analyst Ze‚Äôev Schiff: In South Lebanon we struck the civilian population consciously, because they deserved it‚Ķthe importance of Gur‚Äôs remarks is the admission that the Israeli Army has always struck civilian populations, purposely and consciously‚Ķthe Army, he said, has never distinguished civilian [from military] targets…[but] purposely attacked civilian targets
324  Peace for Galilee  even when Israeli settlements had not been struck.1* These remarks, in 1978, apply with considerable accuracy to the Lebanon invasion four years later, and with still more force.  *  The military doctrine of attacking defenseless civilians derives from David Ben-  Gurion, who was quite explicit about it, though not in public of course. In a January 1, 1948 entry in his Independence War Diary, he writes: There is no question as to whether a reaction is necessary or not. The question is only time and place. Blowing up a house is not enough. What is necessary is cruel and strong reactions. We need precision in time, place and casualties. If we know the family‚Äî [we must] strike mercilessly, women and children included. Otherwise the reaction is inefficient. At the place of action there is no need to distinguish between guilty and innocent. Where there was no attack‚Äîwe should not strike. The latter qualification was not observed, frequently, in the pre-state period and increasingly in later years (as, for example, at Qibya). Excerpts from these diaries, to be published, appear in Yediot Ahronot, April 17, 1983, the independence day edition. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
325  Peace for Galilee  1. The Rational Basis for Attacking the Civilian Population he motive for Israel‚Äôs attacks against civilian populations to the north and east was dual: to disperse the Palestinian refugees, and to embitter relations between them and the local population in the areas to which they had been driven. As explained by Labor Party dove Abba Eban: ‚Äúthere was a rational prospect, ultimately fulfilled, that affected populations would exert pressure for the cessation of hostilities.‚Äù Eban was writing in condemnation of an article by Prime Minister Begin which reviewed attacks against civilians under the Labor government,* presenting a picture, according to Eban, ‚Äúof an Israel wantonly inflicting every possible measure of death and anguish on civilian populations in a mood reminiscent of regimes which neither Mr. Begin nor I would dare to mention by name.‚Äù2 Eban does not contest the facts that Begin reviewed, but criticizes him for stating them, thus contributing to Arab propaganda. He also does not mention that his own doctrine, just quoted, represented the standard practice of the regimes he does not ‚Äúdare to mention by name.‚Äù Recent events in Lebanon again confirm Eban‚Äôs judgment about the ‚Äúrational prospect.‚Äù On the current scene, it is not only in Lebanon (earlier, Jordan) that Eban‚Äôs ‚Äúrational prospect‚Äù has met with a certain success. A ‚Äúveteran Western observer,‚Äù commenting on the tactics of the Afghan resistance, states that ‚ÄúThey‚Äôll come through a village, expect people with hardly any food themselves to feed them, then they‚Äôll use the village‚Äîwith or  T  *  Begin‚Äôs review of atrocities under Labor Party rule was in response to Labor  criticism of the recent bombing of Lebanon, which left hundreds dead. For further quotes and discussion, see Herman, The Real Terror Network, pp. 76f. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  326  without permission‚Äîas a staging point to attack a passing Russian patrol. After the guerrillas leave, the Russians come back and pulverize the area in retaliation.‚Äù It is partly for this reason, he alleges, that ‚ÄúA small but growing number of Afghans…have chosen the [Russianestablished] militia as the only alternative to starvation and to more death at the hands of the Russians.‚Äù3 In short, the fulfilment of Eban‚Äôs ‚Äúrational prospect,‚Äù as in Lebanon. Other similarities have been noted. In Pakistan, local political activists describe the ‚Äúrecent Israeli incursion into Lebanon…as an indication of what could happen if the [Afghan] refugees and resistance assume a permanent presence in Pakistan, a sort of Asian version of the Palestinian problem.‚Äù Local residents speak of the Afghan guerrilla group that is favored by the Pakistani government ‚Äúas troublemakers with licence to interfere in provincial politics,‚Äù a fact that is ‚Äúkeenly exploited by local political activists to stir up fear and animosity among their followers towards Afghans in general.‚Äù Bombing of refugee concentrations in Pakistan (what the Russians, perhaps, call ‚Äúcleaning out nests of terrorists‚Äù) surely contributes to these efforts.4 Those acquainted with the recent history of Lebanon will recognize the pattern. With many local variations, it is, in general, a familiar story. Military tactics in the course of U.S. aggression in Indochina (or to keep to the Party Line, ‚Äúthe defense of South Vietnam‚Äù) are another case.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
327  Peace for Galilee  2. The Northern Border of Greater Israel ith regard to Lebanon, Israel is now realizing plans that have early antecedents in Zionist thinking. It had long been hoped that Israel‚Äôs boundaries would ultimately extend to the Litani River in southern Lebanon, one part of Ben-Gurion’s vision‚Äù (see p. 289). In 1932, a Jewish Agency emissary visited Beirut to discuss ‚Äúa joint company for using southern Lebanon‚Äôs Litani River for electricity and irrigation.‚Äù The Zionists regarded the Christian Maronites as a natural ally and sought to form ‚Äúa symbiotic alliance‚Äù with them against the ‚Äúcommon enemy: Islamic-oriented Arab nationalism.‚Äù The majority of the Maronites, however, ‚Äúchose the alternative of peace with the Muslims,‚Äù establishing the 1943 National Pact which ‚Äúsucceeded in preserving Christian predominance and prosperity for three decades.‚Äù They recognized that ‚Äúthe only alternative to a pact with Lebanese Muslims was civil war and since the resulting agreement was quite satisfactory for Christian interests, this posed little temptation‚Äù‚Äîin the mid-40s. Only 30 years later ‚Äúdid the main Maronite parties accept alliance with Israel.‚Äù5 By then, years of communal strife resulting largely from the inequities suffered by the Muslim majority and later exacerbated by the Palestine presence (siding with the Muslims) had led to the breakdown of the National Pact and a vicious civil war, with Syrian and Israeli participation. Ten days after the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, Ben-Gurion presented his General Staff with his plan to establish a Christian state north of the Litani river with which Israel would form an alliance (see chapter 4, section 9.1). In the mid-1950s, plans were considered at the highest level to dismember Lebanon, establishing a Christian state with Israel annexing the territory south of the Litani.  W  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  328  Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan felt that this could be achieved by finding ‚Äúan officer, even just a Major,‚Äù who could be bribed or won over and would then ‚Äúagree to declare himself the savior of the Maronite population,‚Äù after which Israel would invade and realize its plans.6 These plans had to be put in abeyance from 1956, when Israel was allied with France, which saw itself as ‚Äúthe protector of Lebanon.‚Äù But they were taken up again in the 1970s and were partially realized with the establishment of Major Saad Haddad‚Äôs ‚Äúindependent state‚Äù in southern Lebanon in 1979, after the 1978 Israeli invasion, in territory handed over to him by the Israeli army in defiance of the United Nations after Haddad had deserted from the Lebanese army.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  329  3. The Background in Lebanon 3.1 The PLO and the Civil War n 1970, many Palestinians were driven from Jordan after a bloody conflict in which thousands were killed by King Hussein‚Äôs forces. In Lebanon, they joined hundreds of thousands of refugees from the 1948 war. The PLO at first attempted to keep clear of Lebanon‚Äôs internal strife. Furthermore, after vicious terrorist attacks in Israel in the early 1970s, PLO tactics began to change. John Cooley observes that ‚ÄúDuring 1974 [and in fact, thereafter] there was a strong tendency by Arafat‚Äôs PLO leadership, al-Fatah, to curb cross-border activity,‚Äù though this did not prevent ‚Äú‚Äòwildcat‚Äô actions‚Äù by other groups in the PLO. 7 The PLO was, however, drawn into the civil war, initially, by an April 1975 Phalange attack on a bus killing 27 Palestinians and Lebanese who were travelling to Tel al-Zaatar from the Sabra and Shatila camps‚Äîa grim portent. At first, the PLO role was largely limited to arming some Muslim and leftist groups and helping defend Muslim districts that were under Christian (largely Maronite Phalange) attack. The PLO took a more active role in January 1976, when Christian militias blockaded Palestinian camps. ‚ÄúBy this time,‚Äù Cooley writes, ‚Äúsuch events as ‚ÄòBlack Saturday‚Äô on December 6, 1975, when over 200 Muslim hostages were taken and murdered by the Phalange in reprisals for murders of four Phalangist militiamen, and a new leftist offensive against the fortified [Christian] hotels, had consummated the partition of Beirut and Lebanon as a whole into two well-defined zones: the eastern Christian and the western, ‚ÄòIslamo-Progressivist‚Äô or leftist sector.‚Äù (The alliances were actually fairly complex, but I will keep to the oversimplified familiar  I  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  330  terms, noting here that they are a bit misleading.) The Muslim Karantina slum was overrun by Christian forces with large numbers massacred, then ‚Äúburned and razed‚Ķwith bulldozers.‚Äù The Christian (Chamounist) town of Damour was then taken by ‚Äúthe leftist-Palestinian coalition and‚Ķoccupied, looted, and destroyed.‚Äù The propaganda of Israel and its American supporters regularly refers to the last of these atrocities as proof that the PLO was conducting a murderous war against the Lebanese; what preceded is regularly omitted.  3.2 Syria and Israel in Lebanon Syria entered the war in support of the Christians against the leftistPalestinian coalition, an act that Kissinger called ‚Äúconstructive‚Äù and that was tacitly backed by Israel, though Israel insisted that the Syrian army remain north of the Litani. By July 1976, a Syrian-led ‚Äúpeace-keeping force‚Äù had intervened under an Arab League mandate, still in support of the Christians. In August, the Tel al-Zaatar Palestinian camp was overrun after a long siege. Thousands were massacred by Christian forces using Israeli arms, armored personnel carriers and tanks, ‚Äústill with Israeli Defense Forces markings in Hebrew,‚Äù Cooley writes, adding that ‚ÄúBy early summer considerable transfers of tanks, vehicles, artillery, and other military equipment had been made by Israel to the rightists [Maronites].‚Äù Israeli military forces now operated regularly in southern Lebanon to establish rightist control. Syria launched another major offensive against the leftist-Palestinian alliance in September. By October 1976, the ‚Äúpeacekeeping forces,‚Äù largely Syrian, numbered 30,000. Subsequently, Syria turned against the Christian right. The Maronite Phalange under Bashir Gemayel established its dominance within the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  331  Christian-right alliance by murdering opposition elements. The PLO continued to engage in murderous conflict with Israeli-supported Christian elements and, later, with local Muslim groups in the south, while frequently acting to protect Muslim elements from Christian massacres. Israel meanwhile conducted regular military attacks in Lebanon, including bombing and shelling of refugee camps, bombardment of coastal cities by gunboats, terrorist raids in Beirut and elsewhere, the outright invasion of 1978, and finally the occupation of large parts of Lebanon in the summer of 1982. See also chapter 3, section 3. Israeli sources give further information about early Israeli-Maronite contacts. In Hotam (Mapam), Chaim Margalit reports that in February 1976 a boat with Maronite leaders was received secretly in Haifa. He quotes Amos Eran, then General Manager of the office of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the Labor Party, who explains further that the Maronites were divided into a group that wanted to undertake joint actions with Israel and those who saw Lebanon as part of the Arab world. The Rabin government supported the former group, the Phalangists and Chamounists. The early contacts were at a low level and were kept secret, though they were widely known; and at the time, Eran reports, ‚Äúthe Americans were not in the picture.‚Äù A ‚Äúqualitative change‚Äù took place when the Begin government took power‚Äîin fact, other evidence suggests, after Sharon became Defense Minister in July 1981. The ‚Äúexploitative character‚Äù of the Maronites was well-known, Margalit continues, ‚Äòjust as we knew that they would not hesitate to arrange provocations in order to bring Israel in to fight for them.‚Äù He claims that the conflict with the Syrians over the air defense missiles in the Bekaa valley ‚Äúbegan with a provocation of the Phalange soldiers,‚Äù a view corroborated by other sources (see chapter 6, section 2.2). Eran asserts that Bashir Gemayel, who was elected President in August 1982 under Israeli guns and later assassinated, was no friend of Israel: ‚ÄúIf Bashir Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
332  Peace for Galilee  Gemayel were alive and President of Lebanon, he would be no better [meaning, no more friendly to Israel] than his brother Amin [who was elected President after the assassination]. Those who knew him are ready to say that it is reasonable to assume that he would have been even worse than his brother with regard to Israel and its requests,‚Äù a matter to which we return.8  3.3 The Population under the PLO and the Phalange As Israeli forces conquered southern Lebanon in 1982, many stories began to circulate about the violence and terrorism of PLO rule (in contrast, little was said about the treatment of Palestinians in areas controlled by Israeli-backed Christian forces, but then, there is little to say, since those who were not killed outright were simply expelled; the treatment of Muslims by these forces has also received little notice, and again, the same comment holds). A number of journalists attempted to verify these reports. A respected Israeli Arab journalist, Attallah Mansour (himself a Maronite), travelled through the territories that had been under PLO and Lebanese Muslim control. He observes that of all the forces in Lebanon, only the Maronite Phalange and the extremist Christian ‚ÄúGuards of the Cedars,‚Äù also allied with Israel, practiced policies based on communal exclusivism, simply removing or destroying their local enemies. ‚ÄúIn the left-Muslim-Palestinian camp there were communal militias, but most of these organizations profess a universalist Arab, Lebanese, or socialist ideology,‚Äù and their practice reflected the fact: Christian communities are found throughout the area under their control, in contrast to the Phalangists, ‚Äúwho drove out of the areas they controlled in Beirut, Junieh, and other areas almost all the non-Christian population.‚Äù The well-known Muslim atrocities (Damour, Aishiye) Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  333  ‚Äúapparently were revenge for similar actions carried out by ‚ÄòChristians‚Äô in Karantina, Tel al-Zaatar, and in the Beirut area and Khiyam (near [Israeli] Metullah).‚Äù In contrast, throughout the areas held by the Muslim-Palestinian forces there are ‚Äúlively Christian communities‚Äù of various sects, as Mansour found in a tour through the area, including Christian cities and towns and isolated villages deprived of any Phalange protection. He heard stories of oppression and occasional atrocities‚Äî ‚Äúthe Christians were not fortunate at all, but it is doubtful that many people were fortunate in Lebanon from 1975 apart from murderers and robbers.‚Äù A relative he met in a Christian town near Sidon (under Muslim-Palestinian control) told him that he had ‚Äúread too many newspapers and believed the politicians.‚Äù Mansour‚Äôs general conclusion was that life for the Christians in these areas was no bed of roses, but that it went on in relative peace, in sharp contrast to what happened in the areas dominated by the murderous Israeli-backed Christian forces.9 Note the unusual, perhaps unique credibility of Mansour‚Äôs account, given his reputation, background, and access to sources. Two Jerusalem Post reporters also toured south Lebanon to investigate the stories of PLO terror and atrocities. Despite considerable effort, they ‚Äúcould find little or no substantive proof for many of the atrocity stories making the rounds,‚Äù and eventually concluded that they were ‚Äúexaggerated.‚Äù A close reading of their discoveries suggests that this may be an understatement, particularly when we correct for the extreme bias that they barely attempt to hide. Thus they say that in Tel al-Zaatar ‚Äúmany Palestinians were reportedly killed by the Christian forces‚Äù‚Äîmy emphasis‚Äîand they open their article by saying that life in southern Lebanon was ‚Äúso unpleasant that a large part of its population fled north to escape the PLO,‚Äù later giving evidence that the population fled massive Israeli attacks; and so on, throughout. In the town of Hasbaya, they found that ‚Äúthe PLO appears to have Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  334  behaved more or less correctly with the people‚Äù; they were also told that 49 people were killed there by Israeli shelling though the PLO ‚Äúnever came closer than two kilometers‚Äù except for ‚Äúbrief shopping forays,‚Äù and ‚Äúfear of the IDF was, the notables imply, far greater among Hasbayans than their fear of the PLO,‚Äù an observation from which they draw no conclusions with regard to terrorism. In other towns and villages they found that officials and others knew ‚Äúnothing‚Äù about allegations of PLO atrocities or misbehavior. They visited Nabatiye, allegedly one of the areas of the worst PLO atrocities. The police chief there told them of ‚Äúabout 10 cases of disappearance,‚Äù though he was unable to provide any details. As for the 50,000 people who fled from this town of 60,000, they fled ‚Äúmostly because of fear of the [Israeli] shelling,‚Äù the police chief told them (200 were killed by Israeli attacks, including a ‚Äúreprisal,‚Äù which destroyed much of the Palestine refugee camp after the terrorist raid in Ma‚Äôalot). He also denied that there had been any cases of rape or extortion, though the PLO took goods from shops whose owners had fled. Others confirmed this impression, insisting that they knew of no cases of murder or rape, including residents of Ansar, to which they were specifically directed by an IDF colonel who heard that they were ‚Äúinvestigating PLO rule and atrocities.‚Äù Here, the only story they elicited was of the killing of five local inhabitants who had ‚Äúopposed the PLO, fought against them, with arms, during or after a firefight, according to residents. They visited the Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Tyre, Georges Haddad, to ask him about life under the PLO, but he ‚Äúprefers to expatiate on the problem of the thousands detained by the IDF in southern Lebanon,‚Äù and when asked about ‚ÄúPLO anarchy or rule in Tyre‚Äù he responded by speaking of ‚ÄúIDF destruction of buildings in his city.‚Äù Finally, under repeated prodding, he said (‚Äúexasperated‚Äù) that there were some atrocities by ‚Äúextremist‚Äù elements, specifically, by the Syrian-backed Sa‚Äôiqa in revenge for the Phalangist Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
335  Peace for Galilee  massacre in Tel al-Zaatar, where thousands were murdered. Also, ‚ÄúThe PLO was inclined to persecute and strike out against persons who disagreed with or resisted them, or were identified as agents of Major Sa‚Äôad Haddad or Israel.‚Äù The general impression these two Israeli reporters received was that the PLO were often oppressive, but that atrocities were rare. In southern Lebanon, fear was ‚Äúnever far below the surface‚Äî fear of the PLO‚Äôs arbitrary law of the gun and, in several cases, the even greater fear of Israeli air strikes and artillery barrages.‚Äù10 After what is officially termed their ‚Äúliberation‚Äù from PLO terror, the inhabitants of Hasbaya‚Äîwhere the PLO had behaved correctly and 49 people were killed by IDF shelling‚Äîapparently began to raise some problems for their liberators. In November 1982, the IDF banned all political activity in Hasbaya and other villages of the region ‚Äúafter arms caches were discovered in the offices of these parties in the town of Hasbaya.‚Äù The parties banned were ‚Äúthe pro-Syrian party, the pro-Iraqi party, the Communist Party, and the party of Walid Jumblatt‚Äù (the Druze leader whose father, assassinated in 1977, had headed the now disbanded Muslim-Palestinian Lebanese National Front), a party affiliated with the strongly pro-Israel Socialist International. The Israeli commander also ordered that pictures of party leaders be removed from the walls of houses. The day after these reports appeared, the IDF denied them, alleging that the ban was instituted by Major Haddad, the Israeli client who was given jurisdiction over this area after the Israeli conquest; a distinction without a difference.11  3.4 Israeli Military Operations in Lebanon in the 1970s Israel‚Äôs attacks in Lebanon over the years were generally described in the U.S. as retaliation against PLO terrorism. As usual, the categories of Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  336  ‚Äúterrorism‚Äù and ‚Äúreprisal‚Äù are more ideological than descriptive. One might, for example, raise the question of what the Palestinians were doing in Lebanon in the first place; they did not move there because they liked the scenery. The comparable question would not be regarded as irrelevant in the case of some official enemy conducting ‚Äúretaliatory‚Äù or ‚Äúpreemptive‚Äù strikes against ‚Äúterrorism,‚Äù say, attacks by the Russiansponsored Afghan army against Afghan refugees in Pakistan (see note 4). Other questions also arise. For example, two days before the PLO terrorist attack in Ma‚Äôalot in May 1974, where 20 teenage Israeli hostages from a paramilitary youth group (Gadna) were killed during an attempt to rescue the hostages after Israel had rejected negotiation efforts (the terrorist unit, from Hawatmeh‚Äôs Democratic Front, had previously killed five other Israelis, including 2 Arabs), an Israeli air attack on the village of EI-Kfeir in Lebanon killed four civilians. The PLO raid is (properly) described here as terrorism, but not the Israeli air attack‚Äîwhich, in fact, is known (though barely known) here only because it happened to be the native village of the parents of U.S. Senator James Abourezk. According to Edward Said, the Ma‚Äôalot attack was ‚Äúpreceded by weeks of sustained Israeli napalm bombing of Palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon‚Äù with over 200 killed.12 It might also be noted that the taking of hostages in order to exchange them for prisoners, as at Ma‚Äôalot, is not without precedent. Recall the Israeli hijacking of a civilian airliner, 20 years earlier, with the same intent (see chapter 3, section 3). In the mid-1970s, as the PLO began to turn away from cross-border terrorist raids and the Labor government intensified its attacks, Israel shifted the grounds from ‚Äúretaliation‚Äù to ‚Äúprevention.‚Äù Thus, on December 2, 1975, 30 Israeli warplanes bombed and strafed Palestinian refugee camps and nearby villages, killing 57 people (Lebanese military communiqu√©; Palestinian press service). ‚ÄúIsraeli officials stressed that Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
337  Peace for Galilee  the purpose of the action had been preventive, not punitive.‚Äù Two days earlier, over Israel‚Äôs angry objections, the UN Security Council had ‚Äúpaved the way for participation by the Palestine Liberation Organization in talks on the over-all Middle East situation‚Ķ‚Äù‚Äînamely, in the session devoted to the Arab initiative for a full-scale peaceful two-state settlement ‚Äúprepared‚Äù by the PLO (according to Israel‚Äôs UN representative) and vetoed by the U.S.13 One might conjecture that the ‚Äúpreventive‚Äù strikes in fact constituted Israel‚Äôs retaliation against the UN Security Council. Israel‚Äôs right to undertake such ‚Äúpreventive‚Äù massacres was rarely questioned here. In fact, Israeli attacks in Lebanon were covered only sporadically in the press, and then often in side comment, in part, perhaps, because of the difficulties faced by journalists attempting to travel in southern Lebanon, in part from indifference. The story of these operations has yet to be told. They did receive occasional notice.14 Newsweek reported in 1970 that ‚ÄúBy conservative estimate, the escalating border war has already forced out one-fifth of the 150,000 Lebanese Moslems in the area, and the rest live gripped in a steady terror.‚Äù In the words of one Christian villager, the population is ‚Äúcaught in the middle‚Äù between the Palestinians, who ‚Äúwant back their land,‚Äù and the Israelis, who ‚Äúdon‚Äôt want to give it up.‚Äù ‚ÄúBoth are determined to fight,‚Äù an accurate statement as of 1970.15 After a visit to Lebanon in 1974, correspondent Philip Bowring wrote: Although foreigners feel safe enough from the raids of the Israelis in central Beirut, if they take the trouble to leave the tourist haunts they will see why the locals live with fear. The Lebanese view is that the raids are less an effort to satisfy Israeli domestic blood lusts than an attempt to blow Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
338  Peace for Galilee  Lebanon‚Äôs fragile political unity apart, setting Christians and Muslims against each other and the Palestinians against everyone. It could happen.16 It did happen, in accord with the ‚Äúrational prospect‚Äù explained by Abba Eban, but Americans, who were funding the operation, rarely ‚Äútook the trouble‚Äù to see. That Israel has (again rationally) been intent on fostering internal strife in Lebanon has also been argued, for example, by Walid Khalidi, who suggests that Israeli initiatives leading to the intensive Israeli bombardment of November 1977 and the 1978 invasion may have been in part motivated by the desire to disrupt a recent agreement between the Lebanese government, Syria and the PLO (the Shtaura accord), which imposed a freeze on Palestinian cross-border operations and offered some possibility for a settlement of the civil conflict. Shortly after the surrender of heavy armaments by the PLO in the first phase of the accord, the Israeli-controlled Haddad militia launched an offensive with Israeli military support, disrupting the government‚Äôs plans to deploy the Lebanese army in the south. Edward Mortimer suggests that similar concerns may have influenced the timing of the 1982 invasion, about which, more below. Discussing Israel‚Äôs policies after the 1982 invasion, David Hirst concludes: Israel‚Äôs policy, in so far as it has a coherent one, appears to be to divide and rule, to seize, opportunistically, on all available means of reinforcing military control with political manipulation, to bring rival communities into collision with each other and into dependence on itself.17 A close look at the facts tends to lend credibility to these conclusions, as Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  339  we shall see in the next chapter. One of the rare articles on the bombing of Lebanon in the early 1970s was written by Judith Coburn, after an investigation of several months. One Christian Arab village was ‚Äúa near ghost town‚Äù after five straight days of bombing in May 1974 (the same month as the Ma‚Äôalot terrorist action, which in contrast to this one, is very well-known). She found scores of villages like it, bombed since 1968 and attacked ‚Äúalmost daily in recent months‚Ķby airplane, artillery, tanks and gunboats,‚Äù and invaded by Israeli commandos who blow up houses, kill villagers, and take prisoners. ‚ÄúThe Israelis are using the full range of sophisticated savagery known to our own military in Indochina: shells, bombs, phosphorous, incendiary bombs, CBUs and napalm,‚Äù much of it supplied by the U.S. The Lebanese government says that 301 Lebanese civilians have been killed; diplomats in Beirut and UN officials estimate 3500 killed in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan in Israeli raids. There are no figures for Palestinian civilians, ‚Äúbut observers estimate they must be at least twice as high as for the Lebanese.‚Äù Palestinian towns and camps have been almost levelled. ‚ÄúMost Lebanese and some diplomats in Beirut believe that the Israelis are pursuing a ‚Äòscorched earth‚Äô policy in southern Lebanon designed to drive all population from the area and establish a DMZ,‚Äù reporting burning of crops, destruction of olive groves, and so on. ‚ÄúThe bombing has become so routine that it goes largely unreported in the American press‚Äù18‚Äîthough Palestinian terror attacks were always front-page news and (again, properly) elicited outraged condemnation.* If the figures cited are correct, then by 1975 Israel had killed about 10 times as many Palestinians and Lebanese in attacks on *  American correspondents in Beirut report privately that the New York office of a  major television network suppressed a 1975 documentary on Israeli military actions in southern Lebanon. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  340  Lebanon as the total number of Israelis killed in the course of crossborder Palestinian attacks through 1982. See chapter 3, section 2.4.2. London Guardian correspondent Irene Beeson reports that ‚Äú150 or more towns and villages in South Lebanon‚Ķhave been repeatedly savaged by the Israeli armed forces since 1968.‚Äù She describes the history of the village of Khiyam, bombed from 1968. By the time Israel invaded ten years later, only 32 of its 30,000 inhabitants remained. ‚ÄúThey were massacred in cold blood‚Äù by the Haddad forces that Israel had established in the south.19 After the Beirut massacres in September 1982, the story of Khiyam was recalled in the Israeli press. Moshe Hazani wrote that ‚Äúwe knew about the Christian atrocities of 1978‚Äîand we were silent.‚Äù ‚ÄúThe silence fell on other villages, where there were events similar [to those of Khiyam], and perhaps still more terrible‚Ķ‚Äù ‚ÄúOur hands spilled this blood,‚Äù he writes, adding that the Beirut massacres could have been no surprise to the IDF, which knew the history well.20 Those who are paying the bills have yet to show similar honesty. Note that a decade of bombardment that drove out much of the population still goes unmentioned. Before the Lebanese army disintegrated in 1976, it had given a figure of 1.4 Israeli violations of Lebanese territory per day from 1968-74, with 17 per day in 1975, when the tally ended. By October 1977 it was estimated that the total number of refugees from the south (mostly impoverished Shiite Lebanese Muslims) had reached 300,000.21 Many were brutally expelled from their slum dwellings in West Beirut after the conquering Israeli army (or as some prefer, ‚Äútheir liberators‚Äù) had handed control over to the Phalange; see chapter 6, section 7.3. In November 1977 an Israeli-initiated exchange of fire caused several casualties on each side, and finally Israeli bombing ‚Äúin which some 70 people, nearly all Lebanese, were killed.‚Äù22 As noted earlier, the fear of a Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  341  still greater war at this time may well have been one of the factors that impelled Sadat to offer to visit Jerusalem. In March 1978, Israel invaded Lebanon in retaliation for a terrorist attack by PLO guerrillas, who reached Israel by sea from near Beirut, leading to the death of 34 Israelis in an exchange of fire on a coastal road. The invasion was violent and destructive, with many areas left in ruins, some 250,000 refugees, and 2000 dead.23 The raiders had come from a point well north of the area invaded by Israel; the border had been relatively quiet since the November 1977 interchange initiated by Israel. In 1979, heavy Israeli bombardment continued, generally ignored in the U.S., though some of the worst atrocities were reported. John Cooley reports: ‚ÄúDespairing over apparent Western indifference to the ongoing carnage in Lebanon, Lebanese Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss has compiled a list of Lebanese men, women, and children killed or wounded in Israeli attacks inside Lebanon since last April,‚Äù to be dispatched to Washington by the U.S. Embassy. The purpose was to ‚Äúshow the magnitude of purely Lebanese casualties‚Äînearly 100 killed and wounded in one day‚Äôs air raids last April alone.‚Äù24 The Lebanese government list is reported to have detailed ‚Äúthe names, ages and occupations of 969 Lebanese civilians killed and 224 wounded by Israeli air strikes and shelling.‚Äù25 Cooley reports further that the Lebanese Prime Minister, ‚Äúa mild-mannered man educated in the United States, reacted angrily to a U.S. State Department statement that the American administration did not know whether U.S.-made planes had bombed Lebanon recently,‚Äù asking: ‚ÄúDoes the American spokesman expect to convince us that Israel‚Äôs military capability, being used to pound populated areas mercilessly and daily, is not provided by the United States, despite all the American economic and military aid Israel is receiving?‚Äù Eyewitnesses ‚Äúreport homes, farms, livestock, automobiles, and boats in the port of Tyre destroyed‚Äù in the latest Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  342  fighting, which included firing by U.S.-supplied heavy artillery from inside Israel and from inside Major Haddad‚Äôs southern Lebanese enclave, Cooley continues. Israeli bombardment was regarded as so ordinary and unremarkable that it was sometimes merely noted in passing, as when Pranay Gupte mentioned in a New York Times article on Lebanon that Israeli warships ‚Äúlobbed shells into the port city of Tyre, a Palestinian center‚Äù26‚Äî incidentally, a Lebanese city; the ‚ÄúPalestinian center‚Äù was in Rashidiyeh, south of Tyre. All of this designed to achieve Eban‚Äôs ‚Äúrational prospect.‚Äù One suspects that regular Palestinian bombardment of Israeli cities and towns might have been treated somewhat less casually, and might even have been regularly reported, perhaps even eliciting editorial comment, perhaps even criticism. One may recall, at this point, the common complaint by some Israeli commentators and many supporters of Israel here, several already quoted, that Israel‚Äôs ‚Äúimperfections‚Äù are scrutinized under a magnifying glass by the Western media, while PLO atrocities are ignored.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
343  Peace for Galilee  4. From July 1981 4.1 The July Bombardments and the Habib Cease-Fire n July 1981, Israeli planes once again initiated hostilities after a period of peace, striking Palestinian targets in southern Lebanon. Palestinian retaliation elicited extensive Israeli bombing, ultimately the terror attacks of July 17-8 on Beirut and other civilian targets leaving hundreds dead. After Philip Habib‚Äôs negotiations on behalf of the U.S. government, a cease-fire was put into effect, but it was clear that ‚Äúsooner or later, Israel will probably find a pretext for another invasion of Lebanon in an effort to administer the coup de grace to the PLO and to disperse the refugees once again.‚Äù27 The subsequent history is illuminating.  I  4.2 The Occupied Territories A series of important events took place from summer 1981 to the Israeli invasion a year later. Menachem Begin was re-elected and appointed as his Defense Minister General Ariel Sharon, who at once began to plan for the invasion, as he later explained. In November, a new and far harsher regime was instituted in the West Bank and Gaza, under the direction of Sharon and Menachem Milson, the new Civilian Administrator. The shift to ‚Äúcivilian administration‚Äù was widely understood as a move towards a form of annexation. In December and January, the Golan Heights were in effect annexed to Israel.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  344  4.3 The Sinai Withdrawal In April 1982, Israel completed the withdrawal from the Sinai as arranged at Camp David, evacuating the town of Yamit in northeastern Sinai with a ‚Äúnational trauma‚Äù that appears to have been largely staged for a domestic and American audience.28 Amnon Kapeliouk described the Yamit evacuation as ‚Äúone of the largest brain-washing operations conducted by the government in order to convince the Israeli people that they have suffered a ‚Äònational trauma the effect of which will be felt for generations‚Äù‚Äô and which will create ‚Äúa national consensus opposed to similar withdrawals in the remaining occupied territories.‚Äù He quotes General Chaim Erez, commander of the Yamit evacuation, who says that ‚ÄúEverything was planned and agreed from the beginning‚Äù with the settlers who were to offer a show of resistance. Thus, Kapeliouk writes, ‚ÄúWhile the hospitals of the West Bank were full of scores of Palestinian victims of ‚Äòtrigger happy‚Äô Israeli soldiers, a miracle occurred in Yamit: no demonstrators required even first-aid attention.‚Äù29 Meanwhile, the other intended audience here was treated to heartrending accounts of Jewish settlers, many of them recent immigrants from the U.S. and USSR, forced to leave their homes. As discussed in the preceding chapter (see chapter 4, section 4.1), the former Arab settlers had been displaced by force and violence not long before with little notice here, driven into the desert, their houses, mosques, schools, cemeteries, crops, orchards destroyed. Most then performed menial labor for the new settlers on their former lands. The New York Times reported that ‚Äúlocal Arab labor is cheap,‚Äù not troubling to explain why. Some lived only a few hundred yards away, but they were not even provided with water from the pumping stations built for the modern town of Yamit, one of the proud achievements of the Labor Party.30 This was only one phase in the expulsion of the Bedouin from their lands in Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
345  Peace for Galilee  Israel and across the borders, beginning in 1950, when some 3500 were expelled from the demilitarized zones with air and ground attacks.31 The Bedouin had anticipated that after the completion of the Sinai evacuation, they would be able to move into the town of Yamit that had been constructed on the lands from which they had been driven. This was not to be, however. Yamit and the other Jewish settlements in the area were destroyed by the departing Israeli forces, leaving what Uri Avneri called a ‚Äúmonument commemorating the Israeli vandal.‚Äù32 David Shaham describes how Israel expelled the 6000 Bedouin of the area, destroying everything they had built and cultivated, and then introduced 2000 Jewish settlers with billions of dollars of investment (paid for by the usual generous donor). He then adds: Now again we have uprooted trees, demolished the buildings, pulled out the water pipes, torn down electricity lines and introduced the desert. In the long run we will have only been an episode. Now the Bedouins will come back, they will dig water holes, build shacks and live in them, plant trees, grow vegetables‚Äîthe area will truly return to what it was before we came in. But where shall we take our shame?33 This is in fact standard Israeli practice. Recall the destruction of Kuneitra a few years earlier when the Israeli army withdrew from parts of the Golan Heights. Or 1956, when Israel was compelled to withdraw from the Sinai after its attack on Egypt in collusion with France and Britain and Israeli forces ‚Äúsystematically destroyed all surfaced roads, railway tracks and telephone lines‚Äù and destroyed ‚Äúall buildings in the tiny villages of Abu Ageila and El Quseima,‚Äù prompting UN Commander Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
346  Peace for Galilee  General Burns to comment: ‚ÄúGod had scorched the Sinai earth, and His chosen people removed whatever stood above it.‚Äù34 The Sinai was evacuated in April, as scheduled. Egypt and Israel now enjoyed more or less normal arrangements, and, crucially, Egyptian military forces were excluded from the Arab-Israeli conflict, so that Israel could concentrate its attention (and its military forces) on the occupied territories and the northern border.  4.4 Israeli Provocations and the U.S. Response Through early 1982 Israel carried out a series of provocative actions in southern Lebanon, including the sinking of Lebanese fishing boats in Lebanese territorial waters,* ‚Äútraining exercises‚Äù in southern Lebanon with extensive gunfire by the Haddad forces (in effect, part of the Israeli army), military maneuvers in southern Lebanon that were described by the UN as ‚Äúintensive, excessive, and provocative,‚Äù repeated deployment of military forces at potential invasion routes, and-from August 1981 to May 1982‚Äî2125 violations of Lebanese airspace and 652 violations of Lebanese territorial waters.35 None of these actions succeeded in eliciting a PLO ‚Äúprovocation‚Äù that could serve as a pretext for the planned invasion. In February, Time reported, an Israeli ‚Äúassault was narrowly averted‚Ķthough perhaps not for long.‚Äù In January, Defense Minister Sharon had met with the commander of the Christian Phalange forces, Bashir Gemayel, in an Israeli gunboat off the Lebanese coast, to plan an invasion ‚Äúthat would bring Israeli forces as far north as the edge  *  AJME News (Beirut, April 1982) cites a report of the rightist ‚ÄúVoice of  Lebanon‚Äù radio on March 9 that a Lebanese freighter was dynamited by Israeli frogmen at Tyre (there is a picture of the damaged ship). Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
347  Peace for Galilee  of Beirut International Airport,‚Äù36 a precise description of the operation launched in early June. The Israeli and international media carried many other reports of the impending invasion,* but the PLO was uncooperative and supplied no suitable pretext. On April 21 Israel broke the nine-month truce with a still more provocative action, bombing alleged PLO centers in coastal areas south of Beirut. This time there had been a PLO ‚Äúterrorist act‚Äù: an Israeli soldier had been killed when his military jeep struck a land mine‚Äîin southern Lebanon! There was still no PLO response. Israel‚Äôs position that its bombing was retaliatory was accepted in the U.S. by the ‚ÄúproPLO‚Äù and ‚Äúanti-Israel‚Äù press. The Washington Post, for example, responded to these events as follows: So this is not the moment for sermons to Israel. It is a moment for respect for Israel‚Äôs anguish‚Äîand for mourning the latest victims of Israeli-Palestinian hostility.37 Typically, it is Israel‚Äôs anguish that we must respect when still more Palestinians are killed in an unprovoked Israeli terrorist attack‚Äîagain, one imagines that the reaction might have been somewhat different if the PLO had bombed coastal towns north of Tel Aviv, killing many people, in retaliation for the death of a Palestinian guerrilla in northern *  Ze‚Äôev Schiff cites an NBC television report by John Chancellor, ‚Äúknown for his  contacts in Washington,‚Äù on April 8, 1982, which was so accurate that it ‚Äúamounted to a virtual exposure of the Israeli war plans,‚Äù including the plans for attacking Beirut and confronting the Syrian forces in the Bekaa valley, one of a series of indications that Washington was ‚Äúduly informed‚Äù about Sharon‚Äôs plans ‚Äúthat went beyond southern Lebanon,‚Äù contrary to subsequent pretense. ‚ÄúGreen Light, Lebanon,‚Äù Foreign Policy, Spring 1983. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
348  Peace for Galilee  Israel, an Israeli ‚Äúprovocation.‚Äù The reference in the Post to ‚ÄúIsrael‚Äôs anguish‚Äù has to do with the difficulty of ‚Äúsuppressing‚Äù Palestinian nationalism in the occupied territories, and the ‚Äúgreat pain‚Äù caused by the evacuation of the Yamit settlers in what the Israeli press called ‚ÄúOperation National Trauma ‚Äô82‚Äù (see note 28). Note that ‚Äúthe latest victims‚Äù were not victims of Israeli air raids, but of the more abstract ‚ÄúIsraeli-Palestinian hostility.‚Äù Emboldened by such signals as this, Israel prepared for the next ‚Äúprovocation.‚Äù On May 9 Israel again bombed Lebanon in retaliation for the discovery of land mines in Israel and the bombing of a bus in Jerusalem.38 This time, there was a light PLO rocket and artillery response, directed away from settled areas, with no reported casualties. Three days later, the military correspondent of Ha‚Äôaretz, Ze‚Äôev Schiff, wrote: With regard to the war in the North, Israel is now at one minute before midnight… It is not true that‚Äîas we tell the Americans‚Äîwe do not want to invade Lebanon. There are influential forces, led by the Defense Minister, which, with intelligence and cunning, are taking well-considered steps to reach a situation that will leave Israel with no choice but to invade Lebanon even if it were to involve a war with Syria. The war would aim to ‚Äúroot out‚Äù the PLO and to make Israel the ‚Äúpoliceman of Lebanon,‚Äù able ‚Äúto decide even how the members of the Lebanese parliament vote when it comes to the election of the next Lebanese president‚Äù39‚Äîan election scheduled for the coming August. It is inconceivable that the U.S. government was unaware of all of this.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  349  4.5 The Pretext for the Invasion of Lebanon On June 3, a terrorist group that had been engaged in a running battle with the PLO for a decade and whose head (Abu Nidal) had been condemned to death by the PLO attempted to assassinate Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov in London. The facts were reported at once by the British police and government, with the further information that PLO leaders were on the ‚Äúhit list‚Äù of the attackers, but the insistence of the PLO that it had nothing to do with this act was rejected by the Israeli government, with much of the U.S. press in line as usual.* The Washington Post commented that the assassination attempt was an ‚Äúembarrassment‚Äù for the PLO, which ‚Äúclaims to represent all Palestinians, but‚Ķtends to be selective about accepting responsibility for acts of Palestinian violence.‚Äù40 By the same logic, it would be legitimate to bomb Israel when any Jew carries out a violent act against Palestinians, for example, the Jewish Defense League in New York, or an American immigrant who went berserk at the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, or the ‚ÄúJewish Armed Resistance‚Äù in Rome (see below). Recall that the Israeli courts have determined that Israel is the State of *  The three attackers were caught and given 30-35-year sentences. The leader,  who was deputy commander of Abu Nidal‚Äôs special operations section, was identified as a Colonel in the Iraqi Intelligence Service. The assassination may have been ordered by the Iraqi government in the expectation that Israel would attack Lebanon in ‚Äúreprisal,‚Äù offering Iraq the opportunity to end the war with Iran in the name of unity against Israel, as it proposed to do on June 10. Iran refused, giving exactly this analysis of what had happened. Ian Black, Manchester Guardian Weekly, March 13, 1983. Black suggests further that Britain and the U.S. downplayed the incident because of their interest in improving trade and diplomatic relations with Iraq. See p. 367*. Also p. 159*. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  350  the Jewish people, which includes the Jews of the diaspora (see chapter 3, section 2.2.1, and chapter 4, section 8.2, for the meaning of the fact). If the Post were to make a similar comment about Israel and Jews, it would rightly be condemned for outrageous anti-Semitism and advocacy of terrorism. In ‚Äúretaliation‚Äù for the attempt to assassinate the Israeli Ambassador, Israel carried out heavy bombardment of Palestinian and Lebanese targets in Lebanon (where the Abu Nidal group does not even have an office). Again the official Israeli version was accepted by the press; the bombings were unfortunate, perhaps excessive, but ‚Äúretaliation‚Äù or ‚Äúreprisal.‚Äù41 The Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila (later to become famous as the site of the September massacres) were bombed for four hours. The local (Gaza) hospital was hit. Over 200 people were killed, according to the eyewitness account of an American observer. 42 Recall that the total number of Israelis killed in the course of PLO terrorist cross-border actions in 15 years was 106. This time, there was a Palestinian response, shelling of northern settlements, and Israel launched its long-planned full-scale invasion, Operation ‚ÄúPeace for Galilee,‚Äù to ‚Äúprotect the northern border.‚Äù For 11 months, there had been no Palestinian action on the northern border apart from the May and June retaliatory shellings, and in July 1981 it had been Israel‚Äôs initiative that shattered the peace along the border, not for the first time, as we have seen. A number of Israelis expressed shock over the ‚Äúretaliation‚Äù after the attempt to assassinate Ambassador Argov. One asked that ‚Äúwe imagine that the British would have bombed Tel Aviv or Netanya in retaliation for the murder of Lord Moyne [by a group directed by the current Foreign Minister of Israel] or the hanging of the [British] Sergeants‚Äù by Begin‚Äôs terrorist army, asking: ‚ÄúWouldn‚Äôt we have called it barbarism?‚Äù43 And what would we have called it if Lord Moyne had been killed by an antiClassics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  351  Zionist terrorist group, instead of by Zionist terrorists, to correct the analogy? The same might be asked about the assassination of two Palestinians in Rome in June 1982 by a group called the ‚ÄúJewish Armed Resistance,‚Äù which appears to have been in contact with the Jewish Defense League,44 whose leader calls for the expulsion of Arabs from the Land of Israel when he is not beating and shooting at them as part of his regular army service on the West Bank‚Äîbut in this case, the question was not raised in the United States, in accordance with the normal double standard. The PLO allegation that Israel was involved in the Rome assassinations was denounced by Israeli officials in Rome as tantamount to ‚Äúan appeal to the assassination of members of the embassy of Israel.‚Äù In contrast, the Israeli claim that the PLO was responsible for the Argov attack was not tantamount to an appeal for assassination; rather, it was the prelude to the Israeli assassination of thousands of Palestinians and Lebanese in the ‚Äúretaliatory strikes‚Äù and the subsequent full-scale invasion. Again, the obvious questions were not raised here.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
352  Peace for Galilee  4.6 The Reasons for the Invasion of Lebanon 4.6.1 The Imperatives of Rejectionism The Israeli claim to be acting in legitimate self-defense was accepted by the U.S. government and large segments of the press and intelligentsia, though in this case, an unprecedented negative reaction developed in the U.S. One obvious purpose of the Israeli attack, as predicted long before, was to disperse the refugees once again and to destroy the organization that represents Palestinian nationalism, to ensure, as one senior Israeli diplomat said, that ‚ÄúThey [the PLO] are dead people politically.‚Äù45 Recall the U.S. veto of the June 26 Security Council Resolution calling for an end to hostilities on the grounds that it was ‚Äúa transparent attempt to preserve the P.L.O. as a viable political force.‚Äù46 With the Palestinian counterpart to the Zionist Organization eliminated, it was hoped that Israel could proceed with its plans to suppress any meaningful form of Palestinian self-determination within the occupied territories without any concern for Palestinian opposition in the international arena or for what Palestinians might regard as ‚Äúretaliation‚Äù from southern Lebanon for further oppression and brutality in the territories (‚Äúunprovoked terrorism,‚Äù in western lingo). At the same time, destruction of the PLO might serve to demoralize the Palestinians in the territories and elsewhere, in accordance with the assumption of General Sharon that ‚Äúquiet on the West Bank‚Äù requires ‚Äúthe destruction of the PLO in Lebanon‚Äù47 and the advice of New Republic editor Martin Peretz, on the eve of the invasion, that Israel should administer to the PLO a ‚Äúlasting military defeat‚Äù that ‚Äúwill clarify to the Palestinians in the West Bank that their struggle for an independent state has suffered a setback of many years.‚Äù48 Then, Peretz explains, ‚Äúthe Palestinians will be turned into just another crushed nation, like the Kurds or the Afghans,‚Äù and the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
353  Peace for Galilee  Palestinian problem‚Äîwhich ‚Äúis beginning to be boring‚Äù‚Äîwill be resolved.* Sharon‚Äôs war had long been anticipated within Israel, and the reasons for it were clearly understood. Three months earlier, in March, Yoel Marcus had written in Ha‚Äôaretz: Behind the official excuse of ‚Äúwe shall not tolerate shelling or terrorist actions‚Äù lies a strategic view which holds that the physical annihilation of the PLO has to be achieved. That is, not only must its fingers and hands in the West Bank be amputated (as is now being done with an iron fist), but its heart and head in Beirut must be dealt with. As Israel does *  In this interview in Ha‚Äôaretz, Peretz urges ‚Äúslightly better‚Äù treatment of the  Arabs in the West Bank than is contemplated under Begin‚Äôs ‚Äúautonomy,‚Äù which, he notes, will allow them no more than the right to collect garbage. He thinks that the ‚Äúenlightened and liberal‚Äù occupation policy followed until 1981 was probably a mistake, and that his ‚Äúold friend‚Äù Menachem Milson may be right in his view that ‚Äústrongarm policies‚Äù‚Äîsuch as those discussed in the preceding chapter‚Äîshould have been instituted from 1967, not just from 1981. We return directly to his thoughts concerning the press and ‚Äúthe Arab national character‚Äù (pp. 200, 283). The interview is interesting as a rather crude expression of the right-wing Labor viewpoint, barely distinguishable from that of Likud hard-liners. It may also be usefully compared to what Peretz addresses to an American audience in the New Republic. It is interesting that this advocate of an overwhelming assault on ‚Äúthe PLO‚Äù in Lebanon felt no shame in serving as a sponsor for an Oxfam ‚ÄúUrgent Humanitarian Appeal for the People of Lebanon‚Äù that described ‚ÄúThe grim count of civilian casualties in Lebanon‚Äù with ‚Äúthousands killed‚Äù and ‚Äúhundreds of thousands of people homeless‚Äù (New York Times, June 20, 1982). Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
354  Peace for Galilee  not want the PLO as a partner for talks or as an interlocuter for any solution in the West Bank, the supporters of confrontation with the PLO hold that the logical continuation of the struggle with the PLO in the territories is in Lebanon. With the loss of its physical strength, in their opinion, the PLO will lose not only its hold over the territories but also its growing international status.49 Marcus correctly identifies two concerns: the hold of the PLO over the territories‚Äîor more accurately, the support for the PLO on the part of the overwhelming majority of the population‚Äîand its growing international status. Both factors stood in the way of the rejectionist commitments of the two major political groupings in Israel. The latter concern recalls the familiar ‚Äúpanic‚Äù described by Amos Elon whenever the threat of a peaceful political settlement becomes difficult to contain (see chapter 3). In fact, this panic was again rising in 1981-2, as we have already seen, with the Saudi Arabian peace plan (the ‚Äúreal author‚Äù being the PLO, according to President Chaim Herzog) and subsequent Syrian and Saudi initiatives. But now there was a still more ominous development: the PLO was scrupulously observing the cease-fire, despite many Israeli provocations. The struggle to portray the PLO as nothing more than a terrorist gang had already largely been lost in Europe, but the U.S. was still holding the line. But how long could American opinion remain under control if the PLO persisted on this dangerous course? One might note again, in this connection, the curious beliefs of supporters of Israel about the ‚Äúpro-PLO press‚Äù and the ‚Äúnumerous public figures‚Äù in the West and even Western governments that ‚Äúencourage‚Äù the PLO in its ‚Äúmaximalist course‚Äù of destroying Israel; see chapter 1, first*. Similarly Martin Peretz explained to his Israeli audience that one Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
355  Peace for Galilee  of Israel‚Äôs problems in the U.S. is ‚ÄúObviously‚Äîthe press.‚Äù ‚ÄúThe press you have lost years ago‚Äù because ‚Äúmost journalists are young people of the Vietnam generation whose sympathy is always granted to anyone who calls himself ‚Äòa guerrilla‚Äô or a ‚Äòfreedom fighter‚Äô,‚Äù and television simply ‚Äúmakes the problem worse.‚Äù50 A similar and equally plausible view of the press as Communist-dominated is common among the extreme right-wing in the U.S. The dangers posed by PLO passivity were subsequently elaborated by Yehoshua Porath, one of Israel‚Äôs leading scholars and the author of major works on the Palestinian national movement, cited earlier. Commenting on the motives for the Israeli invasion, Porath dismisses at once the contrived excuse concerning the London assassination attempt as well as the claim that the purpose was to protect Israeli settlements in the Galilee, noting that the PLO had respected the July 1981 cease-fire. But Porath argues that the many commentators who have criticized Israeli propaganda on these grounds are missing the point. ‚ÄúIt seems to me,‚Äù he writes, ‚Äúthat the decision of the government (or more precisely, its two leaders [Begin and Sharon]) flowed from the very fact that the cease-fire had been observed.‚Äù Arafat had succeeded in imposing discipline on the many PLO factions, thus maintaining the cease-fire that had been achieved under U.S. auspices. His success in this constituted ‚Äúa veritable catastrophe in the eyes of the Israeli government,‚Äù since it indicated that the PLO ‚Äúmight agree in the future to a more far-reaching arrangement,‚Äù51 in which case Israel could no longer evade a political settlement on the grounds that the PLO is nothing but ‚Äúa wild gang of murderers.‚Äù ‚ÄúIt was this eventuality that the Israeli attack was primarily designed to prevent‚Äù: The government‚Äôs hope is that the stricken PLO, lacking a logistic and territorial base, will return to its earlier Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
356  Peace for Galilee  terrorism: it will carry out bombings throughout the world, hijack airplanes, and murder many Israelis. In this way, the PLO will lose part of the political legitimacy that it has gained and will mobilize the large majority of the Israeli nation in hatred and disgust against it, undercutting the danger that elements will develop among the Palestinians that might become a legitimate negotiating partner for future political accommodations.52 Other commentators made the same point. Danny Rubinstein wrote in Davar that ‚ÄúThe PLO as an orderly political body is more terrifying to the government of Israel than the powerful terrorist PLO.‚Äù This is the reason why ‚Äúthe government of Israel planned the Lebanon war for the entire past year (as Sharon has testified) and planned to reach Beirut (as all the commanders have testified).‚Äù Israel‚Äôs security had never been so great, but Arafat‚Äôs success in maintaining the cease-fire was a greater danger than any security threat because of the ‚Äúpolitical power that the PLO had developed,‚Äù so that ‚Äúfear was growing‚Äù that it could not be excluded from negotiations, and negotiations would undermine Israel‚Äôs rejectionism, leading to Palestinian self-determination, i.e., a Palestinian state. The PLO must be forced back to ‚Äúmurderous terror‚Äù to overcome the danger of pressure from Western liberal opinion and the U.S. government (a dubious prospect) in favor of a two-state settlement. 53 Always the same ‚Äúpanic‚Äù that there might be a peaceful political settlement, so that Judea, Samaria and Gaza would have to be abandoned, an intolerable prospect to both major political groupings. In line with this rather plausible analysis, one can expect that much of the U.S. press (the New Republic, New York Times, etc.), will eagerly seize upon any indication of PLO ‚Äúradicalism,‚Äù which may indeed develop in the wake of the disaster that the Palestinians suffered in Lebanon, though Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  357  by early 1983 there was as yet no sign of this much hoped-for development. See chapter 3, notes 115, 116 and chapter 6, section 3.1. Some political commentators in the U.S. have argued that Israel‚Äôs intention to destroy the PLO is against its better interests, since success in this venture might provoke a return to terrorism among the scattered Palestinians, a danger to Israel and its citizens and indeed to much of the world. But as Porath, Rubinstein and others suggest‚Äîand their analysis is well-supported by the historical record that has been effectively suppressed in the U.S.‚Äîthis interpretation misses the essential point: Israel‚Äôs goal is precisely to achieve this end, fending off the catastrophe of a political settlement in which both Palestinians and Israelis might live in peace and security. As was evident at the time, the Camp David accords and Kissinger‚Äôs earlier arrangements provided Israel with the opportunity for further moves to incorporate the occupied territories, and to facilitate such actions as the invasion of Lebanon undertaken in large part for the same ends. In the latter connection, former military intelligence chief Shlomo Gazit observes that ‚Äúbehind the Lebanon victory lie the peace accords with Egypt,‚Äù which permitted Israel to concentrate its military forces in the north without fear of military retaliation by the Arab states.54 To underscore the seriousness of this point, Israel warned Egypt during the Lebanese war that if Egypt were to respond by severing diplomatic links, ‚Äúthe Israeli army would be used against Egypt.‚Äù This was reported by Labor Party chairman Shimon Peres at a meeting of Labor Knesset members, and ‚Äúaroused anger among the ruling coalition, but has not been denied by any government spokesman.‚Äù55 The warning was presumably thought necessary because of the impact of the Israeli invasion in Egypt. Egyptian critics of the Camp David agreements were not surprised by the invasion. ‚ÄúIs it really amazing,‚Äù one said, ‚Äúthat Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  358  Israel, supported by America, is implementing the American peace design, after it has separated Egypt from the Arab world?… We objected to the Camp David Accords since we perceived them as a trick to pull Egypt out of the Arab circle, and to make it easier for America and Israel to strike against the Palestinians and the Arab countries who refused to follow Egypt‚Äôs way.‚Äù It is primarily among supporters of the ‚Äúpeace process‚Äù that bitter anger is expressed. The editor of an Egyptian magazine, who backed the Camp David agreements, told a group of Israeli journalists: ‚ÄúYou turned peace into something hated for the Egyptians.‚Äù The journalists discovered the truth of his statement from their own observations among officials, journalists, taxi drivers, salesmen and others. Unlike those who were skeptical from the start, ‚Äúthe advocates of peace with Israel feel defeated, deceived and scorned.‚Äù The editor quoted above says: ‚ÄúI perceived the peace with Israel to be the cornerstone for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. But for you peace was merely a trick to neutralize us so as to more easily strike at the Palestinian people.‚Äù56 The critics of the ‚Äúpeace process‚Äù have been proven correct in their analysis by what has happened in the occupied territories and in Lebanon since, though the fact is almost completely unrecognized in the United States, where‚Äîby definition‚Äîwhatever happens is the fault of the PLO, or perhaps Begin‚Äôs unanticipated excesses. Israeli commentators are often clear enough about the central points; for example, David Krivine of the Jerusalem Post, quoted earlier, who observes accurately that Israel will not talk to the PLO ‚Äúnot because they are nasty people‚Äù but because ‚Äúthe subject on the agenda‚Äù can only be a Palestinian state, to which Israel will never agree because it must retain ‚Äúpart of‚Äô the West Bank. Similarly the leader of the Labor Party, Shimon Peres, explains that ‚ÄúIsrael cannot conduct negotiations with the PLO; not only because of the PLO‚Äôs past but because of the geographical map Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  359  of Israel itself.‚Äù57 See also p. 157*. The reference to the PLO‚Äôs past can hardly be taken seriously considering the history of Zionism and the State of Israel, which Peres knows very well. And outside of the U.S., it is doubtful that many people would take very seriously Peres‚Äôs claim that the world‚Äôs fourth most powerful military force, which had just once again demonstrated its might, would be threatened by a Palestinian state or his further claim that Jordan too would be threatened by this emerging superpower (in fact, Jordan‚Äôs King Hussein is more likely to feel threatened by Israeli leaders who refer to a potential Palestinian state as ‚Äúan additional Palestinian state,‚Äù as Peres does here, in the light of the implications of this view). But for an American audience it can pass. The more serious reasons for Israel‚Äôs insistence on maintaining effective control over the West Bank, we have discussed in chapter 3, section 2.2.1. Recall also the explanation given by Peres‚Äôs predecessor, Yitzhak Rabin, as to why Israel could never negotiate with any Palestinians: such negotiations could only lead to Palestinian selfdetermination in a separate state, which Israel will never accept (see chapter 3, section 2.4.2). Many other Israeli commentators have emphasized the political goals of the operation. Former chief IDF education officer Mordechai Bar-On writes that ‚Äúthere is no doubt that the [war‚Äôs] central aim was to deal a crushing blow to the national aspirations of the Palestinians and to their very existence as a nation endeavouring to define itself and gain the right to self-determination.‚Äù And Ze‚Äôev Schiff, Israel‚Äôs most respected military correspondent, wrote that the decision to enter West Beirut in September in defiance of earlier promises was not motivated, as claimed, ‚Äúby the desire to prevent a state of anarchy and to save the city.‚Äù Rather, ‚Äúthe truth is that it was meant to further a different goal: to influence the election of Lebanon‚Äôs next president and the country‚Äôs future political path… It was an additional proof of the fact that the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  360  goals of the war have been, for a long time now, political and are not directly connected with Israel‚Äôs security,‚Äù58 as is constantly claimed and loyally repeated by American supporters of Israel. Meanwhile much of the American press, either through naivete or cynicism, writes of the great opportunities that the Israeli invasion has offered, including the prospects for a territorial compromise in the West Bank that will lead to genuine recognition of Palestinian national rights‚Äînow that the PLO military force has been destroyed and PLO intimidation of ‚Äúmoderates‚Äù will no longer be possible in the occupied territories. The truth of the matter, it seems rather clear, is somewhat different: the necessity to destroy the PLO politically‚Äîand along with it, organized Palestinian existence in Lebanon‚Äîflowed directly from the increasing isolation of the leaders of the rejectionist camp. As we have seen, the U.S. and Israel stood virtually alone (apart from a few holdouts such as Libya and Iraq,* and the minority Rejection Front of the PLO) in *  It had been assumed that at least Iraq would hold the line, but once again it  appears that the Arabs cannot be trusted. On January 3, 1983, the Iraqi news agency released the text of an August 25 statement by President Saddam Hussein to Rep. Stephen Solarz in which Hussein recognized Israel‚Äôs ‚Äúneed for a state of security,‚Äù stating also that ‚Äúno Arab leader has now in his policies the so-called destruction of Israel or wiping it out of existence.‚Äù Israel at once dismissed the statement as meaningless, the reflex reaction to peace threats. Foreign Minister Shamir stated ‚Äúthat there has been no change in Iraq‚Äôs attitude towards Israel‚Äù; perhaps he had in mind a New York Times report (Dec. 4, 1976) that all the Arab states, even Libya and Iraq, had accepted ‚Äúthe principle of a West Bank state‚Äù alongside of Israel. Sharon also dismissed the Iraqi statement, adding for good measure that Israel would not agree to negotiations that include any members of the PLO in a Jordanian delegation or even West Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  361  opposing a two-state settlement with recognized borders and security guarantees.59 To evade possibilities for a peaceful negotiated settlement would not be possible forever, it seemed. It was therefore necessary for the U.S. and Israel to resort to force, the dimension along which they reign supreme, to establish their own rejectionist terms as the framework for any potential settlement. This policy required the destruction of the organization that most Palestinians regard as their sole legitimate representative, or at least, impelling it towards random terrorism or a rejectionist stance of its own rather than still further political evolution. With this end achieved, Israel and the U.S. might pursue their respective‚Äîand somewhat different‚Äîrejectionist policies: for Israel, extension of sovereignty over the occupied territories; for the Reagan Administration, the September 1 proposals that reject a Palestinian state and exclude the PLO, i.e., that reject Palestinian selfdetermination. The U.S. press and intelligentsia could be counted on to characterize this rejectionist program as the soul of moderation and honor, the basis for any further discussion among humane people, thus eliminating the international consensus, which was becoming something of a nuisance, as an irrelevance. Given the overwhelming U.S.-Israeli Bank Palestinians who support the PLO. For more on the matter, see Eric Rouleau‚Äôs interview with the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz, who observes that Iraq ‚Äúwent along with the Fez resolutions‚Äù of September 1982, which advocated negotiations to establish a Palestinian state alongside of Israel and ‚Äúto work out arrangements with Israel for guaranteeing the existence and security of all the states in question‚Äù (Aziz), including Israel and the Palestinian state. Iraq is also ‚Äúurging Yasser Arafat to coordinate his diplomatic strategy with King Hussein‚Äôs.‚Äù Rouleau also notes a recent low-interest $450 million loan to Iraq from the U.S., part of the ‚Äúcooperation with the United States [which] is developing in every field.‚Äù Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  362  control over the means of violence and the obedience of the intellectual community, there was every reason to expect success in these endeavors, and in fact, it has very largely been achieved. Leaving no doubts as to its intentions in the Lebanon war, Israel quickly proceeded to dissolve the elected city councils of Nablus and Dura in the West Bank and to dismiss the mayors of Jenin and Gaza, also arresting city employees in Jenin. Previously, other elected mayors of major towns had been dismissed or deported, leaving only Mayor Elias Freij of Bethlehem. Mayor Shawa of Gaza had been appointed by the Israeli military government and was known as a supporter of King Hussein of Jordan; he reports that he had been subjected to severe economic pressures by the military government in an effort to induce complete conformity. Shortly after, Israel set up a new Village League near Nablus, with a substantial grant for a water supply project, regularly denied to democratically elected officials. Under the SharonMilson regime, standard procedure for imposing the rule of the selected quisling leadership is to channel subsidies for development to them, require merchants to apply to them or join them to obtain licenses, etc. (supply of arms is another device). Indeed, such measures are necessary given the minuscule support for the official ‚Äúmoderates‚Äù; see chapter 3, section 2.3. As noted there, the Leagues were then united in a regional organization with the ‚Äúpolitical task‚Äù of representing the West Bank in negotiations with Israel. Meanwhile, student protests over the invasion of Lebanon at Bir Zeit University led to tear-gassing by Israeli soldiers and many arrests, beating and harassment of students (according to the university president), and finally closing down of the university‚Äîonce again. From mid-June, demonstrations and a general merchant strike (in the usual manner, merchants were forced by the occupying army to open shops) were met by firing with injuries. Two inhabitants of Nablus were killed during a demonstration in which Israeli soldiers opened fire Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  363  (the government claims they were not killed by soldiers), and members of the Village Leagues, armed by Israel, killed and wounded a number of West Bank opponents. As the Lebanon war proceeded, West Bank organizations and associations, including religious circles, insistently repeated their support for the PLO, in sermons given in mosques and in public statements. The Supreme Islamic Council of Jerusalem, normally apolitical, sent a letter to the United Nations rejecting the Camp David ‚Äúpeace process‚Äù and recognizing the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and stated publicly its ‚Äúsupport for the PLO in its heroic attempt to reach a noble solution for the Palestinian problem,‚Äù calling upon the Palestinian people to donate one day‚Äôs salary ‚Äúto our sons and brothers in Lebanon.‚Äù West Bank and Gaza municipalities issued a communiqu√© denouncing the war in Lebanon and declaring that the PLO remains the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (June 20). A supporting statement, announcing once again ‚Äúour full support for the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in the homeland and the diaspora,‚Äù was issued by a broad group of West Bank unions. Amnon Kapeliouk, who covers the occupied territories for the Israeli journal Al Hamishmar, wrote that there is near unanimity in opposition to the invasion (apart from the Village Leagues ‚Äúfostered by the civilian administration‚Äù) and in reiterating the previous stand that ‚Äúfor any political negotiation it is necessary to address the PLO in Beirut.‚Äù Correspondingly, it was next to impossible to find quisling elements to replace deposed officials. In Dir Dabouan, the eighth town to have its elected administration removed since March, not one inhabitant was willing to serve in the new Israeli-imposed administration. Kapeliouk reports that apart from three people in the city of Jenin, no collaborators were found during the intensive summer repression undertaken ‚Äúto Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  364  exploit the opportunity‚Äù (in the government‚Äôs phrase) to ‚Äúbreak the current local leadership.‚Äù60 In the New York Times, David Shipler quoted the spokesman for the Israeli administrative authority in the West Bank who states: ‚ÄúWe‚Äôre conducting a political war against the P.L.O. The army is conducting a military war.‚Äù ‚ÄúTaking advantage of the P.L.O.‚Äôs weakened position in Beirut,‚Äù Shipler adds, ‚ÄúDefense Minister Ariel Sharon has stepped up political and economic assaults on the organization‚Äôs adherents and admirers in areas occupied by Israel since 1967,‚Äù giving a number of details.61 Protests continued throughout the summer, despite the harsh military repression. On September 3, one person was reported killed and three injured in Nablus when Israeli soldiers fired into a demonstration, and another Palestinian was killed near Tulkarm during a ‚Äúcombing process‚Äù carried out by the Israeli army searching for a person who had fired at Israeli soldiers. Another was killed by a settler during ‚Äúviolent student demonstrations‚Äù on October 26, and two were wounded in clashes with Israeli settlers, among other incidents.62 Recall that even the ‚Äúmoderates‚Äù (Freij, Shawa, etc.) continued to express their support for the PLO throughout the Lebanon invasion, and some in fact felt that support for the PLO had increased during the invasion (see chapter 3, section 2.3.1). A number of Israeli observers, among others, also observed the significant impact of the heroic PLO resistance against overwhelming odds. See section 8.3.1. None of this fits too well with the preferred picture of the West Bank Palestinians, intimidated by the PLO for many years, who presumably should have been celebrating their liberation through the summer of 1982. Americans who might have been dismayed by the events in the real world could be comforted by turning to the pages of the New Republic, where they would be reassured to learn that what was taking Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  365  place in the West Bank did not happen. As the journal‚Äôs specialist on the Palestinians, David Pryce-Jones, explained, ‚Äúthe PLO has had little success in inciting public disturbance on the West Bank and in Gaza‚Äù (this has been the case since 1967, he assures us). ‚ÄúAs in earlier cases, Palestinians declined the PLO‚Äôs appeals to action,‚Äù the reason being that the Palestinians ‚Äúhave been under much more immediate and sustained threat from the PLO itself‚Äô than from ‚ÄúIsrael, Jordan, and the Lebanese Christians,‚Äù who they merely ‚Äúresent,‚Äù while they are terrified of the PLO.63 In short, Israel‚Äôs repression in the occupied territories and its destruction of Palestinian camps in Lebanon, the Black September killings in Jordan, the Tel al-Zaatar and Sabra-Shatila massacres, etc., cannot compare to the terrorism launched against the suffering Palestinians by the PLO. This no doubt explains the total quiescence in the West Bank apart from the outpouring of joyous acclaim for Israel, Jordan, and the Lebanese Christians by the population of the West Bank and Gaza now that they had at last been rescued from their PLO tormenters by Israel‚Äôs army of liberation. Returning to the real world, it comes as little surprise that Israel followed its invasion of Lebanon by heightening the repression in the occupied territories, targeting even pro-Jordanian elements (e.g., Mayor Shawa, who, as noted earlier, also recognizes the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people). Recall that under the Labor government, even pro-Jordanian notables who intended to form an anti-PLO grouping were denied the right to organize while Palestinian moderates, such as Bir Zeit President Hanna Nasser, were expelled or repressed, a fact long noted by Israeli journalists in the occupied territories; for example, Danny Rubinstein, who observed that some of the earliest choices for expulsion were pro-Jordanian figures, and more recently, elected officials regarded as moderates. Arab leadership ‚Äúin fact cannot exist‚Äù under Israeli rule, he wrote well before the Sharon-Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  366  Milson regime was established, even ‚Äúmoderate traditionalists.‚Äù64 The Begin government has simply been extending the policies initiated by the Labor government, with increasing harshness, and continued to do so during and after the Lebanon war. On October 29, 1982, the civil administration in the West Bank (which is subordinate to the military) issued a directive instructing administrators ‚Äúto keep up pressure on ‚Äòextremist mayors‚Äô while trying to neutralize pro-Jordanian Palestinians‚Äù in an effort ‚Äúto curtail Jordanian influence in the area and to increase the area‚Äôs dependence on the Israeli administration there.‚Äù In the words of the directive: ‚ÄúThe pressure must not be let up on them [the ‚Äúextremist mayors‚Äù] after dismissing them from their positions,‚Äù and with regard to pro-Jordanian elements, policy ‚Äúmust be a maximum continuation of neutralizing them and bringing them to great dependence on the administration.‚Äù Support should be provided for ‚Äúpragmatic, moderate people,‚Äù Village League heads who ‚Äúwe have begun to cultivate,‚Äù although ‚ÄúIt should be stressed that the aim of cultivation is not for its own sake but rather for the purpose of achieving a political end.‚Äù65 It is, in fact, difficult to distinguish pro-PLO from pro-Jordanian elements, as the case of ex-Mayor Shawa indicates. Thus when security forces detained three Hebron political figures in mid-June for ‚Äútrying to organize support for the Palestinians in Lebanon,‚Äù it turned out that one was a former director of the local agricultural department who ran social services during the Jordanian administration and another was director of education during the same period.66 Some argue that the spirit of Palestinian nationalism in the occupied territories and support for the PLO there cannot be destroyed by demolishing the organized Palestinian community in Lebanon and employing the strong-arm methods carried out by Sharon, Milson and others and advocated by Martin Peretz and the like (see p. 360*) in the occupied Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  367  territories. This seems to me questionable. The strength and courage of the Samidin have been truly impressive, but people have their limits, and conquerors in the past have succeeded in breaking their will. After the repression of June and early July described above, one supporter of the Israeli invasion, Robert Tucker, wrote that ‚ÄúThe Israeli action was, quite clearly, an anticipatory measure, taken to forestall the prospect of serious injury‚Äù to Israel, hence legitimate; by this moral code, preemptive strikes are now justified, and there can be no rational objection, say, to the Russian invasion of Hungary or Czechoslovakia, given the dangers posed to the USSR by NATO, or perhaps even to Hitler‚Äôs moves to blunt the Czech dagger pointed at the heart of Germany67.* But, Tucker adds, ‚Äúif, despite the destruction of the P.L.O. as a military force, and perhaps as a political force as well, the Israeli Government uses its victory to harden further its policy in the occupied territories, the case made today by critics of the war will be made more persuasive.‚Äù68 One wonders what would count as ‚Äúhardening of policy,‚Äù since evidently the actions undertaken from the first days of the invasion, or those of the preceding months, do not‚Äîperhaps mass expulsion of Palestinians, though no doubt an appropriate moral code could be devised to justify this as well, and perhaps yet will be. The destruction of the PLO in Lebanon will require new prodigies of apologetics from ‚Äúsupporters of Israel,‚Äù who have been stoutly maintaining that Israel has long sought political accommodation but has been blocked in this effort by the PLO, and that only PLO terrorism has *  Recall that Hitler‚Äôs 1937 plan for an operation against Czechoslovakia was  justified in internal documents ‚Äúin order to parry the imminent attack of a superior enemy coalition‚Äù and in public by the Czech threat and ‚Äúterror‚Äù against Germans.67 Recall also that Hitler‚Äôs conceptions have struck a responsive chord in current Zionist commentary; see p. 150*. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  368  prevented West Bank ‚Äúmoderates‚Äù from seeking conciliation with Israel‚Äîwhich will, of course, grant them the right of true national selfdetermination when they are liberated from PLO tyranny. Early efforts appeared by mid-summer 1982, taking the interesting position that of course the Palestinians have national rights and even the right to a state of their own in the occupied territories, but that the PLO cannot play any part in this process. We must ‚Äúeliminate the PLO, and enfranchise the Palestinians.‚Äù69 In short, we are naturally in favor of self-determination for the Palestinians, but we will determine who represents them, meanwhile giving full support to Israel, where both major political groupings have long rejected any meaningful form of self-determination or even negotiation with any Palestinians on any political issue, while looking forward to their ‚Äúdeparture‚Äù in some manner. In Israel, it is recognized that ‚ÄúAmerican Jews have their work cut out for them.‚Äù Elmer Winter outlines their task in the Jerusalem Post: ‚ÄúThey need to place Israel‚Äôs incursion into Lebanon, and the resulting new opportunities, into proper perspective, and not be deterred by editorial writers who criticize Israel for overkill, expansionism, arrogance, etc.‚Äù He then proceeds to suggest an appropriate ‚Äúcourse of action,‚Äù the prime element being to stress that ‚ÄúIsrael‚Äôs decision to push the PLO back from the Israeli-Lebanon border came after 11 months of escalating terrorist attacks against its northern towns and villages‚Äù which the UN forces were unable to prevent.70 In fact, the number of these attacks was zero, apart from retaliatory strikes in May and June, and what the UN was unable to prevent was the Israeli invasion through their lines, a fact little discussed here, but not overlooked in the European countries that had provided those troops. Winter proceeds with his instructions in the same vein, and, predictably, many have risen to the occasion, and will continue to work to overcome the actual history, as in the past, continuing to imitate their Stalinist models. See Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
369  Peace for Galilee  chapter 2, section 2.1.  4.6.2 Achieving National Unity While the occupied territories were the prime target of the Israeli invasion, it had other motives as well. There were, in the first place, domestic political factors. A Hebrew University historian writes that The decision to launch and expand the Lebanese war can probably best be seen at this moment as a military quasicoup in Israel carried through by peaceful means against the previously existing political order. As Bismark demonstrated so brilliantly in the 1860‚Äôs, there is no better way to pulverize political opposition and to silence recalcitrant colleagues than to initiate short, victorious wars against weak neighboring armies. A similar point is made by military historian (Col., Ret.) Meir Pail, former Director of the IDF Military Academy for officer training. He writes that some military adventure was needed by the Begin government ‚Äúto strengthen their position in the Israeli public and to unite the people under their leadership.‚Äù Why pick Lebanon? ‚ÄúThere was to be found the weakest enemy, it would seem, guaranteeing a clear-cut military victory,‚Äù and furthermore, ‚ÄúAmerican support would be forthcoming‚Äù in this case, as indeed it was.71 Even short of ‚Äúvictorious wars against weak neighboring states,‚Äù the same devices can be used to shore up a tottering national consensus, as the Reagan administration has illustrated with its absurd posturing about Libyan hit-men, Libyan aggression and threats, etc. In February 1983, for example, the administration was beginning to be concerned Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  370  about the defection of its ‚Äúconservative‚Äù (meaning, statist militarist) constituency who were charging it with insufficient militancy. The administration responded by boldly confronting an alleged Libyan threat to the Sudan, sending an aircraft carrier into disputed waters off the Libyan coast, providing AWACS to Egypt, etc. Shortly after, Secretary of State George Shultz was able to announce that ‚ÄúCol. Muammar elQaddafi, the Libyan leader, ‚Äòis back in his box where he belongs‚Äô because President Reagan acted ‚Äòquickly and decisively‚Äù‚Äô against this threat to world order.72 The racist character of the phrase was no more perceived (by the mainstream media, that is; others commented on it) than the shallowness of the evidence of the ‚Äúthreat‚Äù (null, so far as has been made public), or the relation to the immediate background circumstances. In fact, the entire episode was quietly dropped as soon as the needs of the state had been served. To cover up the weakness of Israel‚Äôs enemy, it was necessary to concoct stories about the immense military power of the PLO. Impressive tales were circulated about the huge arsenals of captured weapons, repeated with much awe in the U.S. and ridiculed by military commentators in Israel. The military correspondent of Ha‚Äôaretz, Ze‚Äôev Schiff, reported that ‚Äúthe imagination is given full reign as in the stories of A Thousand and One Nights.‚Äù The captured arms were perhaps sufficient to equip one division with ‚Äúlight weapons,‚Äù mostly rifles. Some tanks were captured, a few perhaps belonging to the PLO, the rest Syrian. In the Jerusalem Post, military correspondent Hirsh Goodman concluded that to regard the PLO as a potential military threat ‚Äúwould be pushing the matter to absurdity.‚Äù Meir Pail estimated that weapons in the hands of the PLO were approximately equal to the quantities in the hands of the Haddadists and Phalangists (largely provided by Israel), and were intended to maintain the balance of terror within Lebanon. Labor Knesset member Yossi Sarid ‚Äúwanted to know who had authorized Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  371  senior IDF officers to tell Jewish fund-raisers from abroad that enough PLO arms had been seized to equip a million terrorists,‚Äù an obvious absurdity.73 Former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (Chief of Staff during the June 1967 war) dismissed the idea that the PLO was a threat to Israel, adding that the captured weapons were primarily light arms, intended for ‚Äúterrorists,‚Äù not for an army.74  4.6.3 A New Order in Lebanon There were other reasons for the invasion as well. IDF Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan had stated not long before: ‚ÄúSince I have constructed a military machine costing billions of dollars, I am obliged to use it… Tomorrow I may be in Beirut.‚Äù75 A motive of broader scope and greater historical depth was to place Israel in a position to dictate the terms of any political settlement in Lebanon, exactly as Ze‚Äôev Schiff had pointed out prior to the invasion (see above, sections 4.4, 4.6.1). The timing of the invasion may well have been influenced by the fact that the mandate of the Syrian Arab Peacekeeping force was to expire in late July, while elections were scheduled for August-September.76 The political situation was therefore fluid, and some observers believed that there was a chance for a political agreement among Lebanese.77 Israel preferred rule over Lebanon by the Phalange, or as an alternative, some form of partition with Maronite domination of at least the central regions and the southern portions associated in some form with Israel, perhaps under the rule of its client, Major Haddad. Right-wing Israelis have been quite explicit about the matter. The well-known physicist Yuval Ne‚Äôeman, former president of Tel Aviv University and a Knesset member from the  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  372  Tehiya Party, urged that Israel ‚Äúestablish a new order in Lebanon.‚Äù* The Israeli army ‚Äúmust be prepared for a long stay in Lebanon,‚Äù during which ‚ÄúIsrael will have an opportunity of reaching a stage of socioeconomic or technological development in the nearby region which, geographically and historically, is an integral part of Eretz Yisrael.‚Äù Possibly there could be ‚Äúan agreement on border rectification,‚Äù in which ‚ÄúIsrael could integrate the strip south of the Litani, with its friendly citizens, into Israel‚Äôs development plans‚Äù78‚Äîthus taking a long step towards realizing the traditional ‚Äúvision‚Äù of Ben-Gurion and others, which remained quite alive at least through the mid-1950s, and has a strong motivation in terms of economic and resource factors, as we have seen. A few weeks later, Ne‚Äôeman was appointed to the cabinet to head the new Ministry of Science and Technology. ‚ÄúThe primary mission of the Ministry of Science headed by Professor Yuval Ne‚Äôeman is the development of the Jewish region in the territories beyond the Green Line‚Äù (the pre-1967 borders). In an interview, Ne‚Äôeman stated that ‚Äúonly this mission impelled Tehiya to join the governing coalition.‚Äù79 He may well have his eye on the ‚ÄúNorth Bank‚Äù as well. His new Ministry is also ‚Äúauthorized to concentrate on creating an infrastructure for factories, especially sophisticated scientific industries, in the new Israeli settlements of the West Bank.‚Äù The government‚Äôs goal, Ne‚Äôeman stated, is ‚Äúto settle so many Jews that the West Bank and Gaza can‚Äôt be given back to the Arabs.‚Äù80 We return to some of the activities of the new Ministry in the next chapter. As noted earlier, a kind of balance of terror had been achieved in the *  The phrase is common in the Israeli press. It is again curious to see how  readily the terminology of the Nazis has been adopted in Israeli and American Zionist rhetoric; see p. 150*. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  373  course of the bloody civil war in Lebanon between the PalestinianMuslim National Front coalition and the Phalangist-dominated Christian right. To achieve its two primary aims in Lebanon‚Äînamely, to demolish any organized form of Palestinian existence and to impose a ‚Äúnew order‚Äù‚Äîit was imperative for Israel to destroy this balance and to leave power completely in the hands of the Phalangists, and in the south, its Haddadist client or perhaps new ones, to be created. This goal was easily achieved, given Israel‚Äôs immense military superiority. The end result is expected to be ‚Äúa conservative alliance dominated by Maronite Christians but also including Moslem privileged classes,‚Äù now that the Palestinians and their local Muslim allies have been destroyed and disarmed81 In the Jerusalem Post, David Bernstein observed that ‚ÄúWhen Israel invaded Lebanon earlier this year and routed that country‚Äôs PLO-Moslem alliance it totally destroyed the balance of forces between Moslem and Christian that had prevented either from gaining absolute control over the country,‚Äù leaving the Phalange and Haddad as the dominant military forces. ‚ÄúThe country‚Äôs large Moslem and Palestinian refugee populations were left almost completely defenceless, at the mercy of their Christian foes and dependent on the ability of the Israel Defence Forces and the largely ineffectual Lebanese Army to protect them,‚Äù though ‚Äúfor a reason or reasons yet to be adequately explained, the IDF proved unequal to the task‚Äù in Beirut in September‚Äîcuriously, the only task to which it proved unequal, though Bernstein does not speculate as to why.82 We return to the question. Whatever the mysterious reasons for the sudden and unusual incompetence of the IDF, the goal of placing power in the hands of Israel‚Äôs allies while the Muslim and Palestinian population is left defenseless against forces that have long proven their skill at massacring defenseless people (with Israel‚Äôs backing) appeared to have been achieved by late August 1982. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  374  Apart from having ‚Äúcompletely destroyed the partial and delicate equilibrium that had existed in Lebanon,‚Äù the Israeli invasion, as intended, demolished the basis for organized social life among the half million or so Palestinian refugees. ‚ÄúEveryone now knows that in Lebanon the PLO had, to all intents and purposes, set up a Palestinian state: a state with its own army, with a system of civil administration, welfare and educational institutions and even the characteristics of its own economy, which was only partially integrated with that of their host country‚Äù and which existed in ‚Äúa certain equilibrium‚Äù with it,83 not without periodic and sometimes bitter conflict, in part, through the fulfilment of Abba Eban‚Äôs ‚Äúrational prospect.‚Äù This too is gone. The invasion had some other merits as well. As noted earlier, Israel is now heavily reliant on military exports. While the bombing of Beirut was at its height, the Israeli military industries (Ta‚Äôas) ‚Äúcame out with an extensive publicity campaign in the international press [Aviation Week, etc.] to extend the scope of sales of its bombs.‚Äù The main feature was a display showing a jet plane dropping bombs with the heading: ‚ÄúBombs you can count on to do what they‚Äôre supposed to do. That‚Äôs the only kind of bomb we make.‚Äù84  4.7 The Green Light from Washington While Israel may indeed be the world‚Äôs fourth greatest military power, as the experts claim, this can be true only insofar as it is an appendage to the United States‚Äîit would not be quite fair to speak of it as a 51st state as some do, since none of the 50 states receive comparable benefits from the federal government. Despite the weakness of the enemy, the invasion of Lebanon too was predicated on American support, which was quite clearly forthcoming. As Meir Pail writes, ‚ÄúAll Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  375  signs indicate that the U.S. gave reasonable political backing to the IDF invasion of Lebanon, even when it became clear that it was delivering quite a heavy blow both in land and air to the Syrians in Lebanon.‚Äù85 The Reagan administration recognized that there were ‚Äústrong feelings among members of Congress as well as the American people‚Äù against the Israeli invasion, in the words of White House counselor Edwin Meese; ‚Äúthis is a problem to be solved,‚Äù he added, though there would be no ‚Äúrecriminations‚Äù by the Administration against Israel because it had ‚Äúgood reasons‚Äù for going into Lebanon. 86 Note that it was not a matter of the ‚Äúpluralist consensus‚Äù dragging the government reluctantly towards support of Israel‚Äôs aggression; rather, the problem was to create a consensus in favor of the invasion that the government supported (though less fervently than the Democratic opposition). Supporters of Israel recognized the problem, and regularly appealed to the contribution of Israel to fortifying U.S. power in the region in their attempts to garner support for the invasion in newspaper ads, letters, editorial statements (e.g., in the New Republic, repeatedly), and so on. A number of examples have already been given. It is interesting that among the signers of such statements were some who in other contexts have expressed a degree of concern over the manifestations of U.S. power. Another intriguing argument was that Israel had strengthened the U.S. by demonstrating the superiority of U.S. over Russian arms, from which it should follow that the immense ‚Äúdefense‚Äù build-up should be reexamined, though this conclusion, having only rationality in its favor, was not drawn. It is probable that the occasional show of displeasure by the President was one of the means selected to solve the problem of the shaky domestic consensus. Knowledgeable Israeli observers did not take this display very seriously‚Äînor should they, as long as the diplomatic support is steady and aid continues to flow. ‚ÄúRonald Reagan played his Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  376  part well,‚Äù the Labor Party journal Davar wrote, commenting on the visit to the U.S. by Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir that ended with a photograph at the White House with Reagan looking somber instead of smiling at his guest, a symbolic ‚Äúmessage‚Äù that elicited much commentary by Washington watchers in the U.S. media‚Äîthe counterpart of Kreminologists who pore over pictures of Soviet rulers to try to determine who is in favor today. Israeli Washington watchers interpreted the message differently, and more realistically. ‚ÄúI think that [Shamir‚Äôs] visit was extremely positive,‚Äù the Washington correspondent of Davar continued, even though it offered the U.S. administration the opportunity to ‚Äúcome down on Israel‚Äù in public. ‚ÄúThis fact in itself‚Äî though it is not comfortable and pleasant‚Äîdoes not harm us from a practical point of view. The [U.S.] government is compelled to make a public show of a hard line towards Israel-in part to respond to public pressure and also to deflect the pressures from the Arabs‚Äîand to use the same opportunity to extricate itself from the image of a participant in the Israeli operation.‚Äù In private discussions with government officials and Congress (including Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who is reputed to be the Administration‚Äôs sharpest critic of Israel), the Davar correspondent claims, Shamir was told that it is time to ‚Äúfinish quickly with this matter of West Beirut.‚Äù The expert opinion conveyed to Shamir by his American contacts was that a quick military blow will be acceptable in Washington. ‚ÄúThis is the background for the decision of the Israeli government to carry out, starting yesterday, what its leaders prefer to call ‚Äòdifferent means‚Äô for solving the Beirut problem‚Äù‚Äîmore intensive bombardment, presumably.87 The conclusion seems eminently reasonable, given what is now known. Recall also Reagan‚Äôs careful avoidance of the issue of settlements in his private discussions with Menachem Begin, one of the ways of signalling that public rhetoric on that issue is not to be taken Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  377  very seriously either.88 The more significant component of the message is obviously the increasing flow of aid, as already discussed. Immediately prior to the Israeli invasion, General Sharon visited Washington where, he claims, he informed Defense Secretary Weinberger that Israel ‚Äúmust act in Lebanon.‚Äù Pentagon figures ‚Äúreveal a massive surge of military supplies from the United States to Israel in the first three months of [1982]‚Äîas Israel planned the invasion of Lebanon,‚Äù plans that were perfectly evident, as already noted. Delivery of military goods was almost 50% greater than in the preceding year, including equipment effectively used in Lebanon. Pentagon spokesmen confirm that these deliveries continued through June at a very high level (though not subsequently, it is claimed), including ‚Äúsmart bombs,‚Äù used with ‚Äúdevastating‚Äù effect in Beirut; one such bomb caused the instant destruction of an entire building killing 100 people in an apparent effort to finish off Yasser Arafat, who was thought to be there.89 The last example is instructive in itself, and also because of the way it came to be used by Israeli propagandists here. According to Ha‚Äôaretz, the bomb, which instantly destroyed an 8-story building in West Beirut, was a ‚Äúblast bomb‚Äù or ‚Äúvacuum bomb‚Äù of a type denied to Israel by President Carter but apparently supplied by Reagan. Ha‚Äôaretz proceeds to explain that the bomb ignites aviation fuel in such a way as to cause a vacuum, creating ‚Äúimmense pressure‚Äù and causing a large building to implode, destroying everything within.* Apart from its destructive capacity, the bomb is useful as a terror weapon. The use of such ‚Äúillegal‚Äù terror weapons is described in Al Hamishmar as an expression *  The Ha‚Äôaretz account is cited in Lib√©ration (Paris), Aug. 12; Jean Gueyras  describes the use and psychological effect of this ‚Äòterror‚Äù weapon in Le Monde, Aug. 11. I noticed no discussion of the weapon, or the Israeli reports concerning it, in the American press. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  378  of a ‚Äúfascist tendency.‚Äù90 The New Republic devoted an article to deriding a UPI report (no publication cited) that Israel had used a ‚Äúvacuum bomb‚Äù to destroy the building. The article, by Laurence Grafstein, alleges that UPI was ‚Äúsnookered by a pro,‚Äù and that the vacuum bomb ‚Äúexists only in the mind of [the Soviet news agency] Tass,‚Äù quoting an unidentified ‚ÄúPentagon spokesman.‚Äù Editor Martin Peretz then used the UPI dispatch to show that ‚Äúit‚Äôs easy to get an anti-Israeli story published,‚Äù another example of the anti-Israel bias of the press, repeating that ‚Äúthere‚Äôs no such thing as a vacuum bomb‚Äù and that the ‚Äútale‚Äù that there is ‚Äúhad been exposed‚Äù in Grafstein‚Äôs article. 91 Both Grafstein and Peretz are careful to conceal the fact that a description of the nature of the device, reporting its use on this occasion, and a condemnation of its use, appeared in the mainstream Israeli press, which presumably is neither ‚Äúanti-Israel‚Äù nor ‚Äúpro-PLO‚Äù (I say ‚Äúpresumably,‚Äù because it is not clear that Peretz would accept this conclusion, given that it is denied by extreme chauvinist elements in Israel, as we shall see). What the example shows, as usual, is not that the American press is ‚Äúanti-Israel‚Äù‚Äîa charge too ludicrous to discuss‚Äîbut that it is highly protective of Israel, failing to report atrocities amply covered in the Israeli press. It is interesting that the fact is illustrated by the very example selected by ‚Äúsupporters of Israel‚Äù to demonstrate the contrary, once their deception is exposed. Returning to the U.S. government attitude towards the invasion, after a briefing by national security adviser William Clark, Jimmy Carter refused to divulge its contents but stated that ‚ÄúThe only thing I can say is that the word I got from very knowledgeable people in Israel is that ‚Äòwe have a green light from Washington‚Äô.‚Äù Alexander Haig, who was Secretary of State at the time, angrily denied this charge (‚Äúa grotesque and outrageous proposition,‚Äù ‚Äútotally untrue‚Äù) and then proceeded to confirm it, saying: ‚ÄúThe Israelis had made it very clear that their limit of Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  379  toleration had been exceeded, and that at the next provocation they were going to react. They told us that. The President knew that.‚Äù It is unlikely that even the Secretary of State was totally unaware of the facts concerning ‚Äúprovocation‚Äù and ‚Äútoleration‚Äù in 1981-2. The State Department press office, asked to supply some evidence for the official stance that Washington did not back the invasion, was unable to cite a single official statement opposing it apart from the support, quickly withdrawn, for the first UN Security Council Resolution calling on Israel to terminate its aggression.92 The affair is reminiscent of the U.S. backing for the 1975 Indonesian invasion of East Timor and the subsequent near-genocidal massacre. In that case too the U.S. government pretended ignorance of the invasion plans and also claimed that the U.S. had imposed an embargo on arms after the aggression. The latter claim was false (furthermore, under the Human Rights Administration the arms flow, which had never been reduced, was substantially increased to enable Indonesia to consummate the slaughter), and the former, always incredible (except to the U.S. press), has since been thoroughly demolished. In that case too the U.S. blocked UN action to stop the aggression, a story that UN Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan recounts with pride in his memoirs. Diplomatic cables that have since surfaced reveal that the U.S. Ambassador to Jakarta expressed his hope, several months earlier, that if Indonesia intervened as planned it would do so ‚Äúeffectively, quickly and not use our equipment,‚Äù very much the reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon; the concern over the use of U.S. equipment is farcical in both cases given the dependence of the aggressors on U.S. supplies, and is to be understood as a hope that Congress will not act to enforce treaty obligations that these weapons are to be used only in self-defense.* *  See TNCW, chapter 13. See Ze‚Äôev Schiff, ‚ÄúGreen Light, Lebanon,‚Äù for further  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
380  Peace for Galilee  5. War is Peace n June 6, 1982, a massive Israeli expeditionary force began the long expected invasion, Operation ‚ÄúPeace for Galilee,‚Äù a phrase ‚Äúwhich sounds as if it comes directly out of the pages of 1984,‚Äù as one Israeli commentator wrote:  O  Only in the language of 1984 is war‚Äîpeace and warfare‚Äîhumane. One may mention, of course, that only in the Orwellian language of 1984 can occupation be liberal, and there is indeed a connection between the ‚Äúliberal occupation‚Äù [the Labor Party boast] and a war which equals peace.93 Excuses and explanations were discarded almost as quickly as they were produced: the Argov assassination attempt, defense of the border settlements, a 25-mile limit. In fact, the army headed straight for Beirut and the Beirut-Damascus highway, in accordance with plans that had long been prepared and that were known in advance to the Labor opposition (see section 6.3). Former chief of military intelligence Aharon Yariv of the Labor Party stated: ‚ÄúI know in fact that going to Beirut was included in the original military plan,‚Äù94 despite the pretense to the contrary, dutifully repeated by the U.S. government, which could hardly have been in much doubt about the facts if U.S. intelligence was not on vacation.  discussion of the tacit authorization from Washington of the invasion it knew to be imminent. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
381  Peace for Galilee  5.1 Extermination of the Two-Legged Beasts The first target was the Palestinian camp of Rashidiyeh south of Tyre, much of which, by the second day of the invasion, ‚Äúhad become a field of rubble.‚Äù There was ineffectual resistance, but as an officer of the UN peace-keeping force swept aside in the Israeli invasion later remarked: ‚ÄúIt was like shooting sparrows with cannon.‚Äù The 9000 residents of the camp‚Äîwhich had been regularly bombed and shelled for years from land, sea and air‚Äîeither fled, or were herded to the beach where they could watch the destruction of much of what remained by the Israeli forces. All teen-age and adult males were blindfolded and bound, and taken to camps, where little has been heard about them since.95 This is typical of what happened throughout southern Lebanon. The Palestinian camps were demolished, largely bulldozed to the ground if not destroyed by bombardment; and the population was dispersed or (in the case of the male population) imprisoned. Reporters were generally not allowed in the Palestinian camps, where the destruction was worst, to keep them from witnessing what had happened and was being done. There were occasional reports. David Shipler described how after the camps were captured the army proceeded to destroy what was left. An army officer, ‚Äúwhen asked why bulldozers were knocking down houses in which women and children were living,‚Äù responded by saying: ‚Äúthey are all terrorists.‚Äù96 His statement accurately summarizes Israel‚Äôs strategy and the assumptions that underlie it, over many years. There was little criticism here of Israel‚Äôs destruction of the ‚Äúnests of terrorists,‚Äù or of the wholesale transfer of the male population to prison camps in Lebanon and Israel‚Äîor to their treatment, discussed below. Again, one imagines that if such treatment had been meted out to Jews after, say, a Syrian conquest of Northern Israel, the reaction would have Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  382  been different, and few would have hesitated to recall the Nazi monsters. In fact, we need not merely imagine. When a PLO terrorist group took Israeli teen-age members of a paramilitary (Gadna) group hostage at Ma‚Äôalot, that was rightly denounced as a vicious criminal act. Since then, it has become virtually the symbol of the inhuman barbarism of the ‚Äútwo-legged beasts.‚Äù But when Israeli troops cart off the Palestinian male population from 15 to 60 (along with many thousands of Lebanese) to concentration camps, treating them in a manner to which we return, that is ignored, and the few timid queries are almost drowned in the applause‚Äîto which we also return‚Äîfor Israel‚Äôs display of humanitarian zeal and moral perfection, while aid is increased in honor of this achievement. It is a scene that should give Americans pause, and lead them to raise some questions about themselves. Israel‚Äôs strategy was to drive the Palestinians to largely-Muslim West Beirut (apart from those who were killed, dispersed or imprisoned), then to besiege the city, cutting off water, food, medical supplies and electricity, and to subject it to increasingly heavy bombardment. Naturally, the native Lebanese population was also severely battered. These measures had little impact on the PLO guerrilla fighters in Beirut, but civilians suffered increasingly brutal punishment. The correct calculation was that by this device, the PLO would be compelled to leave West Beirut to save it from total annihilation.97 It was assumed, also correctly, that American intellectuals could be found to carry out the task of showing that this too was a remarkable exercise in humanity and a historically unique display of ‚Äúpurity of arms,‚Äù even having the audacity to claim that it was the PLO, not the Israeli attackers, who were ‚Äúholding the city and its population hostage‚Äù‚Äîa charge duly intoned by New York Times editors and many others. (See section 8.2.3.) Dan Connell, a journalist with wartime experience and Lebanon Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
383  Peace for Galilee  project officer for Oxfam, describes Israel‚Äôs strategy as follows: The Israeli strategy was obvious. They were hitting a broad belt, and they kept moving the belt up toward the populated area and pushing the people in front of it. The Israelis forced an increasing concentration of people into a smaller space, so that the casualties increased geometrically with every single shell or bomb that landed. The attackers used highly sophisticated U.S. weapons, including ‚Äúshells and bombs designed to penetrate through the buildings before they explode,‚Äù collapsing buildings inwards, and phosphorus bombs to set fires and cause untreatable burns. Hospitals were closed down or destroyed. Much of the Ain el-Hilweh refugee camp near Sidon was ‚Äúflat as a parking lot‚Äù when Connell saw it, though 7-8000 Palestinians had drifted back‚Äîmostly women and children, since the men were ‚Äúeither fighting or arrested or dead.‚Äù The Israelis bulldozed the mosque at the edge of the camp searching for arms, but ‚Äúfound 90 or 100 bodies under it instead, completely rotted away.‚Äù Writing before the Beirut massacres but after the PLO had departed, he notes that ‚Äúthere could be a bloodbath in west Beirut‚Äù if no protection is given to the remnants of the population.98 The Israeli press also reported the strategy of the invading army. One journalist observing the bombardment of Beirut in the early days describes it as follows: With deadly accuracy, the big guns laid waste whole rows of houses and apartment blocks believed to be PLO positions. The fields were pitted with craters ‚Ķ Israeli strategy at that point was obvious‚Äîto clean away a no-man‚Äôs land through Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
384  Peace for Galilee  which Israeli tanks could advance and prevent any PLO breakout.99 The military tactics, as widely reported by the Israeli and foreign press, were simple. Since Israel had total command of the air and overwhelming superiority in firepower from land, sea and air, the IDF simply blasted away everything before it, then sent soldiers in to ‚Äúclean out‚Äù what was left. We return to some descriptions of these tactics by Israeli military analysts. The tactics are familiar from Vietnam and other wars where a modern high technology army faces a vastly outmatched enemy. The difference lies in the fact that in other such cases, one rarely hears tales of great heroism and ‚Äúpurity of arms,‚Äù though to be accurate, these stories were more prevalent among American ‚Äúsupporters‚Äù than Israeli soldiers, many of whom were appalled at what they were ordered to do. Economist Middle East correspondent G. H. Jansen describes Israel‚Äôs tactics in the first days of the war as follows: to surround cities and towns ‚Äúso swiftly that civilian inhabitants were trapped inside, and then to pound them from land, sea and air. After a couple of days of this there would be a timid probing attack: if there were resistance the pounding would resume.‚Äù* ‚ÄúA second striking aspect of Israeli military *  Israeli troops in fact often warned inhabitants to leave before the land, sea and  air pounding, but many report, not surprisingly, that they were unaware of the warnings; see Michael Jansen, The Battle of Beirut. Furthermore, the leaflets sometimes were dropped well after the bombardment of civilian targets began, as in Sidon (see Israel in Lebanon, p. 72, citing ‚Äúthe detailed diary of a reputable representative of a relief organisation‚Äù among other evidence). It has repeatedly been claimed that Israel suffered casualties because of the policy of warning inhabitants to leave, but it remains unexplained how this came about in Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  385  doctrine exemplified in the Lebanese campaign,‚Äù he notes, ‚Äúis the military exploitation of a cease-fire. Israel has done this so often, in every one of its wars, that perhaps one must assume that for the Israeli military ‚Äòcease-fire‚Äô only means ‚Äòno shooting‚Äô and is totally unconnected with any freezing of positions on the ground along a ‚Äòcease-fire‚Äô line.‚Äù We have, in fact, noted several earlier examples of exploitation of ceasefire: the conquest of Eilat in 1949 and of the Golan Heights in 1967. ‚ÄúThe Israelis, in this war, have refined their cease-fire-exploitation doctrine by declaring cease-fires unilaterally, at times most advantageous to them. This has left them free to switch cease-fires on and off with a show either of peaceful intent or of outraged indignation. For the Israelis the cease-fire is not a step towards a truce or an armistice, it is simply a period of rest, reinforcement and peaceful penetration‚Äîan attempt to gain the spoils of war without fighting.‚Äù100 Such tactics are possible because of the huge military advantage that Israel enjoyed. Since the western press was regularly accused in the United States of failing to recognize the amazing and historically unique Israeli efforts to spare civilians and of exaggerating the scale of the destruction and terror‚Äîwe return to some specifics‚Äîit is useful to bear in mind that the areas that were sure to be next on the list, warning or not, and how casualties could be caused by the use of the tactics just described, which are repeatedly verified in the Israeli press (see above and below, for many examples). Danny Wolf, formerly a commander in the Paratroopers, asks: ‚ÄúIf someone dropped leaflets over Herzliya [in Israel] tomorrow, telling the civilians in hiding to evacuate the town within two hours, wouldn‚Äôt that be a war crime?‚Äù (Amir Oren, Koteret Rashit, Jan. 19, 1983). It would be interesting to hear the answer from those who cite these alleged IDF warnings with much respect as proof of the noble commitment to ‚Äúpurity of arms.‚Äù Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  386  actual tactics used were entirely familiar and that some of the most terrible accounts were given by Israeli soldiers and journalists. In Knesset debate, Menachem Begin responded to accusations about civilian casualties by recalling the words of Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur of the Labor Party after the 1978 invasion of Lebanon under the Begin government, cited in introduction to chapter 5. When asked ‚Äúwhat happens when we meet a civilian population,‚Äù Gur‚Äôs answer was that ‚ÄúIt is a civilian population known to have provided active aid to the terrorists… Why has that population of southern Lebanon suddenly become such a great and just one?‚Äù Asked further whether he was saying that the population of southern Lebanon ‚Äúshould be punished,‚Äù he responded: ‚ÄúAnd how! I am using Sabra language [colloquial Hebrew]: And how!‚Äù The ‚Äúterrorists‚Äù had been ‚Äúnourished by the population around them.‚Äù Gur went on to explain the orders he had given: ‚Äúbring in tanks as quickly as possible and hit them from far off before the boys reached a face-to-face battle.‚Äù He continued: ‚ÄúFor 30 years, from the war of independence to this day, we have been fighting against a population that lives in villages and in towns‚Ķ‚Äù With audacity bordering on obscenity, Begin was able to utter the words: ‚ÄúWe did not even once deliberately harm the civilian population‚Ķall the fighting has been aimed against military targets…‚Äù Turning to the press, Tom Segev of Ha‚Äôaretz toured ‚ÄúLebanon after the conquest‚Äù in mid-June. He saw ‚Äúrefugees wandering amidst swarms of flies, dressed in rags, their faces expressing terror and their eyes, bewilderment…, the women wailing and the children sobbing‚Äù (he noticed Henry Kamm of the New York Times nearby; one may usefully compare his account of the same scenes). Tyre was a ‚Äúdestroyed city‚Äù; in the market place there was not a store undamaged. Here and there people were walking, ‚Äúas in a nightmare.‚Äù ‚ÄúA terrible smell filled the air‚Äù‚Äîof decomposing bodies, he learned. Archbishop Georges Haddad Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  387  told him that many had been killed, though he did not know the numbers, since many were still buried beneath the ruins and he was occupied with caring for the many orphans wandering in the streets, some so young that they did not even know their names. In Sidon, the destruction was still worse: ‚Äúthe center of the town‚Äîdestroyed.‚Äù ‚ÄúThis is what the cities of Germany looked like at the end of the Second World War.‚Äù ‚ÄúHalf the inhabitants remained without shelter, 100,000 people.‚Äù He saw ‚Äúmounds of ruins,‚Äù tens of thousands of people at the shore where they remained for days, women driven away by soldiers when they attempted to flee to the beaches, children wandering ‚Äúamong the tanks and the ruins and the shots and the hysteria,‚Äù blindfolded young men, hands tied with plastic bonds, ‚Äúterror and confusion.‚Äù Danny Rubinstein of Davar toured the conquered areas at the war‚Äôs end. Virtually no Palestinians were to be found in Christian-controlled areas, the refugee camps having been destroyed long ago (see the description by Attallah Mansour, section 3.3). The Red Cross give the figure of 15,000 as a ‚Äúrealistic‚Äù estimate of the number of prisoners taken by the Israeli army. In the ‚Äúruins of Am el-Hilweh,‚Äù a toothless old man was the youngest man left in the camp, among thousands of women, children and old men, ‚Äúa horrible scene.‚Äù Perhaps 350400,000 Palestinians had been ‚Äúdispersed in all directions‚Äù (‚Äúmainly women, children and old men, since all the men have been detained‚Äù). The remnants are at the mercy of Phalangist patrols and Haddad forces, who burn houses and ‚Äúbeat the people.‚Äù There is no one to care for the tens of thousands of refugee children, ‚Äúand of course all the civilian networks operated by the PLO have been annihilated, and tens of thousands of families, or parts of families, are dispersed like animals.‚Äù ‚ÄúThe shocking scene of the destroyed camps proves that the destruction was systematic.‚Äù Even shelters in which people hid from the Israeli bombardments were destroyed, ‚Äúand they are still digging out bodies‚Äù‚Äî Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
388  Peace for Galilee  this, in areas where the fighting had ended over 2 months earlier.101 An Oxfam appeal in March 1983 states that ‚ÄúNo one will ever know how many dead are buried beneath the twisted steel of apartment buildings or the broken stone of the cities and villages of Lebanon.‚Äù By late June, the Lebanese police gave estimates of about 10,000 killed. These early figures appear to have been roughly accurate. A later accounting reported by the independent Lebanese daily An-nahar gave a figure of 17,825 known to have been killed and over 30,000 wounded, including 5500 killed in Beirut and over 1200 civilians killed in the Sidon area. A government investigation estimated that 90% of the casualties were civilians. By late December, the Lebanese police estimated the numbers killed through August at 19,085, with 6775 killed in Beirut, 84% of them civilians. Israel reported 340 IDF soldiers killed in early September, 446 by late November (if these numbers are accurate, then the number of Israeli soldiers killed in the ten weeks following the departure of the PLO from Lebanon is exactly the same as the number of Israelis killed in all terrorist actions across the northern border from 1967). According to Chief of Staff Eitan, the number of Israeli soldiers killed ‚Äúin the entire western sector of Lebanon‚Äù‚Äîthat is, apart from the Syrian front‚Äîwas 117. Eight Israeli soldiers died ‚Äúin Beirut proper,‚Äù he claimed, three in accidents. If correct (which is unlikely), Eitan‚Äôs figures mean that five Israeli soldiers were killed in the process of massacring some 6000 civilians in Beirut, a glorious victory indeed. Israel also offered various figures for casualties within Lebanon. Its final accounting was that 930 people were killed in Beirut including 340 civilians, and that 40 buildings were destroyed in the Beirut bombings,* 350 in all of Lebanon.102 The number of PLO killed was *  Since one of these was Beirut‚Äôs only synagogue, we may conclude that 39  buildings  of  terrorists  were  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  destroyed.  Despite  considerable  effort,  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  389  given as 4000.103 The estimates given by Israel were generally ridiculed by reporters and relief workers, though solemnly repeated by supporters here. Within Israel itself, the Lebanese figures were regularly cited; for example, by Yizhar Smilanski, one of Israel‚Äôs best-known novelists, in a bitter denunciation of Begin (the ‚Äúman of blood‚Äù who was willing to sacrifice ‚Äúsome 50,000 human beings‚Äù for his political ends) and of the society that is able to tolerate him.104 In general, Israeli credibility suffered seriously during the war, as it had in the course of the 1973 war. Military correspondent Hirsh Goodman reported that ‚Äúthe army spokesman [was] less credible than ever before.‚Äù Because of repeated government lies (e.g., the claim, finally admitted to be false, that the IDF returns fire only to the point from which it originates), ‚Äúthousands of Israeli troops who bear eye-witness to events no longer believe the army spokesman‚Äù and ‚Äúhave taken to listening to Radio Lebanon in English and Arabic to get what they believe is a credible picture of the war.‚Äù The ‚Äúoverwhelming majority of men‚Äîincluding senior officers‚Äù‚Äîaccused Israeli military correspondents of ‚Äúallowing this war to grow out of all proportion to the original goals, by mindlessly repeating official explanations we all knew were false.‚Äù The officers and men ‚Äúof four top fighting units‚Ķaccused [military correspondents] of covering up the truth, of lying to the public, of not reporting on the real mood at the front and of being lackeys of the defence minister.‚Äù Soldiers ‚Äúrepeated the latest jokes doing the rounds, like the one about the idiot in the ordnance corps who must have put all Israeli cannon in back to front. ‚ÄòEach time we open fire the army spokesman announces we‚Äôre being representatives of the World Zionist Organization were unable to convince the Jews of West Beirut to immigrate to Israel. ‚Äú‚ÄòWhy should we leave,‚Äô they asked? Here are our houses and our friends.‚Äù152 Or what is left of them. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  390  fired at…‚Äô‚Äù Goodman is concerned not only over the deterioration in morale caused by this flagrant lying but also by Israel‚Äôs ‚Äúcurrent world image.‚Äù105 About that, he need not have feared too much. At least in the U.S., Israeli government claims continued to be taken quite seriously, even the figures offered with regard to casualties and war damages. As relief officials and others regularly commented, accurate numbers cannot be obtained, since many‚Äîparticularly Palestinians‚Äîare simply unaccounted for. Months after the fighting had ended in the Sidon area inhabitants of Ain el-Hilweh were still digging out corpses and had no idea how many had been killed, and an education officer of the Israeli army (a Lieutenant Colonel) reported that the army feared epidemics in Sidon itself ‚Äúbecause of the many bodies under the wreckage‚Ķ‚Äù106 Lebanese and foreign relief officials observed that ‚ÄúMany of the dead never reached hospital,‚Äù and that unknown numbers of bodies are believed lost in the rubble in Beirut; hospital figures, the primary basis for the Lebanese calculations cited above, ‚Äúonly hint at the scale of the tragedy.‚Äù ‚ÄúMany bodies could not be lodged in overflowing morgues and were not included in the statistics.‚Äù107 The Lebanese government casualty figures are based on police records, which in turn are based on actual counts in hospitals, clinics and civil defense centers. These figures, according to police spokesmen, do ‚Äúnot include people buried in mass graves in areas where Lebanese authorities were not informed.‚Äù108 The figures, including the figure of 19,000 dead and over 30,000 wounded, must surely be underestimates, assuming that those celebrating their liberation (the story that Israel and its supporters here would like us to believe) were not purposely magnifying the scale of the horrors caused by their liberators. Particularly with regard to the Palestinians, one can only guess what the scale of casualties may have been. A UN report estimated 13,500 severely damaged houses in West Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  391  Beirut alone, thousands elsewhere, not counting the Palestinian camps (which are‚Äîor were‚Äîin fact towns).109 As for the Palestinians, the head of the UN Agency that has been responsible for them, Olof Rydbeck of Sweden, said that its work of 32 years ‚Äúhas been wiped out‚Äù; Israeli bombardment had left ‚Äúpractically all the schools, clinics and installations of the agency in ruins.110 Israel made much of the fact that one UNRWA school had been converted to a PLO military training center, unknown to UNRWA. ‚ÄúThe Israelis are entitled to be indignant,‚Äù the London Economist observed. ‚ÄúTheir protest would carry more weight if they had not looted the college‚Äôs educational equipment, reduced its student roll to about 150 and reduced the nearby refugee camp, from which many of the students were drawn, to a mass of rubble.‚Äù111 Some older Israelis must have winced at the show of indignation, those who recalled UNRWA‚Äôs earlier incarnation as UNRRA, established to care for other refugees. The Chief of UNRRA Operations in Germany, 1945-6, writes in his memoirs that ‚ÄúMilitary training of Jewish D.P.‚Äôs was taking place in [UNRRA] camps, presumably in preparation for active participation in the war of liberation from the British Mandate on their arrival in Palestine. Instructors were found to be N.C.O.s from British and U.S. armies, in uniform, absent without, but I fancy sometimes with, leave from their units.‚Äù112 All illegal, a violation of UNRRA‚Äôs commitment, and one of the proud moments in the history of the foundation of the State of Israel. It is, once again, uncanny to see how history is being replayed, with a change in the cast of characters that will become still more macabre before we conclude, with future chapters that one hesitates to imagine. John Kifner reported that ‚Äúthere was not much left standing‚Äù in the Palestinian camps after Israel‚Äôs bombardment, and that in the south, ‚Äúthe Israelis have bulldozed refugee camps to make them uninhabitable.113 Contrary to a standard propaganda claim, reporters Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  392  found ‚Äúno heavy artillery or well-fortified positions‚Äù in the Sabra, Shatilla and Bourj al-Barajneh camps in Beirut, which had ‚Äútaken a terrible pounding‚Äù since June 6 (actually, June 4), causing the flight of half of their 125,000 population in the first few weeks of the war.114 The areas to which they escaped, particularly the Fakhani quarter in Beirut, were also mercilessly bombed. Since Palestinians are by definition all terrorists, or mothers of terrorists, or future terrorists‚Äîso different from Begin, Shamir and Sharon for example‚Äîwhatever was done to them was regarded as legitimate.  5.2 Beirut: Precision Bombardment Repeatedly, Israel blocked international relief efforts and prevented food and medical supplies from reaching victims.* Israeli military forces also appear to have gone out of their way to destroy medical facilities‚Äîat least, if one wants to believe Israeli government claims about ‚Äúpinpoint accuracy‚Äù in bombardment.115 ‚ÄúInternational agencies agree that the civilian death toll would have been considerably higher had it not been for the medical facilities that the Palestine Liberation Organization provides for its own people‚Äù116‚Äîand, in fact, for many poor Lebanese‚Äî so it is not surprising that these were a particular target of attack. In the first bombing in June, a children‚Äôs hospital in the Sabra refugee camp was hit, Lebanese television reported, and a cameraman said he saw ‚Äúmany children‚Äù lying dead inside the Bourj al Barajneh  *  The International Red Cross, World Vision International, UNICEF and other  relief agencies report long delays in supply of food and medicines caused by Israeli interference.115 This is confirmed by Israeli officials responsible for relief, as we will see directly. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  393  camp in Beirut, while ‚Äúfires were burning out of control at dozens of apartment buildings‚Äù and the Gaza Hospital near the camps was reported hit.117 This, it will be recalled, was in ‚Äúretaliation‚Äù for the attempt by an anti-PLO group with no base in Lebanon to assassinate Ambassador Argov. On June 12, four bombs fell on a hospital in Aley, severely damaging it. ‚ÄúThere is nothing unusual‚Äù in the story told by an operating room assistant who had lost two hands in the attack; ‚ÄúThat the target of the air strike was a hospital, whether by design or accident, is not unique either,‚Äù William Branigan reports, noting that other hospitals were even more badly damaged. Fragments of cluster bombs were found on the grounds of an Armenian sanitarium south of Beirut that was also ‚Äúheavily damaged during the Israeli drive.‚Äù118 A neurosurgeon at the Gaza hospital in Beirut ‚Äúinsists that Israeli gunners deliberately shelled his hospital,‚Äù it was reported at the same time.119 A few days later, Richard Ben Cramer reported that the Acre Hospital in Beirut was hit by Israeli shells, and that the hospitals in the camps had again been hit. ‚ÄúIsraeli guns never seem to stop here,‚Äù he reported from the Sabra camp, later to be the scene of a major massacre: ‚ÄúAfter two weeks of this random thunder, Sabra is only a place to run through.‚Äù120 The Acre hospital was again hit on June 24, along with the Gaza hospital and the Islamic Home for Invalids, where ‚Äúthe corridors were streaked with blood.‚Äù The hospitals were short of supplies because Israel was blocking tons of medical supplies ready for shipment in Cyprus, according to the International Red Cross.121 By mid-August, the Islamic Home had been repeatedly shelled, only 15 of 200 staff members remained, and ‚Äúseveral of the retarded children have died of starvation for lack of someone who has the time to feed them properly.‚Äù At the Palestinian Hospital for the Disabled (perhaps the same institution), ‚Äúa visitor walking the gloomy corridors is approached by stumbling figures crying ‚ÄòFood, food‚Äô in Arabic‚Äù; 800 patients remained, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  394  all mentally ill, half of them children, cared for by a dozen nurses.122 A French doctor reported witnessing ‚Äúan intense Israeli bombing raid around and against the [Gaza] hospital, which forced the evacuation of the hospital at the time.‚Äù123 When the Beirut mental hospital was hit shortly after, ‚Äú800 patients varying in condition from senile dementia to violent schizophrenia were released into the streets of Beirut.‚Äù The hospital, clearly marked by Red Cross flags, was hit by artillery and naval gunfire, including four phosphorus shells. Medical personnel reported that the patients, including children with mental problems whose nursery was hit by rockets that set beds on fire, were 90% Lebanese. No military target was found within a half-mile. The hospital was, however, ‚Äúprecariously located near the Palestinian ghettoes of Sabra and Shatila, frequent targets of Israeli bombardment,‚Äù though the ‚Äúimmediate surroundings are residential‚Äù (i.e., not Palestinian slums).124 Most of this was before the bombing escalated to new levels of violence in August. By August 4, 8 of the 9 Homes for Orphans in Beirut had been destroyed, attacked by cluster and phosphorus bombs. The last was hit by phosphorus and other rockets, though clearly marked by a red cross on the roof, after assurances by the International Red Cross that it would be spared.125 On August 4, the American University hospital was hit by shrapnel and mortar fire. A doctor ‚Äústanding in bloodstained rags‚Äù said: ‚ÄúWe have no more room.‚Äù The director reported: ‚ÄúIt‚Äôs a carnage. There is nothing military anywhere near this hospital.‚Äù126 The hospital was the only one in Beirut to escape direct shelling, and even there, sanitary conditions had deteriorated to the point where half the intensive-care patients were lost and with 99% of the cases being trauma victims, there was no room for ordinary illnesses. ‚ÄúDrive down any street and you will almost always see a man or woman with a missing limb.‚Äù127 The Red Cross reported that by August 6, ‚Äúthere were 130 beds Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  395  available in west Beirut out of a total of about 1,400.‚Äù The American University Hospital was admitting only ‚Äúthose who look salvageable‚Äù on bad days, the staff reported. The Berbir hospital was ‚Äújust an underground dormitory with generators churning away to give the few patients air.‚Äù At the Hotel Bristol, hit by an Israeli phosphorus shell, the Red Cross had set up an underground hospital. ‚ÄúThe majority of the doctors and nurses working in the city have fled.‚Äù128 ‚ÄúEven the Red Cross delegation has been shelled twice. In an Israeli naval bombardment on July 30, six shells struck the building and on Aug. 5 it was again hit by two artillery shells.‚Äù The Berbir hospital was already seriously damaged by mid-July, with trails of blood in the corridors, many of the patients removed from the wreckage, and the mortuary full of corpses until the remaining doctors were able to leave the building to bury the unidentified bodies in a communal grave when the shelling and air attacks temporarily stopped. 129 One of the true heroes of the war is Dr. Amal Shamma, an Americantrained Lebanese-American pediatrician who remained at work in Beirut‚Äôs Berbir hospital through the worst horrors. In November, she spent several weeks touring the U.S., receiving little notice, as expected. She was, however, interviewed in the Village Voice, where she described the extensive medical and social services for Palestinians and poor Lebanese that were destroyed by the Israeli invasion. For them, nothing is left apart from private hospitals that they cannot afford, some taken over by the Israeli army. No medical teams came from the U.S., although several came to help from Europe; the U.S. was preoccupied with supplying weapons to destroy. She reports that the hospitals were clearly marked with red crosses and that there were no guns nearby, though outside her hospital there was one disabled tank, which was never hit in the shellings that reduced the hospital to a first-aid station. On one day, 17 hospitals were shelled. Hers ‚Äúwas shelled repeatedly Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  396  from August 1 to 12 until everything in it was destroyed.‚Äù It had been heavily damaged by mid-July, as already noted. Hospital employees stopped at Israeli barricades were told: ‚ÄúWe shelled your hospital good enough, didn‚Äôt we? You treat terrorists there.‚Äù130 Recall that this is the testimony of a doctor at a Lebanese hospital, one of those liberated by the Israeli forces, according to official doctrine. An American nurse working in Beirut, who was appalled by the ‚Äúwatered-down descriptions in American newspapers,‚Äù reported that Israel ‚Äúdropped bombs on everything, including hospitals, orphanages and, in one case, a school bus carrying 35 young schoolgirls who were traveling on an open road‚Äù; she cared for the survivors.131 The U.S. Navy Lieut. Commander in charge of removing unexploded ordnance in Beirut reports that ‚Äúwe found five bombs in an orphanage with about 45 cluster bombs in the front yard. We were called there after five children were injured and four killed.‚Äù About 3-5% of the shells and bombs failed to go off and are considered highly dangerous, he said.132 This particular orphanage, then, must have been heavily bombed. One of the most devastating critiques of Israeli military practices was provided inadvertently by an Israeli pilot who took part in the bombing, an Air Force major, who described the careful selection of targets and the precision bombing that made error almost impossible. Observing the effects, one can draw one‚Äôs own conclusions. He also expressed his own personal philosophy, saying ‚Äúif you want to achieve peace, you should fight.‚Äù ‚ÄúLook at the American-Japanese war,‚Äù he added. ‚ÄúIn order to achieve an end, they bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki.‚Äù133 The precedents this pilot cited can be placed alongside of others offered by Prime Minister Begin in justification of the war: Dresden and Coventry, for example. The reference to Coventry particularly amazed Israeli listeners; ‚ÄúWe know who carried out the bombardment of Coventry,‚Äù Abba Eban wrote‚Äîcommenting also on the ‚Äúdelegations of diasClassics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  397  pora Jews [who] came to Israel, or rather to Lebanon, and applauded the decision to make war as enthusiastically as they would have applauded a decision not to make it,‚Äù and the ‚Äúembarrassing vulgarity in holding [United Jewish Appeal] fundraising appeals‚Äù in occupied Lebanon. These precedents give some insight into the mentality of the Israeli political leadership and segments of the officer corps, and also of American supporters who appeal to the same precedents, for example, former Supreme Court Justice and UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg. In his interesting comments in support of the invasion, to which we return, he cites the precedent of the bombing of Dresden and more generally, the war ‚Äúagainst the demented barbarian who sought to enslave the world.‚Äù ‚ÄúIs not the government of Israel faced with the same terrible dilemma in view of repeated PLO acts of terrorism against Israeli civilians and the bombing of its northern settlements?‚Äù134 Recall the actual scale of PLO terrorism and the comparison to Israeli terrorism, already discussed, and the fact that there had been no unprovoked bombardment of northern settlements for a year, none at all for 10 months despite extensive Israeli provocation, including bombing in April. Goldberg‚Äôs notion that Israel‚Äôs invasion of Lebanon is comparable to the war against Hitler was also invoked by Prime Minister Begin in a letter to President Reagan in which he portrayed himself as marching to ‚ÄúBerlin‚Äù to liquidate ‚ÄúHitler.‚Äù To the Labor Party spokesman on foreign affairs, Abba Eban, this seemed ‚Äúa dark and macabre fantasy,‚Äù ‚Äúone of the most bizarre documents in recent diplomatic history,‚Äù an example of ‚Äúlosing touch with reality.‚Äù* Other Israeli commentators also ridiculed *  Eban remarks that ‚ÄúArafat‚Äôs ideology and rhetoric, repulsive as they are, are  identical with those of Anwar Sadat until a few months before Begin embraced him in the Knesset.‚Äù135 There is some truth to what he says, though not in the sense that he intended his audience to understand, as we see when we recall Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  398  this comparison, suggesting that it raised questions about Begin‚Äôs sanity.135 I noticed no comment here on Goldberg‚Äôs sanity. It is, perhaps, not too surprising that a liberal American hero should surpass the ‚Äúmacabre fantasies‚Äù of Israel‚Äôs Nobel Peace Prize winner in his own ruminations on the topic.  Sadat‚Äôs rebuffed efforts to make peace with Israel for over six years before his visit to Jerusalem, and Arafat‚Äôs moves towards the accommodationist international consensus, also regularly rebuffed, from the mid-1970s. See chapter 3. Eban surely knows all of this, and more, very well. He is able to exploit his reputation as a dove to conceal the historical record with considerable effectiveness. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
399  Peace for Galilee  5.3 Caring for the Victims: Prisoners, Patients, Refugees Not only hospitals, but also medical personnel seemed to evoke particular fury. One eyewitness saw a Palestinian doctor, unconscious, ‚Äúhis hands and neck tied to a post, his face bloodied and covered with flies.‚Äù136 Palestinian hospitals were closed down, their staffs arrested, removed to prison camps, and brutalized. In Sidon, the Israeli army closed down the Palestinian Red Crescent Hospital. A Dutch nurse working there told a reporter: ‚ÄúI was in Holland during World War II. I know what fascists are like. It‚Äôs terrible that all these women and children are being killed. Tell that to the world.‚Äù137 On the same day, the New York Times reported a Jerusalem news conference in which Imri Ron, a Mapam Knesset member (from Kibbutz Mishmar Haemek) and paratroop major, ‚Äúspoke from a combination of political and military authority‚Äù about the ‚Äúclean fight‚Äù the Israeli army had fought, ‚Äútaking extraordinary precautions to save civilians.‚Äù138 Apart from the U.S. military itself, only an Israeli officer would be accorded such ‚Äúauthority‚Äù in the U.S. press. Ron‚Äôs authority is undiminished by the fact that he was such an enthusiast for the war that he volunteered to take part in it, though as a Knesset member he was not called up.139 We return to some of his further ‚Äúauthoritative‚Äù observations, comparing them to those of a different breed of Israeli military officers. A Belgian doctor at the closed Sidon hospital, who ‚Äústruggled to cope with wounded men, women and children‚Äù (victims of this ‚Äúclean fight‚Äù), stated that ‚ÄúWe had a good operation here. We were doing surgery and everything‚Äù before almost the entire staff was arrested by the Israeli army.140 Shipler reported the same events in the New York Times. He quotes the Israeli Major who is military governor of Sidon and who closed the hospital because, he said, ‚ÄúIt‚Äôs obvious it‚Äôs not a good Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  400  hospital.‚Äù Therefore, ‚ÄúAt 11A.M. today I had all the patients moved out to a good private hospital, the Labib Medical Center,‚Äù not tainted by a Palestinian connection. He added that he had not ordered the arrest of a Norwegian nurse, though ‚Äúshe is a member of the P.L.O.,‚Äù because ‚Äúwe are democratic‚Äù and therefore ‚Äúwe are not taking women‚Äù‚Äîwhether or not this was true at the time, it is false for the subsequent period, as we shall see. A Canadian and Norwegian doctor, along with Palestinian doctors, will be taken to Israel for interrogation and possible imprisonment, the Major added. Shipler visited the ‚Äúgood private hospital,‚Äù where no one seemed ‚Äúpressed for time‚Äù and the director angrily refused to take patients from the closed hospital, explaining to his guests that ‚ÄúThe first case I got from there, she had gangrene all over her body.‚Äù He will take only ‚Äúgood cases.‚Äù Meanwhile one Belgian doctor remained in the closed Palestinian hospital to take care of 58 patients, some badly wounded, amidst ‚Äúa stench of filth and rotting flesh.‚Äù The director of the ‚Äúgood private hospital‚Äù is, incidentally, the son of a millionaire orange grove owner, who was quite pleased to be liberated by the Israeli army.141 None of this merited any editorial comment, apart from the regular tributes to Israel‚Äôs sublime moral standards, which are a wonder to behold. One may recall, perhaps, the reaction in the Times and elsewhere when the peasant army of Pol Pot evacuated the hospitals of Phnom Penh‚Äîwithout first reducing them to ruins, however. The Canadian and Norwegian doctor, along with a Norwegian social worker, were indeed arrested and taken to Israel, then released after protests from their governments. Their testimony received a brief notice in the New York Times, divided between Canadian surgeon Chris Giannou‚Äôs testimony before Congress that he had seen prisoners beaten to death by Israeli soldiers and other atrocities, and the Israeli Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  401  government denials and allegations that Giannou was a liar suspected of working for the PLO, that the hospital he reported being bombed ‚Äúwas hit only because the P.L.O. used it for fighting,‚Äù etc.142 This admirable show of balance in reports of atrocities is not familiar from other cases.* In his congressional testimony, Giannou reported that he was ‚Äúa witness to four prisoners who were beaten to death‚Äù (reduced to two by the Times). He also witnessed ‚Äúthe total, utter devastation of residential areas, and the blind, savage, indiscriminate destruction of refugee camps by simultaneous shelling and carpet bombing from aircraft, gunboats, tanks and artillery,‚Äù leaving only ‚Äúlarge blackened craters filled with rubble and debris, broken concrete slabs and twisted iron bars, and corpses‚Äù; ‚Äúhospitals being shelled,‚Äù one shell killing 40-50 people; the shelling of the camp after Israeli soldiers had permitted women and children to return to it; the use of cluster bombs in settled areas; ‚Äúthe calcinated, carbonized bodies of the victims of phosphorus bombs‚Äù; 300 cadavers in one area while he was evacuating the Government Hospital; and much more. He saw ‚Äúthe entire male staff‚Äô of the hospitals being taken into custody, leaving patients unattended, and ‚Äúsavage and indiscriminate beatings‚Äù of prisoners with fists, sticks, ropes with nuts and bolts tied to them. He saw a Palestinian doctor hung by his hands from a tree and beaten and an Iraqi surgeon ‚Äúbeaten by several guards viciously, and left to lie in the sun with his face buried in the sand,‚Äù all *  Not surprisingly, Giannou merits an entry in the Anti-Defamation League  Enemies List of people dedicated ‚Äòto undermine American support for Israel‚Äù (see chapter 4, note 145). The Handbook of ‚Äúpro-Arab propagandists‚Äù repeats Israel‚Äôs charges that Giannou ‚Äúwas detained because of his close connection to the PLO and his apparent sympathy for the terrorist organization,‚Äù sufficient reason by ADL standards, and states that his ‚Äúpublic accusations against the Israelis‚Äù are ‚Äúnot authenticated.‚Äù Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  402  in the presence of an Israeli Colonel who did nothing about it. He watched prisoners ‚Äúbeing rehearsed by an Israeli officer to shout ‚ÄòLong Live Begin‚Äô,‚Äù others sitting bound in ‚Äústifling heat‚Äù with ‚Äúfood and water in short supply.‚Äù He was forced to evacuate his hospital and bring the patients down to the seafront. The Norwegians confirmed his story and said that they had seen at least 10 people beaten to death, including an old man who was crazed by the lack of water and intense heat as the prisoners were forced to sit for hours in the sun; he was beaten by four or five soldiers who then tied him with his wrists to his ankles and let him lie in the sun until he died.143 Another demonstration of courage and purity of arms. Little of this was reported here in the mainstream media, but Giannou‚Äôs testimony obviously did impress Congress, as we can see from its decision, shortly after, to improve the terms of Reagan‚Äôs proposed increase of military and economic aid to Israel. The Norwegian doctor and social worker told the story of their captivity in a report issued by the Norwegian Department of Foreign Affairs.144 Under Israeli captivity, they were forced to sit, hands tied, for 36 hours without permission to move, while they heard ‚Äúscreams of pain‚Äù from nearby. In an Israeli prison, they were forced to lie for 48 hours, blindfolded and handcuffed, on the interrogation ground. They report ‚Äúextensive violence‚Äù against prisoners, including beatings by thick table legs, batons, plastic tubes ‚Äúoften with big knots in the ends‚Äù and clubs with nails. Officers were present during severe beatings, but did nothing. One of the most sadistic Israeli guards told them he was from a kibbutz where an Austrian girl had been killed by rocket fire. Prisoners were tied with tight plastic straps with sharp edges, ‚Äúcausing pain.‚Äù The Norwegians were given ‚Äúpreferential treatment.‚Äù Arab prisoners were subjected to constant brutality and degradation. Dr. Shafiqul-Islam from Bangladesh, who was on the staff of the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  403  Palestinian hospital in Sidon, reports that he was arrested by the IDF while operating on a 12-year-old Palestinian boy with severe internal shrapnel injuries. He was not permitted to complete the operation, but was arrested, beaten mercilessly, forbidden to ask for food or water for 4 days, denied drugs or dressings for other prisoners on the grounds that they were ‚Äúall terrorists,‚Äù and so on.145 The treatment of prisoners gives a certain insight into the nature of the conquering army and the political leadership that guides it, as does the very fact that it was considered legitimate to round up all teen-age and adult males and to ship them off to concentration camps after they were identified as ‚Äúterrorists‚Äù by hooded informants. Similarly, the fact that all of this was generally regarded as quite unremarkable here‚Äî search New York Times editorials, for example, for a protest‚Äîgives a certain insight into the society that was funding this operation, the paymasters and coterie of apologists. Little is known about the fate of those who were imprisoned, in part, because Israel has blocked access to the camps. For over a month, Israel refused even to permit the Red Cross to visit the camps, prompting unaccustomed protest by the ICRC, which later suspended its visits in apparent protest against what it had found within (as a matter of policy, the ICRC refrains from public criticisms). Five months after the war‚Äôs end, Israel was still refusing to permit reporters to visit the Ansar camp in Lebanon, as was discovered by one of the rare journalists (William Farrell) who tried to do so on the strength of the statement in an official IDF publication that ‚Äúthe camp is open to visiting journalists throughout the day and newsmen may interview detainees on camp grounds.‚Äù146 He was told (‚Äúpolitely‚Äù): ‚ÄúYou may not enter.‚Äù* More than *  Possibly in response to Farrell‚Äôs article, Israel then allowed two reporters to  enter the camps. Edward Walsh reports that prisoners continue to be brought to Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  404  half of the estimated 15,000 prisoners were reported to be in prisons or camps in Israel, where the Red Cross stated that it was still denied any access to them, many months after the war ended (see section 5.1 and chapter 6, section 6.5).147 Some information has come from released prisoners, and more from Israeli sources to which we turn directly. The few released prisoners interviewed by the press report ‚Äúsardine-like‚Äù overcrowding, with prisoners required to lie on the ground day and night. Some report that they were required to hold their hands over their heads and forced to ‚Äúbark like the dogs you are‚Äù and shout ‚ÄúLong live Begin, long live Sharon.‚Äù Jonathan Randal, who reports these facts, states that ‚Äúthere appear to be virtually no Palestinian men between the ages of 16 to 60 free in southern Lebanon,‚Äù an observation confirmed by other reporters and visitors. Released prisoners allege that many prisoners died of torture. One, who was in Ansar for 155 days, reported in an interview with Liberation (Paris) that prisoners were laid ‚Äúon special tables that have holds for legs and arms,‚Äù then beaten with sticks and iron rods. He claims to have seen deaths as the result of torture. A London Times inquiry reported in Yediot Ahronot led to the discovery of 7 young men apparently killed in an Israeli detention camp near Sidon in the early weeks of the invasion, their bodies found with hands tied and signs of Ansar, sometimes as many as 20 a week. The head of the prisoners‚Äô committee says: ‚ÄúAt first this place was hell. Then there were improvements… I will not say that this is Auschwitz, but it is a concentration camp.‚Äù He also says that ‚ÄúThere is no torture now in Ansar.‚Äù See also Uri Avneri‚Äôs report on the Ansar ‚Äúconcentration camp,‚Äù including interviews with guards who regard the prisoners as ‚Äúsubhuman,‚Äù etc.; and Mary Arias, reporting degrading conditions, electric torture, efforts to induce psychological disorientation by various measures, etc.147 Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  405  severe beatings. Independent Lebanese witnesses gave similar accounts; one claimed to have seen one prisoner beaten to death by an Israeli guard. Israeli authorities first denied the allegations, then confirmed that the bodies had been found and that an investigation was proceeding. One died from a heart attack, they claimed. The Times reports that five were Lebanese citizens of Palestinian origin, one was a Palestinian refugee, and one an Egyptian. A lengthy account of the experiences of one prisoner in Israel and in Ansar appears in the German periodical Der Spiegel. This man, a Lebanese Shiite Muslim (the largest religious group in Lebanon), was taken prisoner on July 2, when his village was officially ‚Äúliberated‚Äù by the IDF. At 4:30 AM the village was awakened by loudspeakers announcing that all inhabitants from ages 15 to 75 were to gather in the village center at 5 AM. IDF troops with tanks and armored personnel carriers surrounded the village while, to the amazement of the villagers, a network of collaborators within the village, clearly established in advance, appeared with IDF uniforms and weapons, prepared for their task, which was to select the victims. Each person received a notice, ‚Äúguilty‚Äù or ‚Äúinnocent‚Äù; this man was ‚Äúguilty,‚Äù with a written statement describing his ‚Äúcrime‚Äù‚Äî in Hebrew, so he never did find out what it was. The guilty were blindfolded and taken to a camp in southern Lebanon. There they were interrogated while being beaten with heavy clubs. Teachers, businessmen, students and journalists received special treatment: more severe beatings. The interrogation-beating sessions lasted from 10 minutes to half a day, depending on the whims of the liberators. Prisoners slept on the ground, without blankets in the cold nights. Many were ill. They were forced to pass before Lebanese informants, and if selected, were sent to Israel. For no reason that he could discern, this man was one of those selected. Their first stop in Israel was Nahariya, where Israeli women Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  406  entered their buses, screaming hysterically at the bound prisoners, hitting them and spitting at them while the guards stood by and laughed. They were then driven to an Israeli camp where they were greeted by soldiers who again beat them with clubs. They were given dinner‚Äîa piece of bread and a tomato. Then soldiers came with four large shepherd dogs on chains, who were set upon the prisoners, biting them, while those who tried to defend themselves were beaten by soldiers. ‚ÄúParticularly the young boys, aged I5 and 16, began to cry from fear,‚Äù leading to further beatings. ‚ÄúEach day brought with it new torture.‚Äù Many were beaten with iron bars, on the genitals, on the hands, on the soles of the feet. One had four fingers broken. This man was hung by his feet ‚Äúand they used me as a punching bag.‚Äù When prisoners begged for water they were given urine, provided by the liberators. One day they were taken to the sports stadium of a nearby village where the inhabitants came to throw bottles and other objects at them. Prisoners were forced to run like cattle, beaten with clubs. Once they were made to sit for a solid week, most of the time with hands on their heads. The worst times were Friday night and Saturday, when the guards celebrated the Sabbath by getting drunk, selecting some prisoners for special punishment ‚Äúto the accompaniment of laughter, full of hate.‚Äù After the war ended this man was taken back to Lebanon, to the Ansar concentration camp, where there were then about 10,000 prisoners. There the terror continued. One day they saw many Lebanese women outside the camp. They waved to them and shouted. To stop the turmoil, the guards shot in the direction of the women, and the prisoners, angered, threw stones, and were fired on directly with 28 wounded, eight seriously. One night, at 1 AM, he was told that he was free; 225 men were freed, all Lebanese. He was sent to Nabatiye, where an officer told him: ‚ÄúWe wish you all the best. We had to mete out Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
407  Peace for Galilee  justice. It was a long time indeed, but justice triumphed anyway. ‚ÄúI do not know what he meant,‚Äù this man adds, concluding his story.148 The story was translated into Hebrew and appeared in Ha‚Äôaretz, but curiously, it was missed by the New York Times, New Republic, and other journals that were lauding the ‚Äúpurity of arms‚Äù and magnificent moral standards of the liberators. Apparently, it was not deemed of sufficient importance to be communicated to those paying the bills. According to other reports, prisoners were held blindfolded and bound in barbed wire compounds; while Lebanese prisoners were kept with arms tied, Palestinians were kept naked, blindfolded, with arms tied. Despite daily appeals from June 6, the ICRC was permitted to see only 18 injured Palestinians in a hospital in Israel until July 18. Wealthy Lebanese detainees who say that they had ‚Äúfought the PLO‚Äù describe beatings and humiliation, confirming the reports of others.149 One reads an occasional description, usually in the foreign press, of ‚Äúthe agitated crowd of Arab women gathered in the shade of a neighbouring wall to see whether any of their relatives could be spotted,‚Äù150 but the torment of the families is of as little interest to the paymasters as is the fate of the prisoners themselves. The Greek Orthodox Archbishop of ‚Äúdemolished Tyre,‚Äù Monsignor Haddad, described ‚Äúthe arbitrary arrests‚Äù as ‚Äúan insuperable barrier to the establishment of a just peace,‚Äù expressing his certainty ‚Äúthat 95 percent‚Äîif not 99 percent‚Äîof the people arrested are innocent.‚Äù151 It might be added that some questions also arise about the concept ‚Äúguilt,‚Äù as applied by a conquering army. Correspondents in Lebanon provide more information. One Reuters reporter gives this eyewitness account after seeing prisoners under guard: Flicking a two-thonged leather whip, an Israeli soldier Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
408  Peace for Galilee  moved through the lines of suspected guerillas squatting on a lawn outside the Safa Citrus Corporation. Nearby, a row of eight men stood with their hands in the air as a greenbereted Israeli border guard, an Uzi sub-machinegun slung over his shoulder, inspected them. ‚ÄúThis is where they bring our men. It is the Israelis‚Äô interrogation center,‚Äù said a sobbing woman in a small crowd on the pavement opposite. The border guards, a force renowned for their toughness, barked out orders in Arabic and refused to let journalists linger at the gates of the corporation, a depot on the southern outskirts of Sidon. Through the bars, about 100 prisoners could be seen on the lawn while a queue waited to enter the depot, apparently for questioning. Those able to satisfy the Israelis that they were not PLO guerillas were put onto a bus and driven to an open space in the town for release. As the men left the bus, soldiers stamped a Star of David on their identity cards to show they had been cleared. Those who had no card were stamped on their wrists. A picture above the story shows the top half of the body of an unidentified man, killed during the bombing of a school building in Sidon a week earlier, lying in the ruins where residents say that more than 300 died. A woman who was personally acquainted with several men who were released says she was told that ‚Äúthey had to stand or sit in the sun all day. The only water they got was poured on the ground, and they had to lap it up like animals.‚Äù ‚ÄúOther Lebanese residents of Sidon told the same story.‚Äù Adult males had been rounded up after the occupation, taken to the beaches, and passed before men wearing hoods who pointed some of them out, ‚Äúand then the Israelis took them away.‚Äù152 Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  409  Again, it is useful to ask ourselves what the reaction would be in the United States if an Arab army had conquered half of Israel, leaving a trail of destruction in its path, sending all males to prison camps where they were beaten, murdered, humiliated, while their families were left to starve or be harassed or killed by terrorist bands armed by the conqueror. William Farrell visited the same school 7 months later, reporting again that ‚Äúseveral hundred refugees were killed‚Äù when the school‚Äôs shelter was hit. This one shelter, then, contained more corpses than the total number killed in all of Sidon, according to the Israeli official responsible for the population in the territories that were ‚Äúliberated,‚Äù Minister of Economic Coordination Ya‚Äôakov Meridor, who reported to the Israeli Knesset that 250 people were killed in Sidon, * ‚Äúincluding terrorists and their hostages‚Äù‚Äîwhich presumably translates as ‚ÄúPalestinians and Lebanese.‚Äù153 Farrell interviewed the assistant principal of this French-language elementary school: ‚Äúthere are problems with some of the students, he said, who still shudder when they hear planes overhead. ‚ÄòIt will take a long time to take this impression from them,‚Äô he added.‚Äù154 More information about the prisons comes from Israeli sources. Dr. Haim Gordon, an IDF educational officer, describes his visit to what he calls the Ansar ‚Äúconcentration camp.‚Äù Prisoners are not permitted to leave their tents, but must lie on the ground. There are no showers, in the burning July sun. ‚ÄúThe terrible stink ‚Äòmaddens‚Äô the Israeli guards.‚Äù One prisoner is an 83-year-old man who ‚Äúcollaborated‚Äù with the PLO, *  For the accounting by those who were celebrating their liberation, see note  103. Recall that the actual numbers are unknown, and that months after the battle ended corpses were still being found and the IDF feared that epidemics might break out because of those still buried under the rubble. See section 5.1. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  410  renting a field to Palestinians who allegedly used it for an ammunition dump. He is therefore ‚Äúa terrorist,‚Äù and ‚Äúwe must frighten him so that in the future he will not collaborate,‚Äù Gordon was informed by a guard. Amnon Dankner reports testimony by an Israeli soldier who served as a prison guard. He too describes the terrible smell, intolerable to the Israeli guards; and ‚Äúthe cries of pain of those under interrogation.‚Äù He describes the pleading women who kiss your hands and show you a picture, begging you to tell them whether you have seen their husband or child, whom they have not seen or heard from for three months. And the military police officer who shoots into a crowd of prisoners (see section 5.3), the blood streaming from the wounds of those who are hit, the roadblocks where you must stop and send back a woman about to give birth or an old man in terrible pain, trying to reach a hospital. And finally, the suicide of an Israeli soldier, who, it seems, could bear no more.155 Within Israel, the matter has elicited some concern. Knesset Member Amnon Rubinstein brought up in the Knesset the issue of ‚Äúterrifying incidents in Ansar,‚Äù alleging that ‚Äúintolerable conditions that are a stain on Israel‚Äôs reputation‚Äù prevail in the camp: ‚ÄúPrisoners walk about barefoot in the severe cold and there have been many incidents of assaults against them.‚Äù156 In the United States, little has been said about the topic. We return to the Israeli response to an Amnesty International appeal on the matter. Israeli soldiers returning from duty in Lebanon in the reserves add more to the picture. One, a student at Tel Aviv University, reports what he saw in Koteret Rashit (a new journal with Labor support, including many Labor doves). In 1978, he had been arrested in Argentina on suspicion of spying and had spent ten days in an Argentine prison, but had seen nothing there to compare with what he found in the IDF headquarters in Sidon in January 1983, where he spent a month. At Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  411  least 10 people were arrested each day and forced to perform menial labor for the IDF and the Israeli Border Guards, cleaning latrines and private quarters, washing floors, etc. In a letter of complaint to the Defense Ministry, this man and two other reservists, reporting their experiences, state that the IDF is becoming ‚Äúan army of masters.‚Äù Prisoners in this military base were held only on suspicion, and many were released after a brief stay. In the base they were brutalized by the Border Guards; ‚Äúwhoever is caught will be punished,‚Äù these reservists were told by the commanding officer. They witnessed degradation and beating of prisoners who were bound and blindfolded, forced to crouch on the floor for long hours, then often released. Even worse than the behavior of the Border Guards (with the knowledge of their officers, who did nothing) was that of the Haddad forces who had free access to this IDF base. They beat prisoners brutally, again, with the knowledge of IDF officers. In one case a young woman, ‚Äúcompletely bound‚Ķand crying from pain wherever they touched her,‚Äù was repeatedly raped by Haddad soldiers who also attempted to force her to copulate with a dog. Then ‚Äúthey returned her to imprisonment.‚Äù ‚ÄúNaturally there was no investigation‚Äù of what had happened within this IDF military base; the responsible IDF officers ‚Äúexplained to me that this is how they behave in Lebanon…‚Äù The soldiers had hoped to present their complaints to Chief of Staff Eitan, who arrived on a tour, but were unable to contact him. His visit had some good effects, however: the prisoners were given mattresses and blankets for the first time, after having been forced to work extra hours to clean the building in preparation for Eitan‚Äôs visit. This soldier, who seems completely apolitical and is certainly no dove, is unwilling to return to Lebanon but does not want to join the hundreds who have refused service there (many others have refused service at Ansar). He is thinking of emigrating, as several of his friends have done.157 Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  412  It might be noted, incidentally, that brutal treatment of helpless prisoners is an old Begin specialty. After the Deir Yassin massacre, survivors were paraded through the streets of Jerusalem by Irgun soldiers proud of their achievement. Colonel Meir Pail, who was communications officer for the Haganah in Deir Yassin and an eyewitness, describes how Begin‚Äôs heroes loaded 25 survivors into a truck and drove them through Jewish neighborhoods of Jerusalem, then taking them to a quarry where they were murdered, while others were driven off to be expelled beyond Israeli lines. And after Begin‚Äôs troops had finished with their ‚Äúorgy‚Äù of looting and destruction in Jaffa in April 1948, they also paraded blindfolded prisoners through the streets of Tel Aviv, ‚Äúto the disgust of a large section of the public.‚Äù158 Many of those driven from Jaffa in 1948 found their way to the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, where their families were subjected to the gentle ministrations of Israel‚Äôs local adjuncts in September 1982; see chapter 6, section 5. In other respects too, the IDF did not break new ground in Lebanon; recall its massacre of defenseless civilians in the Gaza Strip in 1956 (see p. 98) and its behavior at the end of the 1967 war, when after the fighting ‚ÄúIsrael coldly blocked a Red Cross effort to rescue the human ruins staggering and dying in the desert under the pitiless midsummer sun.‚Äù159 As already noted, the military doctrine of attacking defenseless civilians, described once again by Menachem Begin in connection with the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, derives from longstanding practice and was enunciated clearly by David Ben-Gurion in January 1948 (see p. 325*). Many Israeli soldiers were appalled by the nature of the war, a fact that may be reflected in the ‚Äúpsychiatric casualties,‚Äù particularly among reservists, which were twice as high as the norm (including the 1973 war) in comparison to physical casualties.160 Many of these soldiers Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  413  reported what they had seen on their return, giving a picture of the war that was rather different from what had passed through Israeli censorship, and contributing substantially to growing opposition to the war in certain circles. One important case was Lieut. Col. Dov Yirmiah,* the oldest soldier to serve in Lebanon, whose military career goes back to the pre-state Haganah days.161 Col. Yirmiah served with a unit that had responsibility for the captured population. After he returned from his first tour of duty, he made public some of the facts about its activities, or lack of activities. He was then dismissed from the army of which he was one of the founders, as punishment for this misdeed, on August 6. Yirmiah reports that the care for the captured population was ‚Äúnot serious, to use an understatement.‚Äù The behavior of his unit was governed by ‚Äúhatred of Arabs, particularly Palestinians, and a feeling of revenge,‚Äù and disregard for the needs of both Palestinians and Lebanese. He describes how tens of thousands of people (100,000, according to the estimate of the military commander, 50,000 according to others) were concentrated on the beaches near Sidon for two days or more, in ‚Äúterrible heat,‚Äù without even water (the city‚Äôs water system had been destroyed and no plans had been made for a substitute). When he tried to arrange for assistance, he was told that there was ‚Äúno hurry.‚Äù *  Yirmiah has compiled an honorable record over many years. It was he,  incidentally, who exposed the story of Shmuel Lahis when this mass murderer was appointed to the highest executive position in the World Zionist Organization, a fact that merited no comment in the United States; after all, as the Israeli High Court had determined, his murdering several dozen old men, women and children under guard in a mosque was an act carrying ‚Äúno stigma.‚Äù See chapter 4, section 9.3. Yirmiah had been his commanding officer at the time of the massacre. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  414  His unit was not permitted to care for the needs of Palestinians at all. Only after a week were supplies brought for the population, and then nothing for the Palestinians. Supplies gathered in Israel were not permitted entry. Christians were permitted to sit in the shade; Palestinians and Muslims forced to sit in the sun. When the chief Israeli administrator, Cabinet Minister Ya‚Äôakov Meridor, came to inspect and was asked what they were to do with the Palestinians, his answer was: ‚ÄúYou must drive them East, towards Syria‚Ķand not let them return.‚Äù Yirmiah subsequently spoke at a meeting in Tel Aviv with a number of soldiers and university professors who opposed the war, including soldiers who refused to return to Lebanon and also one of Israel‚Äôs most prominent military commanders, General (Res.) Avraham Adan, who participated, though he opposed the refusal to serve in Lebanon. Yirmiah explained that as soon as he entered Lebanon he realized that the purpose of the military operation was not ‚Äúto kill terrorists‚Äîfew terrorists were killed‚Äîbut to destroy the [Palestinian] camps.‚Äù After 3 months, virtually nothing had been done for the tens of thousands of people whose camps (actually, towns) were destroyed, and Israel refused to take any responsibility for them. Even in his service in the European theatre during World War II, Yirmiah said, he saw nothing comparable to the destruction of the Ain el-Hilweh camp. He also described his visit to one of the concentration camps for Palestinian men and boys. He saw prisoners with their hands tied beaten by soldiers, one struck repeatedly in the face with the heel of a shoe, others beaten with clubs all over their bodies‚Äîon orders, they claimed. Appeals to higher officers went unanswered. ‚ÄúEverything that is happening is the result of 15 years of conquest,‚Äù Yirmiah concluded plausibly, referring to the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  415  post-1967 occupation.162 At the same time, Imri Ron, whose ‚Äúauthority‚Äù was so respected by the New York Times (see beginning of section above), reported that there were ‚Äúno signs of beating or ill-treatment‚Äù in a prison camp he visited near Sidon, where the prisoners were ‚Äúsmoking and conversing, on the grass‚Ķdefinitely a humane attitude‚Äù‚Äîrather like a college campus in the spring, by his account.163 In his published diary and elsewhere, Yirmiah gave further details.164 He described how military authorities blocked shipments of food, blankets, medical supplies and tents requested by the Mayor of Sidon (the supplies were delayed for several weeks, arriving only on July 5, because of the insistence of the Israeli military that they be shipped through Israel or Christian East Beirut, and they had not been distributed as of early August). A ship arrived with 700 tons of supplies for the people of Sidon, who were in desperate need, sent by a Lebanese millionaire. The IDF command refused to allow it to land, pretending that there were mines in the harbor. The real reason was that it was sent by ‚Äúforeign and hostile factors who would defame Israel‚Äù; and besides, the IDF command said, ‚Äúthey are all Arabs, and they all aided the terrorists in one way or another.‚Äù Furthermore the IDF command claimed that they had ample provisions in their houses, stored ‚Äúaccording to the Arab custom‚Äù‚Äîin houses that were destroyed, or to which they could not gain access, Yirmiah adds. The IDF command refused to offer any help; ‚Äúthe ‚ÄòAraboushim‚Äô can wait,‚Äù Yirmiah comments. There was reconstruction, carried out by local people, without IDF assistance. ‚ÄúWe know how to destroy, let others build,‚Äù Yirmiah observes. The commanding officer ordered that with regard to UNICEF, ‚Äúwe must disrupt all their activities.‚Äù As for the International Red Cross, it is ‚Äúa hostile organization‚Äù and orders were given to ‚Äúprevent all its Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  416  activities in the region.‚Äù Relief gathered by Israelis was not distributed or was given to Lebanese army units. Milk collected in Haifa was not distributed in Tyre on the grounds that ‚Äúthey (the Arabs) ruin their stomachs with our milk.‚Äù The IDF command refused to permit huge army water carriers to be used for the tens of thousands of people suffering from thirst and hunger for days on the Sidon beaches. ‚ÄúI will not send one IDF vehicle or driver into that mob,‚Äù Yirmiah was told by the commanding officer, who also refused to allow him to enter Sidon to help because there might be danger: ‚ÄúIt is better that 1000 Arabs should die and not one of our soldiers,‚Äù the commanding officer said. Refugees from camps that were flattened were forbidden to pitch tents, though these were in plentiful supply (later, Israeli authorities were to place the blame on the Lebanese and international organizations for this), a decision that is ‚Äúevil and inhuman, and it teaches us the meaning of the ‚Äòhumanitarianism‚Äô that [the military commander] boasts of on television.‚Äù Travelling near Tyre, Yirmiah came across the refugees from Rashidiyeh who were camping in citrus groves near their destroyed town. A military commander ordered that they be driven away because ‚Äúthey are being filmed too much.‚Äù ‚ÄúIt is important to preserve the beautiful face of Israel,‚Äù Yirmiah comments. He hears reports on the Israeli radio of the wonderful humanitarian efforts of the IDF and the Israeli population: ‚Äúevidently, we learned something from the fascist propagandists in Europe,‚Äù Yirmiah comments in despair, from the scene. He reports the fakery and invention of ridiculously low numbers of casualties and destroyed buildings, and the lies about humanitarianism and ‚Äúpurity of arms.‚Äù ‚ÄúThe Jewish soldier, the Israeli, who is crowned by hypocritical commanders and politicians as the most human in the world; the Israeli army that pretends to observe the purity of arms (a phrase that is sickening and false)‚Äîis changing its image‚Äù (Yirmiah is not above certain illusions about the past). Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  417  All of this refers to the treatment of the Lebanese, those who were liberated (Yirmiah accepts the official version that the IDF entered Lebanon to ‚Äúliberate‚Äù the Lebanese and to fight ‚Äúthe terrorists‚Äù). As for the Palestinians, ‚Äúthe attitude towards the noncombatant Palestinian population recalls the attitude towards cockroaches that swarm on the ground.‚Äù Ain el-Hilweh was savagely bombed though it was known that many women and children were cowering in the shelters. The women and children must be ‚Äúpunished,‚Äù because they belong to the families of terrorists; recall General Gur‚Äôs principles, cited by Prime Minister Begin (section 5.1), though he was ordering ‚Äúpunishment‚Äù of all inhabitants of southern Lebanon, not just Palestinians. Even the limited aid offered the Lebanese was denied the remnants of the Palestinians. Some of Yirmiah‚Äôs most terrible stories concern the prisoners. Lebanese and Palestinians were taken over and over again for ‚Äúidentification‚Äù before hooded informers, many from the underworld‚Äî‚Äúso that they should know what awaits a terrorist, and will be careful in the future,‚Äù the official explanation ran. He tells story after story of prisoners savagely and endlessly beaten in captivity, of torture and humiliation of prisoners, and of the many who died from beatings and thirst in Israeli prisons or concentration camps in Lebanon. On the bus trip to an Israeli prison, one 55-year old man, a diabetic with heart disease, felt ill and asked for air; he was thrown out of the bus by a soldier, fell and died. His son heard his cries and tried to help him, but he was stopped with ‚Äúsevere beatings.‚Äù The son was still in Ansar, as of January 1983. The long and repeated interrogations were accompanied by constant beatings, or attacks by dogs on leashes, or the use of air rifles with bullets that cause intense pain but do not kill: ‚Äúthis gets all the secrets out of those under interrogation,‚Äù Yirmiah was told by an IDF officer who exhibited this useful device. New loads of clubs had to be brought into the camps to replace those broken during interrogation. The torturers Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  418  were ‚Äúexperts in their work,‚Äù the prisoners report, and knew how to make the blows most painful, including blows to the genitals, until the prisoners confessed that they were ‚Äúterrorists‚Äù‚Äîthough when the Red Cross was finally permitted entry to Ansar in August, things improved somewhat. Prisoners were placed in ‚Äúthe hole,‚Äù a tin box too small to permit them to sit or lie down, with gravel and pieces of iron on the floor; there they would be kept for hours until they fainted and were covered with wounds on the soles of their feet. Prisoners were forced to sit with their heads between their legs, beaten if they moved, while guards shouted at them: ‚ÄúYou are a nation of monkeys, you are terrorists, and we will break your heads: You want a state? Build it on the moon.‚Äù The stories closely resemble those told by other released prisoners, specifically, the death from beatings and harsh treatment of ‚Äúat least seven prisoners‚Äù who were buried in the Muslim cemetery near Sidon; see above. Yirmiah served in the Allied forces in World War II. He compares the incredible brutality of the IDF with the behavior of Allied troops in Italy, where German POWs were treated honorably and decently and if there were violations, they were stopped at once, while the IDF officers simply observe the atrocities and do not intervene. Reporting his experiences in June‚Äîin the early stages of the war‚Äî Yirmiah describes the bombed hospitals, the shattered population wandering in the ruins of Tyre and Sidon and the camps, the terrorism of Phalange hoodlums brought in by the IDF, the cries of the bereaved, the massive weaponry so out of proportion to any military need. ‚ÄúIt seems that there are many soldiers in the IDF to whom it matters and who are pained that we have become a nation of vicious thugs, whose second nature is fire, destruction, death and ruin.‚Äù He sees religious soldiers celebrating the Sabbath amidst the horrors: ‚ÄúI am ashamed to be part of this nation,‚Äù he says, ‚Äúarrogant, boastful, becoming more cruel and Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  419  singing on the ruins.‚Äù And he asks, finally: ‚ÄúWhat will become of us,‚Äù acting in such ways?  5.4 The Grand Finale Israel‚Äôs attack continued with mounting fury through July and August, the prime target now being the besieged city of West Beirut. By late June, residential areas had been savagely attacked in the defenseless city. Robert Fisk writes that ‚ÄúThe Israeli pilots presumably meant to drop their bombs on the scruffy militia office on Corniche Mazraa, but they missed. Instead, their handiwork spread fire and rubble half the length of Abu Chaker Street, and the people of this miserable little thoroughfare‚Äîthose who survived, that is‚Äîcannot grasp what happened to them… Abu Chaker Street was in ruins, its collapsed apartment blocks still smoking and some of the dead still in their pancaked homes, sandwiched beneath hundreds of tons of concrete… The perspiring ambulance crews had so far counted 32 dead, most of them men and women who were hiding in their homes in a nine-storey block of flats, when an Israeli bomb exploded on its roof and tore down half the building.‚Äù One old man ‚Äúdescribed briefly, almost without emotion, how [his daughter‚Äôs] stomach had been torn out by shrapnel.‚Äù ‚ÄúThis was a civilian area,‚Äù he said. ‚ÄúThe planes are terrorizing us. This is no way for soldiers to fight.‚Äù165 This was before the massive air attacks of late July and August. On one occasion, on August 4, the IDF attempted a ground attack, but withdrew after 19 Israeli soldiers were killed.166 The IDF then returned to safer tactics, keeping to bombing and shelling from land and sea, against which there was no defense, in accordance with familiar military doctrine. The population of the beleaguered city was deprived of Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
420  Peace for Galilee  food, water, medicines, electricity, fuel, as Israel tightened the noose. Since the city was defenseless, the IDF was able to display its lighthearted abandon, as on July 26, when bombing began precisely at 2:42 and 3:38 PM, ‚Äúa touch of humor with a slight hint,‚Äù the Labor press reported cheerily, noting that the timing, referring to UN Resolutions 242 and 338, ‚Äúwas not accidental.‚Äù167 The bombings continued, reaching their peak of ferocity well after agreement had been reached on the evacuation of the PLO. Military correspondent Hirsh Goodman wrote that ‚Äúthe irrational, unprovoked and unauthorized bombing of Beirut after an agreement in principle regarding the PLO‚Äôs withdrawal had been concluded between all the parties concerned should have caused [Defense Minister Sharon‚Äôs] dismissal,‚Äù but did not.168 The 11-hour bombing on August 12 evoked worldwide condemnation. even from the U.S., and the direct attack was halted. The consensus of eyewitnesses was expressed by Charles Powers: To many people, in fact, the siege of Beirut seemed gratuitous brutality… The arsenal of weapons, unleashed in a way that has not been seen since the Vietnam war, clearly horrified those who saw the results firsthand and through film and news reports at a distance. The use of cluster bombs and white phosphorus shells, a vicious weapon, was widespread. The Israeli government, which regarded news coverage from Lebanon as unfair, began to treat the war as a publicrelations problem. Radio Israel spoke continually of the need to present the war in the ‚Äúcorrect‚Äù light, particularly in the United States. In the end, however, Israel created in West Beirut a Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
421  Peace for Galilee  whole set of facts that no amount of packaging could disguise. In the last hours of the last air attack on Beirut, Israeli planes carpet-bombed Borj el Brajne [a Palestinian refugee camp]. There were no fighting men left there, only the damaged homes of Palestinian families, who once again would have to leave and find another place to live. All of West Beirut, finally, was living in wreckage and garbage and loss. But the PLO was leaving. Somewhere, the taste of victory must be sweet.169  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  422  6. The Taste of Victory 6.1 The Victors or some, indeed, the taste of victory was sweet, in particular, for ‚Äúthe Christians of east Beirut [who] drove wildly through the streets in cars draped with [newly-elected President] Mr. Gemayel‚Äôs portrait, firing into the air in an outburst of glee that left 5 dead and 19 wounded.‚Äù170 Previously they had been enjoying the spectacle of West Beirut in flames from the hotel verandas where they were sipping drinks or the beaches where they were sunning themselves, urging the Israeli army on to more violent attacks on the impoverished Muslims and Palestinians who ‚Äúnow live like moles, between destroyed houses,‚Äù awaiting the next blow. These rich Lebanese ‚Äúregard us as mercenaries who are working for them,‚Äù military correspondent Ze‚Äôev Schiff commented after observing this scene of ‚Äòdolce vita and death.‚Äù171 The New Republic described the same scene in rather different words. Its editors complained that among the many crimes of the press, it did not show ‚Äúpictures of the Lebanese Christian women who demonstrated in east Beirut to celebrate‚Äîtruly celebrate‚Äîthe departure of those who had destroyed their lives and killed their loved ones.‚Äù And ‚Äúwhere are the pictures of the weeping mothers of the Israeli war dead?‚Äù There is no concern for them in the cynical American press, entranced by the ‚Äútheatrical flourishes‚Äù of the PLO which has displayed such skill in manipulating American ‚Äúopinion leaders,‚Äù particularly those‚Äîfound everywhere in the United States‚Äîwho revel in ‚Äúanti-Israel hysteria.‚Äù172 One recalls earlier days, the Spanish civil war, for example, when  F  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  423  George Orwell reported from the front lines, where he was serving with the POUM (anti-Stalinist) militia, that ‚ÄúIn the New Republic Mr. Ralph Bates [assistant commissar of the 15th International Brigade] stated that the P.O.U.M. troops were ‚Äòplaying football with the Fascists in no man‚Äôs land‚Äô at a time when, as a matter of fact, the P.O.U.M. troops were suffering heavy casualties and a number of my personal friends were killed and wounded‚Äù and the Communists were withholding arms from the front, where the troops were predominantly anarchist.173 Other days, other heroes, other villains, the same integrity‚Äîthough there is nothing in the history of this journal to compare with what it has become under the current owner and editor. The New Republic celebrated the close of 1982 with an article praising Orwell by Irving Howe, in its Year-End edition. The taste of victory was also sweet for most‚Äînot all‚ÄîIsraelis; and for the ‚Äúsupporters of Israel‚Äù here, who could look forward to the establishment of the anticipated ‚ÄúNew Order‚Äù of their dreams in Lebanon and the imposition of Israeli control over the demoralized occupied territories, where Israel could now proceed to implement the ‚Äústrong arm tactics‚Äù so admired by New Republic editor Martin Peretz, eliminating the danger of ‚Äúa dagger poised at the heart of Israel‚Äù (see pp. 364*, 152*). The sweet taste was not, however, to linger long. We return to the aftermath in the next chapter.  6.2 The Liberated There are, of course, Lebanese other than those whom Ze‚Äôev Schiff and the New Republic editors described in their differing ways. What was the taste of Israel‚Äôs victory to them? This question was rarely asked, perhaps because the answer was obvious. After all, former Supreme Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  424  Court Justice Arthur Goldberg had pronounced that ‚ÄúLebanese hail Israel‚Äôs action as liberation‚Äù while the editors of the New York Times explained early on that they were being granted their ‚Äúliberation from the Syrians and the P.L.O.,‚Äù anticipating by several weeks the announcement by Ariel Sharon that ‚ÄúIsrael‚Äôs troops entering Lebanon were greeted as liberators for driving out the terrorists who had raped and pillaged and plundered.‚Äù And surely the Lebanese were grateful for the fact that ‚Äúno army in the history of modern warfare ever took such pains to prevent civilian casualties as did the Israel Defense Forces,‚Äù as Sharon explained (echoing Begin‚Äôs words after Deir Yassin; see chapter 4, section 2), observing the ‚ÄúJewish doctrine‚Äù of tohar haneshek (purity of arms) ‚Äúscrupulously‚Äù while ‚Äúattacking only predetermined P.L.O. positions and in bombing and shelling buildings only when they served as P.L.O. strongholds‚Äù*‚Äîthe mental hospital in West Beirut, the school shelter in Sidon, and so on.174 Despite these assurances, let us nevertheless, if only out of idle curiosity, inquire further into the attitudes of Lebanese towards their liberation, beyond those who were freely expressing their opinions to visiting Americans guided by an Israeli army escort in occupied Lebanon. An obvious place to start would be the statements of the official representative of the Government of Lebanon at the United Nations, Mr. Ghassan Tueni, a Christian, the owner of the highly-respected Beirut journal An-nahar, later the Lebanese government‚Äôs coordinator of negotiations with the liberators. In fact, he had a good deal to say on behalf of the government of Lebanon, though one has to search a little to discover what it was; his name does not appear in the New York *  Sharon also cited the figure of 1392 civilians killed by PLO terrorist raids, a  fabrication that set off the inquiries by Israeli journalists that elicited the actual official figures, cited above; see chapter 3, section 2.4.2. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  425  Times index for this period, for example. Mr. Tueni gave a major address at the highly-publicized United Nations conference on disarmament on June 22, a few blocks away from the editorial offices of the Times, just two weeks after the liberation began. He asked to be excused if the representative of Lebanon had ‚Äúno words on universal disarmament, save the pious prayers that it should happen soon enough for his country to survive,‚Äù a country that was then being ‚Äúmartyred and crucified.‚Äù ‚ÄúThe atomic holocaust of tomorrow,‚Äù he said, ‚Äúbecomes a problematic danger, remote and almost unreal, to those who are living an actual holocaust: the holocaust of their mother earth, of men, women, and children physically destroyed along with the cities they built and loved.‚Äù The choice for the Lebanese is ‚Äúbetween today and tomorrow,‚Äù ‚Äúbetween surviving immediate death, and thinking‚Äîbut only thinking‚Äîof preventing ultimate destruction.‚Äù Recall that he was speaking well before the siege of Beirut and the indiscriminate bombing of heavily-populated civilian areas that reached its peak in late July and August. He asked that the General Assembly not ‚Äúbe diverted by abstract testimonies for peace… Concerned as we all are with the necessity of halting the race towards the atomic holocaust of tomorrow, let us remember the no less apocalyptic realities of today.‚Äù The official (Christian) spokesman for the country that was then being liberated by Israel may, perhaps, be excused for lapsing into hyperbole. Mr. Tueni called for the ‚Äúimmediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon,‚Äù citing UN Security Council Resolution 509, ‚Äúwhich clearly and unequivocally establishes the criteria of Israeli withdrawal: that it should be both immediate and unconditional.‚Äù He deplored the fact that the UN peace-keeping forces were unable ‚Äúto defend [Lebanon] against aggression,‚Äù adding that ‚Äúit is the very future of peacekeeping operations which is now at stake,‚Äù given the inability of Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
426  Peace for Galilee  the United Nations to stop the Israeli attack‚Äîand, though he was too polite to add this, the support for this aggression by the U.S. government, which rendered the UN impotent. Ungratefully, he offered Israel no thanks for his liberation.175 It is perhaps worthy of note that one has to go to Tel Aviv to discover from the press what the representative of Lebanon was saying in New York.* The Lebanese Ambassador did reach an American audience‚Äîthough not the press‚Äîat a later stage of the liberation. Writing in Foreign Affairs, he commented on the name given ‚Äúto the Israeli invasion: ‚ÄòPeace for Galilee‚Äô.‚Äù ‚ÄúTo occupy almost half of a country, destroy its capital, disrupt its economy, ferociously kill its civilian population by the thousands‚Äîfor the sake of ‚ÄòPeace for Galilee‚Äô‚Äîis indeed a very strange notion of peace!‚Äù And of liberation. He also expressed some concern for the future: Zionist literature has consistently maintained that the Jewish National Home, and later Israel, needed the water of the Litani and the land south of it. And Israel itself has dealt with the issue as if the population living there‚Äîwhich is Arab not Jewish, and in its majority, Muslim not Christian‚Äî were a negligible entity, eventually disposable, not significant, and almost nonexistent.‚Äù176  *  There is a brief reference to Tueni‚Äôs speech at the end of an article on Lebanon  in the Boston Globe, June 24, 1982. Tueni‚Äôs impassioned condemnations of the Israeli invasion were occasionally seen on television, which American supporters of Israel have denounced even more bitterly than the ‚Äúpro-PLO‚Äù print media for its alleged anti-Israel attitudes, a matter to which we return. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  427  Perhaps he had in mind some other areas that had been liberated before. Tueni reviews the problems that Israel would face if it attempted to ‚Äúabsorb‚Äù this new area. The Lebanese Ambassador also expressed concern over the intentions of Syria, but we need not dwell on that in the present context, since in the United States there are no ‚Äúopinion leaders‚Äù‚Äîor others‚Äîwho extol Syria for its ‚Äúliberation‚Äù of Lebanon, though more muted expressions of approval were heard when Syria entered Lebanon in 1976 to combat the Muslim-Palestinian National Front coalition in the civil war. On the contrary, what we are told by such luminaries as Arthur Goldberg, in his statement published by the American Friends of Israel (see note 134), is that after Hussein expelled the PLO from Jordan in 1970. ‚Äúwhen Syria and the PLO invaded and occupied Lebanon later that year [1970], the killing, maiming and destruction was so wanton and the occupation so pervasive that Lebanon virtually ceased to exist as an independent country.‚Äù The actual facts of the matter have already been reviewed. The idea that Syria invaded and occupied Lebanon in 1970 is an original contribution by Mr. Goldberg and his sponsors, but apart from that, his sentiments are familiar. We return to his further thoughts on the matter, which do break some new ground. Putting aside the observations of Lebanon‚Äôs representative to the United Nations, let us search elsewhere. Another obvious place to turn would be the Lebanese press, just as we naturally turn to the Israeli press if we are interested in the attitudes of Israelis. This possibility also seems not to have occurred to those who inform us with much confidence about what the Lebanese think and feel. Fortunately, the task is not too difficult, even without access to the Arabic or French press; it should be noted, incidentally, that daily translations from the Arabic press are readily available in Beirut (Middle East Reporter). There is an independent English-language weekly published in West Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  428  Beirut: Monday Morning. It is open to a wide spectrum of opinion ranging from Phalangist to PLO, from Nahum Goldmann and U.S. Middle East specialist William Quandt to representatives of the Arab states and movements. In particular, its treatment of Israel‚Äôs Phalangist clients and of the Phalangist government elected under Israeli guns was sympathetic and free from rancor, so that it passes the basic test of acceptability for an American audience. It contains a regular and detailed factual review of the week‚Äôs events in Lebanon, along with analytic articles by local Western journalists and others, and broad coverage of the international (including Israeli) media. The tenor of its reporting did not change detectably as one military force replaced another, so it seems plausible to suppose that it was not published at gunpoint, as is obvious enough from the range and character of the material that appeared. Whatever they may have been in the past (about which I do not know), its standards were quite respectable through 1982. It certainly compares quite favorably to Western journals. It is likely that this journal offers as good a reflection of what many educated Lebanese were thinking during this period as any single journal could do, and this is a segment of the population that we do not ordinarily disregard in discussing other societies. Let us then consider what it has reported about Lebanese attitudes to the war, beginning with its first week. Immediately after the initial Israeli bombardments, the journal reports, Ambassador Tueni informed the Security Council on June 5 that Israeli commandos had landed on the coastal road between Sidon and Beirut and had opened machine gun fire on cars and buses in which civilian refugees were fleeing from the south‚Äîthe first attack, after the initial bombings, on ‚Äúpredetermined P.L.O. positions‚Äù and ‚ÄúP.L.O. strongholds‚Äù in the terms pronounced appropriate by General Sharon (see above), and adopted by Israel‚Äôs American supporters, and an early Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  429  example‚Äîin this war‚Äîof how the IDF never aims at civilian targets, as Begin explained while recalling the familiar military doctrine of punishing the civilian population (see p. 386). ‚ÄúThis action is of the utmost gravity,‚Äù Ambassador Tueni said, ‚Äúand my government earnestly hopes that the Council is not thus confronted with yet another preemptive act by Israel.‚Äù He requested that the Security Council act ‚Äúto stop the aggression against Lebanon‚Äù ‚Äúthe wanton bombardment of positions in Lebanon by Israel…‚Äù The Security Council responded by unanimously passing a Resolution calling for a cease-fire at 6AM on June 6, to which Israel responded in turn by launching the invasion on June 6. Perhaps mindful of the warning by the representative of Lebanon that Israeli aggression was a ‚Äúcatastrophe‚Äù for Lebanon and perhaps for international peace and security as well, the Security Council unanimously passed a further resolution on June 6 that ‚ÄúDemands that Israel withdraw its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized borders of Lebanon.‚Äù This too was disregarded by the liberators. On June 8, the U.S. vetoed a Security Council resolution that ‚ÄúCondemns the noncompliance‚Äù of Israel with the earlier resolutions, calling for immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Israeli forces.177 By this act, the U.S. gave its official blessing to the liberation, a stance that it then maintained, with the general approbation of the media, while stoutly denying the fact. In an article entitled ‚ÄúDifferent Lebanese React Differently,‚Äù the journal reported that ‚ÄúWith the exception of the rightist Lebanese Front, officials, politicians and party leaders unreservedly condemned Israel‚Äôs invasion of Lebanon and vowed to resist it, accusing the United States of responsibility for the savage aggression and denouncing the Arabs‚Äô failure to throw their full weight behind Lebanon and the Palestinians.‚Äù Among those joining in the condemnation was Prime Minister Shafik Wazzan, speaking in the name of the Council of Ministers. Wazzan was Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  430  again chosen to head the new government by Phalangist President Amin Gemayel after the liberation was completed in September and thus should qualify as a legitimate spokesman for the liberated population, by the standards of the New York Times and others.178 Also joining in the condemnation were Christian Foreign Minister Fuad Butros; Shiite House Speaker Kamel Asaad; a number of former Prime Ministers; Nabih Berri, head of the Shiite militia (Amal) that fought alongside the Palestinians*; spokesmen for both the Sunni Islamic Grouping and the Higher Shiite Council (that is, the two major Muslim religious groups); Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, son of the assassinated leader of the Lebanese National Movement (the Muslim-Palestinian coalition); former President Suleiman Franjieh, a Maronite who condemned ‚Äúthe barbaric Israeli invasion‚Äù; and others. The invasion was supported only by ‚Äúthe Lebanese Front, which groups the main rightist Maronite parties,‚Äù specifically, by Front leader Camille Chamoun (who had requested the U.S. marines to land in 1958) and Phalangist Party Chief Pierre Gemayel and his son Bashir Gemayel, who headed the Phalange militia.179 *  In mid-June, Robert Fisk reported, Nabih Berri, ‚Äúthe leader of the Amal Shia  movement, which fought so bravely with the Palestinians against the Israelis south of Beirut, ordered his men to lay down their guns.‚Äù further resistance being hopeless. He and Walid Jumblatt, who also regarded further resistance as hopeless, joined the new ‚ÄúCommittee of National Salvation‚Äù formed by President Sarkis as an executive in the emergency. Jumblatt counselled ‚Äúpassive resistance,‚Äù given the overwhelming force of the invaders. Berri later stated that ‚ÄúAn Israeli attack on West Beirut will not be the end of the war but the beginning of another one which will spread to the entire country,‚Äù accusing the U.S. and some Arab states ‚Äúof having encouraged the Israeli aggression on Lebanon.‚Äù Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
431  Peace for Galilee  Reuters correspondent Patrick Worsnip described the ‚ÄúPhalangistIsraeli cooperation‚Äù as ‚Äúa nightmare come true for Lebanese leftists and Palestinians,‚Äù noting that the Phalangists had opposed the Palestinians because ‚Äúthey feared the new arrivals could tilt the confessional balance in favor of their Moslem rivals and threaten their own political supremacy in a country in which they were the minority, and noting also that ‚Äúmany Lebanese Christians, especially non-Maronite sects, reject Phalangist policies.‚Äù Meanwhile, Israel‚Äôs main ally in Lebanon, Pierre Gemayel, expressed his reservations concerning the liberation in an interview. He described it as ‚Äúa catastrophe for Lebanon, the Palestinians and the Arab world,‚Äù which might even lead to ‚Äúan international war.‚Äù The ‚ÄúIsraeli presence is going to ruin this Lebanese formula, much to Israel‚Äôs joy‚Äù‚Äîwhere the ‚ÄúLebanese formula‚Äù is the ‚Äúassociation between two civilizations,‚Äù Christian and Muslim; and it will lead to the division of Lebanon into ‚Äúwho knows what [sectarian] states.‚Äù In short, something less than unreserved pleasure, even from this quarter.180 Protests mounted as the invasion-liberation ground on. By late June, Prime Minister Wazzan and Walid Jumblatt stated that they could not continue the negotiations to remove the PLO from Beirut because of the unremitting Israeli attacks. Wazzan stated: Every time we reach some kind of understanding, we run into a new escalation as if designed to pressure us. You can quote me: this is an international conspiracy against Lebanon and the Lebanese. You want me to remain silent while Philip Habib watches the bombardment of residential areas? As if we were rats in this country! Shafik Wazzan cannot accept this… Therefore, I have informed President Sarkis that I cannot continue shouldering my responsibility Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  432  under this blackmail and escalation.181 His continuing protests in this vein were occasionally reported in the U.S. On July 27, the government of Lebanon once again protested the continuing invasion ‚Äúin the strongest possible terms‚Äù and called upon the Security Council ‚Äúto seek practical ways and means under the charter to ensure the implementation‚Äù of the earlier resolutions, an option that was regularly blocked by U.S. veto. On July 30, Camille Chamoun issued a statement demanding that ‚Äúthis cruel and unjustifiable treatment of innocent civilians should stop,‚Äù referring to Israel‚Äôs blockade of West Beirut. On August 11 he condemned Israel for sending its forces into the Christian hinterland, including areas north of Beirut, saying that ‚ÄúThere is no explanation for this.‚Äù182 By the end of July, then, condemnation of the liberation was unanimous among Lebanese political elites, including even Pierre Gemayel and Camille Chamoun‚Äîwho, nevertheless, continued to support the invasion for the reasons already explained by Ze‚Äôev Schiff: they were pleased to have Israeli mercenaries win the civil war for them and reestablish their supremacy over the Muslim majority of the population. Muslim leaders were far harsher in their condemnations throughout, including Shafik Wazzan, former Prime Minister Saeb Salam, and others. Apart from condemning the merciless attacks on the civilian population, as he did throughout, Salam expressed his outrage over ‚Äúthe phosphorus bombing that gutted the 1,000-year-old mid-city pine woods in and around the now-destroyed horse race track.‚Äù ‚ÄúThe pine forest, the pride of Beirut, the whole forest was burned with phosphorus bombs,‚Äù183 he told reporters on August 2.* Subsequently, he demanded *  The destruction of the forest, ‚Äúa children‚Äôs park,‚Äù ‚Äúthe pride of Beirut,‚Äù was  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  433  that Israel pay reparations, which is ‚Äúthe practice in war.‚Äù ‚ÄúWith the savage way the Israelis have acted, I think it‚Äôs the least of things to demand of the aggressor,‚Äù he told a news conference in which he also blamed the U.S. for ‚Äúbacking Israel blindly.‚Äù184 Salam and Wazzan lived in West Beirut, where they endured the terror; Chamoun and Gemayel watched from East Beirut. On August 30, Yasser Arafat departed from Beirut, effectively terminating an organized Palestinian presence in Lebanon. The day began with an emotional farewell meeting with Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. Arafat was then accompanied to Prime Minister Wazzan‚Äôs office by Jumblatt, Shiite Amal militia commander Nabih Berri and Lebanese Communist Leader Mohsen Ibrahim. ‚ÄúBrother Arafat,‚Äù as Prime Minister Wazzan referred to him, was seen off from Beirut by Wazzan, four former Prime Ministers, religious leaders, and representatives of President Sarkis, many of whom ‚Äúwere in tears as the single smokestack Atlantis, gleaming white in the sunlight, pulled out of the port.‚Äù185 There were, indeed, many who had reason to fear what the future held, and these fears were soon borne out: the Palestinians and Muslims in Beirut, who were left defenseless, with power now in the hands of their Phalange enemies; the population of the south, subject to the whims of Major Haddad and whomever else Israel might choose to arm; the Druze of the Chouf region, which had escaped the civil war, who ‚Äúwere worried and scared last weekend as the Phalangist militias moved in behind the advancing Israelis‚Äù; and perhaps also those who reported (with TV clips) on NBC TV news, Aug. 2. James Compton reported that ‚ÄúThere were Palestinian positions here. They have long been abandoned… Most fortified Palestinian positions have been abandoned under Israel‚Äôs relentless barrage.‚Äù Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
434  Peace for Galilee  remembered the West Bank while they pondered such scenes as the entry to Lebanon of the followers of the New York Lubavitcher Rabbi, equipped with a press to print copies of the Tanya, expounding their doctrine, photographed carrying out their work near the Presidential Palace in the hills above Beirut.186 The attitudes of Lebanese in Beirut did not go unnoticed in the American press. Time Bureau Chief William Stewart reported that by mid-August there had been a remarkable transformation of opinion in this beleaguered city. Instead of desperately wanting the P.L.O. to leave in order to avoid further bloodshed, Lebanese civilians we talked to all over West Beirut now want to see Israel defeated. The Israeli attacks were directed not just against Palestinian military positions but at hospitals, schools, apartment houses, government offices and shipping centers. Everything became a target, and so did the people of West Beirut in what has become known as ‚Äúthe great siege.‚Äù187 The consummation‚Äîtemporarily‚Äîof Operation ‚ÄúPeace for Galilee,‚Äù the ‚Äúliberation of Lebanon.‚Äù Although the commentary on the matter that is standard here is hardly very persuasive, nevertheless it is reasonable to suppose that many Lebanese were pleased to see the PLO depart, for quite sound reasons. The first was that Abba Eban‚Äôs ‚Äúrational prospect‚Äù (see chapter 5, section 1) had been amply fulfilled for many years, leading to vast suffering, and had again been fulfilled in Beirut, as Stewart observes. Furthermore, Lebanese across the political spectrum want to see the Palestinians in Palestine, not in their own country. While these feelings Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
435  Peace for Galilee  were complicated by Palestinian support for the Muslim majority in the civil war, nevertheless the sentiment is no doubt widely held, understandably enough. Just as even the most sympathetic Pakistanis want to see the Afghan refugees return to Afghanistan‚Äîparticularly when, as in Lebanon, their presence and military actions call forth ‚Äúretaliatory‚Äù strikes‚Äîso the Lebanese favor the return of Palestinians to their land. In this regard, they share views held throughout the Arab world. Propagandists here made much of the reluctance of the Arab states to take in the PLO fighters, crowing about this alleged demonstration that even the Arab states despise and reject the PLO. While it is true enough that the elites that rule the Arab states dislike the PLO‚Äîand, quite generally, nationalist currents in the Arab world that might threaten their power‚Äîone can hardly demonstrate the fact on these grounds, at least if we add one factor commonly ignored: that they regularly stated that they did not want to contribute to a new dispersal of the Palestinians, whom they prefer to see in a state of their own in Palestine in accordance with the international consensus. In the same context, we may take note of the common charge that the Arab states have contributed to the plight of the refugees by refusing to take them in,* a claim that ignores, as usual, the wishes of the Palestinians themselves, who have insisted on maintaining their national and cultural identity and their hope to return to their native land. Finally, while the charges that have circulated in the U.S. concerning the behavior of the PLO in Lebanon appear to be vastly exaggerated, at least to judge by investigations carried out by Israeli journalists, Jewish and Christian Arab, and while there seems little doubt that the behavior of the Israeli*  The charge is so common as to make reference almost superfluous. It was, for  example, repeated in an unusually accurate ABC Closeup report on the Beirut massacres, Jan. 7, 1983, in apportioning the blame for the massacres. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  436  backed Phalange was more brutal than anything attributable to the PLO, it nevertheless remains true that the PLO behaved in a disgraceful and stupid fashion in southern Lebanon, alienating much of the population.  6.3 Israelis It is, then, a shade less than obvious that Lebanese were uniformly celebrating their liberation through the summer of 1982. As for Israel‚Äôs reactions, the war had initially received overwhelming support there, including many critics of the drift towards religious-chauvinist fanaticism. For example, Amnon Rubinstein, a Knesset member from the Shinui (‚ÄúChange‚Äù) Party and a civil libertarian of sorts,* wrote after a month of war that ‚Äúonly a small radical minority demands immediate withdrawal‚Äù from Lebanon, an accurate appraisal apart from the term  *  As for many others (notoriously, Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz),  Rubinstein‚Äôs civil libertarian commitments quickly fade in connection with Israeli dissidents. See TNCW, p. 434, and p. 142 and note 107. The point illustrated by Dershowitz, et al., is familiar enough. Thus, many Stalinists really did struggle courageously for civil rights in the United States, while taking a rather different stance with regard to their Holy State. The same is true, to a lesser but nonetheless quite substantial degree, of supporters of the murderer of Kronstadt, the man who called for the militarization of labor in a ‚Äúlabor army,‚Äù who dismantled the Soviets and factory councils and destroyed the anarchist movements after they were no longer needed to defend Bolshevik rule while assisting in establishing the institutions of the Soviet dungeon. It is a curious feature of the contemporary intellectual scene in the U.S. that former Trotskyites are now commonly described as having fought the good fight against totalitarian oppression. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  437  ‚Äúradical,‚Äù familiar in a similar context from the days of U.S. aggression in South Vietnam. ‚ÄúIsrael is rightly not ashamed of its alliance with the Christian minority in Lebanon,‚Äù Rubinstein added. ‚ÄúThe negative attitude toward the Lebanese Christians almost universally expressed in the Western media…[is] a mixture of ignorance and insanity that characterizes some segments of the international scene.‚Äù Even France, which the Maronites regard as a ‚Äúsecond homeland,‚Äù has ‚Äúcompletely forsaken them‚Äù and in its ‚Äúfrenzied courtship of Palestinians,‚Äù overlooks the rights of the Lebanese Christians including the Haddadists, as does the West more generally, he argued. 188 Turning to the facts, it was a convenient pose, hardly to be taken seriously, that Israel‚Äôs alliance with pro-Israeli segments of Christian society was undertaken to defend a persecuted minority (namely, the privileged group that dominated the Muslim majority). Israel‚Äôs concern for the rights of the oppressed‚Äîadequately illustrated by its behavior with regard to South Africa, Zaire, Somoza‚Äôs Nicaragua, Guatemala, etc., not to speak of the territory it controls directly and those it has driven from their homes*‚Äîis basically no different from that of any other *  Recall that many of the Palestinian refugees were expelled outright, while many  others fled in terror after Israeli atrocities, and that since 1948 Israel has refused any settlement that might involve permitting their return apart from limited cases. Israel‚Äôs colossal gall in this regard‚Äîor more accurately, its perception of the integrity of its supporters and its colossal contempt for them‚Äî has repeatedly been demonstrated, for example, in a flyer distributed (with no identification) by the Israeli consulate with the heading ‚ÄúWho Cares About Refugees?‚Äù Its purpose is to compare Israel‚Äôs profound humanitarian concern for refugees, its ‚Äúcare about refugees‚Äù deriving from Jewish historical experience, with the callousness of the Arab states. The proof is that Israel has been enthusiastic in helping Cambodian refugees. By the same logic, Soviet Party Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
438  Peace for Galilee  state with interests to pursue in the international arena. The reference to the ‚Äúfrenzied courtship of Palestinians‚Äù in the West gives an interesting indication of the state of mind and grasp of reality on the part of many liberal Israeli intellectuals. What Rubinstein describes as a ‚Äúmixture of ignorance and insanity‚Äù with regard to Israel‚Äôs Christian allies spread over Israel as well, as soldiers and journalists began to learn about them from evidence more direct than Israeli propaganda. Included were some of the most respected correspondents in Israel, for example, Ze‚Äôev Schiff, whose description of Israel‚Äôs Maronite allies enjoying the fun was cited above, and Colonel Dov Yirmiah, who recounts stories of Phalange atrocities in June (see section 5.3). Or consider the report by this soldier, after the Beirut massacres: A storm was aroused in the state concerning the Phalangists in connection with the Sabra and Shatila affair. It was only necessary to become acquainted with the Phalangists to know that they were capable of doing what they did. At least I, a simple soldier, understood this, when I was in Beirut before it all happened. I happened to make friends with one Phalangist. Until today, I cannot forget two pictures that he showed me with real pride. In one he stood in a heroic pose holding in his hands two full jars‚Äîears of terrorists! He told me that he had cut them from the bodies of terrorists recently [that is, after the IDF had turned the Liners, if they had the audacity, could demonstrate the deep commitment of the Soviet leadership to civil liberties by citing their outrage over miscarriages of justice in the United States, the case of the Wilmington 10, for example. Again, the Age of Orwell. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
439  Peace for Galilee  ‚Äúterrorists‚Äù over to Phalange control]. In the second, I saw him standing holding in each hand a head that had been cut off, and between his legs a third! He explained to me with great self-importance that these were the heads of Palestinians he had decapitated.189 Another case is the story of the Druze Sheikh Sami Abu-Said in the Chouf, quiet during the civil war but enflamed by the entry of the Phalange in the trail of the IDF. He was captured in a Phalange ambush and killed with an axe. His body was mutilated and his limbs cut off, then placed in a box and sent to his village, setting off one of the many postwar incidents in the region.190 There are many other examples. In fact, Rubinstein is being a bit disingenuous. There was ample evidence about the character and behavior of Israel‚Äôs allies and clients long before, from the days of Karantina, Tel al-Zaatar and Khiyam (see section 3), for example. The facts were simply suppressed in Israel when it was convenient to suppress them‚Äîand brought forth, to a degree, when it became useful to do so, in particular, by September 1982, when evidence began to mount that the Phalangists would not be the docile allies that Israel had expected, and after the Sabra-Shatila massacres, when it became necessary to appeal to the ‚ÄúArab character‚Äù to explain away what had happened under the control of the IDF. Rubinstein himself would surely not have written about the Phalange in October the way he did in July, nor would he have condemned the ‚Äúignorance and insanity‚Äù of those in the West who were critical of the Phalange, not because the Phalange had changed, or because his knowledge about the Phalange had changed, but because Israel‚Äôs relations with them had changed. One may also recall the forbidden point that however terrible the behavior of Israel‚Äôs allies had been, it hardly compares with what Israel itself had done in its war of terror in Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
440  Peace for Galilee  southern Lebanon for many years; consider the full story of Khiyam, for example. Rubinstein‚Äôs is a voice from the critical end of the spectrum of mainstream political and intellectual life in Israel. A month later, as the battering of Beirut reached new heights of savagery, Begin‚Äôs popularity correspondingly soared to record heights. A mid-August poll showed that Begin‚Äôs Likud would capture 66 seats in the 120-member Knesset if elections were held then (up from 48 in the 1981 elections), while Labor Party support dwindled to 35 seats (47 in 1981).* More than 80% supported the invasion of Lebanon (which was supported, publicly at least, by the Labor opposition), and 64% approved of the decision to go beyond the 25-mile zone announced in early propaganda, though it was already clear that the costs to Israel would not be small. 191 A few weeks later, another poll showed that 60% of Israelis opposed negotiations with the PLO while 5% supported the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank (NB.: not including the Gaza Strip).192 Presumably, Israel‚Äôs population largely agreed with Begin‚Äôs assertion that Israel ‚Äúnever attacked the civilian population in Beirut,‚Äù and with the statement of Defense Minister Sharon that ‚ÄúI would not be exaggerating by saying that there is no other country in the world that can boast of such a capacity for confrontation and such successes with such supreme universal moral value as little Israel.‚Äù The Knesset voted *  Asked to state their preference for head of the government, 54% selected Begin  in August, the next highest (14%) being Rabin and the next, then President Yitzhak Navon (4%). Begin‚Äôs popularity dropped to 45% by October (and Rabin‚Äôs to 11%) after the events to which we return, while Navon‚Äôs rose to 18%. By February 1983, Begin‚Äôs popularity was 45%, Navon‚Äôs 23%, and Rabin‚Äôs 5% (about 20% not responding throughout). Shimon Peres, head of the Labor Party, stood at about 3.5% throughout. Ma‚Äôariv, Feb. 18, 1983. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  441  50-40 to accept Sharon‚Äôs statement, rejecting by 52-38 a Labor Party statement that ‚Äúthe military advantage gained by the heavy bombing and shelling of Beirut ‚Äòdid not justify the damage caused Israel‚Äô,‚Äù obviously the only relevant consideration.193 None of this affected judgments here concerning Israel‚Äôs sublime moral standards. Recall the ‚Äúpragmatic‚Äù critique of America‚Äôs aggression and atrocities in Indochina which was predominant by far among ‚Äúthe intellectual elite‚Äù even at the height of opposition to the Vietnam war.194 As explained by Gideon Hausner, Israel‚Äôs war against the PLO (‚Äúthe centre of a cancerous growth which has metastasized all over the world,‚Äù a ‚Äúgang of thugs‚Äù) proved ‚Äúagain‚Äù Israel‚Äôs ‚Äúpower and its respect for human values. Not for the first time in our history, an outstanding Jewish contribution is being first begrudged, then gradually acknowledged and ultimately acclaimed‚Äù‚Äîacclaimed as a ‚Äúvictory for humanity.‚Äù195 Hausner was the prosecutor of Adolf Eichmann and is the chairman of the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial Center. Hausner‚Äôs choice of terms can hardly fail to call to mind other episodes of Jewish history, when Jews or Zionists were the centers of various cancerous growths.‚Äù Again it is interesting to see how some supporters of Israeli policies seem intent on fulfilling a curious self-image as spokesmen for states that we do not ‚Äúdare to mention by name,‚Äù in Abba Eban‚Äôs phrase, with insistent mimicry of their phraseology: a ‚Äúnew order‚Äù imposed by Israeli arms; a Palestinian state as ‚Äúa dagger poised at the heart of Israel‚Äù‚Äînot to speak of ‚Äútwo-legged beasts‚Äù inhabiting ‚Äúnests‚Äù like vermin, etc. There is something indeed perverse in this pose. The significance of such phrases as ‚Äúcancerous growth‚Äù and ‚Äúgang of thugs‚Äù becomes clearer when we bear in mind the status of the PLO among Palestinians in the occupied territories and elsewhere, and the fact, clear enough to many Israeli soldiers fighting in Lebanon, that ‚Äúevery Palestinian is automatically a suspected terrorist, and by our Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  442  definition of that term it is actually true‚Ķ[since] we are confronting a comprehensive [PLO] organizational structure,‚Äù including youth clubs, health services and a functioning economy, and everyone connected with them (i.e., all Palestinians) ‚Äúis now a terrorist by our definition.‚Äù196 Recall Ya‚Äôakov Meridor‚Äôs reference to the casualties in Sidon as ‚Äúterrorists and their hostages‚Äù‚Äîa phrase that can only be interpreted as meaning ‚ÄúPalestinians and Lebanese,‚Äù in the perverse Israeli idiom. This picture of Israel‚Äôs war in southern Lebanon, and of the nature of the cancer that was excised, was confirmed by many others, for example, Mordechai Bar-On, formerly the IDF‚Äôs chief education officer and a Jewish Agency official, whose remarks were partially quoted earlier (section 4.6.1).* ‚ÄúOf all the declared, implied and hidden *  This leading Peace Now activist describes the PLO as ‚Äúa malicious and  extremist movement‚Äù which has ‚Äúto a great extent employed intimidation and terror amongst the Palestinians themselves‚Äù (a claim that is not too easily reconcilable with the results of Israeli polls in the West Bank and that also overlooks too easily some elements of the history of Zionism); it is ‚Äúa vicious and cruel organization‚Äù with ‚Äúextremist positions‚Äù refusing any compromise with Israel, reflecting the ‚Äúobstinacy, blindness and folly of the Palestinians.‚Äù It would require ‚Äúa radical internal reform‚Äù for the PLO to ‚Äúlead the Palestinians to realize their aspirations through compromise with Israel.‚Äù Again, we note how Bar-On, a respected dovish intellectual, erases from history the record of PLO moves to realize Palestinian aspirations through compromise since the mid-1970s, which happen to have been publicized repeatedly in the very journal in which he writes. Comparable remarks by a PLO leader concerning Israel would be eagerly seized upon by Israeli propagandists as proof that the PLO cannot be considered a possible partner for negotiations. Recall that Peace Now (which, in fact, has done important and courageous work) is commonly put forth as an ideal that has no counterpart among the Palestinians. See p. 288* and chapter 3, note Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
443  Peace for Galilee  objectives of the war in Lebanon,‚Äù he writes, ‚Äúthere is no doubt that the central aim was to deal a crushing blow to the national aspirations of the Palestinians and to their very existence as a nation endeavouring to define itself and gain the right to self-determination.‚Äù The goal was achieved: Anyone who visited Southern Lebanon during and even after the fighting would see that the war was fought not just against terrorist organizations and the PLO, and not even solely to destroy the PLO‚Äôs military infrastructure in the region. It was fought against the very existence of the Palestinians as a community with its own way of life, which had been evolving in Lebanon since 1948, and at an enhanced rate since 1975… [against the] health and educational services, political and social organizations, judicial and self-management systems, etc. Now that all these autonomous social systems have been utterly destroyed, the Palestinian refugees have once again become a faceless mass of people, uprooted, evacuated and torn away from any form of collective life.197 Bar-On may incidentally be right in saying that ‚Äúanyone who visited Southern Lebanon‚Äù could see the facts that he describes, the results of what Meir Pail calls ‚Äúthe ‚Äòsmash-up‚Äô technique‚Äù used ‚Äúto raze‚Äù the areas to be occupied ‚Äúin various ways: in air, naval and artillery bombardment, and with tanks, rockets and mechanical equipment.‚Äù198 But it is also true that many who visited the area explicitly denied these facts and condemned the American media as dupes or liars or worse for partially 111. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  444  reporting them. In any event, so Eichmann‚Äôs prosecutor informs us, the ‚Äúgang of thugs‚Äù has now been replaced by the Phalange and Haddad‚Äîthe humanists of Tel al Zaatar, Khiyam, and other noteworthy incidents‚Äîbacked by the IDF, which has some tales of its own to tell, and the cancer has been removed. As for the terror that had ‚Äúmetastasized‚Äù throughout the world, there were early claims that Israel had captured innumerable ‚Äúinternational terrorists‚Äù from Europe and elsewhere who were being groomed by the PLO. The careful reader of the press was later to learn, in the small print buried in other stories, that these much-publicized reports were false. Israeli intelligence officials conceded that ‚Äúthey had seized no Western European or Japanese terrorists, only 28 Turks, in their occupation of Palestinian camps and bases‚Äù; ‚Äúdespite some erroneous statements in the early days of the war that European terrorists had been taken prisoner, no member of a major international terrorist organization was captured by the invading Israeli army,‚Äù* an *  There is more to the story of terrorism in Europe than what is reported in the  U.S. The Palestinian role has been very widely publicized, but it is barely known here that Israel has been accused of direct involvement in terrorism in Europe, and that the Israeli secret services have been condemned for terrorist acts in the courts in Norway and Italy (in the former case, for killing the wrong person in error, and in the latter, in connection with the murder of Palestinian poet Wael Zuaiter). It has also been reported that right-wing European terrorists have had close dealings with the Phalange and have spent time in Phalange and Haddad areas (see, e.g.. Economist, Oct. 11, 1980, citing the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior; Zu Haderekh (Rakah, Communist), July 29, 1981, quoting from the West German journal of former anti-Nazi resisters; the same report alleges that terrorists who were identified as trained by the PLO were in fact captured by the PLO when they left Phalange territory). In their recent spate of confessions, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  445  Israeli specialist on terrorism reported, speculating that they might have left in May, ‚Äúwhen war appeared imminent.‚Äù199 The comparisons brought to mind by Gideon Hausner‚Äôs words did not go unnoticed in Israel, for example, by the paratrooper just quoted (note 196), who ‚Äúcannot help remembering what was done to my people during the Second World War,‚Äù and by a fair number of others who expressed their dismay in the press or in demonstrations. For many, there were chilling reminders of not-so-distant history when roles were reversed, extending concerns that had already been aroused, and clearly articulated, over developments in Israel and the occupied territories in the past few years (see chapter 4). In a huge government-sponsored demonstration in support of Operation ‚ÄúPeace for Galilee,‚Äù one sign particularly struck reporters, standing out from the others with red letters and in many copies: ‚ÄúOne people, One Army, One Government.‚Äù A Hebrew-speaking journalist from a German television company leading Red Brigadists have alleged that the Israeli Mossad sought to assist them, providing them with information about targets of assassination as part of what an Italian judge called a ‚Äúdiabolic plan‚Äù to destabilize Italy. A Radical Party (i.e., liberal) parliamentarian charged that the Mossad ‚Äúwas not at all disinterested in the elimination of Aldo Moro, considered by Israel as an excessively ‚Äòpro-Arab‚Äô statesman.‚Äù Cited by Lisa Palmieri-Billig, Jerusalem Post, Feb. 1, 1982, as evidence of ‚Äúvilification of Israel‚Äù in Italy; another example of such ‚Äòvilification,‚Äù according to the Post, was a statement by President Pertini expressing support for Israel but also calling for a Palestinian ‚Äúhomeland.‚Äù On the testimony of Red Brigadists, see Panorama, January 11, 1982 (Italian). For more information, see Livia Rokach, ‚ÄúIsraeli Terror in Europe,‚Äù The Dawn (Al Fajr), Oct. 16. 1981. An Italian parliamentary inquiry confirmed Mossad efforts to aid the Red Brigades in an apparent effort to destabilize Italy. Roger Cohen, Reuter, Boston Globe, June 4, 1983. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
446  Peace for Galilee  ‚Äúimmediately translated it to her friends, pointing out its similarity to the Nazi slogan: ‚ÄòEin Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Fuehrer‚Äô,‚Äù the Labor Party journal reported.200 Letters appeared in the press from the generation of Holocaust survivors expressing fear and concern over what they felt was happening. One, Dr. Shlomo Shmelzman, was forbidden by the directors of the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial Center to conduct a hunger strike there‚Äîhis son was serving with the paratroopers in Lebanon. He wrote a letter to the press announcing his hunger strike in protest against the Lebanon war: In my childhood I have suffered fear, hunger and humiliation when I passed from the Warsaw Ghetto, through labor camps, to Buchenwald. Today, as a citizen of Israel, I cannot accept the systematic destruction of cities, towns, and refugee camps. I cannot accept the technocratic cruelty of the bombing, destroying and killing of human beings. I hear too many familiar sounds today, sounds which are being amplified by the war. I hear ‚Äúdirty Arabs‚Äù and I remember ‚Äúdirty Jews.‚Äù I hear about ‚Äúclosed areas‚Äù and I remember ghettos and camps. I hear ‚Äútwo-legged beasts201‚Äù* and I remember ‚ÄúUntermenschen.‚Äù I hear about tightening the siege, clearing the area, pounding the city into *  The reference is to Menachem Begin‚Äôs statement in the Knesset, widely quoted  in Israel and Europe since, interpreted as a description of Palestinians as ‚Äútwolegged  beasts.‚Äù  The  government  of  Israel  protested  that  this  is  a  misinterpretation, and that Begin‚Äôs ‚Äúdescription is applicable to whosoever sinks to such moral depths that by killing or threatening to kill a Jewish child, he proves himself bereft of any semblance of humanity‚Äù (my emphasis). This clarification elicited several bitter rejoinders, raising the obvious question. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
447  Peace for Galilee  submission and I remember suffering, destruction, death, blood and murder… Too many things in Israel remind me of too many other things from my childhood.202 Many agreed with Meir Pail, who saw ‚Äúdisturbing signs that we are becoming spiritual slaves to the culture of physical force,‚Äù or with Boaz Evron, who wrote that ‚Äúthe true symbol of the state is no longer the Menorah with seven candlesticks; the true symbol is the fist.‚Äù203 Such voices will not be heard if ‚Äúsupporters of Israel‚Äù have their way, and those who choose not to see will continue to be responsible for much grief and suffering. Like Colonel Dov Yirmiah and many other soldiers, the paratrooper quoted above derides the ‚Äútalk about the purity of our arms and about our humane fighters‚Äù (see Yirmiah‚Äôs comments cited on p. 239 on the ‚Äúfalse‚Äù and ‚Äúsickening‚Äù phrase ‚Äúpurity of arms‚Äù and the ‚Äúcynical‚Äù lies about the ‚Äúhumane‚Äù Israeli soldier), repeated with much respect by Americans taken on guided tours by the Israeli military; for example, the inimitable Martin Peretz, who presents this Truth on the authority of selected Israeli soldiers and an IDF education officer, dismissing evidence to the contrary on the grounds that ‚ÄúArabs exaggerate‚Äù and the media are committed to ‚Äúdeceit‚Äù or are simply anti-Israel. 204 A comparable conclusion based on such evidence would be dismissed with ridicule in the case of any other state (always apart from one‚Äôs own). But let us look further. The IDF education officer on whose testimony Peretz bases his conclusion about ‚Äúpurity of arms‚Äù is Shlomo Avineri, whom Peretz presents as a critic of Begin‚Äôs policies, hence highly credible in this regard. What is more, this critic of Begin was invited to conduct ‚Äú‚Äòfully free and open‚Äô discussions with officers and ordinary soldiers [at the front] on various vexing topics, including whether it Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  448  would be right or wrong for Israel to move against West Beirut.‚Äù ‚ÄúThe army doesn‚Äôt fear these discussions,‚Äù Avineri informed Peretz, ‚Äúeven though it knows that the officers who conduct them, being mostly intelligentsia, are mostly critics of the government or actually on the left.‚Äù The fact that such a strong critic of Begin‚Äôs policies as Shlomo Avineri is invited to discuss such ‚Äúvexing topics‚Äù as an invasion of West Beirut surely demonstrates the uniquely democratic and open character of the Israeli army, according to Peretz. Unfortunately, there are some problems in this demonstration, and in reliance on Avineri as an authority on ‚Äúpurity of arms.‚Äù Peretz neglects to report the opinions of this critical dove. Others have, for example, Meron Benvenisti (see chapter 4, section 4.2), who, as an IDF lecturer, sat through Avineri‚Äôs ‚Äútraining sessions‚Äù for these lecturers and reports their contents in an open letter accusing Avineri of ‚Äúlack of intellectual honesty.‚Äù Avineri informed the IDF lecturers in July that ‚Äúunder the given conditions there is no alternative to the conquest of Beirut by force,‚Äù thus joining the hawkish wing of Likud and setting himself in opposition to the Labor Party. When asked about the political and human cost, he responded that ‚Äúthis question is no concern of the lecturers.‚Äù He furthermore explained ‚Äúthat the Americans would agree after the fact to the conquest of West Beirut by force.‚Äù When participants objected to his ‚Äúshocking presentation,‚Äù he ‚Äúburst out and insisted that whoever is unable to go out and to encourage soldiers to perform their duty (that is, the conquest of West Beirut) is not entitled to appear before them.‚Äù205 Once again, the facts that Peretz suppresses are highly relevant to the point he is attempting to establish (recall the incident of the ‚Äúvacuum bomb‚Äù; section 4.7). Knowing the contents of Avineri‚Äôs instructions to the IDF lecturers one might draw a rather different conclusion about the significance of his being invited to discuss such ‚Äúvexing topics‚Äù as the invasion of West Beirut, and about his credibility as an authority on Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
449  Peace for Galilee  ‚Äúpurity of arms. It is worth noting that Peretz‚Äôs demonstration of Israeli adherence to the doctrine of ‚Äúpurity of arms‚Äù is taken quite seriously in the U.S., even among liberal doves. Few have been so outspoken in criticism of Israeli expansionism as Rabbi Balfour Brickner, a member of the Advisory Committee of the peace group Clergy and Laity Concerned (CALC) and a peace activist for many years. In the CALC journal he writes of his anguish over what happened in Lebanon in 1982. but not before establishing the ground rules: But, I believe every word of what others have reported re Israel‚Äôs conduct of the war and PLO atrocity (the most persuasive of these reports was Martin Peretz‚Äôs ‚ÄúLebanon Eyewitness‚Äù‚Ķ)‚Ķ I am persuaded that Israel‚Äôs soldiers practiced ‚Äútohar haneshek‚Äù‚Äîthe morality of arms‚Äîwith zeal and extreme sensitivity. I am convinced that they took great care to avoid abusing the strength their weapons gave them. Note that he remained ‚Äúpersuaded‚Äù even after the terror bombing and siege of West Beirut, and that the ‚Äúothers‚Äù who have reported do not include Israeli soldiers returning from the front or Israeli journalists, some already cited. He also writes that within the PLO only ‚Äúa small moderate element‚Äù is ‚Äúprepared to support a two-state solution‚Äù (clearly false) and that ‚Äúthough the cease fire was holding and had held for over a year, terrorists did continue to rain rocket fire on Israel‚Äôs northern border communities‚Äù; the second of these two inconsistent statements is false, except with reference to the clearly retaliatory strikes of May and June 1982, the first symbolic and after extensive Israeli provocation, including murderous bombardment, here unmentioned. As for the IDF Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  450  soldiers, ‚ÄúIn the annals of military combat, their behavior is unique,‚Äù with ‚Äúno abuse of civilian populations,‚Äù ‚Äúno reported instances of looting‚Ķ[and] a care not to needlessly destroy civilian property.‚Äù206 We have reviewed evidence bearing on the veracity of most of these claims, and will turn to the remainder in section 8.1. Though Shlomo Avineri‚Äôs views on the war, as presented to the IDF lecturers, are essentially those of Begin and Sharon, he is regularly presented here as a critical dove. A look at what he actually says is interesting. Writing to an American audience, this noted scholar explained that ‚Äúthe Palestinians have always adopted the line of maximum no-compromise with Zionism and with Israel‚Äù (on the facts, see chapter 3), though their current willingness to consider a cease-fire ‚Äúmay be the first sign of sanity‚Äù (as contrasted with their strict observance of the July 1981 cease-fire, which caused such distress in Israel). ‚ÄúWith the decimation of the PLO in Lebanon, Israel can now afford to be more self-assured and more generous,‚Äù achieving its ‚Äúlegitimate Jewish liaison with Judea and Samaria‚Äù and allowing ‚Äúthe bulk of the West Bank and Gaza‚Äù to be attached to Jordan, while the East Bank becomes ‚Äúthe area in which the Palestinian refugees could be rehabilitated.‚Äù He subsequently explained that ‚Äúas long as the PLO held sway in Beirut, moderate Palestinians were effectively deterred by PLO threats and terrorism from coming forward with plans that did not mesh with the ideology calling for the destruction of Israel‚Äù (such as, for example, the January 1976 plan for a peaceful two-state settlement prepared by the PLO). Others often regarded as doves agreed, for example, Raanan Weitz, the head of the rural settlement department of the Jewish Agency, who proposed that ‚Äúwater can be brought from the Litani River, in Lebanon, to arid regions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,‚Äù while Jewish settlement remains at least along the Jordan River, ‚Äúconstituting a part of the state of Israel,‚Äù and presumably in other areas Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  451  of the West Bank and Gaza being settled under the auspices of the agency that he directs. 207 As for the government of Israel, it held fast throughout to its resolution ‚Äúthat the fight against the PLO permits no compromise‚Äîbecause the PLO wants it that way‚Äù (compare the facts reviewed in chapter 3), that the PLO threat is ‚Äúpolitical no less than military,‚Äù and that the PLO must not be permitted to exist as a ‚Äúpolitical body.‚Äù The PLO men who ‚Äúhave entrenched themselves in the heart of residential West Beirut‚Äù have ‚Äúagain‚Ķcreated acute danger to the safety of the Lebanese as well as Palestinian men, women and children from behind whom these PLO forces are sending out volleys of artillery and small-arms fire against the Lebanese and Israeli forces in East Beirut and beyond‚Äù in ‚Äúblatant violation of the rules of warfare.‚Äù208 The emphasis on the ‚Äúthreat‚Äù posed by the existence of the PLO as a ‚Äúpolitical body‚Äù is quite appropriate. One may plausibly read this as confirming evidence, from the highest source, for the thesis of Porath and others concerning the origins of the war, already discussed; reading this quite typical statement, one may also recall the regular indignation over the alleged refusal of the PLO (and the Arabs generally) to accept the existence of Israel, the heart of the Middle East problem, it is commonly argued. One might have hoped, however, that the government of Israel would at least have stopped short of accusing the PLO of attacking Israeli forces in Beirut. Perhaps one can expect nothing more of the government. What then was the role of Israel‚Äôs opposition party throughout the war? There should be few illusions in the light of its record when in office, particularly in the bloody 1950s and the expansionist post-1967 period. Amiram Cohen gives a detailed accounting of the deliberations of the Labor Party leadership during the critical events of 1982, based on interviews with high level officials, including the leadership itself. 209 Prior to the war, the leadership strongly opposed the military action that Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  452  every knowledgeable observer knew was being prepared. Chaim Bar-Lev stated on April 9 that ‚Äúthe present conditions do not justify military action that will engage us in war,‚Äù and Mordechai Gur, another former Chief of Staff, wrote in Ma‚Äôariv that current tensions are not related only to terrorist activities but to ‚Äúthe intention to change the political map of Lebanon.‚Äù Yitzhak Rabin warned against actions that would disturb the cease-fire and opposed ‚Äúa massive attack against the terrorists in Lebanon.‚Äù Israel should observe the cease-fire strictly, he wrote in Davar on May 14, ‚Äúas long as the terrorist organizations are observing it.‚Äù Two months before the war, Begin informed the Labor Party leadership of the ‚Äúlarge plan‚Äù: conquest of southern Lebanon up to the BeirutDamascus highway and a link-up with the Phalangists. A month later they were presented with the ‚Äúsmall plan‚Äù: the pretense concerning a 25-mile security zone. Labor agreed to support Operation ‚ÄúPeace for Galilee,‚Äù though ‚Äúwhen the tanks began to move it was well-known to the leadership where they were heading‚Ķjust as the officers and the soldiers knew.‚Äù On June 5, Peres outlined to the Labor leadership the content of the ‚Äúlarge plan,‚Äù which he and others knew was to be implemented. While some conveyed their objections internally, apart from Yossi Sarid and Shulamith Aloni Labor voted with Likud to support the operation, knowing perfectly well that the official explanation about the 25-mile limit was a fraud (at least, the leadership knew). For the first two weeks of the war, Labor was silent. They continued to support the war, with two qualifications: Labor opposed conflict with the Syrians‚Äîan aspect of the war to which I will turn in the next chapter‚Äî and the entry into Beirut, though even in this regard there were exceptions, among them, Chaim Bar-Lev, Secretary-General of the Labor Party, who approved the invasion of West Beirut after the Gemayel assassination in September.210 Throughout, Cohen continues, Labor anticipated that the conseClassics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  453  quences of the war for Israel would be grim in all respects, but they kept silent. One factor was their conviction that ‚Äúthe U.S. gave the green light and Haig was able ‚Äòto live‚Äô even with an entry into Beirut.‚Äù See section 4.7. Apart from that, ‚Äúnothing succeeds like success.‚Äù Labor temporized, waiting to see ‚Äúhow things would turn out.‚Äù To oppose the war was considered politically impossible, given poll results indicating that 98% of the Likud and 91% of the Labor Alignment supporters backed the war and regarded it as justified. The Labor Alignment refused to take to the streets in support of those who demonstrated against expansion of the war. Rabin regarded the war as justified after ‚Äúthe terrorists bombarded the Galilee settlements‚Äù (in retaliation for the heavy bombing of Lebanon on June 4-5; such retaliation, after the unprovoked murder of several hundred people, evidently proves that ‚Äúthe terrorists‚Äù continue to be ‚Äútwo-legged beasts,‚Äù in Begin‚Äôs rhetoric). Chaim Herzog (elected President in March 1983) went so far as to favor even the conquest of Beirut. Gur was the strongest opponent of the war among the top leadership. He issued a public denunciation of the Labor leadership and the entire operation on August 20, in Ha‚Äôaretz. The attack on Beirut, he said, would prove to be an ineradicable stain, and the entire war, as it was conducted, was unjustified. The presence of the IDF, he wrote, was the ‚Äúprimary factor in the election of Bashir Gemayel‚Äù to the presidency of Lebanon, ‚Äúand whoever activates the IDF to such aims is capable of doing the same tomorrow in Israel as well,‚Äù a concern about Defense Minister Sharon that had been voiced frequently before, even by Begin, it has been alleged. Yossi Sarid, along with Shulamith Aloni and parts of Mapam, opposed the ‚Äúlarge plan‚Äù strenuously and called for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all positions that had no direct connection with the security of the Galilee. But the leadership in general remained silent, apart from its general opposition to the conquest of Beirut. When Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  454  things began to go wrong later, after the Sabra-Shatila massacres, the Labor leadership changed its tune, as we shall see. All of this will again evoke memories among opponents of American aggression in Indochina. It is difficult to conjure up a picture of Labor as constituting a meaningful opposition, though one might reasonably argue that support for Labor is nevertheless justified when one considers what Begin and his cohorts are likely to do in the future. Cohen writes that ‚Äúif anyone thinks in error that from Abba Eban there will come salvation for the doves‚Äîdisappointment awaits him.‚Äù True, Eban‚Äôs views are ‚Äúextremely dovish.‚Äù But he will not use his international prestige to express them in public. In fact, in his article in Socialist Affairs cited above (see note 135), Eban writes that Begin ‚Äúsolemnly promised the Knesset on June 8 that when we reach the 40km. limit, ‚Äòthe fighting will cease‚Äô,‚Äù a sign of his duplicity. Surely Eban knew that the ‚Äúsmall plan‚Äù had never been seriously entertained and that the Labor leadership was well aware of this fact from the start.  6.4 The American Scene We have sampled the ‚Äútaste of victory‚Äù among Lebanese and Israelis‚Äîit is superfluous to discuss further the reaction of the Palestinians. What of the United States? As noted earlier, Israel‚Äôs direct aggression evoked only limited criticism within the U.S., though when the true objectives and the costs of the war became clear, the situation began to change. Some went so far as to claim that Syria and the PLO ‚Äúwere the aggressors‚Äù in Lebanon, not Israel, which simply ‚Äúuprooted them from where they had no right to be,‚Äù211 though this commentator‚ÄîHenry  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  455  Fairlie‚Äîdoes not tell us where the Palestinians had a ‚Äúright to be.‚Äù* Others did, for example, historian Barbara Tuchman, who explained that although ‚Äúthe invasion of Lebanon seems to me out of proportion‚Äù and may not be ‚Äúthe wisest course,‚Äù nevertheless: ‚ÄúLet us put the responsibility for a solution where it lies… Let the Arabs solve the problem of the Palestinians,‚Äù not those who occupy their former homes.212 Since the Palestinians were the ‚Äúaggressors‚Äù when Israel invaded Lebanon, it must be that Israel was acting in a ‚Äúpeaceproducing role‚Äù‚Äîand so we are informed by ex-Senator Jacob Javits, who also points out that once before Israel had ‚Äúserve[d] in this peaceproducing role‚Äù in Lebanon, namely, in 1958, when Israel provided logistical support at the Haifa port for the landing of U.S. marines in Lebanon.213 Michael Walzer, the noted social democratic theorist of ‚Äújust wars,‚Äù explained that ‚ÄúI certainly welcome the political defeat of the PLO, and I believe that the limited military operation required to inflict that defeat can be defended under the theory of just war.‚Äù Under his concept of ‚Äújust war,‚Äù with its special provisions for the State of Israel discussed above (see pp. 100-1), his conclusion is surely correct. Walzer also assures us that Israel‚Äôs military practice in the south ‚Äúwas a good example of proportionate warfare‚Äù‚Äîthe proof is that Israeli soldiers so informed him‚Äîand if later operations in Beirut put civilians ‚Äúat risk,‚Äù we must understand that ‚Äúthe responsibility for the risks lies with the PLO,‚Äù214 the official position of the Begin government and yet another notable contribution to contemporary moral doctrine by this highly*  He also avoids mention of the fact that Syria was present under an Arab League  mandate that was to expire in July 1982, and that the U.S. and Israel at least tacitly supported the original Syrian intervention in opposition to the Palestinians and their Muslim allies. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
456  Peace for Galilee  regarded social democratic humanist.* Morris Abram, formerly U.S. representative at the UN Commission on Human Rights, explained that ‚Äúthe moral culpability for the loss of innocent lives in Lebanon, as in Dresden, Germany, and Normandy, in France, during World War II, rests primarily on those who initiated the terror rather than on those who ended it‚Äù‚Äîthat is, on the PLO, whose terrorism, surely to be condemned, hardly matched that of Israel. ‚ÄúThe pain of west Beirut was caused by the grip of the guerrillas who held it hostage.‚Äù The war was ‚Äúregrettable,‚Äù but it ‚Äúwould never have occurred‚Äù if the Arab states had resettled the Palestinians‚Äîwho, in fact, insisted on their right to return to their homes, always failing to comprehend the point, so clear to American Zionists, that they had forfeited this right by their flight and expulsion, and must put the past behind them, while the Jewish people returns to the homeland from which it was exiled 2000 years ago.215 Just at the point when the siege and bombing of Beirut were reaching their peak of savagery, the well-known liberal columnist William Shannon expressed ‚Äúsome distress‚Äù over the ‚Äúterrifying violence‚Äù while noting that ‚Äúsomething positive‚Äù may yet come out of it; namely, the PLO and *  A review of his latest book (Boston Globe, March 20, 1983) describes Walzer  as ‚Äúsomething of a national treasure‚Äù: ‚ÄúNo reader [of these essays], even one profoundly opposed to his democratic socialist politics, could fail to appreciate his humanism.‚Äù In his previously-cited Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer also relies on the testimony of Israeli soldiers to demonstrate the high moral level of the IDF‚Äîperhaps not the most objective source. It should be unnecessary to stress that evidence from the combatants of some military force is highly relevant when it is critical of its practices, of limited significance otherwise. No one would credit reports by Russian soldiers on their ‚Äòpurity of arms‚Äù in Afghanistan, though critical comment offered freely should be taken quite seriously. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
457  Peace for Galilee  ‚Äútheir Syrian patrons‚Äù may be ‚Äúforced to recognize reality.‚Äù ‚ÄúReality‚Äù is that ‚Äúthe PLO has sabotaged every effort to make some diplomatic or political headway on the problems of the Palestinian people‚Äù and that ‚Äúthe PLO has murdered or intimidated into silence independent-minded Palestinians who wanted to explore different political possibilities,‚Äù ‚Äútolerat[ing] no divergence from its political line, tiresomely reiterated, that Israel is unacceptable and must be destroyed‚Äù: But it is not Israel‚Äôs fault that a defeated PLO chose to hole up in West Beirut and use women and children as shields. For a generation, the PLO has been the aggressor against Israel, using every tactic from terrorist bombings to diplomatic stonewalling. Any nation placed in Israel‚Äôs predicament would put an end to this aggression if it were within its power to do so.216 As we have seen, reality is rather different from Shannon‚Äôs ‚Äúreality.‚Äù In the real world it is the U.S. and its Israeli client that have rejected every effort‚Äîincluding PLO efforts‚Äîto reach a peaceful political settlement in accord with the international consensus, and it is hardly accurate to say that the PLO ‚Äúchose to hole up in West Beirut,‚Äù to which it was driven by Israeli violence. These lies are particularly ugly ones, coming at the time they did and thus providing a justification for Israel‚Äôs terrorist attack on the defenseless civilian population then held within its grip*. *  Shannon‚Äôs gross errors of fact were immediately brought to his attention, with  extensive documentation, but he had no interest in correcting them. As for the ‚ÄúSyrian patrons‚Äù of the PLO, who had entered the Lebanese civil war to attack the PLO, it was hardly necessary to provide Shannon with evidence; the same issue of the Globe contained a report by Michael Kennedy of the Los Angeles Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
458  Peace for Galilee  Soldiers who had participated in the attack on Beirut had a rather different picture of what was happening. We may, for example, compare Shannon‚Äôs version with this one, from the scene: One Friday we stood on a high hill overlooking the Beirut airport. We had hundreds of cannons that we used according to plan, to bombard the refugee camps of south Beirut. Everything was calculated. Each unit received a definite area to bombard. For four hours we bombarded the refugee camps which at the same time were being bombarded from the air and the sea. It is difficult for me to return to those four hours and to recount what I felt. From our position we could see our artillery strikes with the naked eye. We could see the sparks of fire every second. It was a terrible scene.217 Evidently, things looked a little different from Boston. Once again, we should recognize the familiarity of the practice of Fairlie, Walzer, Abram and the rest throughout the history of the modern state-worshipping intellectuals, the annals of Stalinism being only the most obvious example. Recall Elmer Winter‚Äôs admonition in the Jerusalem Post that ‚ÄúAmerican Jews have their work cut out for them‚Äù; it is perhaps unfair to fault them‚Äîand others‚Äîfor performing their tasks; see end section 2.6.1 and chapter 2, section 2.1. Times on battles between the PLO and Syria just prior to the Israeli invasion. Naturally, this and much similar evidence was also dismissed as irrelevant to Higher Truths. For another no less amazing example of the ruminations of this distinguished liberal columnist, see TNCW, p. 87, this one in the New York Times and concerned with the righteousness of another Holy State. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  459  Editorials in the nation‚Äôs press took a similar stance. Echoing the wording of the Israeli Embassy, cited above, the Washington Post argued that ‚ÄúThe PLO made [West Beirut] an involuntary battleground; Israeli guns did most of the damage to it: a deadly ‚Äòpartnership‚Äô.‚Äù Employing similar logic (putting aside differences in the circumstances irrelevant to the point at issue), one might argue‚Äîperhaps some Nazis did‚Äîthat the British made Calais and Dunkirk an involuntary battleground, in a ‚Äúdeadly partnership‚Äù with Hitler‚Äôs armies. The Post continues: the PLO must now ‚Äúfind a political course that is reasonable and realistic‚Äù‚Äîin contrast to its former proposals for a peaceful twostate settlement in accordance with the international consensus.218 In the eyes of the New York Times editors, ‚ÄúAmerican weapons were justly used to break the P.L.O.‚Äù The Lebanese must understand that their ‚Äúliberation from the Syrians and the P.L.O. is no license to resume civil war,‚Äù and Israel must understand that though ‚ÄúAmerica will extricate them from Lebanon, and let its aid cover the costs,‚Äù they must have ‚Äúrespect for American interests in the Middle East…and yield something to America‚Äôs view of the ‚Äòfull autonomy‚Äô jointly promised at Camp David.‚Äù The Israeli invasion ‚Äúopened some promising political paths‚Äù (as did the Argentine invasion of the Falklands at the same time, though for some reason this fact was not adduced here in support for it), but the U.S. should not ‚Äúreward [the PLO for] the biggest hijacking in history‚Äîhalf of Beirut is the hostage‚Äîin a coin they do not possess, the Israeli-held West Bank‚Äù (the Gaza Strip seems to have been tacitly consigned to Israel). ‚ÄúThe civilians [the PLO] are using for cover are Moslem innocents; the P.L.O.‚Äôs final bet is on Israel‚Äôs humanity and the sensibilities of civilized nations,‚Äù and they must respect their ‚Äúenemy‚Äôs restraint.‚Äù ‚ÄúWhen the P.L.O. holds half a city hostage and shouts ‚ÄòPay my ransom or shoot your way past these innocents,‚Äô there is no special virtue in cease-fires that let the talks drag indefinitely.‚Äù The U.S. –  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  460  recognition that the PLO demands as its ‚Äúransom‚Äù should be denied, since it ‚Äúwould strengthen the P.L.O‚Äôs extremists‚Äù and ‚Äúwould destroy the chances of negotiating true autonomy with fairly elected Palestinians in the West Bank‚Äù (though the dismissed elected mayors and even Israel‚Äôs chosen quislings reject this ‚Äútrue autonomy‚Äù and insist upon an independent Palestinian state along with 98% of the population, who furthermore overwhelmingly advocate that this state be run by the PLO). With the final cease-fire, ‚Äúthe P.L.O. fighters who have held west Beirut hostage will finally evacuate without goading the Israeli attackers into ferocious house-to-house fighting that would have vastly increased the carnage.‚Äù219 Etc., etc. Particularly of note‚Äîsince the remainder is fairly routine in this style of journalism‚Äîis the notion that of course the U.S. taxpayer must willingly pay Israel for its achievements in Lebanon. Not everyone approved. Nathan Glazer and Seymour Martin Lipset described the war as ‚Äúill-advised‚Äù and urged that Israel grant the Palestinians ‚Äúreal self-determination‚Äù in the West Bank and Gaza.220 Some used stronger terms, though they remained a distinct minority. In fact, across a broad spectrum of articulate opinion, Israel‚Äôs aggression received strong support. Crucially, it received the direct material and diplomatic support of the U.S. government. The Democratic Party expressed its sympathetic support still more forcefully. The Administration stood by its recommendation for an increase in aid to Israel, and Congress, under the prodding of liberal Democrats, demanded still further increases. The Labor Union bureaucracies strongly supported the war, as did most conservative columnists. The national press did too, though with some reservations. The familiar principles of official doctrine concerning Israel and the PLO were continually reiterated as in the few examples just cited, truth being dismissed as the usual irrelevance. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  461  At the extreme left of mainstream politics, support for the invasion was no less fervent. The Santa Monica City Council, regarded as virtually a socialist enclave, passed a resolution ‚Äúin essence, to support the right of Israel to defend its borders by invading Lebanon.‚Äù The same resolution ‚Äúquestions the Reagan Administration‚Äôs ‚Äòdrifting away from commitment to the Camp David process,‚Äô challenges the appointment of George P. Shultz as secretary of state ‚Äòat such a grave time in Israel‚Äôs existence‚Äô and calls upon Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif) ‚Äòto carefully examine at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings Mr. Shultz‚Äôs ties to the Bechtel Corporation and his ties and Bechtel‚Äôs ties to Saudi Arabia* and Saudi Arabian support for the PLO‚Äô.‚Äù221 The idea that it is Israel‚Äôs existence, not the national (or simply human) existence of the Palestinians, that is threatened as Israeli military forces are systematically demolishing Palestinian society with U.S. support should be carefully noted, not merely dismissed on the grounds of patent absurdity; it reflects, in the clearest possible form, the deep-seated racist assumptions that extend across a broad spectrum of U.S. opinion, including much of the left. Others too felt that Shultz might be a problem. Seymour Martin Lipset, speaking at the Hebrew University, warned that ‚ÄúIsrael‚Äôs biggest problem is likely to be that Shultz is a ‚Äòdo-good Christian‚Äô with sympathy for the underdog and the oppressed. Israel‚Äôs policies in Lebanon and in the territories are likely to arouse his ‚Äòmoral indignation‚Äô.‚Äù222 One can understand the concern over these possible character flaws. Few surpassed Tom Hayden and Jane Fonda in their support for the *  The demand to examine Mr. Shultz‚Äôs various ties would be fair enough, were it  coupled with a demand to investigate the ties of others to Israel or to countries that support Israel, a meaningless demand given the U.S. role, thus highlighting the true significance of the concern over Mr. Shultz. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  462  invasion. Well before, Fonda had announced that ‚ÄúI identify with Israel unequivocally.‚Äù This was on the occasion of her ‚Äúspecial prize‚Äù from the Hebrew University ‚Äúfor her contribution to freeing the prisoners of Zion in the USSR and for the freedom of immigration for Jews there.‚Äù Fonda announced on this occasion that she is ‚Äúmaking every effort‚Ķto explain to the government and the general population‚Äù in the U.S. that ‚Äúworld peace and certainly the security and future of Israel‚Äù are threatened by moves in the U.S. ‚Äúto establish friendly relations with a state such as Saudi Arabia.‚Äù ‚ÄúI operate according to my conscience, and am attempting to convince President Reagan that the U.S. interest is bound up with friendship with democratic Israel, and not with feudal Saudi Arabia.‚Äù This is one aspect of her commitment ‚Äúto continue with my work for human rights.‚Äù223 The ceremony took place just at the moment when the Sharon-Milson oppression had reached its peak of violence; see chapter 4, section 5. If her ‚Äúwork for human rights‚Äù extended to those then being shot, beaten, humiliated a few miles from where she was speaking, the fact remained unrecorded. In July 1982, Fonda and Hayden toured Israel and Lebanon as guests of the Israeli Organization for the Soldier (in effect, the Israeli USO), reaching as far as Beirut, where they ‚Äúwatched the shelling‚Äù from Israeli positions. Fonda ‚Äúexpressed her identification with Israel‚Äôs struggle against Palestinian terror, and her understanding for the Israeli invasion in Lebanon, which would remove the terror, and her support for Israel‚Äôs struggles for its existence and independence‚Äù‚Äîall feelings that naturally come to the fore as one travels past (probably not seeing) the rubble of Ain el-Hilweh and witnesses the bombardment of Beirut. ‚ÄúIsrael has the right to defend herself from anyone who threatens to destroy her,‚Äù she said, ‚Äúand not only when they are attacking her.‚Äù ‚ÄúTom Hayden blamed the PLO for causing the ‚ÄòPeace for Galilee‚Äô operation,‚Äù presumably, by its regular and unprovoked shelling of the Galilee in the Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  463  preceding year and its adamant refusal to consider a political settlement, despite Israel‚Äôs enthusiastic efforts in this regard. ‚ÄúThe couple FondaHayden expressed their hope that the PLO would indeed leave Beirut; that further bloodshed would be avoided there and that the affair will lead to a solution of the Palestinian problem in the spirit of Camp David,‚Äù thereby taking their stand in explicit opposition to virtually all the inhabitants of the occupied territories.224 Hayden laid the blame for the present crisis on the PLO, stating that the PLO, by ‚Äúits tragic refusal to recognize Israel‚Äôs existence as being compatible with Palestinian nationalism, by its repeated calls for annihilation of the Zionist state and by its use of terrorism, has made the current Israeli response inevitable‚Äù‚Äîcompare the actual facts, discussed in chapters 3, 4 above‚Äîthough he said that he did not ‚Äúturn a blind moral eye to reports of massive and excessive civilian casualties‚Äù or the use of cluster bombs, the familiar stance of many liberal supporters of American aggression in Indochina. He further stated that a direct Israeli invasion of Beirut would be ‚Äúunderstandable,‚Äù thus lining up with Begin‚Äôs Likud against the Labor Party, which opposed this final step; and he held that ‚ÄúIsrael won‚Äôt be able to‚Ķpull back without a PLO withdrawal.‚Äù225 As quoted, at least, he did not explain why the refusal of Israel to have any dealings with the political representative of the Palestinians does not justify Palestinian military action against Israel, given that the Israeli invasion is justified by the failure of the PLO to recognize Israel, putting aside the fact, which does not appear to be entirely irrelevant, that the PLO has long agreed to the establishment of a separate state alongside of Israel, a position rejected across the mainstream of Israeli politics. At a luncheon at the Beverly Hilton for the new president of a ‚Äúfraternal organization which seeks to link American and Israeli Jewry,‚Äù Fonda gave him ‚Äúa small menorah she had bought in Hebron [that is, in Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  464  Kiryat Arba in the occupied West Bank, the settlement of the Gush Emunim racist-chauvinist fanatics who at that very moment were carrying out the pogroms described in chapter 4] during her visit to the Jewish state.‚Äù The new president then joined with Vidal Sassoon and a number of Rabbis in a strong endorsement for Hayden for State Assembly, noting the praise he had received from officials of the Begin government and the Labor opposition in Israel, and his views ‚Äúagainst the PLO‚Äù and for Israel ‚Äúas a Zionist and Jewish state‚Äù226‚Äîthat is, a state based on the principle of discrimination against the ethnic-religious minorities, a principle that is effectively applied in the Jewish state, as we have seen, though the facts have been equally effectively suppressed in the country where one may make tax-free donations to these discriminatory programs.* *  One might note, in this connection, Irving Howe‚Äôs distress over ‚ÄúJewish boys  and girls, children of the generation that saw Auschwitz, [who] hate democratic Israel and celebrate as revolutionary the Egyptian dictatorship,‚Äù some of whom ‚Äúgo so far as to collect money for Al Fatah ‚Ķ About this I cannot say more; it is simply too painful‚Äù (‚ÄúPolitical terrorism; hysteria on the left,‚Äù in Chertoff, ed., The New Left and the Jews). He gives no evidence that any such examples exist. If  they did, they were sufficiently marginal as to pass unnoticed except by those seeking some means to discredit the activist movements of the 1960s, and surely did not typify the New Left, which was hardly enamored of Nasser and was largely dovish Zionist (see my article in the same volume for documentation). It is interesting to compare Howe‚Äôs reaction to the alleged collection of funds by Jewish boys and girls (or anyone in the U.S.) for Fatah, with his reaction to their by no means imaginary collection of charitable funds for Israel‚Äôs ‚Äúnational institutions.‚Äù to be used for purposes deemed ‚Äúdirectly or indirectly beneficial to persons of Jewish religion, race or origin‚Äù (not to citizens) including measures that effectively exclude Arab citizens from 92% of the land, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  465  At a meeting in New York after the war, Fonda ‚Äúannounced her unqualified support for Israel and condemned the hypocrisy with regard to Israel in connection with the Lebanon war,‚Äù which she attributed to anti-Semitism and to the subservience of liberals to third world states, both phenomena of great moment in the United States. ‚ÄúI love Israel,‚Äù she said, ‚Äúand I believe that Israel is a loyal ally of the United States,‚Äù and thus deserving of support, apparently with no further questions asked. ‚ÄúShe spoke with great emotion about the prisoners of Zion in the USSR‚Äù‚Äîbut not, as reported, about those who might be called ‚Äúprisoners of Zion‚Äù in another sense of the phrase: in Ansar in Lebanon or in the West Bank villages terrorized by the settlers who were selling her a menorah. Halhul for example (see chapter 4, section 5.1). ‚ÄúIsrael rarely makes mistakes,‚Äù she said, ‚Äúand when Israel makes a mistake‚Äî everyone, particularly Jews, shouts and screams.‚Äù She asked: ‚ÄúWho ever made a criticism of Yasser Arafat, the head of the PLO?‚Äù‚Äîsurely no one in the American press‚Äî‚Äúand who does he represent anyway?‚Äù‚Äîa question to which she might have heard some answers on her visit to Hebron, had she chosen to mingle with the local population, apart from her gracious hosts. She concluded ‚Äúthat it is easy to sit here, Jews and non-Jews, and to make criticisms.‚Äù ‚ÄúBut we do not live on the Lebanon border and we were not attacked for 12 years by the Palestinian terrorists,‚Äù so we have no right to criticize.227 And by the same logic, those who have not lived in Palestinian refugee camps surely have no right to criticize the PLO. legalized robbery of Arab lands, channelling development funds to Jewish rather than Arab citizens, etc. This is not ‚Äútoo painful to discuss‚Äù for an ardent (post1967) supporter of Israel, though in this case the phenomenon is quite real. See chapters 2, 4 and references cited for discussion of the background for all of this. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  466  Not everyone in Israel is entranced by these observations, though most of the press, including the left-wing press cited, is quite pleased. The well-known Israeli dove Uri Avneri, for example, writes: ‚ÄúI have learned to despise Jane Fonda, who gained a reputation as a fighter for peace and human rights, and who now sells this name to various fascists, among them Israelis, in order to advance her career and that of her husband…,‚Äù along with some far harsher comments. A ‚Äúpartial list of events in the vicinity of Hebron,‚Äù about which Fonda could have learned with ease on her visit there, is presented by Rafik Halabi, who notes that ‚Äúuntil now their perpetrators have not been revealed and no one has come to trial for any of them.‚Äù Included are a 1976 incident in which ‚Äútens of [Arab] youths and students from Hebron‚Äù were held prisoner in Kiryat Arba, set upon by dogs so that several required hospitalization; the 1976 expulsion of a judge of a Muslim religious court by the Kiryat Arba settlers after they publicly humiliated him; killings, destruction of vineyards, looting and destruction of property in the house of a leading Muslim family, throwing of grenades at Arab houses, destruction of houses, etc.; alongside of events of the sort described in chapter 4, section 5. Chaim Bermant, an orthodox Jew himself, describes Fonda‚Äôs Hebron hosts as orthodox Jews for whom ‚ÄúHate Thy Neighbour‚Äù has become a ‚Äúcreed‚Äù and a general ‚Äúphilosophy‚Äù: ‚ÄúThe knitted kippa [skullcap; their symbol], in Arab eyes, has become the badge of the bully and the thug, and I‚Äôm afraid I‚Äôm beginning to see it in the same light myself.‚Äù 228 At the opposite extreme of California politics, newly-elected rightist Senator Pete Wilson, virtually quoting Jane Fonda a few days earlier, said that ‚Äúhe intends to follow a strongly pro-Israel line in the Senate because Israel is ‚Äòthe only real hope that we enjoy of a strong, determined ally‚Äô in the explosive Middle East.‚Äù229 On the views of California‚Äôs other Senator, liberal Democrat Alan Cranston, see chapter Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  467  2, section 1. In short, considerable unity, across the board. Jane Fonda is, of course, not alone in her contention that criticism of the war in Lebanon is an expression of anti-Semitism. Norman Podhoretz, among many others, makes the same allegation.* Critics of the invasion, he holds, deny to the Jews ‚Äúthe right of self-defense,‚Äù which they exercised by invading Lebanon: ‚ÄúWhat we have here is the old anti-Semitism modified to suit the patterns of international life. Why should Americans lend themselves to this disgusting maneuver?‚Äù230 Or Israelis; for example, those who pointed out the absurdity of appealing *  Podhoretz is the editor of Commentary, which I have avoided discussing here.  For an example of what it contains, see Robert W. Tucker, ‚ÄúLebanon: The Case for the War,‚Äô October 1982, which begins by denying that Israel had any ‚Äúwelldeveloped plan‚Äù to destroy the PLO presence in Lebanon (rather, the IDF was, ‚Äúone might almost say pulled‚Äù to Beirut by unexpected lack of ‚Äúeffective opposition‚Äù), carefully avoiding extensive and quite compelling evidence to the contrary from Israeli sources, some cited earlier, and continuing at the same level of concern for fact. Tucker rejects the ‚Äúmoral critique‚Äù of Israel‚Äôs aggression, writing that ‚Äúwhat has so often been presented as hard-headed political analysis is, when its surface is once scratched, moral preference masquerading as political analysis.‚Äù He gives no examples, but the judgment holds of his affectation of ‚Äúhard-headed political analysis,‚Äù a largely muddleheaded expression of his ‚Äúmoral preference‚Äù for the doctrine that ‚Äúthere is nothing in reason or morality that enjoins a government to refrain from taking action against a threat to the state‚Äôs security,‚Äù that is, to engage in aggressive war, even in a case such as this, where ‚Äúthe threat that united virtually all Israelis‚Äù turns out to be the threat ‚Äúof a PLO state in the West Bank.‚Äù His position is a familiar one; Hitler and Goebbels, for example, gave a similar justification for their resort to force. See p. 372*. It is not unusual for this moral stance to be represented as ‚Äúhard-headed political analysis.‚Äù Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
468  Peace for Galilee  to the right of self-defense when in fact the PLO had scrupulously observed the July 1981 cease-fire. Others concocted lurid tales of how Lebanon was ‚Äúdismembered by Soviet-armed PLO terrorists and Syrian forces who have used its towns and villages as a battleground,‚Äù leading to the death of 100,000 civilians; the world stood by in silence ‚Äúwhile the PLO imposed a seven-year reign of terror on Lebanon‚Äù and now condemns Israel for its ‚Äúrecent campaign to uproot the terrorists from their bases‚Äù despite its ‚Äúextraordinary precautions‚Äù to prevent civilian casualties. And of course the bottom line: ‚Äúvital American interests are at stake.‚Äù231 The signers speak of ‚Äúthe campaign of lies and distortions mounted by the terrorists and their supporters,‚Äù an apt description of their own statement. It is easy enough to ridicule such pronouncements by comparing them with the undisputed facts about the civil war in Lebanon, or with the descriptions by Israeli soldiers, journalists and military experts. But to do so would be to miss the more important point, the efficacy of the Big Lie when the media are effectively disciplined and the illustration, yet again, of how easy it is for intellectuals to believe anything, however fantastic, in the service of some Holy State and to produce apologetics for its atrocities, phenomena of no small significance in this terrible century. Some attempted more original arguments, for example, Arthur Goldberg, who offered this one: Free from the illusion, now demonstrated to be without foundation, that the PLO has the coherence, strength and support to act as the ‚Äúsole representative of the Palestinian people,‚Äù and liberated from its terroristic acts and blackmail against Palestinian leaders, inhabitants of the West Bank, and other Arab countries, it should be possible to conclude Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
469  Peace for Galilee  an autonomy agreement with all deliberate speed.232 It is not entirely clear who is said to be now ‚Äúfree‚Äù and ‚Äúliberated‚Äù in this semi-coherent statement, but the idea appears to be that by successfully employing its overwhelming military might to smash the PLO, Israel has demonstrated that the PLO cannot claim to represent the Palestinian people, specifically, those in Lebanon and the occupied territories who support it even though it is not the world‚Äôs fourth strongest military power. With a bit more understanding of the facts, and a rather different moral stance, Meir Pail put the point in these terms, presenting what he suggests may have been ‚Äúthe real aim of the invasion,‚Äù conveyed in the following ‚Äúmessage of vital import to the Palestinians‚Äù in the occupied territories: ‚ÄúBeware you Palestinians living under Israeli rule! All that we have done to the refugee camps, the cities and towns and villages of south Lebanon, on the coast of the Mediterranean between Rashidiye, Tyre and Beirut we can do to you in Gaza, Judea, Samaria‚Ķand even perhaps in Um-el-Faham and Nazareth [within Israel proper]. And we can do that now, especially, given that there is no P.L.O. or any other legitimate organized body that could be seen to represent the Palestinian cause. If you will bend down and follow our rules, it would be best that you accept the limited autonomy offered you as defined by Begin-Sharon-Milson; if not, your fate will be that of Rashidiye (near Tyre), EinHilwa (near Sidon), or Beirut.‚Äù233 This ‚Äúmessage‚Äù is a more literate version of what Goldberg is apparently trying to say, stripped of the deceptive rhetoric that only barely conceals Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  470  the true meaning of his words. The former Supreme Court Justice and UN Ambassador has produced a most impressive contribution to contemporary thought: if some political entity can be destroyed by force, that demonstrates its illegitimacy and the right of the conqueror to determine the fate of those whom it had pretended to represent. This idea has not previously been advanced, to my knowledge, though its usefulness is evident; for example, to justify the Nazi conquests. Goldberg‚Äôs article would also delight structuralist literary analysts with its intriguing formal properties. Thus it begins by berating the media for joining the PLO in speaking of ‚Äúan invasion‚Äù when ‚ÄúIsraeli troops encircle Beirut‚Äù (how odd for them to do so), and it ends, with charming consistency, by referring to Israel‚Äôs ‚Äújustified invasion of Lebanon.‚Äù There appears to be one striking exception to this picture of a broad spectrum of American discussion, namely, the publication here of Jacobo Timerman‚Äôs harsh criticism of Begin‚Äôs Israel, The Longest War, and the reception accorded to it.234 An earlier version was published in the New Yorker, a mass circulation journal that reaches a liberal intellectual audience, and it has been extensively reviewed, critically but also with respect, a most unusual occurrence with regard to a book that is critical of Israel, since 1967. This is true even in the New Republic, where passages in the book are described as ‚Äústuff and nonsense‚Äù and ‚Äúfaintly nauseating,‚Äù but it is nevertheless taken to be ‚Äúan eloquent personal testimony, and a contribution of lasting significance to the great debate on Israel.‚Äù235 The latter comment is a radical departure from the normal style of this journal in the case of people who presume to criticize policies of Israel, except within the limits of the tolerated form of ‚Äúcritical support.‚Äù More typical are the terms applied to Alexander Cockburn, whose detailed factual and analytic commentary on the war and the Sharon-Milson repression, in the Village Voice, was unique in Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  471  American journalism in its insight, detail, and accuracy and was thus a major irritant in New Republic circles: he is ‚Äúa nasty piece of work,‚Äù ‚Äúdespicable,‚Äù with a ‚Äúdouble moral standard,‚Äù ‚Äúadmiration for the P.L.O. and extreme tolerance of the Soviet Union,‚Äù236 charges flung without a shred of evidence or argument, and with the veracity that we expect in comparable descriptions of political enemies in the Daily Worker. Elsewhere too, reviewers and journals that rarely tolerate critical discussion of Israel have praised Timerman‚Äôs book for its balance and integrity (while generally dismissing its contents). Why such exceptional treatment? Does this show that the spectrum of approved opinion is indeed far wider than I have suggested, in mainstream intellectual circles? The comment cited from the New Republic gives a clue to the mystery. The book is, indeed, a ‚Äúpersonal testimony,‚Äù and can be tolerated as ‚Äúa contribution of lasting significance to the great debate on Israel,‚Äù in fact as virtually the sole critical discussion to be admitted to this canon, precisely for this reason. It contains few facts and little analysis, but is primarily a cry of anguish, often quite harsh and eloquent. It is, therefore, fairly safe: one man‚Äôs impressions, to be understood in terms of his personal history and psychology, and therefore an excellent choice to represent the side of the critics in the ‚Äúgreat debate.‚Äù A further clue is given by the reference in every review to the book‚Äôs ‚Äúbalance.‚Äù The New Republic, for example, begins by noting Timerman‚Äôs ‚Äústrong criticism of some modes of condemning Israel and of supporting the Palestinians,‚Äù and his ‚Äúdevastating indictment of the P.L.O. sympathizers and the effect of their sympathy,‚Äù quoted at length. These examples are cited as ‚Äúsharp bursts of shrewd insight,‚Äù the only ones so honored. It is not easy to know to whom Timerman is referring in these ‚Äúsharp bursts of shrewd insight,‚Äù since this impassioned ‚Äúpersonal testimony‚Äù is rather short on specifics, but there is little doubt Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  472  that this ‚Äúbalance‚Äù contributes to rendering his criticism tolerable, alongside of the restriction to personal impressions and feelings. A closer scrutiny of the features of the book that permit it to be admitted into the ‚Äúgreat debate‚Äù yields some insight into the contemporary ideological scene. As already noted, Timerman repeats standard myths about Israel, for example, that the 1982 Lebanon war ‚Äúwas the first war launched by Israel‚Äù (see chapter 4, section 3). This is one notable contribution to ‚Äúbalance,‚Äù and there are numerous others. Consider the statement that the PLO ‚Äústarted the 1975 war‚Äù in Lebanon‚Äîby arranging to have a busload of Palestinians killed by the Phalange in April (see section 3.1). Or the claim that the Peace Now demonstrators on July 4 were ‚Äúready to withdraw this very day from Lebanon and negotiate this very day with the Palestinians, regardless of who represents them, for the establishment of an independent sovereign state on the West Bank,‚Äù a serious misrepresentation of the facts; with some exceptions, the demonstrators took no such position, nor did Peace Now as an organization, but the picture is a useful contribution to images of Israel that are welcome here, regardless of the facts. Or consider the injunction to the Palestinians to abandon their ‚Äúterrorist strategy‚Äù and ‚Äústerile diplomacy‚Äù and to ‚Äúorganize politically‚Äù‚Äîunaccompanied by any account of just how they were to ‚Äúorganize politically‚Äù under the regime imposed by the Labor Party and then Begin, or why their willingness to accept a two-state settlement in accordance with the international consensus is ‚Äústerile diplomacy‚Äù (indeed it is, given U.S.-Israeli rejectionism, but that is not Timerman‚Äôs point). Such assertions, which help establish the ‚Äúbalance‚Äù that renders his condemnation of Israeli policies tolerable, go part of the way towards explaining the relatively favorable reception of the book. But let us look further. The book begins with a moving description of a lunch with Michael Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  473  Walzer at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton three months before the outbreak of the war, when the repression in the West Bank had reached its peak (a fact not mentioned). Both men knew that ‚ÄúSharon‚Äôs war‚Äù was soon to come. What could they do to stop it? Timerman suggested ‚Äúthat if the two of us decided to commit suicide and explained in our wills that we were killing ourselves to stop Sharon‚Äôs war, perhaps we could succeed in stopping it.‚Äù But the idea was rejected, since Sharon would not ‚Äúhave found in his heart the images of so many Jews who believed in moving the conscience of mankind by the generous surrender of their own lives… What would the world, or Israel, or General Sharon himself, have done with our two bodies?… We cut pathetic and ridiculous figures, Michael Walzer and I, in our search for logic and sober judgment,‚Äù pathetic in their inability to find a way to prevent the tragic events that they foresaw. For Timerman, ‚ÄúSharon‚Äôs War began that very day.‚Äù There are certain difficulties in this account. First, Walzer supported the war as a ‚Äòjust war,‚Äù as we have seen. Thus it is not clear why he should have contemplated suicide to prevent it. Indeed, in the light of his record, it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which he would take any action in opposition to policies of Israel, or even deign to recognize unpleasant truths about the state that he so loyally defends. Second, one can think of some less extreme measures that might have been useful, for example, writing an article warning of what lay ahead, an option that neither man undertook though they have access to a wide audience denied to others who had the same perception. In fact, Timerman considered the idea of organizing a petition among ‚Äúthe men of Princeton‚Äù but rejected it on the grounds that Sharon and his associates would not ‚Äúpay attention to these men of Princeton who have written so many books and shared so many discoveries with mankind,‚Äù which seems a bit facile, even if it would have been possible to mobilize Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  474  ‚Äúthe men of Princeton‚Äù in an advance warning against the war. Let us turn to the ‚Äúdevastating indictment of the P.L.O sympathizers‚Äù which so impressed the New Republic reviewer. Timerman bitterly condemns ‚Äúthe Harvard, Princeton, and Columbia professors who went along with [the PLO] for years‚Äù; they were ‚Äúallies or accomplices,‚Äù or simply ‚Äúvain and frivolous academics who wanted to prove a thesis.‚Äù ‚ÄúThe principal task of the academics should have been to confront Palestinian terrorism with a clear and convincing picture of the political reality,‚Äù but instead ‚Äúthey preferred to feel important glorifying an obsolete and reactionary image, that of terrorist machismo‚Äù; ‚Äúmore than one U.S. scholar considered it a privilege to review the world situation with Arafat.‚Äù ‚ÄúThey seized upon the idea of the historical inevitability of a Palestinian state,‚Äù while failing to work ‚Äúwith the moderates among the Palestinians and the Arab world within the bounds of a political strategy.‚Äù And with others (e.g., Western Europeans), ‚Äúthey allowed the PLO to avoid the issue with ambivalent insinuations that not even the goodwill with which some of us in Israel heard them could convince us that they accepted anything less than the destruction of our country.‚Äù Had these miserable academics met their responsibilities, ‚Äúthey could have forced the creation of a Palestinian state despite the obstructions of Israeli reactionary groups.‚Äù Again, there are some problems. First, note the typical falsifications with regard to Arab ‚Äúmoderates‚Äù and ‚Äúpolitical strategy‚Äù; thus it is unexplained, for example, why PLO support for a two-state settlement since the mid-1970s drove Israel into such a panic, and failed to convince those with Timerman‚Äôs ‚Äúgoodwill‚Äù that ‚Äúthey accepted anything less than the destruction of our country.‚Äù And as well, the typical falsifications with regard to Israeli opinion: it was not certain ‚ÄúIsraeli reactionary groups that opposed the creation of a Palestinian state, but the Labor Alignment, along with the Likud. As of 1980, only about 1/10 Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  475  of the Jewish population in Israel ‚Äúunconditionally accepted Israel‚Äôs recognition of a Palestinian nation‚Äù while half that number agreed to the establishment of a Palestinian state, and under 3% of the population (and 1/5 of the ‚ÄúDovish Leaders‚Äù) agreed to ‚Äúrecognition of the PLO as the Palestinians‚Äô representative‚Äù‚Äîeven fewer, presumably, would have been willing to recognize a PLO-run Palestinian state in accordance with the wishes of the vast majority in the occupied territories. 237 We have already noted how images of the ‚Äúbeautiful Israel‚Äù have been cynically manipulated by American liberals to increase military support for Begin‚Äôs policies of settlement and aggression (see chapter 4, section 4.2.2). Timerman‚Äôs fables about Israeli attitudes lend themselves to exploitation for these ends in exactly the same way, not his intent surely, but a part of the explanation for the relatively favorable reception of his critique. Still other questions arise. Just who are these vile professors? No names are mentioned. I cannot think of a single ‚ÄúU.S. scholar,‚Äù a single professor at Harvard, Princeton or Columbia‚Äîor elsewhere‚Äîto whom Timerman‚Äôs description even remotely applies, except insofar as some Palestinian scholars did presumably discuss the world situation with Arafat, hardly a crime, one would think, particularly when one eliminates Timerman‚Äô s fanciful constructions about the views expressed. Recall Robert Tucker‚Äôs astonishing fantasies; chapter 1, first*. There is one important qualification to this remark: Timerman‚Äôs description does apply, rather accurately in fact, if we replace a few words: ‚ÄúIsrael‚Äù for ‚ÄúPLO,‚Äù ‚ÄúGolda Meir‚Äù for ‚ÄúArafat,‚Äù etc. This is an important fact that could hardly be comprehended within the American intellectual community, apart from a few, or by Timerman, it would appear. But let us keep to his version. Timerman claims that these disgraceful academics, who ‚Äúrisked nothing,‚Äù pandered to the Palestinian (or Third World) taste for terrorism Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  476  instead of patiently explaining to the PLO that this would lead to disaster. Again, some references would have been helpful. I know of none‚Äîthough possibly a diligent search would yield a marginal example in some Maoist journal. These professors, Timerman says, were ‚Äúobsessed by their competition with academics who supported Israel‚Äù (who are subjected to no criticism by Timerman), as if there were some ‚Äúgreat debate‚Äù in academic circles, or anywhere in the United States, between ‚Äúsupporters of Israel‚Äù and ‚Äúsupporters of the PLO,‚Äù a ludicrous picture, as anyone familiar with the U.S. would know at once, including his editors and reviewers, if not Timerman himself. There were, in fact, a handful of critics of Israeli policies within the academic profession, no one of whom questioned the right of existence of Israel, to my knowledge. These few, who incidentally had few opportunities to publish here on these matters, consistently warned the PLO of the dangers of its resort to terrorism while sharply condemning this practice, and condemned the early rejectionist diplomacy of the PLO as intolerable on moral grounds as well as self-destructive. They needed no instruction from Timerman on this score. I was in fact one of these few, so I will keep to my own writings on the subject, though there are few enough critics so that a full record would not be difficult. My first article on the topic appeared in Liberation and the New Outlook (Tel Aviv) in 1969, and is reprinted in Peace in the Middle East? as chapter 1. It contains an extensive discussion of the ‚Äúsuicidal‚Äù and deeply immoral character of the resort to terror, drawing from Israeli doves who were making the same point. My next article (reprinted as chapter 2 of the same book) was a talk given at a conference of the Association of Arab-American University Graduates (AAUG) in 1970, where I condemned the PLO reliance on ‚Äúarmed struggle‚Äù on moral and political grounds, emphasizing precisely its ‚Äúsuicidal‚Äù character for the Palestinians given the actual balance of Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  477  forces, warning against ‚Äúromantic illusions about these matters,‚Äù and also condemning the official PLO rejectionist program, which, even if it could succeed‚Äîwhich, as I emphasized, it could not‚Äîwould be ‚Äúintolerable to civilized opinion.‚Äù Exactly the same remained true in subsequent years (see p. 159*), and is true of the handful of other critics of Israel‚Äôs policies whose writings or public talks are familiar to me. Timerman‚Äôs story is fantasy from beginning to end. But useful fantasy, of a sort illustrated several times above. Like Irving Howe and others, Timerman is relying on the convention that critics of established doctrine can be freely denounced without argument or evidence, or even explicit reference. Like Mark Helprin in the New York Times Magazine and numerous others, he invents a ‚Äúgreat debate‚Äù and lambasts the non-existent advocates of the point of view of the enemy. This creates ‚Äúbalance‚Äù and allows the author to take ‚Äúthe middle ground‚Äù of sanity while proceeding with the illusions and fabrications of current propaganda concerning the U.S., Israel and the Palestinians. Timerman accuses Begin of ‚Äúgirding himself for a typical Israeli political debate in which accusations require no proof and weigh more than ideas or analysis.‚Äù I do not know whether this is a fair comment with regard to Israel, but it surely holds with regard to its supporters here, and to Timerman himself. It should, however, be noted that in the case of Timerman, these concoctions are, in a strange way, a contribution to truth. Had he not presented and emphasized them, his book, with its impressionistic but sometimes accurate critique of Begin‚Äôs Israel, would have suffered the usual fate of work that lies outside the bounds of mainstream ideology or that presents factual material that tends to undermine it. The text would certainly not have appeared in the New Yorker or any other journal that reaches a substantial audience, and could not have been accepted as a contribution to the ‚Äúgreat debate,‚Äù were it not for its tales about pro-PLO Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
478  Peace for Galilee  academics and its reiteration of familiar fabrications about Israel and the Palestinians; nor could it have been regarded as ‚Äúa contribution of lasting significance,‚Äù or even recognized as existing. So, in a certain sense, one should welcome this remarkable record of falsification, given the ideological climate in the United States. For completeness, I should note that when we escape the confines of the U.S. ideological system, the contributions of this critical tract to Israeli propaganda do not go unnoticed. Thus in London, Elfi Pallis observes that Timerman ‚Äúfalls victim to Israeli mythology‚Äù: Looking at the land of Kibbutz Gesher Haziv in Galilee, he reflects ‚Äúhow in the past this was a desert.‚Äù Galilee, of course, has never been a desert, and Kibbutz Gesher Haziv farms the fields that used to belong to the Palestinian villagers of al-Zeeb, now refugees in Lebanon. ‚ÄúTwo-legged beasts‚Äù living in ‚Äúnests of terrorists‚Äù that must be ‚Äúcleansed,‚Äù we may add. And again in London, David Gilmour comments on Timerman‚Äôs belief ‚Äúthat Israel‚Äôs crimes only began with Begin and that before him its moral integrity remained intact,‚Äù listing a series of earlier examples that demonstrate the contrary, a few of them mentioned above. Gilmour also cites Timerman‚Äôs statement that ‚Äúfor the first time Israel has attacked a neighbouring country without being attacked,‚Äù commenting accurately that ‚ÄúEven Begin no longer pretends that‚Äù (see chapter 4, section 3). He also takes note of Timerman‚Äôs approval of a letter that Professor Jacob Talmon wrote to Begin in which he said: ‚ÄúHowever lacerating are the pain and the shame we feel for the affronts that our perverse and anachronistic policy, which is devoid of a future, causes among our neighbors, much greater and even [decisive] is the fear of the consequences of such behavior for us, the Jews; for our Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  479  dream of a social and moral rebirth‚Ķ‚Äù238 Gilmour comments: ‚Äúthere is something a little ridiculous about the sight of Ashkenazi intellectuals earnestly debating their own identity while Israeli aeroplanes are destroying Beirut with phosphorus bombs.‚Äù239 Timerman‚Äôs personal statement is not without value, and should be read, but it lends little support to the belief that a ‚Äúgreat debate‚Äù is raging in the United States, or that more than a very narrow spectrum of opinion is represented here among the articulate intelligentsia. These examples give some idea of the range of opinion expressed as Israel conducted its attack on Lebanon, or, if one prefers the New York Times version, its ‚Äúliberation‚Äù of Lebanon. These examples, however, illustrate the attitudes of elite ‚Äúopinion-makers‚Äù and may not be a reflection of prevailing attitudes among the population that is the intended target for indoctrination. Indeed, there is reason to believe that popular attitudes are rather different, to judge by personal experience and also poll results. One poll indicates that there appear to be ‚Äútwo U.S. publics,‚Äù one described as ‚Äúbetter informed‚Äù and the other as ‚Äúless informed.‚Äù The ‚Äúbetter informed‚Äù feel that the invasion of Lebanon was justified, by 52 to 38 percent; the ‚Äúless informed‚Äù hold that it was not justified, by 43 to 28 percent. One recalls the attitude studies that showed a correlation between educational level and support for the Vietnam war, or the current ones that show that nearly 3/4 of the general population regard the war as ‚Äúmore than a mistake; it was fundamentally wrong and immoral,‚Äù a position held by only 45% of ‚Äúopinion makers‚Äù and probably by a far smaller proportion of the ‚Äúelite,‚Äù to judge by earlier studies.240 Such results are subject to various interpretations. One, which I think is plausible, is that the term ‚Äúbetter-informed‚Äù should be construed as ‚Äúmore effectively indoctrinated,‚Äù i.e., more subject to the distortions of the ideological system. People who are less susceptible to its influences, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  480  perhaps because of lack of exposure, are more readily able to perceive aggression and massacre as aggression and massacre, not understanding them to be, in reality, self-defense and extraordinary precautions to safeguard civilians. As a case in point, consider the standard attitude towards the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. Few people know much about it, but it is overwhelmingly understood to be exactly what it is: a case of brutal aggression and massacre. Those subjected to effective Communist indoctrination will regard this view as naive and deluded, as ‚Äúmoral preference masquerading as political analysis‚Äù (see p. 467*), accepting the more sophisticated interpretation that the leader of the socialist camp is fulfilling its internationalist duty to defend freedom and human rights from terrorists serving the interests of the CIA and Western imperialism. Our own systems of indoctrination, while quite different in form and technique, often have the same kind of effect on sophisticated opinion. A poll conducted by Decision/Making/Information, a research institute directed by White House pollster Richard B. Wirthlin, indicated that 3/4 of the population favored the establishment of a Palestinian state‚Äîin accordance with the international consensus and in sharp opposition to the rejectionist stands of Israel and the U.S. government. 65% felt that there would be no peace in the Middle East unless a Palestinian state is established.* The poll also revealed a sharp decline in sympathy for *  Popular support for a Palestinian state has been expressed before. For example,  a survey of participants in the Foreign Policy Association‚Äôs ‚ÄúGreat Decisions ‚Äô76‚Äù program showed that 66% approved of the right of Palestinians to an independent state while 19% objected (New York Times, July 11, 1976). There is a survey of a number of polls by Allan C. Kellum, publisher of the Washington report Mideast Observer, in The Link (AJME, New York, Dec. 1982). Polls taken after the Beirut massacres showed that 50-60% were in favor of Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  481  Israel (down from 59% a year earlier to 39%) and increase in sympathy for the Palestinians (up from 13% to 23%). 69% disapproved of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and of those who felt that the invasion was justified by the PLO presence in Lebanon, nearly half changed their minds when told that the Palestinians had observed the cease-fire while Israel had not. 35% felt that the U.S. should take unspecified ‚Äúdisciplinary measures‚Äù against Israel because of its invasion of Lebanon. 50% said ‚Äúno‚Äù when asked if the U.S. ‚Äúshould give aid to Israel,‚Äù and the 44% ‚Äúyes‚Äù vote decreased when in a follow-up question the actual quantities of aid were cited. 241 It would be interesting to see what the responses would be if it were known for what purposes the aid is used, or if information were provided about the nature and uses of tax-free charitable contributions, or other devices that are used to funnel aid to Israel. This poll was taken after the Beirut massacre, and State Department ‚Äúexperts say it is not clear whether the shift in American attitudes is transitory or whether it is part of a more lasting trend.‚Äù242 It is, however, clear enough that the specialists in what Walter Lippmann called ‚Äúthe manufacture of consent‚Äù have their work cut out for them. These results are particularly striking in the light of the fact that virtually no one who can gain access to a large public advocates the positions that appear to be backed by most of the population: abandonment of U.S.-Israeli rejectionism, and reduction or suspension of aid, particularly military aid. On the contrary, at this very time Congress was debating whether to increase aid to Israel even beyond the increase already proposed by the Reagan Administration; if there was any articulate criticism of this strange spectacle, it was that the Reagan suspending or reducing arms sales to Israel, while over half favored a Palestinian state. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  482  Administration was ‚Äúpoliticizing‚Äù the aid process by placing barriers before even further increases. And while the public appears ready to accept the international consensus on a two-state settlement, the government and most of articulate opinion continue to maintain the traditional rejectionist position, either supporting the Labor Party or Reagan‚Äôs September peace plan. As noted earlier, public opposition to the Lebanon invasion was regarded by the Reagan administration as ‚Äúa problem‚Äù that had to be somehow overcome (see section 4.7). It is rare for such a gulf to exist between articulate opinion and policy on the one hand, and public opinion on the other. The question merits a closer study, and may be suggestive for people who would like to see the issue truly enter the arena of democratic politics.  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  483  7. The Critique of the Media 7.1 The American Media ne interesting feature of the ideological scene in the summer of 1982 was the attack on the media as pro-PLO and anti-Israel. The charge had often been made before (see chapter 1 first* and section 4.6.1, for some examples on the part of current New Republic editors), but it was renewed with considerable vigor as the Lebanon war began to appear on television screens and front pages. Television was a particular target of attack, particularly, for its insistence on showing scenes of the siege and bombing of Beirut, not counterbalanced by equivalent scenes of the siege and bombing of Tel Aviv or of parts of Lebanon where peace reigned under military occupation (on the same grounds, one could criticize the British press after the bombing of Coventry for not featuring pictures of parts of the city that remained intact). In a rational world, one would simply dismiss the charge of proPLO and anti-Israel bias as absurd or paranoid, noting the overwhelming evidence of ‚Äúsupport for Israel,‚Äù racist dismissal of the Palestinians, and suppression of unwanted history across most of the spectrum of opinion and analysis. But we live in this world, so let us consider the matter. Criticism of the media is certainly a legitimate undertaking, rarely pursued in a serious and intellectually responsible way. But the criticism in this case had some unusual aspects. Critical discussion of the media generally centers on editorializing, in explicit opinion pieces (including editorials) and more important, internal to news reports, where it is often manifested in more subtle ways; or on the selection of items to appear, the emphasis given to various topics, the uncritical acceptance of  O  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
484  Peace for Galilee  material that serves ideological needs, the incredible standards of evidence that are erected in the case of material that runs counter to these needs, and so on. There is ample material of this sort, and its significance is vastly underrated, in my opinion. But the criticism in this case was of a novel type. I do not recall a previous charge that correspondents on the scene were systematically misrepresenting what was happening before their eyes. On the contrary, even the harshest critics of the press in the past have always emphasized the generally highly professional standards of foreign correspondents in presenting what they found‚Äîthough what they were looking for, and how they interpreted it, are often another matter. In the present case, however, we find such criticisms as this, emblazoned on the front cover of the New Republic: Much of what you have read in the newspapers and newsmagazines about the war in Lebanon‚Äîand even more of what you have seen and heard on television‚Äîis simply not true.243 So we are informed on the authority of Martin Peretz, who was there‚Äî on a guided tour with an Israeli military escort. It is, of course, possible that the news presented here was contrived so skillfully that much of what we had actually seen, and what we had read in the reports of usually reliable correspondents, did not happen, but was fabricated for the occasion. One would want some rather strong evidence before accepting this conclusion, something stronger than ‚ÄúI was there‚Äù‚Äîor the authority of Israeli soldiers (carefully selected, since as noted many such soldiers gave harrowing reports going well beyond what was published here), his reports of what he was told by Lebanese, ‚ÄúArab friends‚Äù who ‚Äúcoyly‚Äù explained that ‚ÄúArabs exaggerate,‚Äù noted doves such as Shlomo Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  485  Avineri (see section 6.3), and his own observations, which are credible to the extent that he has demonstrated himself to be a credible commentator and observer. On the latter issue, we have already seen some pertinent evidence.244 Recall, for example, his treatment of the very examples he selected to demonstrate the perfidy of the press, the ‚Äúvacuum bomb‚Äù story (section 4.7) and the case of Professor Avineri. This article contains much more. Note simply the scrupulous avoidance, once again, of the Israeli press, with its reports‚Äîsome quoted above‚Äîby journalist, military experts and soldiers. Or the integrity (or, to be more charitable, the gullibility) of someone who can report that ‚ÄúWhomever I talked to on the streets‚Äîand there are many eager to talk, Christian and Moslem, in French or English or Arabic‚Äîpointed out that what the Israelis had targeted were invariably military targets‚Äù; an incredible falsehood, from the first day of the bombings just prior to the actual invasion, and a claim startlingly at variance with the reports of Israeli observers. Recall the observation by the former chief education officer of the IDF, Mordechai Bar-On, that ‚Äúanyone who visited Southern Lebanon during and even after the fighting‚Äù could see that the target was not merely ‚Äúthe PLO‚Äôs military infrastructure‚Äù but rather ‚Äúthe very existence of the Palestinians as a community.‚Äù At the very time that Peretz reported that the IDF was scrupulously limiting itself to only military targets, military historian Col. (Ret.) Meir Pail, former head of the IDF officers training school, was writing that the region that Peretz visited ‚Äúlooked as though it had suffered a major earthquake in the ‚Äòbest‚Äô tradition of the destruction of the Vandal conquests in ancient times or of the Mongols in the Middle Ages,‚Äù a scene of ‚Äúdestruction and ruin‚Äù that ‚Äúwill be the haunting memorial which points to Israel and the IDF as the inheritors of the  Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  486  Mongols in the Middle East.‚Äù* There are numerous other examples, some cited earlier from Israeli soldiers, military analysts and journalists; not to speak of the bombardment of Beirut, the character of which was already evident when Peretz wrote.245 Peretz seems to have visited a different country from the one these Israeli ‚ÄúLebanon eyewitnesses‚Äù were describing (unless they too were secretly ‚Äúpro-PLO‚Äù or intent on defaming Israel). To believe on the basis of Peretz‚Äôs claims that large segments of the American and European media were systematically lying would require quite a leap of faith‚Äîone easily taken by some American doves (see section 6.3). As we have seen, even before the war Peretz felt that Israel had ‚Äúlost‚Äù the press years earlier, because most correspondents were so afflicted by the Vietnam experience that they always sympathize with those who call themselves ‚Äúguerrillas‚Äù or ‚Äúfreedom fighters.‚Äù A person who could read the American press in this way has some credibility problems to start with. These mount further when we proceed to his indictment of television, in the same interview, because it fails to give the relevant background when it shows an Israeli soldier ‚Äúbeating the head of a Palestinian boy with a club‚Äù‚Äîone aspect of the ‚Äústrongarm methods‚Äù that Peretz recommended, as implemented by his friend *  Pail argues that ‚Äúthere was a reasonable military explanation‚Äù for all of this,  given the goals of the invasion, as already described, and that the IDF observed ‚Äúthe principle of purity of arms on its low and minimal scale.‚Äù in the sense that ‚Äúthere was no deliberate killing of civilian population,‚Äù though there was ‚Äúcontempt of that same principle on the national scale,‚Äù for example, when the airforce was directed ‚Äúto drop its bombs on unspecified targets, to devastate and raze the city and, apparently, to destroy the houses together with their terrorist residents,‚Äù etc. A number of soldiers quoted in the Hebrew press made the same point. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  487  Menachem Milson, which he thinks should perhaps have been instituted from the start instead of the ‚Äúliberal enlightened administration‚Äù of the preceding years. Peretz‚Äôs criticism is that TV reporting, so tainted by superficiality, fails to ‚Äúexplain that the Arab national character tends towards violence and incitement and that thousands would be massacred if the PLO ruled in the West Bank.‚Äù Without tarrying any longer over the reports of someone who is capable of speaking in this way about ‚Äúthe Arab national character,‚Äù and who hold2s that this belief of his about the PLO somehow justifies the scene portrayed, and who is responsible for material of a sort already described sufficiently, it should be noted that if Peretz is to be believed, the Israeli government regards him as too harsh a critic! Peretz asserts that the Israeli Embassy in Washington contacted him with a request to circulate his ‚ÄúLebanon Eyewitness,‚Äù but requested first that he eliminate ‚Äúcritical passages.‚Äù246 Peretz did not restrict his criticism to the media. He also extended it to opponents of the invasion, in ways that also reflect on his credibility. Take just one example. He refers to the fact that he signed an ad for Oxfam with the honorable goal of helping to ‚Äúalleviate the suffering of those Lebanese caught in the fighting‚Äù (recall that this ad by ‚Äúunexceptionable humanitarians‚Äù contained the figures on casualties and refugees that he later claimed to have been fabricated by the anti-Israel media, a fact that raises some interesting questions that might have been addressed somewhere; see p. 364*, also section 5.1). But  *  On my ‚Äúpro-PLO hardline‚Äù position see pp. 164 and section 6.4 and references  cited. For Peretz, the position that Palestinians have a right to select whom they wish as their representatives‚Äîthat is, the position that they have the same human rights as Jews‚Äîis what is intolerable, and counts as a ‚Äúpro-PLO hardline‚Äù position. Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
488  Peace for Galilee  that is not the purpose of a new committee…[that] rounds up the usual suspects: pro-PLO hardline in America (Edward Said, former Senator James Abourezk, Noam Chomsky);* old-line Communist fellow-travellers (Pete Seeger, Paul Robeson Jr.); and the predictable goofies (Ramsey Clark, Dr. John Mack, Daniel Berrigan). The signatories seek relief money not for all the victims of the war in Lebanon, but only for those ‚Äútrapped in West Beirut without water, essential services, and medical supplies.‚Äù What an odd humanitarian impulse to aid just West Beirut! The statement of the pro-PLO hardliners, fellow-travellers and predictable goofies in fact reads as follows: ‚ÄúHelp the victims including hundreds of thousands trapped in West Beirut without water, essential services and medical supplies.‚Äù247 More interesting than this convenient bit of rewriting is what follows: Who exactly is holed up there? There are none ‚Äútrapped‚Äù but the PLO. So this is what I.F. Stone, after all his agonizing about bloodshed, has finally come to: asking his admirers to put up money so that the PLO can continue to fight, not simply against Israel, but against the possibility of a peaceful Lebanon. In fact, there were hundreds of thousands of people ‚Äúholed up there,‚Äù either because they had nowhere to flee, or because the local forces under Israeli control would not let them leave (see section 8.2.3)‚Äîor because it was their city, or because they stayed to help the victims. But to provide food or medicine to those who are being deprived of it by an Israeli siege while the IDF is in the process of blasting them to bits is Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  489  obviously an intolerable act, more evidence of a ‚Äúdouble standard‚Äù and a ‚Äúpro-PLO bias,‚Äù if not outright anti-Semitism, in the eyes of the editor of this leading journal of American liberalism‚Äîa fact that passes without comment here, again yielding some insight into the American cultural scene. Another major critique of the media was produced by the AntiDefamation League of B‚Äônai Brith (ADL) in October. This time TV was the villain. The report consists of a documentary record of TV broadcasts with critical observations, and an analysis by the ADL. Subsequently, this was referred to by supporters of Israel as an indictment of the media, but a review of the documentation presented leads to no such conclusion. In fact, the study has its comic aspects. The primary criticism of the early evening news programs to which the study is restricted is that they gave reports with sources the ADL regards as inadequate. Thus on June 14, ABC and NBC cited casualty figures, attributing them respectively to the ‚ÄúLebanese police‚Äù and ‚Äúthe Lebanese government.‚Äù ‚ÄúWho are ‚ÄòLebanese police‚Äô,‚Äù ‚ÄúWho is the ‚ÄòLebanese government‚Äô,‚Äù the ADL analysts ask? Apparently, their concept is that in reporting the crimes of their Holy State in a TV clip one must provide an extensive scholarly apparatus. Similarly, CBS cited ‚Äúinternational relief officials‚Äù in Beirut who reported casualty figures from Sidon. The ADL asks: ‚ÄúWho are these ‚Äòinternational relief officials,‚Äô and if they are in Beirut, how could they be reporting on casualties in Sidon?‚Äù (could they have received a message from Sidon?). If such standards were applied generally to TV reporting, the 6PM news would last until midnight if it could appear at all; someone who proposed that such standards should be met in any other connection would be regarded as quite mad. The ADL also criticizes the figures cited from Sidon because ‚Äúthis figure was later proven to be a gross exaggeration, yet no retraction was forthcoming.‚Äù They do not provide the ‚Äúproof,‚Äù but it appears to be Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  490  Israeli government claims to the contrary, cited above. The ADL does not explain why Israeli government announcements ‚Äúprove‚Äù that the figures provided by the Lebanese police and government and by relief officials are false, a conclusion that is particularly curious when we recall that the Lebanese sources were celebrating their liberation by Israel, according to ADL doctrine. The analysis continues at the same intellectual level. In fact, a review of their material shows, as would be expected, that American TV treated Israel with kid gloves. The ADL study contains one major specific charge of TV turpitude, namely, a June 13 report that there were 600,000 refugees in southern Lebanon, attributed to the Red Cross. The Red Cross later gave an estimate of 300,000 homeless but, the ADL study states: ‚ÄúNo network reported this update.‚Äù Two sentences later we read: ‚Äú‚Ķon June 16, John Chancellor of NBC reported a Red Cross estimate of 300,000 homeless.‚Äù The example reveals rather nicely the contempt of the ADL for its intended audience. The next sentence reads: ‚ÄúYet on June 19, Jessica Savitch, also of NBC, reported a figure of 600,000 homeless,‚Äù showing that NBC was persisting in its evil ways. In this case, we do not have self-contradiction within three sentences; rather, gross misrepresentation. Turning to the documentary record supplied as an appendix, we find that in this report Jessica Savitch stated: ‚ÄúIt is now estimated that 600,000 refugees in south Lebanon are without sufficient food and medical supplies.‚Äù (my emphasis). Recall that these are the only specific and marginally serious criticisms that appear in the report. The ADL study proceeds to criticize the networks for giving inadequate coverage to ‚ÄúIsraeli relief efforts (an extraordinary departure from the usual behavior of combatants and certainly newsworthy).‚Äù It is quite true that the ‚ÄúIsraeli relief efforts‚Äù described by Col. Yirmiah were ‚Äúinadequately covered‚Äù and ‚Äúnewsworthy,‚Äù but this fact merely reveals Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  491  the normal pro-Israeli bias of the media, as the evidence cited earlier from Israeli sources shows clearly enough (see section 5.3). This conclusion will simply be fortified when we return, directly, to further reports from the Israeli press about these ‚Äúextraordinary‚Äù efforts. The study also criticizes the networks because ‚Äúnot enough attention was devoted to the fact that the overwhelming majority of Israelis solidly supported the Begin government.‚Äù This criticism is interesting, given that the media were also regularly accused of failing to report Israeli dissent against the war, which revealed that Israel had not lost its high moral values. How these requirements are to be jointly met has not yet been adequately explained. The ADL study concludes finally that TV coverage was unfair because ‚Äúthe main sentiment which emerged from the coverage was one of revulsion at the violence which was implicitly and explicitly associated with Israel‚Äù; ‚ÄúScenes of violence were inevitably and reflexively linked to Israel, however inadvertently and however understandably in a situation where the media competes for ‚Äòscoops‚Äô and graphic depiction of violent events‚Äù; ‚Äúa majority of human interest stories shown were those which depicted scenes of great devastation and human suffering.‚Äù248 Comment seems unnecessary, except, perhaps, to recall once again Meir Pail‚Äôs observation on the Stalinist character assumed by the Zionist organizations under the influence of Golda Meir and the Labor Party in the post-1967 period; see chapter 2, section 2.1. While the ADL study itself is merely embarrassing, it is of some interest, perhaps, that this document was taken quite seriously by the media. I saw no critical analysis of it, though its absurdity is obvious on even superficial reading, even putting aside the assumptions that underlie it. The Times had a fairly lengthy news report on its release, simply summarizing its allegations without analysis and quoting some responses by TV executives, e.g., Reuven Frank, president of NBC news, Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  492  who characterized the study as ‚Äúcareful and quietly stated.‚Äù249 Earlier, Frank had commented, more accurately, that ‚ÄúWhat Israel sees today is not an anti-Israel bias in the news coverage,‚Äù but ‚Äúa reduction in the pro-Israel bias.‚Äù He referred to the attack on the U.S. media by ‚Äúthe pro-Israeli PR establishment, partly the [Israeli] government, partly Martin Peretz,‚Äù and said he is willing to bet that ‚Äúsomebody in New York‚Äù instructed David Shipler of the New York Times to write a critical piece ‚Äúon the PLO occupation of Lebanon‚Äù (cited above, note 10).250 It is interesting to ask why the media did not expose the selfcontradictions, falsehoods and intellectual vacuity of the ADL critique and the astonishing moral values implicit in it. Perhaps they simply did not want to be charged with anti-Semitism or to be subjected to the kind of defamation and slander in which the ADL specializes. But there may be something else involved. It almost appears that the media relish this kind of criticism. There is evidence that that is so, in fact. The incident recalls an earlier one, a massive two-volume critique of the media by Peter Braestrup produced under the auspices of Freedom House, demonstrating (by the standards of its sponsor) that the media were unfairly critical of the American war in Vietnam, contributing to the failure of the U.S. to achieve its (by definition, noble) aims. The study impressed commentators in the press as ‚Äúconscientious‚Äù and ‚Äúpainstakingly accurate‚Äù (New York Times); ‚Äúwith its endless attention to accuracy,‚Äù Dean John Roche of the Fletcher School commented in the Washington Post, it constitutes ‚Äúone of the major pieces of investigative reporting and first-rate scholarship of the past quarter century‚Äù and should lead to a congressional investigation of the press (see note 251). Harvard political scientist Michael Mandelbaum wrote (Daedalus, Fall 1982) that ‚ÄúPeter Braestrup‚Äôs exhaustive study of the American media‚Äôs coverage of the Tet offensive does show that the public received a Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
493  Peace for Galilee  distorted picture of the event.‚Äù Others reacted similarly,* In fact, the first volume, containing the analysis, grossly falsifies the evidence presented in the second volume, containing the supporting documentation, so even on internal grounds the study would at once be dismissed by any rational commentator. Furthermore, crucial documentary evidence is omitted and the study fails to raise even the most obvious questions (e.g., how did news reporting compare with intelligence analyses, available from the Pentagon Papers and elsewhere?). When these elementary inadequacies are overcome, we see from Braestrup‚Äôs own evidence‚Äîand what he omits‚Äîthat the media accepted the framework of state propaganda and were more optimistic about the prospects for American arms than internal intelligence documents, not too surprising since the media tended to rely on public government statements, not knowing then what was being transmitted internally. The Freedom House case is narrow to begin with‚Äîthat the press was too ‚Äúpessimistic.‚Äù By Freedom House standards, one must conclude, the press must not only accept the assumptions of the state propaganda system but must do so in an upbeat and enthusiastic spirit in its news –  *  See, e.g., Col. Harry G. Summers, New Republic, Feb. 7, I983, a review-article  based on the Yale University press reissue, which typically regards the study as definitive, raising no questions about it. Summers claims that ‚ÄúBraestrup was widely attacked‚Äù both by supporters and opponents of the war and by ‚Äúthe journalistic profession,‚Äù citing no examples and giving no indication that there was any favorable reception prior to his own; he also, incidentally, expresses a point of view concerning the war and the U.S. involvement in it that merits attention. The review predictably ends with a comparison to the ‚Äúmedia coverage of the recent war in Lebanon‚Äù: ‚ÄúAs was true with Tet, the most damaging aspect of this reporting has been its effect on weakening the community of interest that is the bedrock of the American-Israeli alliance.‚Äù Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  494  commentary and editorial analysis. When the shoddy and incompetent treatment of documentary evidence is corrected, nothing remains even of its remarkable charge: excessive pessimism.251 What is interesting in the present context is that there was no exposure of any of this (apart from the reference of note 251, which was ignored). Rather, both the media and scholarship regarded the study as exemplary, even those who argued against its conclusions concerning the media; many agreed with the Freedom House sponsors that Braestrup‚Äôs impressive results provide cause for concern about the antiestablishment commitments of the media. Even the simple fact of falsification of evidence, easily demonstrated, was considered irrelevant. One can readily understand why conformist scholarship should take this position. As for the media, one may perhaps conclude in this case too that the criticism was in a way a welcome one. Why should this be so? Anyone who has attended a university commencement or similar event where a spokesperson for the press elaborates on its awesome tasks will understand why. Criticism of the press as ‚Äúanti-establishment‚Äù and too critical of the government or of standard ideology (e.g., ‚Äúanti-Israel,‚Äù ‚Äúpro-PLO‚Äù) provides an occasion for orations on the duty of the Free Press courageously to examine and confront established power and doctrine, and if it sometimes goes too far, we must understand that this is a problem inherent in our system, which encourages the media to undertake this crucial challenge, etc. On the other hand, a more accurate critique of the media as tending to be subservient to external power and established doctrine is most unwelcome, and is certain to gain no hearing. There is an obvious further point. If the conformist media and intelligentsia can be represented as ‚Äúanti-establishment‚Äù and fiercely critical, then any genuine critical discussion, any attempt to approach our own society and institutions and practice with the same rational Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  495  standards that we are permitted to invoke in the case of others, is at once undercut. There is, then, good reason on all sides to maintain the pretense. As I have documented extensively elsewhere, the device of feigned dissent has made an impressive contribution to indoctrination in the democratic societies. See TNCW and references cited for discussion. There was, in fact, another study of the media and the Lebanon war by a different anti-defamation group, namely, the American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee (ADC), written by Eric Hooglund of the ADC Research Institute. Hooglund presents evidence of ‚Äúa consistent proIsraeli bias‚Äù in press coverage of the Lebanon war, shown by such phenomena as reference to the invasion as a ‚Äúreprisal‚Äù (New York Times, June 5; obviously false); emphasis on Israel‚Äôs right to protect its border towns from being ‚Äúindiscriminately shelled‚Äù (Washington Post, June 7; recall the facts concerning the cease-fire and the violations of it); dehumanization of the Palestinians, including racist cartoons that would arouse charges of a revival of Nazism if the targets were Jews; and soon. I noticed no comment in the press apart from a column by Washington Post Ombudsman Robert J. McCloskey (Oct. 6, 1982), who referred to the study, ignoring its contents while noting the symmetry of the charges from the Jewish and Arab communities, from which the reader is to understand that ‚ÄúWe must be doing our job,‚Äù in the words of ‚Äúcynical editors.‚Äù Still another study, this time of both print and TV media coverage, was carried out by Roger Morris. His conclusion is that there is no evidence to establish the charges of a ‚Äúdouble standard‚Äù levelled against the media‚Äîreferring to the charges by Norman Podhoretz, Martin Peretz, the ADL, and the like. This conclusion he establishes with ease. The material he presents does, however, support the conclusion that there was a rather different double standard; namely, the overwhelming tendency, from the first day, to adopt the point of view and the general Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
Peace for Galilee  496  interpretations provided by the aggressor. Morris‚Äôs own assumptions are revealed by his conclusion that TV news ‚Äúfor the most part struck the balance carefully‚Äù‚Äîbetween the aggressor and the victim‚Äîthough there were a few ‚Äúlapses‚Äù, for example, an ‚Äúemotional portrayal‚Äù on ABC news that left the impression ‚Äúthat the Israelis were dropping the brutal weapons on civilians.‚Äù But, Morris adds judiciously, ‚Äúif noncombatants were now dying in the city, ABC at this early stage had an obligation to remind its viewers pointedly that the PLO had retreated into the heart of West Beirut, bringing the war with them like a plague‚Äù‚Äîjust as British troops had retreated to Dunkirk, ‚Äúbringing the war with them like a plague,‚Äù as any fair-minded reporter had an obligation to emphasize in depicting scenes of Nazi bombing.252 It would be a revealing exercise to take this defense of the media for their balance, replace a few names, and consider how it would read as applied to other wars. The charge that the American media were ‚Äúpro-PLO‚Äù or ‚Äúanti-Israel‚Äù during the Lebanon war‚Äîor before‚Äîis easily unmasked, and is in fact absurd. It suffices to compare their coverage of the occupied territories, the war, the treatment of prisoners, and other topics, with what we find in the Hebrew press in Israel, a comparison always avoided by those who produce these ridiculous charges. Again, the annals of Stalinism come to mind, with the outrage over Trotskyite ‚Äúcritical support‚Äù for the ‚Äúworkers‚Äô state.‚Äù Any deviation from total obedience is intolerable to the totalitarian mentality, and is interpreted as reflecting a ‚Äúdouble standard,‚Äù or worse.  7.2 The ‚ÄúBroad-scale Mass Psychological War‚Äù against Israel In Israel too there was concern and surprise over the way the war was depicted. Reporting from Jerusalem, Norman Kempster observes that Classics in Politics: The Fateful Triangle  Noam Chomsky
497  Peace for Galilee  ‚ÄúIsraelis, almost universally [a considerable exaggeration], were shocked to learn that large segments of world public opinion considered the nation‚Äôs war effort to be highhanded, aggressive bullying and excessive.‚Äù Blame was placed on journalists, whom Begin accused of ‚Äúhatred for Israel and anti-Semitism‚Äù (his words in a Knesset speech). ‚ÄúCritics say Israel‚Äôs version of the war was not told effectively because of a failure of hasbara, the Hebrew word that means literally ‚Äòexplanation‚Äô but in usage comes out somewhere between ‚Äòpublicity‚Äô and ‚Äòpropaganda‚Äô.‚Äù253 Among others, former chief of military intelligence Aharon Yariv commented that he could not understand ‚Äúwhy so much ground in the hasbara battle was lost so quickly to the other side.‚Äù254 The head of the Hasbara department of the Foreign Ministry, Moshe Yegar, wrote a spirited defense against the charge of ‚Äúhasbara failure,‚Äù which was voiced early on, accusing correspondents of violating ‚Äúthe most elementary norms of fairness and professional ethics in their reports and commentary. Some of them were busy spreading propaganda instead of writing fair, objective reports.‚Äù The international media, he charged, ‚Äúsuppressed information about the unparalleled IDF efforts to avoid or minimize‚Ķcivilian losses, even at the expense of its own soldiers‚Äù (note that this was written after the terror bombings of Beirut). And ‚ÄúMost foreign correspondents ignored what they were shown about the return of normal life in Southern Lebanon and the warm reception given the IDF.‚Äù Furthermore: Unfortunately, international relief organizations helped disseminate these malicious anti-Israel reports, sometimes in order to stimulate